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2026:HHC:28306
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 627 of 2025
Date of Decision: 13.07.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
Sanjeev Kumar
……...Petitioner
Versus
M/s Sleep On Emporium
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Ms. Tamanna Sharma and Mr. Sahil Thakur,
Advocates.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Ashok Kumar Verma, Advocate.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 read
with Section 442 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays
challenge to judgment dated 30.07.2025, passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal
Appeal No.42-NL/10 of 2024, titled as Sanjeev Kumar Vs. M/s Sleep On
Emporium, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
08.08.2024/20.08.2024, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, whereby the learned
trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter, ‘accused’)
guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the ‘Act’), convicted and sentenced
2026:HHC:28306
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him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay
compensation to the tune of ₹3,50,000/- to the respondent-complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law
alleging therein that it is engaged in the business of trading of mattresses,
blankets, pillows, bedsheets etc. and accused, being proprietor of M/s Sanju
Cloth House and his brother, being proprietor of M/s Saraswati Cloth House,
are having its trading shops at different places. Complainant alleged that
accused and his brother used to purchase the Mattresses, Razai, Blanket,
Pillows, Bed Sheets & other Bedding items etc. from complainant on cash
and credit basis from time to time. Complainant alleged that as per statement
of account as maintained by the it, complainant asked the accused for
payment and in order to discharge his and his brother’s legal liability,
accused issued one Cheque bearing No.636050 dated 20.05.2019 amounting
to ₹2,55,321/- drawn at Andhra Bank, Main Market, Bilaspur, H.P., of his
account in favour of complainant. However, fact remains that aforesaid
Cheque on its presentation to the Bank concerned was dishonoured vide
return
memo
dated
24.05.2019
with
remarks
‘Funds
Insufficient’.
Immediately, after receipt of aforesaid return memo, complainant served
accused with demand notice dated 13.06.2019, calling upon him to make
the payment good well within stipulated time. However, since petitioner-
2026:HHC:28306
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accused failed to make the payment good within the time stipulated in the
legal notice, respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings
under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law.
3.
by
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
the
respective
parties,
vide
judgment/order
dated
08.08.2024/20.08.2024, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having
committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted
and sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove.
4.
Though, at first instance, accused preferred an appeal in the
Court of
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan,
Himachal Pradesh,
30.07.2025.
In
however, same was dismissed vide judgment dated
the
aforesaid
background,
petitioner-accused
has
approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his
acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the
Courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 03.11.2025, Coordinate Bench of this Court
suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the Court below subject to
petitioner-accused furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- and
depositing 30% of the compensation amount, in addition to the amount
already deposited by him before the learned trial Court within a period of
four weeks. However, fact remains that aforesaid order never came to be
complied with. Repeatedly, matter was adjourned, enabling petitioner to do
2026:HHC:28306
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the needful, but in vain. Today during proceedings of the case, learned
counsel representing the petitioner fairly states that since petitioner is not
coming forward to impart instructions and he has not complied with the
previous orders passed by this Court, this Court may proceed to decide the
case on its own merits.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with learned counsel
representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen in grave error while
appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below
have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there
is no scope left for interference.
7.
In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused
did not dispute that complainant deals in trading of mattresses, blankets,
pillows, bed sheets etc. He also admitted that he is owner of M/s Sanju Cloth
House. He also admitted that he and his brother used to purchase articles
from the complainant on cash as well as credit basis. He also admitted that
his Cheque Ex.C2/CW1 had been dishonoured vide memo Ex.C3/CW1 due
to insufficiency of funds, however, he attempted to raise a defence that he
used to purchase articles through a broker named Arjun, to whom he had
given Cheque Ex.C2/CW1, but same came to be misused by the petitioner.
Since factum with regard to issuance of Cheque as well as signatures
2026:HHC:28306
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thereupon never came to be disputed, coupled with the fact that aforesaid
defence never came to be probabilised, no illegality can be said to have been
committed by the learned Courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139
of the Act, which speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the
Cheque that Cheque was issued towards discharge of a lawful liability. No
doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption,
accused either can refer to the documents and evidence led on record by the
complainant or presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if
any.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is
able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise
probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of
a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been
included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
2026:HHC:28306
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Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court
however, further observed that it must be remembered
that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose money is usually confined to the private
parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the
construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the defendant accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court
further observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139,
the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of
probabilities.
24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and
it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however,
the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises
a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in
order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the
NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is
called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such
a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay
the amount, that the said default would be considered a
dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not there was
lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial
court will have to examine having regard to the evidence
2026:HHC:28306
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adduced before it keeping in view the statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration.
In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while
issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite
sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be
extremely heavy.”
9.
In the case at hand, with a view to prove its case, Ms. Champa
Devi stepped into the witness box as CW1 and tendered evidence by way of
affidavit Ex.C1/CW1, reiterating therein averments of the complaint. Besides
above, she also proved that Cheque in question Ex.C2/CW1, dishonour
memo dated 24.05.2019 Ex.C3/CW1, demand notice Ex.C4/CW1, postal
receipt Ex.C5/CW1 and parcel Ex.C6/CW1 containing the demand notice
received back with endorsement “Refused”. Cross-examination conducted
upon afore witness nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract
anything contrary to what this witness stated in her examination-in-chief. In
cross-examination, she deposed that the complainant firm is owned by her.
While admitting that she has not filed any bill or receipt regarding delivery of
the said articles, she deposed that entire articles were supplied to the
accused. While stating that her husband maintains her business and
transactions, she denied that blank cheque was obtained from the accused
for security. She denied that her husband had filled contents of the cheque.
She denied that she was deposing falsely. Careful perusal of crossexamination conducted upon afore witness suggest that accused attempted
to carve out a case that Cheque in question was issued as a security, but
2026:HHC:28306
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same has been misused. At the cost of repetition, it is once again noticed that
in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused attempted to
carve out a case that Cheque in question was issued to some broker, through
whom, he used to purchase the material from the present petitioner, but
same was misused, however, both the aforesaid defences never came to be
probabilised and despite sufficient opportunity, accused failed to lead any
evidence.
10.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of
Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021,
has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction
cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every
circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and
the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment.
It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an
obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the
amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to
secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other
form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or
agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the
cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and
the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On
such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences
2026:HHC:28306
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contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I.
Act would flow.”
11.
Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather same
is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on record
with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable Instruments Act
does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a “security cheque” to
say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable
as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued,
same would attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its
dishonour.
12.
If the evidence led on record by the respective parties is read in
conjunction, this Court sees no reason to differ with the findings returned by
the Courts below that complainant successfully proved on record that
accused had issued Cheque towards discharge of his lawful liability. Defence
otherwise attempted to set up could not be proved by the accused by leading
cogent and convincing evidence. Otherwise also, by now it is well-settled that
a person is liable for the commission of offence punishable under Section
138 of the Act even if the Cheque is filled by some other person. Reliance in
this regard is placed upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bir
Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197, wherein it was observed as
under:
2026:HHC:28306
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“37. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139,
makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it
over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut
the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a
debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may
have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque
is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal
provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.
38. answered in the negative.
40. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by
the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract
presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in
the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not
issued in discharge of a debt.
41. The fact that the appellant-complainant might have been an
Income Tax practitioner conversant with knowledge of law does not
make any difference to the law relating to the dishonour of a cheque.
The fact that the loan may not have been advanced by a cheque or
demand draft or a receipt might not have been obtained would make
no difference. In this context, it would, perhaps, not be out of context
to note that the fact that the respondent-accused should have given or
signed blank cheque to the appellant- complainant, as claimed by the
respondent-accused, shows that initially there was mutual trust and
faith between them.
42. In the absence of any finding that the cheque in question was not
signed by the respondent-accused or not voluntarily made over to the
payee and in the absence of any evidence with regard to the
circumstances in which a blank signed cheque had been given to the
appellant-complainant, it may reasonably be presumed that the
cheque was filled in by the appellant-complainant being the payee in
the presence of the respondent-accused being the drawer, at his
2026:HHC:28306
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request and/or with his acquiescence. The subsequent filling in of an
unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration. There was no change in the
amount of the cheque, its date or the name of the payee. The High
Court ought not to have acquitted the respondent-accused of the
charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”
12. Since factum of issuance of Cheque by the accused as well as her
signatures thereupon was never disputed, presumption as available
under Section 118 and 139 of the Act rightly came to be invoked in the
case of the petitioner that Cheque in question was issued in discharge
of lawful liability. Since no evidence worth credence ever came to be
led on record to rebut the presumption, no illegality can be said to have
been committed by the Courts below while holding petitioner/accused
guilty for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of
the Act.”
13.
Since factum of issuance of Cheque by the accused as well as
his signatures thereupon was never disputed, presumption as available
under Section 118 and 139 of the Act rightly came to be invoked in the case
of the petitioner that Cheque in question was issued in discharge of lawful
liability. Since no evidence worth credence ever came to be led on record to
rebut the presumption, no illegality can be said to have been committed by
the Courts below while holding petitioner/accused guilty for the commission
of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
14.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of
2026:HHC:28306
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insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having
received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated
time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the
Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record
by the respective parties.
15.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction
is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional
power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court
nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross
miscarriage of justice.”
16.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present
case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any,
2026:HHC:28306
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committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments, there is
no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
17.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another
Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has
held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of
judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is
salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or
miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by
inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order,
but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any
material irregularity committed by the Courts below while appreciating the
evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the wellreasoned judgments passed by the Courts below.
18.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
19.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within a period of six weeks to serve the
sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail
2026:HHC:28306
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bonds of the petitioner, if any, are cancelled. Interim order dated 03.11.2025
stands vacated. Amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner-accused with the
learned trial Court as well as Registry of this Court is ordered to be released
in favour of complainant by remitting the same in its bank account, detail
whereof, shall be furnished by its counsel within a period of one week.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
July 13, 2026
(Rajeev Raturi)
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