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signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI
Date:
2026.02.02
14:58:38
+0530
2026:CGHC:5627-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 35 of 2026
1 - Sanjay Mundra S/o Shri Ram Kishan Mundra Aged About 58 Years
R/o Shop No. 201, Sector- 6, A Market, Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg
(C.G.)
2 - Sanjay Kumar Agrawal S/o Late Shri Laxman Prasad Agrawal Aged
About 58 Years R/o Shop No. 146, Sector- 6 A Market, Bhilai, Tehsil And
District- Durg (C.G.)
3 - Dr. Basant Verma S/o Late Dr. Balram Verma Aged About 58 Years
R/o Shop No. 90, Sector- 6 A Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg (C.G.)
4 - Smt. Lalita Jain W/o Shri Gyan Chand Jain Aged About 71 Years R/o
Shop No. 199, Sector- 6a, Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg (C.G.)
5 - Alok Kumar Gupta S/o Late Shri Indrajeet Gupta Aged About 40
Years R/o Shop No. 106, Sector- 6A, Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg
(C.G.)
... Appellants
versus
1 - Steel Authority of India Limited Through Chairman, Ispat Bhawan,
3rd Floor, Lodhi Road, New Delhi, Pin No.- 110003
2 - Bhilai Steel Plant Through- Chief Executive Officer Bhilai, DistrictDurg (C.G.)
3 - Union of India Through Ministry Of Steel, Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi,
Pin No.- 110011
4 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary, Revenue And
Disaster Management, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur
(C.G.)
5 - Collector Durg District- Durg (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellants
: Mr. Tarendra Kumar Jha, Advocate
For Respondent No.2
: Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, Advocate
For Respondent No.3
: Ms.
Shweta
Rai,
Central
Government
Counsel on behalf of Mr. Ramakant Mishra,
Deputy Solicitor General
For Respondents No.4 & : Mr. Prasun Kumar
Advocate General
Bhaduri,
Deputy
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
02.02.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Tarendra Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the
appellants. Also heard Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2, Ms. Shweta Rai, learned
Central Government Counsel on behalf of Mr. Ramakant Mishra,
learned Deputy Solicitor General for the Union of India/respondent
No.3 as well as Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy
Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.4 and
5 on I.A. No.02, which is an application for condonation of 7 days
in preferring the instant writ appeal.
2.
For the reasons mentioned in the application (I.A. No.02), the
same is allowed. Delay of 7 days in preferring the instant appeal
is hereby condoned.
3.
With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, we
proceed to hear the matter finally.
4.
By way of this writ appeal, appellants have prayed for following
relief(s):“It is, therefore played that this Hon'ble court
may kindly be pleased to allow this appeal and
set
aside/quash
the
impugned
order
31.10.2025 (Annexure A/1) passed by Hon'ble
Single Bench in W.P.(C) No. 2606/2025 and
other connected matter and also quash the
impugned offer letter/notice dated 01.04.2025
(Annexure P/3), in the interest of justice.”
5.
The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order
dated 31.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC
No.2606/2025, whereby the writ petition filed by the writ
petitioners has been dismissed.
6.
The brief facts projected before the learned Single Judge were
that the writ petitioners/appellants are long-standing lessees of
plots situated in the Bhilai Steel Plant Township, having acquired
the same either directly or through their predecessors-in-title
pursuant to registered sale lease deeds executed during the years
1989–1991, each for a fixed tenure of 33 years. The lease deeds
categorically provide for renewal on expiry of the original term,
with the only permissible enhancement being 50% of the existing
ground rent, and specifically bar the levy of any premium, service
charges or any other amount at the time of renewal.
7.
The appellants/writ petitioners contended that the impugned
demand/offers issued by respondent No.1 amount to a unilateral
alteration of the contractual terms of the lease deeds, which is
impermissible in law. Such action was asserted to be arbitrary,
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, as the petitioners have been compelled to pay amounts
never contemplated under the lease deeds, thereby interfering
with their vested contractual rights and causing grave financial
hardship and uncertainty. It was further brought to the notice of
the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioners had specifically
challenged the offer letter/notice dated 01.04.2025 (Annexure P/3)
before this Court in the writ petition. However, the learned Single
Judge, by order dated 31.10.2025, dismissed the writ petition.
8.
Calling in question the legality and propriety of the order dated
31.10.2025, the appellants have filed the instant writ appeal.
9.
Learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners submits that
the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the original
lease expired on 11.03.2024 by efflux of time, and despite such
expiry,
respondent–SAIL
has
not
initiated
any
eviction
proceedings against the writ petitioners. On the contrary, SAIL
itself issued an offer letter dated 01.04.2025 for renewal of the
lease, thereby clearly evincing its intention to continue the
tenancy. The petitioners are ready and willing to renew the lease
strictly in terms of the lease deeds; however, they were
constrained to approach this Court due to the exorbitant and
unlawful charges demanded by SAIL. He further submits that the
learned Single Judge failed to consider that the valuation report
relied upon by the respondents was prepared unilaterally, without
affording any opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners and
without taking into account the express terms of the lease deeds,
historical ground rent, or the writ petitioners’ long-standing
possession. Such reliance, in disregard of the contractual terms
and even the directions of the District Collector, is legally
impermissible.
10.
It is contended that since SAIL has accepted rent after expiry of
the lease, permitted the writ petitioners to continue in possession,
and issued an offer for renewal, the case squarely attracts Section
116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, giving rise to a tenancy
by holding over. In support of the said contention, reliance is
placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Bhuneshwar Prasad & Anr. v. United Commercial Bank &
Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 232.
11.
Learned counsel further submits that the conduct of SAIL in
assenting to the continued possession of the writ petitioners and
agreeing to accept rent constitutes clear consent under Section
116 TPA, creating a lease by holding over. Reliance in this regard
is placed upon Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran & Ors.,
(2006) 1 SCC 228. It is further urged that under Section 105 of the
Transfer of Property Act, the concept of “premium” is distinct from
“rent,” and once the writ petitioners have already paid the
premium at the time of initial grant, the demand of fresh premium
—particularly manifold and exorbitant—at the stage of renewal is
wholly impermissible, especially when SAIL itself seeks renewal of
the lease. He also places reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in Hanuman Malla Surana v.
SAIL, W.P.(C) No. 2440 of 2015, decided on 18.07.2022,
wherein similar arbitrary demands raised by SAIL were quashed
and reassessment was directed on rational and lawful principles.
12.
On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits
that the original lease admittedly came to an end by efflux of time,
and thereafter the appellants continued in occupation only as
permissive occupants without any enforceable right of renewal. It
is contended that the offer letter dated 01.04.2025 was merely a
conditional proposal for renewal, subject to acceptance of revised
terms and payment as per the prevailing policy, and does not
amount to assent so as to attract Section 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act. Mere acceptance of rent, it is urged, does not create
a tenancy by holding over when renewal is expressly conditional.
The demands raised are stated to be lawful, based on current
valuation and policy guidelines, and free from arbitrariness;
hence, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed.
13.
Learned counsel for the Union of India submits that the lease
expired by efflux of time and the petitioners continued in
occupation only as permissive occupants. The offer letter dated
01.04.2025 was merely a conditional proposal subject to
acceptance of revised terms and cannot be construed as assent
for creation of a lease under Section 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act. It is submitted that acceptance of rent does not ipso
facto create holding over when renewal is expressly subject to
fresh terms. The demands raised are stated to be lawful, nonarbitrary and based on current valuation, and therefore no
interference is warranted.
14.
Learned State counsel submits that the impugned demand has
been raised strictly in accordance with the prevailing policy and
guidelines governing renewal of leases in the Bhilai Steel Plant
Township. It is contended that upon expiry of the original lease
term, no vested right of automatic renewal survives and the lessor
is entitled to reassess the terms and conditions, including financial
aspects, before granting renewal. It is further submitted that the
valuation has been carried out on objective criteria and the
petitioners cannot insist upon renewal solely on the basis of past
lease terms. As such, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed at
the threshold.
15.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
impugned order as well as materials available on record.
16.
After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the
parties as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge
has passed the impugned order in following terms:“37. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS :
(a) Nature of Right after Lease Expiry:
Upon lease expiry, no tenant including the
present petitioners, has any automatic or
vested
right
to
renewal
or
continued
possession. Renewal clauses where present in
the original lease, vest the discretion with
lessor (SAIL) “on such terms and conditions as
may be decided by the lessor.”. Both statutory
law (Section 107, Transfer of Property Act) and
binding precedents (Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Hede & Co. (2007) 5 SCC 614) confirm that
renewal is fresh grant, not a matter of right. As
per Sub-clause 6 of Clause 5 reads as under:
“if the lessee wants to reatin the demised land
for a further term \of 33 years, the lessee shall
given noticeo f his intention to do so to the
Lessor six months prior tot he date of expiry of
such period and the Lessor may grant a fresh
lease in respect of the land herein demised for
a further period of 33 years on the terms and
conditins as may be decided by the Lessor. In
case, the lessee wants to retain the demised
land for a further term of 33 years, subsequent
to the expiry of the term of the first renewal as
above, the lessee shall give notice of his
intention to do so six months prior to the date of
expiry of the period of such renewal and the
lessor may grnat a further lease in respect of
the land herein demised for a further period of
33 years on the lterms and conditions as may
be decided by the Lessor.”
(b) SAIL’s Power to Revise Terms/Charges:
The respondents, as absolute owners and
managers of the public premises by virtue of
assignment from the Central Government, are
lawfully empowered to fix rates and frame
policies for renewal after expiry. As held in
Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. State of MP
(1999) 4 SCC 76, and reaffirmed in the High
Court precedents, Board-approved policies
apply uniformly to all similar cases. The
impugned conditions, including payment of
premium at 25% of land value, service charges
and security deposit, have statutory and
contractual legitimacy and are not per se
arbitrary.
(c) Public Premises and Jurisdiction:
The properties in question constitute “public
premises” within Section 2(e) of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971. The procedure for eviction, renewal
and adjudication of disputes lies with the
designated
Estate
Officer;civil
jurisdiction
(including writ petitions of this nature) is
expressly
barred.
The
Apex
Court’s
Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Ltd.
Vs. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406
reiterated
this
principle.
These
petitions,
essentially seeking to block or modify terms of
renewal is thus not maintainable in this Court.
(d) Fairness, Reasonableness and Opportunity
The petitioners’ contention that SAIL did not
give
opportunity
of
hearing
or
that
premium/charges are arbitrary, is unpersuasive.
All lessees were issued a uniform offer letter
with break-up of charges. Board-approved
policies are the benchmark for reasonableness;
individualized notice or negotiation on every old
allotment is administratively impractical and not
mandated by law or equity unless there is
manifest discrimination, which is not shown.
The cited rulings (Hanuman Malla Surana Vs.
SAIL) pertain to fact-specific assessments in
other jurisdictions and do not unsettle the
prevailing law governing SAIL-Bhilai. State or
District Collector advisories or communications
on premium are not binding on SAIL, which has
absolute title and Board-approved powers,
post-transfer and assignment. Historic low rates
cannot estop a public entity from updating
policies in light of market realities and financial
prudence as held in Aggarwal and Modi
Enterprises Vs. New Delhi Municipal (2007) 8
SCC 75.
38. Having analyzed the submissions and the
applicable legal framework, it is apparent that
the petitioners have no enforceable right to
renewal of lease on original terms, nor any
entitled to disregard the charges prescribed in
the current SAIL policy. Their continuing
occupation post expiry is unauthorized unless
fresh lease agreement is duly executed upon
compliance
with
demand.
The
impugned
notices and renewal conditions issued by SAIL
are not arbitrary or illegal in the circumstances.
39. It is further observed that as per the offer
letter
dated
01.04.2025
issued
by
the
respondent Steel Authority of India Limited, it
can be seen simply in the manner for assuming
that in WPC No. 2337 of 2025, the shop of the
petitioner which is a public premise measuring
600 sq. ft. was originally allotted on a 33 years
long term lease basis w.e.f. 12.04.1991 and
valid till 11.04.2024 on the specific terms and
conditions mentioned therein. If the petitioner is
interest for renewal of lease for the said shop
for a further term of 33 years, he was advised
to make payment towards lease renewal
charges as under:
***
***
40. It has been further informed that the
petitioner shall carry out necessary legal
formalities to execute Lease Deed/Agreement
in the prescribed format at his own cost and
thereafter
to deposit the abovementioned
amount. It has to be ensured within one month
from the date of issue of this offer letter, failing
which this opportunity will automatically stand
cancelled. The delay in payment of renewal
charges will attract penal interest as per
Company Rule. Likewise, other petitioners in
the connected petitions have been issued the
offer letter with the details of the charges levied
on them.
41. From the aforesaid offer letter, it is clear
that the respondent company has computed
the annual rent for the renewal lease period at
Rs. 8,25,000/- which amounts to a nominal
monthly rent of approximately Rs. 2100/- per
month considering the commercial nature of the
premise and the passage of time. In addition to
this, the service charge, ground rent and
security
deposit
represent
statutory
and
maintenance related charges, essential and
justified for upkeep and management of the
township premises. These charges are in line
with the Board-approved policy effective from
1st April 2008 and subsequent resolutions and
have been fixed after due valuation by certified
professionals. The payment of such charges by
lessees
seeking
renewal
is
standard,
reasonable and legally sustainable, entitling the
respondent to demand compliance as a
prerequisite for execution of fresh leases. The
respondent SAIL as of today, is recognized as
one of the India’s fast growing industrial sector
with significant recent expansion in production,
sales
and
infrastructure
investment.
This
growth has driven continuous modernization
and capacity upgrades, reflected by its robust
financial and operational benchmarks.
42. Consistent with this upward trajectory, SAIL
has fixed the lease renewal premium and
related charges for the Bhilai properties by
valuation
conducted
through
certified
professionals, ensuring parity with market
standards and company requirements for
sustained asset and township management.
This process is in line with policy and statutory
mandates, supporting both transparency and
future readiness in one of the country’s key
steel and industrial hubs.
43. The petitioners’ failure to apply within the
stipulated
period
for
lease
renewal
as
prescribed in the original lease agreements and
subsequent policies, results in the forfeiture of
any entitlement to renewal or extension bases
on the prior lease terms. The respondent
(SAIL/Bhilai Steel Plant), acting within its
statutory and contractual rights has validly fixed
the renewal charges including premium, rent
and statutory obligations in accordance with the
Board-approved policy effective from 1st April
2008 and subsequent resolutions. The fixation
of nominal rent of about Rs. 2000/- per month
for 33 years, based on valuation by certified
professionals, and the statutory charges are
found to be reasonable, non-arbitrary and
within the bounds of law and policy.
44. For all the above reasons, the petitions are
devoid of merits, both in law and on facts.
SAIL’s
demand
for
payment
of
renewal
charges, premium, service charge and ground
rent is not arbitrary, violative of petitioners’
rights or contrary to applicable legal principles.
The Court cannot substitute its wisdom for
administrative or commercial decisions of the
respondent in exercise of power of judicial
review unless gross illegality, malafides or clear
discrimination is shown, none of which are
present in the facts at hand.
45. It is therefore submitted that the petitioners
have no vested right to renewal without
payment of fresh premium and charges under
SAIL’s current lease renewal policy. The
present petitions raises disputed facts, is
premature with respect of proceedings under
the Public Premises Act and deserves to be
dismissed. No order as to costs.”
17.
Upon careful consideration of the rival submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the parties, and on a cumulative reading of
the pleadings, documents placed on record and the law governing
renewal of leases of public premises, we are of the considered
opinion that the learned Single Judge has exhaustively analysed
the nature of rights, if any, surviving in favour of the appellants
after expiry of the original lease by efflux of time and has rightly
held that there is no automatic or vested right of renewal. The
relevant clauses of the lease deeds unequivocally vest discretion
in the lessor to grant renewal on such terms and conditions as
may be decided by it, clearly indicating that renewal is a fresh
grant and not an extension as of right. The findings recorded in
this regard are fully in consonance with the statutory scheme
under the Transfer of Property Act as well as the binding
precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18.
We also find no infirmity in the conclusion drawn by the learned
Single Judge that mere acceptance of occupation charges or
issuance of a conditional offer letter does not ipso facto give rise
to a tenancy by holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act, particularly when renewal is expressly made subject
to revised terms and compliance with a board-approved policy.
The contention of the appellants seeking creation of rights based
on holding over has rightly been repelled in view of settled legal
principles.
19.
The impugned demands raised by respondent–SAIL are founded
upon a uniform, board-approved lease renewal policy, applicable
to all similarly situated lessees, and are based on valuation
carried out by certified professionals. The learned Single Judge
has correctly held that historical lease rates or past concessions
cannot estop a public authority from revising its policy in tune with
present-day market realities and administrative prudence. No
material has been placed before us to demonstrate arbitrariness,
discrimination or mala fides in fixation of the impugned charges.
20.
We also concur with the view that the properties in question
constitute public premises, and disputes relating to continuation,
renewal or eviction are governed by the statutory mechanism
under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 in such
matters is limited, and unless manifest illegality or violation of
constitutional guarantees is shown, the Court would refrain from
substituting its wisdom for policy and commercial decisions of the
competent authority.
21.
The reliance placed by the appellants on judgments cited on their
behalf has been duly considered by the learned Single Judge and
rightly distinguished on facts and applicability. We find no
perversity, legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned
order warranting interference in exercise of our appellate
jurisdiction.
22.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm opinion that
the writ appeal is devoid of merit. The appellants have failed to
establish any enforceable legal right to renewal of lease on the
original terms or to assail the validity of the renewal conditions
imposed by respondent–SAIL.
23.
Consequently, the writ appeal stands dismissed. No order as to
costs.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Anu
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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