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Serial No.05
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A.No.23/2022 with
Crl.M.C.No.47/2022
Date of Order: 08.02.2023
Sangte Paite
Coram:
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & anr
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
: Mr. S. Ali, Adv with
Mr. I.M. Gogoi, Adv
Mr. B.D. Goswami, Adv
Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, Adv
For the Respondents
: Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, AAG with
Ms. R. Colney, GA
i) Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The appeal has been carried by one of the two convicts against
a judgment of June 15, 2022 and the consequential sentence of June 16,
2022 in a case originating in this State capital.
2.
As of now, there is no appeal preferred by the other convict
who suffered the same sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with
a fine of Rs.1 lakh. In default of the payment of fine, they are to undergo
a further two months of simple imprisonment. The time of detention
already suffered was taken into account and the remainder of the period
of detention indicated in the sentence. The sentence followed the
appellant’s conviction under Section 22(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for possessing or transporting
commercial quantity of psychotropic substance. About 4272 capsules of
spasmo-proxyvon bearing a net weight in excess of 2.1 kg – where the
commercial quantity is reckoned at 500 g – were recovered from the joint
possession of the two persons riding a scooty and the trial court found
that even though the blue bag containing the contraband was in the
physical possession of the pillion rider and not the present appellant, the
appellant was deemed to have been in constructive possession thereof.
3.
The incident occurred on February 22, 2013. The case made out
by the prosecution was that in course of additional checking during the
election period, the police party led by PW1 made a chance recovery of
the contraband from the scooty and from the joint possession of the
appellant and the pillion rider.
4.
The further case made out by the prosecution in the oral
evidence at the trial was that PW1 immediately informed his superiors
whereupon members from the anti-narcotics task force were sent to the
spot. In the presence of such personnel, the contraband seized were
recorded, a seizure-list prepared and the signatures of both the then
accused persons obtained thereon.
5.
Three principal grounds have been taken in this appeal. For a
start, great emphasis has been laid on the fact that the blue bag which
allegedly contained the contraband was apparently recovered from the
physical possession of the pillion rider and not from the appellant. The
second limb of the submission pertains to the presumption that arises
under Section 35 of the Act. The third contention raised is that the
material seized could not be linked to the material that was sent for
forensic examination or the contraband which was ultimately produced in
court at the time of trial. Some murmurs have also been made on Section
52A of the Act and the inadequacies in the manner of dealing with the
contraband; however, the contraband seized in this case had not been
destroyed and had been preserved and produced at the time of trial where
PW1 identified the material exhibits and also proved his signature.
6.
The main thrust of the argument is on Section 35 of the Act and
the judgments reported at (2000) 2 SCC 513 (Abdul Rashid Ibrahim
Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 17 SCC 627 (Mohan Lal v. State of
Punjab) and (2020) 16 SCC 709 (Hanif Khan alias Annu Khan v. Central
Bureau of Narcotics) have been placed to indicate the scope and purport
of the provision and the perceived failure on the part of the trial court to
apply the law appropriately in the present case. Section 35 of the Act
provides as follows:
“35. Presumption of culpable mental state.--(1) In
any
prosecution for an offence under this Act which requires a
culpable mental state of the accused, the Court shall presume
the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for
the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state
with respect to the act charged as an offence in the prosecution.
Explanation. – In this section “culpable mental state”
includes intention, motive knowledge of a fact and belief in, or
reason to believe, a fact.
(2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be
proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is
established by a preponderance of probability.”
7.
It is evident on a plain reading of the provision that both the
explanation in sub-section (1) and the seemingly substantive provision in
sub-section (2) are in aid of the primary rule enunciated in sub-section
(1). In other words, the provision mandates that a presumption arises as
to the culpability of an accused and it is for the accused to prove that he
was not culpable in respect of the act charged with by the prosecution.
Sub-section (2) merely qualifies the nature of the burden of proof to be
discharged by an accused in terms of sub-section (1).
8.
In certain cases, whether it is in the assessment of a special fact
or in the matter of rebuttal of a presumption, the general rule in criminal
jurisprudence of beyond reasonable doubt may not apply. In the present
case, sub-section (2) above emphasises that the standard of proof in
respect of the fact that has to be established by an accused in an NDPS
case is beyond reasonable doubt for the rebuttal to be accepted. SubPage 4 of 15
section (2) of Section 35 of the Act has no manner of application beyond
the rule enunciated in sub-section (1) of the provision as would be
evident from the opening words, “For the purpose of this section ...”
9.
The charge against the appellant herein and the resultant ground
of his conviction was that the appellant had, in contravention of the
provisions of the Act of 1985, possessed or transported a psychotropic
substance of commercial quantity. For the prosecution to bring home the
charge against the appellant it was necessary to adduce evidence that the
appellant herein possessed or was in the process of transporting a
psychotropic substance in a manner that was in contravention of the
provisions of the said Act; and, that the quantity of the contraband
involved was such as would be regarded as commercial quantity.
10.
The factum that the substance was a psychotropic substance and
the factum that the quantity involved was commercial were required to be
affirmatively established by the prosecution. This was done in the present
case and required little further proof apart from the recording in the
seizure-list with the appellant’s signature appended thereto and stood
virtually admitted upon no objection in such regard being raised at the
trial.
11.
The next aspect was whether, upon the contraband of
commercial quantity being recovered from a vehicle being driven by the
appellant, the element of mens rea could be attributed to the appellant in
the sense that he was consciously in possession of the commercial
quantity of the contraband or that he was consciously transporting the
same.
12.
It is in such a scenario that Section 35 of the Act would come
into play. In the absence of such provision, the prosecution would have
had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant herein was aware
that he was acting in contravention of the provisions of the said Act. The
mere possession of contraband or the mere transporting of the contraband
would, ordinarily, not have sufficed without the element of mens rea
being established had it not been for Section 35 of the said Act.
13.
In view of Section 35 of the said Act, upon an apparent act of
possession of contraband and or upon an apparent act of transportation of
contraband being established, it is for the accused to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he was not aware of the contraband or its presence
and, as such, had no element of culpability. It is because of this heavy
onus that an accused in an NDPS case has to discharge that there are
several checks and balances in the statute, including the strict conditions
imposed, inter alia, under Section 50 of the Act.
14.
Upon the nature of the goods being proved and the quantity
involved being established beyond reasonable doubt, it was for the
appellant to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had no such mental
state with respect to the act charged as an offence. The appellant
completely failed in such regard and, indeed, made no attempt at all at the
trial to prove the absence of the culpable mental state.
15.
In the first case cited by the appellant of Abdul Rashid Ibrahim
Mansuri, the accused was an autorickshaw driver who was intercepted
and four gunny bags containing cannabis were found in the autorickshaw.
The trial court acquitted the accused, but he was convicted by the High
Court which referred to Section 35 of the Act. It is in such context that the
Supreme Court analysed Section 35 of the Act to observe as follows at
paragraphs 21 and 22 of the report:
“21. No doubt, when the appellant admitted that the narcotic
drug was recovered from the gunny bags stacked in the
autorickshaw, the burden of proof is on him to prove that he
had no knowledge about the fact that those gunny bags
contained such a substance. The standard of such proof is
delineated in sub-section (2) as “beyond a reasonable doubt”. If
the court, on an appraisal of the entire evidence does not
entertain doubt of a reasonable degree that he had real
knowledge of the nature of the substance concealed in the
gunny bags then the appellant is not entitled to acquittal.
However, if the court entertains strong doubt regarding the
accused’s awareness about the nature of the substance in the
gunny bags, it would be a miscarriage of criminal justice to
convict him of the offence keeping such strong doubt
undispelled. Even so, it is for the accused to dispel any doubt in
that regard.”
“22. The burden of proof cast on the accused under Section 35
can be discharged through different modes. One is that he can
rely on the materials available in the prosecution evidence.
Next is, in addition to that, he can elicit answers from
prosecution witnesses through cross-examination to dispel any
such doubt. He may also adduce other evidence when he is
called upon to enter on his defence. In other words, if
circumstances appearing in the prosecution case or in the
prosecution evidence are such as to give reasonable assurance
to the court that the appellant could not have had the knowledge
or the required intention, the burden cast on him under Section
35 of the Act would stand discharged even if he has not
adduced any other evidence of his own when he is called upon
to enter on his defence.”
16.
In the case of Mohan Lal, 4 kg of opium was recovered from
the accused as the contraband was found in a bag carried by him. While
the Supreme Court ultimately found that the investigation conducted in
the particular case was vitiated, the following observation on, inter alia,
Section 35 of the Act is found at paragraph 12 of the report:
“12. Unlike the general principle of criminal jurisprudence that
an accused is presumed innocent unless proved guilty, the
NDPS Act carries a reverse burden of proof under Sections 35
and 54. But that cannot be understood to mean that the moment
an allegation is made and the FIR recites compliance with
statutory procedure leading to recovery, the burden of proof
from the very inception of the prosecution shifts to the accused,
without the prosecution having to establish or prove anything
more. The presumption is rebuttable. Section 35(2) provides
that a fact can be said to have been proved if it is established
beyond reasonable doubt and not on preponderance of
probability. The stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such as
Section 37, the minimum sentence of ten years, absence of any
provision for remission, do not dispense with the requirement
of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case beyond
reasonable doubt after investigation, only after which the
burden of proof shall shift to the accused. The case of the
prosecution cannot be allowed to rest on a preponderance of
probabilities.”
17.
In the final case of Hanif Khan, the allegation was in regard to
an illegal sale-purchase between the appellant before the Supreme Court
and an acquitted co-accused. No appeal was preferred by the State
against the acquittal. It was in such context, when the principal accused
had been acquitted, the Supreme Court doubted the conviction of the
appellant before it. Paragraph 8 of the report quotes a previous Supreme
Court judgment as to the scope of Section 35 of the Act:
“8. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the
parties. The prosecution under the NDPS Act carries a reverse
burden of proof with a culpable mental state of the accused. He
is presumed to be guilty consequent to recovery of contraband
from him, and it is for the accused to establish his innocence
unlike the normal rule of criminal jurisprudence that an accused
is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. But that does
not absolve the prosecution from establishing a prima facie case
only whereafter the burden shifts to the accused. In Noor Aga v.
State of Punjab [(2008) 16 SCC 417] it was observed as
follows:
“58. Sections 35 and 54 of the Act, no doubt, raise
presumptions with regard to the culpable mental state on
the part of the accused as also place the burden of proof
in this behalf on the accused; but a bare perusal of the
said provision would clearly show that presumption
would operate in the trial of the accused only in the event
the circumstances contained therein are fully satisfied.
An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only
when it stands satisfied, would the legal burden shift.
Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused
to prove his innocence is not as high as that of the
prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to
prove the guilt of the accused on the prosecution is
“beyond all reasonable doubt” but it is “preponderance of
probability” on the accused. If the prosecution fails to
prove the foundational facts so as to attract the rigours of
Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus which is possession
of contraband by the accused cannot be said to have been
established”.
18.
There is no doubt in the present case, as appears from the oral
evidence at the trial and the meticulous discussion thereon in the
impugned judgment of conviction, that a scooty was apprehended, a bag
was found in such scooty which may have been in the physical
possession of the pillion rider and, inter alia, commercial quantity of
contraband found in the bag. Since this was the case of a chance
recovery, the trial court dwelt at length on the applicability of Section 50
of the Act and the limited rigours that such provision carries in case of a
chance recovery. Ultimately, upon relying on a judgment reported at
(1999) 6 SCC 172 (State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh), the trial court
concluded that Section 50 of the Act would come into play only in the
case of a search of a person as distinguished from search of any premises
and that in case of a chance recovery such provision would not apply.
19.
The trial court also considered at length whether the accused
persons were in conscious possession and knowingly transporting the
contraband. On such aspect, the trial court recorded the articles that were
seized, noticed that the seized articles had been duly deposited and that
they had been produced at the time of the trial. According to the
appellant, there was no link between the goods that were seized and the
goods that were ultimately produced at the trial. A further point is taken
that though the first page of the seizure-list had been signed by the
appellant herein, the second page does not bear the signature of either the
appellant herein or the other convict.
20.
It is evident from the seizure-list that several bundles of
spasmo-proxyvon capsules were recovered from the bag in question.
There cannot be any denial of such fact, particularly at this stage, when
the appellant did not question either the seizure-list or the appellant’s
signature thereon at the trial. It is true that the second page of the seizurelist does not bear the signature of the appellant or the other convict; but if
the appellant was minded to seriously question the veracity of the second
page of the seizure-list, that should have been done in course of the trial
since the appellant, no doubt, had been forwarded a copy of the seizurelist in accordance with the requirements of, inter alia, Section 207 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
21.
The further point made on behalf of the appellant is that at the
time of seizure, no recording was made of the batch numbers of the
capsules or the expiry dates thereof for it to be later established that the
articles produced at the trial were the same articles that had been seized
from the possession of the accused. Ideally, the officers seizing the
contraband should have indicated the particulars just as a chemist’s bill
would. Ideally, the batch numbers of the strips or the expiry dates thereof
or both ought to have been recorded. However, what is of relevance is
whether the failure to indicate such particulars has resulted in any
miscarriage of justice.
22.
It is plain from the first page of the seizure-list that several
bundles of the contraband had been recovered from the blue bag, whether
or not such bag was in the actual physical possession of the appellant.
Even without referring to second page of the seizure-list, the quantum of
the contraband indicated in the first page thereof would make up
commercial quantity of contraband. Since the appellant did not question
either the veracity of the seizure-list or the contents thereof, even on the
first page thereof, it matters little whether the batch numbers or the
expiry dates of the seized material had been recorded or not. The
appellant herein is deemed to have accepted that the goods as recorded in
the first page of the seizure-list had been recovered from the scooty or the
constructive possession of the appellant or, at least, from the physical
possession of the pillion rider. So much cannot be questioned. Since the
quantum of the material seized made the seizure one of commercial
quantity, the exact identity of the material became immaterial.
23.
As to whether the goods were found in the possession of the
appellant or the goods had to be regarded to have been found solely from
the possession of the pillion rider, the trial court has examined the matter
at great length. Referring to the concept of constructive possession in
such a scenario, particularly when the driver of a vehicle would scarcely
be in a position to physically carry the contraband on his person, the trial
court concluded that in the absence of the appellant herein demonstrating
that he had no connection with the seized contraband, he was deemed to
be in constructive possession thereof. It is for such purpose that Section
35 of the Act has been stressed upon by the appellant in course of the
present proceedings.
24.
For such purpose, the appellant suggests that if possession of
the contraband by an accused is not established beyond reasonable doubt
or if the goods are not identified beyond reasonable doubt then the
burden in terms of Section 35 of the Act is not required to be discharged
by the accused. Further, it is the case of the appellant that in his response
to the first question put to him in course of his examination under Section
313 of the Code, he disowned the bag and indicated that he had nothing
to do with the same. The appellant submits that in the light of such
statement and the admitted position that the blue bag which contained the
contraband was recovered from the physical possession of the pillion
rider, the appellant could not have been prosecuted or convicted.
25.
In reading a provision or applying the same, there is a
bandwidth of reasonableness that has to be maintained. It is possible that
in a bigger vehicle there are several persons and a bag is discovered
therein containing the contraband which is not actually in the physical
possession of any of the passengers. In such a scenario, unless there is a
suitable explanation as the one required under Section 35 of the Act, the
passengers would be deemed to be in constructive possession of the bag
and the contraband contained therein. In a less spacious vehicle as a
scooty where the driver has both hands on the steering wheel and the
levers and the only available spaces are, probably, a little footboard to the
front, a little carrier behind and the person of any pillion rider, it is not
surprising that any goods carried in such a scooty would not be actually
in the lap of the driver or in the driver’s actual physical possession. But
that would not, by itself, imply that the driver was not in possession of
the contraband since the said Act has a built-in principle of constructive
possession as has been referred to in copious detail by the trial court.
26.
It may have been possible for the appellant herein to
demonstrate that the appellant had no nexus with the pillion rider or that
the pillion rider had merely requested the appellant to give him a ride or
the like. However, no attempt was made by the appellant in course of the
trial to either establish the circumstances in which the pillion rider came
on board or the lack of the appellant’s connection with the pillion rider or
the blue bag that was found in the physical possession of such pillion
rider.
27.
The trial court has referred to the circumstances of the seizure,
the quantity of the contraband seized and arrived at a just conclusion that
the appellant herein could not have been regarded as not to possess a
mental culpable state since the recovery of contraband from the vehicle
or from another person that the appellant was driving was established
beyond reasonable doubt. In the order on sentencing, appropriate
considerations have been taken into account before directing the
appellant to suffer the sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a
fine of Rs.1 lakh.
28.
Based on the material that the prosecution put on display and
the appreciation thereof by the trial court, neither the judgment of
conviction nor the consequent sentence call for any interference.
29.
Crl.A.No.23 of 2022 is dismissed.
30.
Crl.M.C.No.47 of 2022 is disposed of.
31.
Let an authenticated copy of this judgment and order be
immediately made available to the appellant free of cost.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
08.02.2023
“Lam DR-PS”
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