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2024:MLHC:938
Serial No. 03
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 37 of 2024
Date of Decision: 22.10.2024
Shri. Sanget Deb Barman
S/o Shri. D.S. Barman
R/o Aidankul,
P.O Chamahour, P.S Khowai
District Khowai, Tripura
……Petitioner
-VERSUSUnion of India
Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence (DRI) Shillong
……Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Ms. S. Nongsiej, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. R. Fancon, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
ORDER (ORAL)
1.
Heard Ms. S. Nongsiej, learned counsel for the petitioner who
has submitted that the petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated
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18.07.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (NDPS) in DRI Case
No.07/CL/NDPS/GANJA/DRI/SHG/2023-24 has now approached this
Court with a prayer for quashing and setting aside the said order
impugned herein.
2.
It is the submission of the learned counsel that the petitioner
was arrested by the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence
(DRI), Shillong Regional Unit on 14.01.2023 and was remanded to
judicial custody on the same day. The petitioner is still under custody till
date, his custody being extended from time to time on prayer of remand.
3.
The petitioner being in custody for more than 180 days,
therefore on 14.07.2023 an application for grant of default bail was
preferred before the trial court, the application being registered as Bail
Application No. 174(H) 2023 wherein the learned Special Judge had
posted the matter for hearing on 18.07.2023.
4.
It is also mentioned that the DRI on an application made under
Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act dated 12.07.2023 had also made a
prayer before the trial court to allow extension of the period of
investigation by 90 days. The said application was also finally heard on
18.07.2023.
5.
The learned Special Judge vide related order dated 18.07.2023
has allowed the prayer for extension of the period of investigation by
another 45 days effective from 13.07.2023.
6.
By another order of even date that is, on 18.07.2023 passed in
Bail Application No. 174(H) 2023, the learned Special Judge has
rejected the prayer made therein by observing that the court having
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extended the period of investigation for another 45 days and further
remand of the accused beyond the period of 180 days being allowed, the
grant of default bail to the accused person does not accrue.
7.
The learned counsel has submitted that the observations made
and the rejection of the application for grant of default bail by the
learned Special Judge has been made on a wrong assumption of the facts
and the settled legal position governing the provision of default bail.
8.
It is the contention of the learned counsel that the mandatory
period of 180 days stipulating the time within which the chargesheet
should be filed in cases under the NDPS Act involving investigation in
case of seizure of commercial quantity of narcotic substance as far as the
case in hand is concerned has expired on 12.07.2023. On the 180 th day
no chargesheet has been filed instead an application for extension of
time to file the same has been preferred. The learned Special Judge
immediately on receipt of the said application has not passed any order
but has finally passed the same only on 18.07.2023, that is, after 6 days
when the right to default bail has accrued. In the meantime, the
petitioner being entitled to default bail since the chargesheet has not
been filed within or on the 180 th day, on the 182nd day, that is, on
14.07.2023, the petitioner has accordingly preferred the said application
for grant of default bail. The learned Special Judge having failed to pass
any effective order on the application for extension of time for further
investigation, even if such application is pending consideration at the
time when the application for grant of default bail was made, it is
incumbent upon the learned Special Judge to allow the prayer for grant
of default bail, submits the learned counsel.
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9.
In support of this contention, the case of Judgebir Singh @
Jasbir Singh Samra @ Jasbir & Ors. v. National Investigation Agency
was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner referring to para 76
and 77 of the order dated 01.05.2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 1011 and
1012 of the 2023. The case of Grant Victor Ikenna v. State Rep. by the
Inspector of Police, NIB-CID, Chennai before the Hon’ble Madras High
Court was also cited, particularly at para 8, 9 and 10 of the order dated
08.02.2024. The case of M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer,
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2020) 12 SCR 915 para 12 was
also relied upon in this regard.
10.
Learned DSGI, Dr. N. Mozika in support of the impugned order
has submitted that the facts that are to be noted is that the application for
extension of time to complete the investigation has been filed prior to
the application for grant of bail filed by the petitioner.
11.
The learned DSGI on the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the application for grant of default bail ought to have
been considered by the learned Special Judge in spite of the said
application for extension of time being filed by the DRI, has submitted
that the answer to this contention is that the trial court being aware of
the two applications pending for consideration has come to the right
decision, when on the application for extension of time being allowed,
the issue of default bail has lost its relevance. In support of this
contention, the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II)
reported in (1994) 5 SCC 410 was cited wherein at para 48 of the same
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that if there is an application
for release on bail under Section 167 Cr.P.C and also another application
with a prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation then in
2024:MLHC:938
such a case bail cannot be granted unless the application for extension of
time is rejected. This is exactly the situation as regard the impugned
order dated 18.07.2023 when the prayer for grant of default bail has
been rejected by the trial court, submits the learned DSGI.
12.
This Court has given due consideration to the submissions of
the learned counsels for the respective parties, the facts as stated above
not required to be recounted, what is required to be considered here is
the legal aspect of the matter.
13.
The law is present which provides for an accused person to
seek enlargement on default bail if he is in custody beyond the period
stipulated for filing of the final report or the charge sheet by the
Investigating Officer (IO), in cases under the NDPS Act, for an offence
under Section 20(C), involving seizure of a commercial quantity of
contraband substance, the period for filing of the chargesheet is fixed at
180 days as per Section 36A(4) NDPS Act, where it is expected that the
investigation would have been concluded. However, if the investigation
could not be completed within such period of 180 days, the prosecution
is permitted to seek extension of such stipulated period.
14.
In the case between the parties herein, admittedly, the period of
180 days has since expired when, on the 180th day, the prosecution has
filed an application for extension of time to complete the investigation.
15.
Again, as is provided under Section 167(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, on expiry of the period stipulated for filing the
chargesheet, an indefeasible right has accrued to the accused to seek
release on default bail which ought to be granted by the court on an
application made therein. The petitioner has also accordingly filed such
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bail application on 14.07.2023, two days after the stipulated period of
180 days has expired and no chargesheet having been filed till such date.
16.
The Apex Court in the case of Judgebir Singh @ Jasbir Singh
Samra @ Jasbir (supra), particularly para 76 and 77 relied upon by the
petitioner has dealt with a situation wherein an application for extension
of time to complete the investigation was filed prior to the expiry of the
statutory period for filing of the chargesheet, but such application was
taken up and an order passed only after 10 days or so after the expiry of
such statutory period, the question of the Court was what would have
happened had an application for grant of default bail been filed during
the pendency of consideration of the said application for extension of
time. The Court has answered this question at para 77 when it observed
that “The right to be released on default bail continues to remain
enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding
pendency of the bail application or subsequent filing of the chargesheet
or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the
court”.
17.
The Apex Court upon such observations as at para 76 and 77
having been made has further qualify the same by the observation
rendered at para 78 of the same, which somewhat resemble the situation
wherein the impugned order dated 18.07.2023 was passed. Reproduction
of the said observations is being made herein as:
“78. Our observations in paras 76 and 77 respectively as above
are keeping in mind the decision of this Court rendered by a
three-Judge Bench in the case of Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi v.
State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and Others reported in
(2012) 12 SCC 1, wherein in paras 25, 26 and 27 respectively,
this Court observed as under:
2024:MLHC:938
“25. Having carefully considered the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties, the relevant provisions of
law and the decision cited, we are unable to accept the
submissions advanced on behalf of the State by the
learned Additional Solicitor General Mr Raval. There is no
denying the fact that on 17-7-2012, when CR No. 86 of
2012 was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and
the custody of the appellant was held to be illegal and an
application under Section 167(2) CrPC was made on
behalf of the appellant for grant of statutory bail which
was listed for hearing. Instead of hearing the application,
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate adjourned the same till
the next day when the Public Prosecutor filed an
application for extension of the period of custody and
investigation and on 20-7-2012 extended the time of
investigation and the custody of the appellant for a further
period of 90 days with retrospective effect from 2-6-2012.
Not only is the retrospectivity of the order of the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate untenable, it could not also defeat
the statutory right which had accrued to the appellant on
the expiry of 90 days from the date when the appellant
was taken into custody. Such right, as has been
commented upon by this Court in Sanjay Dutt [(1994) 5
SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] and the other cases cited
by the learned Additional Solicitor General, could only be
distinguished (sic extinguished) once the charge-sheet had
been filed in the case and no application has been made
prior thereto for grant of statutory bail. It is wellestablished that if an accused does not exercise his right to
grant of statutory bail before the charge-sheet is filed, he
loses his right to such benefit once such charge-sheet is
filed and can, thereafter, only apply for regular bail.
26. The circumstances in this case, however, are different
in that the appellant had exercised his right to statutory
bail on the very same day on which his custody was held
to be illegal and such an application was left undecided by
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate till after the application
filed by the prosecution for extension of time to complete
investigation was taken up and orders were passed
thereupon.
27. We are unable to appreciate the procedure adopted by
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the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, which has been
endorsed by the High Court and we are of the view that
the appellant acquired the right for grant of statutory bail
on 17-7-2012, when his custody was held to be illegal by
the Additional Sessions Judge since his application for
statutory bail was pending at the time when the application
for extension of time for continuing the investigation was
filed by the prosecution. In our view, the right of the
appellant to grant of statutory bail remained unaffected by
the subsequent application and both the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court erred in
holding otherwise.”
18.
Now, another aspect of the matter is to be considered, inasmuch
as the authority in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra) has revealed that the
Apex Court while making an observation on the merits of the case of
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602, has
at para 48 opined that “…The Division Bench also indicated that if there
be such an application of the accused for release on bail and also a
prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation according to
the proviso in Section 20(4)(bb), both of them should be considered
together. It is obvious that no bail can be given even in such a case
unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In short, the
grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the prayer
for extension of time, if such a prayer is made…”.
19.
To further qualify this observation or opinion, a three Judge
bench of the Supreme Court in the case of M. Ravindran (supra) at para
14.1 has observed as follows:
“14.1. The observations made in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur
(supra) and Sanjay Dutt (supra) to the effect that the application
for default bail and any application for extension of time made
by the Public Prosecutor must be considered together are, in our
opinion, only applicable in situations where the Public
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Prosecutor files a report seeking extension of time prior to the
filing of the application for default bail by the accused. In such
a situation, notwithstanding the fact that the period for
completion of investigation has expired, both applications
would have to be considered together. However, where the
accused has already applied for default bail, the Prosecutor
cannot defeat the enforcement of his indefeasible right by
subsequently filing a final report, additional complaint or report
seeking extension of time.”
20.
What has emerged from the above proposition is that even if
the statutory period has expired and an indefeasible right of default bail
is available to the accused, an application in such regard has to be filed
before the court concerned. Again, if there is also an application filed by
the prosecution seeking extension of time, the Court may hear both the
applications simultaneously, however the court can do so only if the
application for extension of time is filed first in point of time.
21.
In the case of the petitioner, admittedly, the application for
extension of time was filed on the 180th day, while the application for
default bail was filed two days hence. Therefore, the fact that the trial
court has considered both application on the same day and an order
dated 18.07.2023 was also passed on the same day cannot be faulted.
22.
Following the observations in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra) at
para 48, the application for extension of time being allowed by the trial
court, rejection of the application for grant of default bail is therefore
found justified.
23.
As to the alleged illegality of the impugned order allowing the
extension of time with retrospective effect, that is, w.e.f. 13.07.2023, this
Court would agree that the same is not founded on settled principles of
law in this regard, however, the same will not have much bearing on the
2024:MLHC:938
facts and circumstances of the case of the parties inasmuch as by this
time, the chargesheet have already been filed and the case has proceeded
in due course.
24.
Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the impugned order was passed keeping the accepted
principle of law intact. There is no infirmity in the same.
25.
Resultantly, this petition is found to be devoid of merits and the
same is hereby dismissed.
26.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2024.10.23 16:36:05
PDT
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