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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 5th March, 2020
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl.A. No.33 of 2018
Appellant
:
Sancha Bahadur Subba
versus
Respondent
:
Ramesh Sharma
Appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Umesh Ranpal with Mr. Raghvendra Kumar and Ms. Sanju
Gupta, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. S.S. Hamal with Mr. Leada T. Bhutia, Ms. Sabina Chettri
and Ms. Saroja Chettri, Advocates for the Respondent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl.A. No.34 of 2018
Appellant
:
Sancha Bahadur Subba
versus
Respondent
:
Ramesh Sharma
Appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Umesh Ranpal with Mr. Raghvendra Kumar and Ms. Sanju
Gupta, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. S.S. Hamal with Mr. Leada T. Bhutia, Ms. Sabina Chettri
and Ms. Saroja Chettri, Advocates for the Respondent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl.A. No.35 of 2018
Appellant
:
Sancha Bahadur Subba
versus
Respondent
:
Ramesh Sharma
Appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
Appearance
Mr. Umesh Ranpal with Mr. Raghvendra Kumar and Ms. Sanju
Gupta, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. S.S. Hamal with Mr. Leada T. Bhutia, Ms. Sabina Chettri
and Ms. Saroja Chettri, Advocates for the Respondent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
This common Judgment disposes of three Criminal
Appeals i.e. Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018 (arising out of Private
Complaint Case No.14 of 2015), Criminal Appeal No.34 of 2018
(arising out of Private Complaint Case No.31 of 2015) and
Criminal Appeal No.35 of 2018 (arising out of Private Complaint
Case No.30 of 2015).
2.
The Appeals assail the acquittal of the Respondent
(the accused person before the learned trial Court) by the
Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Sikkim at
Gangtok, for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “N.I. Act”), vide Judgments
dated 11.05.2018, in the afore detailed Private Complaint Cases.
The grounds for acquittal were that the Appellant had failed to
prove the ingredients of “giving Notice” as required under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The Appellant failed to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that a debt or any other liability
existed in his favour. That the presumption under Section 139 of
the N.I. Act was successfully rebutted by the Respondent.
Hence, the Appeals.
3.
The facts common in all the Complaints, leading to
the Appeals may briefly be adverted to. The Appellant required
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
finances for his son‟s incomplete hotel project at Gangtok,
Sikkim. The Respondent in the month of March, 2013 offered to
assist him to obtain loan of Rupees five crores for the said
purpose from Syndicate Finance Private Limited, Mumbai. The
condition for obtaining such loan was an advance payment of 2%
of the capital applied for, as processing fees. The Appellant
agreed to the said proposal and thereafter made over a sum of
Rs.12,70,000/- (Rupees twelve lakhs and seventy thousand)
only, to the Respondent in March, 2013 in two tranches of
Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs) only, and Rs.2,70,000/(Rupees
two
lakhs
and
seventy
thousand)
only,
for
the
aforementioned purpose. Later, on doubts emerging about the
credentials of the Finance Company, the Appellant instructed the
Respondent not to deposit the said amounts with the Company.
The Respondent however informed him that the deposit was
already made, nevertheless, the amount would be refunded by
the month of July, 2013. In August, 2013 in order to obtain loan
for
the
same
purpose
from
ICCI,
Kolkata
a
sum
of
Rs.30,00,000/- (Rupees thirty lakhs) only, was again handed
over by the Appellant to the Respondent as Promoters Capital
contribution. The total amount thus advanced to the Respondent
by the Appellant was a sum of Rs.42,70,000/- (Rupees forty two
lakhs and seventy thousand) only. When no loans were
forthcoming,
the
Appellant
demanded
a
refund
from
the
Respondent in April, 2014, who promised to repay the entire
amount by 31.05.2014, in vain. Following these events, on
07.11.2014 the Respondent executed a written Agreement
(Exhibit 1), acknowledging therein receipt of Rs.42,70,000/-
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
(Rupees forty two lakhs and seventy thousand) only, from the
Appellant in different tranches. He undertook to repay the entire
amount towards which he issued three post dated Cheques
bearing different dates. The Cheques came to be dishonoured on
various grounds when presented to the Bank for payment by the
Appellant
on
31.12.2014,
07.04.2015
and
17.02.2015
respectively but the Respondent neglected to repay the amount
to the Appellant. The Appellant in the meanwhile lodged a
Complaint against the Respondent at the Sadar Police Station,
Gangtok on 05.01.2015 (Exhibit 8) for cheating and criminal
breach of trust. Pursuant thereto the Appellant issued Legal
Notices to the Respondent under Section 138 of the N.I. Act as
follows;
(a) Legal Notice on 13.01.2015 (received
by
Dharni
Sharma,
brother
of
the
Respondent), informing the Respondent that
the Cheque bearing No.031570 drawn on IDBI
Bank, Gangtok Branch, dated 30.12.2014
amounting to Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten
lakhs) only, issued by the Respondent had
been deposited by the Appellant in the Central
Bank of India, Gangtok Branch with due
notice to the Respondent. The Cheque was
dishonoured vide
31.12.2014
with
its return
the
memo dated
remarks
“Funds
insufficient” (Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018,
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
arising out of Private Complaint Case No.14 of
2015, for short “P.C. Case”).
(b)
Legal
Notice
on
05.05.2015,
(received by Pashupathi Sharma, father of the
Respondent), informing the Respondent that
the Cheque bearing No.002215 drawn on
AXIS
Bank,
31.05.2015
(Rupees
Gangtok
amounting
twenty
one
Branch,
to
dated
Rs.21,70,000/-
lakhs
and
seventy
thousand) only, issued by the Respondent had
been deposited by the Appellant in the Central
Bank of India, Gangtok Branch with due
notice to the Respondent. The Cheque was
dishonoured vide
its return
memo dated
07.04.2015 with the remarks “Account closed”
(Criminal Appeal No.34 of 2018 arising out of
P.C. Case No.31 of 2015).
(c)
Legal
Notice
on
16.03.2015,
(received by Dharni Sharma, brother of the
Respondent), informing the Respondent that
the Cheque bearing No.002217 drawn on
AXIS
Bank,
15.02.2015
Gangtok
amounting
Branch,
to
dated
Rs.11,00,000/-
(Rupees eleven lakhs) only, issued by the
Respondent
had
been
Appellant
in
the
Central
Gangtok
Branch
with
deposited
due
Bank
by
of
notice
the
India,
to
the
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
Respondent. The Cheque was dishonoured
vide its return memo dated 17.02.2015 with
the remarks “Funds insufficient” (Criminal
Appeal No.35 of 2018 arising out of P.C. Case
No.30 of 2015).
Hence, the prayers in the Appeals.
4.
After the Complaints were lodged under Section 138
of the N.I. Act before the learned trial Court in the three Private
Complaints supra, cognizance was taken and substance of
accusation for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in
each of the Complaints was explained to the Respondent to
which he pleaded “not guilty.” The Appellant examined himself
and four other witnesses. The Respondent was examined under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. and was a witness for himself thereafter, but
failed to produce two other witnesses that he had earlier sought
to examine in his defence. On consideration of all materials and
evidence the impugned Judgments of the learned trial Court was
pronounced.
5.(a)
While reiterating the facts as put forth hereinabove,
it was urged by learned Counsel for the Appellant that despite
the proof that the Legal Notices addressed to the Respondent in
his permanent address, as indicated in Exhibit 1, had been
received by his brother as reflected in P.C. Case No.14 of 2015
and P.C. Case No.30 of 2015 and by his father in P.C. Case
No.31 of 2015, the learned trial Court overlooked the provisions
of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held that the
ingredients of “giving Notice” were unfulfilled as it was not sent
to the Respondent‟s Gangtok address as he no longer resided in
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
“Linkey.” The learned trial Court thus failed to appreciate that
the address furnished in Exhibit 1, executed by the Respondent
on 07.11.2014 was of “Linkey” and therefore he had made a
false statement before the Court. To fortify this submission
reliance was placed on Bhagwati Kumar Gupta v. State of Rajasthan
and Another1. Besides, he has not denied that Dharni Sharma is
his brother and Pashupathi Sharma his father, both of whom he
failed to produce as witnesses to substantiate his denial of their
signatures appearing on the Acknowledgment Cards.
(b)
In the next leg of his argument, learned Counsel
advanced the contention that the learned trial Court concluded
that neither debt nor legal liability subsisted against the
Respondent, who it opined, was evidently pressurized to enter
into the Agreement, Exhibit 1, as witnesses to the execution of
the document were known to the Appellant but no witnesses
were present from the side of the Respondent. This, despite the
Respondent‟s admission that his guardian Durga Prasad Sharma
was present. The learned trial Court also opined that Exhibit R1
the
General
Diary
extract
of
the
Crime
Branch,
Crime
Investigation Department, dated 18.09.2014 revealed that the
Appellant had complained to the Crime Investigation Department
regarding non-refund of his money amounting to Rs.45,00,000/(Rupees forty five lakhs) only, by the Respondent, prior in time
to issuance of the Cheques and hence assumed that the
Respondent was coerced to execute Exhibit 1. The learned trial
Court next ventured into discussing the merits of Exhibit 1, the
contents of which stood admitted by the Respondent, therefore,
2013 (2) RLW 1788 (Raj.)
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
the conclusion of the learned trial Court that the contents cannot
be relied for “speaking of the actual facts” is untenable. The
learned trial Court also raised doubts about the place where
Exhibit 1 was signed viz. the Chambers of the Advocate and
further opined that the Appellant had failed to prove that the
Cheques had been dishonoured, whereas the documents relied
on by the Appellant marked Exhibit 4 in all the Complaints,
clearly indicate the rejection of the Cheques. The Respondent did
not deny issuance of the Cheques.
(c)
That, the learned trial Court reached a finding that
the presumption against the Respondent was duly rebutted by
him as required under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, when in fact
none existed. On this count, reliance was placed on Uttam Ram v.
Devinder Singh Hudan and Another2 and Purna Kumar Gurung v.
Ankit Sarda3. Hence, the impugned Judgments of the learned trial
Court deserve to be set aside.
6.(a)
Repudiating the arguments of learned Counsel for
the Appellant, it was contended by learned Counsel for the
Respondent that the records reveal that no Notice was issued to
the Respondent in his address at “Bypass Road, Gangtok,”
despite the Appellant being aware that the Respondent resided
there. That, no averment was made in the Complaints that the
Notices were sent to the correct address of the drawer and
hence there can be no assumption of service when the
Respondent has denied receipt of Notices. That in M.D. Thomas v.
(2019) 10 SCC 287
MANU/SI/0060/2018
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
P.S. Jaleel and Ors.4 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has unequivocally
laid down that Notice must be served on the accused and not on
a third person. That, there is no fixed rule that whenever Notice
cannot be served due to non-availability of addressee Court
would presume service of the Notice. The Appellant failed to
summon the Respondent‟s father and brother or the Postman to
establish service of Notices which is therefore unproved. Support
was garnered from the decision in D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda
Belliappa5.
(b)
It was next contended that the Appellant failed to
establish that the Cheques were returned dishonoured. The
Cheque Return Memos filed before the learned trial Court were
photocopies and never a part of the documentary evidence
furnished, thereby failing to establish the third ingredient of the
offence. That, the Appellant is a Government servant but the
source from where he obtained Rs.42,00,000/- (Rupees forty
two
lakhs)
only,
has
not
been
disclosed.
Therefore
the
unaccounted cash amount is not a legally enforceable liability or
a legally recoverable debt and Exhibit 1 does not substantiate
the Appellant‟s case. To buttress this submission reliance was
placed on Sanjay Mishra v. Kanishka Kapoor alias Nikki and Another6
and Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa7.
(c)
That, so far as rebuttal of presumption is concerned,
the standard of proof to be discharged by the accused is not
“beyond a reasonable doubt”
(2009) 14 SCC 398
(2006) 6 SCC 456
2009 Cri.LJ 3777
AIR 2019 SC 1983
but only to the extent of
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
preponderance of probability. In this context reliance was also
placed on Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde8 and
Rangappa v. Sri Mohan9. That, in the facts and circumstances as
placed before this Court the impugned Judgments of the learned
trial Court warrant no interference and the Appeals be dismissed.
7.
Learned
I have heard the rival submissions put forth by
Counsel
at
length
and
given
due
and
anxious
consideration to the same. I have also carefully perused the
records of the case including the evidence, impugned Judgments
and the citations made at the Bar.
8.
The questions germane to the decision of the
Appeals are;
(i)
Whether the learned trial Court was in error
in concluding that the Appellant failed to
prove the ingredients of “giving notice” as
required under Section 138 of the N.I. Act?
(ii)
Whether the Appellant failed to establish
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt
that
the
Respondent had to discharge a debt or a
legal liability?
(iii) Whether the Respondent was able to rebut
the presumption in terms of Section 139 of
the N.I. Act?
9.
In the first instance it would be relevant to notice the
ingredients that make out an offence under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act which are as follows;
(i)
(2002) 2 SCC (Cri) 166
2010 Cri.LJ 2871
a person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for
payment of a certain amount of money to
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
another person from out of that account for
the discharge of any debt or other liability.
(ii)
that cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date
on which it is drawn or within the period of
its validity, whichever is earlier.
(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid,
either because the amount of money
standing to the credit of the account is
insufficient to honour the cheque or that the
cheque
amount
exceeds
the
amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with the bank;
(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of
the said amount of money by giving a notice
in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,
within thirty days of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding
the return of the cheque as unpaid;
(v)
the drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the
payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the
said notice.
The penalty for a dishonoured Cheque is conviction for the
drawer if the demand is not met within fifteen days of the receipt
of Notice. Needless to add if payment ensues within the
statutory period the legal liability under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act ceases.
10.
To address the first question flagged supra it is
evident that Proviso (b) of Section 138 of the N.I. Act specifies;
“138. Dishonour of cheque for
insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. ………………
(a)…………………………
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of
the cheque, as the case may be, makes a
demand for the payment of the said amount
of money by giving a notice in writing, to the
drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of
the receipt of information by him from the
bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid; and
………………”
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
In this context it is relevant to discuss what “giving a notice in
writing” tantamounts to. From the provisions of Section 27 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “Evidence Act”) it manifests that
once Notice is served by registered post by correctly addressing
it to the drawer of the Cheque, the service of Notice is deemed
to have been effected. In such a circumstance the requirements
of Proviso (b) of Section 138 of the N.I. Act stands complied if
the Notice is served in the manner prescribed therein. The object
of these provisions are to ensure that unscrupulous drawers of
Cheques are unable to avoid service of the statutory Notice by
leaving
their
homes
for
sometime,
and
thereby
evade
prosecution. In this thread, we may usefully refer to the
Judgment in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr. 10
wherein it was held as follows;
“20. If a strict interpretation is given
that the drawer should have actually received
the notice for the period of 15 days to start
running no matter that the payee sent the
notice on the correct address, a trickster
cheque drawer would get the premium to
avoid receiving the notice by different
strategies and he could escape from the legal
consequences of Section 138 of the Act. It
must be borne in mind that the court should
not adopt an interpretation which helps a
dishonest evader and clips an honest payee
as that would defeat the very legislative
measure.
21.
In Maxwell's
Interpretation
of
Statutes, the learned author has emphasised
that ‘provisions relating to giving of notice
often receive liberal interpretation’ ……… The
words in Clause (b) of the proviso to Section
138 of the Act show that the payee has the
statutory obligation to „make a demand‟ by
(1999) 7 SCC 510
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
giving notice. The thrust in the clause is on
the need to „make a demand‟. It is only the
mode for making such demand which the
legislature has prescribed. A payee can send
the notice for doing his part for giving the
notice. Once it is dispatched his part is over
and the next depends on what the sendee
does.
………………………………………………………………………
24. No doubt Section 138 of the Act
does not require that the notice should be
given only by “post”. Nonetheless the
principle incorporated in Section 27 (quoted
above) can profitably be imported in a case
where the sender has despatched the notice
by post with the correct address written on
it. Then it can be deemed to have been
served on the sendee unless he proves that
it was not really served and that he was not
responsible for such non-service. Any other
interpretation can lead to a very tenuous
position as the drawer of the cheque who is
liable to pay the amount would resort to the
strategy of subterfuge by successfully
avoiding the notice.”
(emphasis supplied)
11.
Reiterating
the
observation
supra
the
Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed and Ors. 11
held as under;
“8. …………………It was observed that
though Section 138 of the Act does not
require that the notice should be given only
by “post”, yet in a case where the sender has
dispatched the notice by post with correct
address
written on it, the
principle
incorporated in Section 27 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 (for short „the G.C. Act‟)
could profitably be imported in such a case.
It was held that in this situation service of
notice is deemed to have been effected on
the sendee unless he proves that it was not
really served and that he was not responsible
for such non-service.”
In N. Parameswaran Unni v. G. Kannan and Another12 the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held as follows;
(2007) 6 SCC 555
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
“15. This Court in a catena of cases
has held that when a notice is sent by
registered post and is returned with postal
endorsement “refused” or “not available in
the house” or “house locked” or “shop
closed” or “addressee not in station”, due
service has to be presumed. Though in the
process of interpretation right of an honest
lender cannot be defeated as has happened
in this case. ...”
(emphasis supplied)
12.
The decisions supra clear the air on the stand of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court with regard to service of Notice. It is now
essential to consider the Notices issued in the instant matters.
The Legal Notice in each Complaint has been marked as Exhibit
5, the Postal Receipt as Exhibit 6 and the Acknowledgment Card
as Exhibit 7 respectively. In P.C. Case No.14 of 2015 and P.C.
Case No.31 of 2015 the Notices allegedly were received by
Dharni Sharma, while in P.C. Case No.30 of 2015 the Notice
allegedly was received by Pashupathi Sharma. The Respondent
has not disputed that Dharni Sharma is his younger brother and
Pashupathi Sharma is his father or that they were residents of
“Linkey.” While carefully walking through the evidence of the
Respondent he asserts that he was not residing in “Linkey,”
Pakyong, East Sikkim from 2012-13 and that his father resides
there. That, he is now residing in Gangtok due to his business
and thereby had no knowledge of the alleged Legal Notices sent
by the Advocate of the Appellant. He also denied the signatures
of his brother and father on the Acknowledgment Cards, Exhibit
7. However a bare perusal of Exhibit 1, the Agreement,
admittedly executed between the Respondent and the Appellant
on 07.11.2014, reveals the address of the Respondent as
AIR 2017 SC 1681
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
“Linkey, P.O. & P.S. Pakyong, East Sikkim.” The circumstances
elucidated hereinabove pertaining to his non residence at
“Linkey” but furnishing the address of “Linkey” in Exhibit 1
controvert each other and therefore makes the evidence of the
Respondent unreliable. The Respondent failed to produce his kin
supra
to
establish that
the
signatures appearing
on the
Acknowledgment Cards, Exhibit 7, were not their signatures
respectively despite his denials.
13.
The learned trial Court relied on the ratio of M.D.
Thomas (supra) wherein it was held that service of Notice to the
wife of the accused is not sufficient compliance with the
requirement of “giving Notice” in terms of proviso (b) to Section
138 of the N.I. Act. The ratio in M.D. Thomas (supra) of a two
Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, it may respectfully
be stated is per incuriam in view of a prior decision of a three
Judge Bench in C.C. Alavi Haji (supra) on the same aspect. It is
apposite to state that while discussing per incuriam the Hon‟ble
Supreme
Court
in
Government
of
A.P.
and
Another
v.
B.
Satyanarayana Rao (dead) by Legal Representatives and Others 13
held as follows;
“The rule of per incuriam can be
applied where a court omits to consider a
binding precedent of the same court or the
superior court rendered on the same issue or
where a court omits to consider any statute
while deciding that issue.”
In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of
Maharashtra14 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has observed that the
law laid down by it in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger
(2000) 4 SCC 262
(2005) 2 SCC 673
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal
strength. In light of the above rulings it is clear that this Court is
required to follow the ratio in C.C. Alavi Haji (supra). Hence, the
decision in C.C. Alavi Haji (supra) and K. Bhaskaran (supra) of
which the relevant portion is already extracted supra, would be
applicable to the facts of the instant Appeals. No deficiency
emanates on the part of the Appellant for having issued Notices
to the Respondent in his admitted address and it therefore
concludes that the Notices having been sent to the Respondent‟s
correct address were duly served, fulfilling the requirement of
“giving Notice,” contrary to the finding of the learned trial Court.
14.
Now to address the second question hereinabove.
The learned trial Court held that no proof of a legal liability of the
Respondent towards the Appellant existed as no Money Receipts
were tendered in evidence to establish transactions between the
Appellant and the Respondent. That although the Appellant
deposed during cross-examination that money was taken by him
from one Lalit Agarwal, Prem Chand Sharma and Sheetal
Pradhan, he failed to examine them as witnesses. That, it was
unbelievable that the Appellant would hand over money for
obtaining loan without considering its mode of repayment and all
other allied consequential terms of liabilities or conditions. The
learned trial Court was impressed by the evidence of the
Respondent that Exhibit 1 was prepared by him under coercion.
15.
The contents of Exhibit 1 are explicit acceptance of
liability by the Respondent. Although the learned trial Court was
of the opinion that coercion was evident on account of absence
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
of independent witnesses from the side of the Respondent, to
the contrary it is in the Respondent‟s evidence that one Durga
Prasad Sharma his guardian was present with him. No proof
whatsoever to establish coercion has been furnished. Why he did
not make Durga Prasad Sharma sign on the document is not
relevant for the present purposes, at the same time it is worth
noticing that he has not deposed that Durga Prasad Sharma was
restrained by the Appellant from signing on the document. The
document was executed before an Oath Commissioner and all
other allegations to the contrary have remained unproved. This
Court in Purna Kumar Gurung (supra) while considering “debt”
and “liability” held as follows;
“10. …………………………………………………
Towards this, we may briefly examine
what “debt” and “liability” entails. The term
“debt” according to Black‟s Law Dictionary,
10th edition, is;
“Liability on a claim; a specific sum of
money due by agreement or otherwise.”
The explanation to Section 138 of the
NI Act clarifies that the term “debt” referred
to in the Section means “legal debt”, that is
one which is recoverable in a Court of law,
e.g. as debt on a bill of exchange, a bond or
a simple contract. On the other hand, the
term “liability” as per Black‟s Law Dictionary,
10th edition is;
“The quality, state or condition of
being legally obligated or accountable.”
“Liability” otherwise has also been
defined to mean all character of debts and
obligations, an obligation one is bound in law
and justice to perform; an obligation which
may or may not ripen into a debt, any kind of
debt
or
liability,
either
absolute
or
contingent, express or implied.
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
16.
Section 138 of the N.I. Act speaks of “any debt or
other liability.” The explanation to Section 138 lays down as
follows;
“Explanation.–For the purposes of this
section, “debt or other liability” means a
legally enforceable debt or other liability.”
It has to be spelt out herein that every debt is a liability but not
every liability is a debt, however both are required to be legally
enforceable. In view of the contents in Exhibit 1 there is a clear
admission by the Respondent of his liability to repay the
amounts mentioned in the document. There is no escaping the
fact that it was a legally enforceable liability. The issuance of
three post dated Cheques by the Respondent further endorses
this circumstance. The argument of learned Counsel for the
Respondent that the Appellant is a Government servant hence
the source from where he afforded Rs.42,00,000/- (Rupees forty
two lakhs) only, has not been indicated was never raised in the
evidence of the Respondent and for the first time finds place only
in Appeal. The Judgment of the Hon‟ble Bombay High Court in
Sanjay Mishra (supra) relied on by the Respondent is overruled by
the ratio of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel
v. State of Gujarat and Others15 wherein it was inter alia held as
follows;
“17. In the case at hand, even after
purportedly
drawing
the
presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act, the Trial
Court proceeded to question the want of
evidence on the part of the complainant as
regards the source of funds for advancing
loan
to
the
accused
and
want
of
examination of relevant witnesses who
allegedly
extended
him
money
for
advancing it to the accused. This approach
MANU/SC/0393/2019
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
of the Trial Court had been at variance with
the principles of presumption in law . After
such presumption, the onus shifted to the
accused and unless the accused had
discharged the onus by bringing on record
such facts and circumstances as to show the
preponderance of probabilities tilting in his
favour, any doubt on the complainant's case
could not have been raised for want of
evidence regarding the source of funds for
advancing loan to the accused-Appellant.
The aspect relevant for consideration had
been as to whether the accused-Appellant
has
brought
on
record
such
facts/material/circumstances which could be
of a reasonably probable defence.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.
The circumstances in the instant cases also can be
distinguished from the ratio in Basalingappa (supra) wherein the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows;
“30. We are of the view that when
evidence was led before the court to indicate
that apart from loan of Rs 6 lakhs given to
the accused, within 2 years, amount of Rs 18
lakhs have been given out by the
complainant and his financial capacity being
questioned, it was incumbent on the
complainant to have explained his financial
capacity. Court cannot insist on a person to
lead negative evidence. The observation of
the High Court that trial court's finding that
the complainant failed to prove his financial
capacity of lending money is perverse,
cannot be supported. We fail to see that
how the trial court's findings can be termed
as perverse by the High Court when it was
based on consideration of the evidence,
which was led on behalf of the defence.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the above ratio it is clear that evidence was led before the
Court pertaining to the financial capacity of the Appellant
thereby extending him an opportunity to meet the evidence by
way of cross-examination, or furnishing of witnesses. In the
cases at hand, this is an altogether new point raised at the time
of Appeal. The Respondent had never questioned the financial
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
capacity of the Appellant during trial and cannot bring out a new
point at the appellate stage.
18.
That having been said while considering the third
question formulated hereinabove, it is apposite to first discuss
what Section 139 of the N.I. Act envisages. This Section is
extracted hereinbelow for easy reference;
“139. Presumption in favor of holder.It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is
proved, that the holder of a cheque received
the cheque of the nature referred to in
section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in
part, or any debt or other liability.”
This Section is essentially to be read with Section 118 of the N.I.
Act, the relevant portion is extracted hereinbelow;
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable
instruments.-Until the contrary is proved, the
following presumption shall be made:(a)
of
consideration-that
every
negotiable instrument was made or drawn
for consideration, and that every such
instrument, when it has been accepted,
endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted,
endorsed,
negotiated
or
transferred for consideration;”
It emerges from a reading of the said provisions that the
presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is an extension of
the presumption of Section 118(a) of the Act. If the negotiable
instrument happens to be a Cheque, Section 139 raises a further
presumption that the holder of the Cheque received the Cheque
in discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability.
Section 118 of the N.I. Act uses the phrase “until the contrary is
proved,” Section 139 of the N.I. Act provides “unless the
contrary is proved.” Section 4 of the Evidence Act which defines
“may presume” and “shall presume” makes it clear that
presumptions to be raised under the aforestated provisions are
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
rebuttable. In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee16 while
discussing rebuttable presumption, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
held as follows;
“20. That the four cheques were
executed by the appellant in favour of
Standard
Chartered
Bank
(hereinafter
referred to as “the Bank”) has not been
denied nor was it in dispute that the cheques
were dishonoured because of insufficient
funds in the appellant‟s account with the
drawee viz. Andhra Bank. Because of the
admitted execution of the four cheques by
the appellant, the Bank was entitled to and
did in fact rely upon three presumptions in
support of its case, namely, under Sections
118, 138 and 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Section 118 provides, inter
alia, that until the contrary is proved it shall
be
presumed
that
every
negotiable
instrument was made or drawn for
consideration,
and
that
every
such
instrument when it has been accepted,
endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted,
endorsed,
negotiated
or
transferred
for
consideration.
The
presumption which arises under Section 138
provides more specifically that where any
cheque drawn by a person on an account for
payment of any amount of money for the
discharge in whole or in part of any debt or
other liability, is returned by the drawee
bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account
is insufficient to honour the cheque, such
person shall be deemed to have committed
an offence and shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend
to one year, or with fine which may extend to
twice the amount of the cheque, or with
both. The nature of the presumption under
Section 138 is subject to the three conditions
specified relating to presentation, giving of
the notice and the non-payment after receipt
of notice by the drawer of the cheque. All
three conditions have not been denied in this
case.
…………………………………………………………………………
22. Because both Sections 138 and
139 require that the court “shall presume”
the liability of the drawer of the cheques for
the amounts for which the cheques are
drawn, as noted in State of Madras v. A.
Vaidhyanatha Iyer [AIR 1958 SC 61] it is
2001 SCC (Cri) 960
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
obligatory on the court to raise this
presumption in every case where the factual
basis for the raising of the presumption had
been established. “It introduces an exception
to the general rule as to the burden of proof
in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to
the accused.” (Ibid. at p. 65, para 14) Such a
presumption is a presumption of law, as
distinguished from a presumption of fact
which describes provisions by which the court
“may presume” a certain state of affairs.
Presumptions are rules of evidence and do
not conflict with the presumption of
innocence, because by the latter, all that is
meant is that the prosecution is obliged to
prove the case against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The obligation on the
prosecution may be discharged with the help
of presumptions of law or fact unless the
accused adduces evidence showing the
reasonable possibility of the nonexistence of
the presumed fact.”
19.
In Kamala S. v. Vidhyadharan M.J. and Another17, it was
held as follows;
“16. The nature and extent of such
presumption came up for consideration
before this Court in M.S. Narayana Menon
Alias Mani v. State of Kerala and Anr.
[(2006) 6 SCC 39] wherein it was held:
“30. Applying the said definitions
of "proved" or "disproved" to the principle
behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the
court
shall
presume
a
negotiable
instrument to be for consideration unless
and until after considering the matter
before it, it either believes that the
consideration does not exist or considers
the non-existence of the consideration so
probable that a prudent man ought, under
the circumstances of the particular case,
to act upon the supposition that the
consideration does not exist. For rebutting
such presumption, what is needed is to
raise a probable defence. Even for the
said purpose, the evidence adduced on
behalf of the complainant could be relied
upon.”
20.
On
the
touchstone
of
the
above
ratios
and
examination of the contents of Exhibit 1 it is evident that the
Respondent has admitted his legal liability/ obligations towards
(2007) 5 SCC 264
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
the Appellant for an amount of Rs.42,70,000/- (Rupees forty two
lakhs and seventy thousand) only. The three post dated Cheques
came to be issued consequent upon execution of Exhibit 1
thereby raising the presumption as elucidated in Sections 139
and 118 of the N.I. Act supra. The Respondent does not deny his
signatures on the Cheques which were dishonoured nor does he
dispute the transactions between him and the Appellant and has
accepted the execution of Exhibit 1. Section 139 of the N.I. Act
is an example of reverse onus and therefore once an admission
of issuance of Cheque emanates from the Respondent and the
signatures on the Cheques are admitted, there is always a
presumption in favour of the Complainant that a legally
enforceable debt or liability exists. It is for the Respondent to
rebut such presumption in evidence, which he has failed to do.
21.
The argument of learned Counsel for the Respondent
concerning non-filing of documentary evidence in the Complaints
to establish that the Cheques were dishonoured has no legs to
stand. It emanates with clarity that Exhibit 4, a certified copy of
the Cheque Return Memo in P.C. Case No.14 of 2015 established
that the Cheque was dishonoured. Neither the evidence nor the
Orders of the learned trial Court, (dated 22.02.2017) reveal that
any objection was raised by the Respondent to Exhibit 4 being a
certified copy in P.C. Case No.14 of 2015. Such an objection not
having been raised at trial cannot now be heard at the appellate
stage. In P.C. Case No.31 of 2015 and P.C. Case No.30 of 2015
Exhibit 4, in original, individually, were furnished as evidence by
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
the
Appellant
which
established
that
the
Cheques
were
dishonoured by the Bank on grounds given in the documents.
22.
This Court is conscious and aware that interference
against an acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court should be
rare and in exceptional circumstances, however it is open to the
High Court to reappraise the evidence and the conclusion drawn
by the learned trial Court to consider whether the Judgment of
the learned trial Court can be stated to be perverse. The word
“perverse” has to be understood in law as defined to mean
“against the weight of evidence.” From the discussions that have
ensued above I am of the considered opinion that the findings
arrived at by the learned trial Court are perverse and erroneous.
23.
Consequently, the Appeals are allowed.
24.
The impugned Judgments are set aside.
25.
The Respondent is convicted of the offence under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act in each of the afore detailed
Complaints.
26.
He is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment of
three months each, under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in each of
the Complaints. The Sentences shall run concurrently.
27.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Meters and Instruments
(P) Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta18 inter alia held that;
“18.4...apart from the sentence of
imprisonment, the court has jurisdiction
under Section 357(3) CrPC to award suitable
compensation with default sentence under
Section 64 IPC and with further powers of
recovery under Section 431 CrPC.“
(2018) 1 SCC 560
Crl.A. Nos.33, 34 and 35 of 2018
Sancha Bahadur Subba vs. Ramesh Subba
On the anvil of the said Judgment it is hereby ordered that the
Respondent shall also pay a total compensation amounting to
Rs.42,70,000/- (Rupees forty two lakhs and seventy thousand)
only, within three months from today to the Appellant, in terms
of Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C., with interest at the rate of 9%
per annum on the above stated amount, from the date of filing
of the Complaints before the learned trial Court. In default of
payment of compensation he shall undergo Simple Imprisonment
of two years. The compensation shall thereafter be recovered in
terms of the provisions of Section 431 Cr.P.C.
28.
The Respondent/Convict shall surrender before the
Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Sikkim at
Gangtok, within sixty days from today, to undergo his Sentence.
Should there be failure on his part to surrender, the learned trial
Court shall issue a Non-Bailable Warrant of Arrest against the
Respondent/Convict and thereafter commit him to jail for serving
the Sentence.
29.
Copy of this Judgment be transmitted to the learned
trial Court for information and compliance.
30.
No order as to costs.
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
05.03.2020
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