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Serial No. 02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 100 of 2021
Date of Decision: 12.08.2022
Shri Samlang Robert Sohkhlet
Vs. Shri Sameul Khongbuh Massar & Anr.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. R. Majaw, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S. M. Suna, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This is an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C preferred by the
petitioner with a prayer to quash the Complaint Case No. 12 of 2019 under
Section 191 and 193 IPC pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate
First Class, District Council Court, Shillong.
2.
The petitioner herein has preferred a writ petition before this Court
being WP(C) No. 283 of 2019 which was since disposed of. In the said petition,
the petitioner while swearing the affidavit has given his personal particulars as
required and has stated that he is a resident of Siatbakon village, East Khasi
Hills District, Meghalaya.
3.
The respondents taking exception to the fact that the petitioner has
filed the said petition before the High Court affirming that he is a resident of
Siatbakon village, which according to them he is not, but is actually a resident
of
Urksew-Wahpathaw,
has
accordingly
filed
the
said
complaint
aforementioned against which the petitioner has then approached this Court in
the present proceedings.
4.
Heard Mr. R. Majaw, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that in the complaint petition, the contention of the complainant/
respondents herein is that the petitioner cannot claim to be a permanent resident
of Siatbakon village since his name appears in the Electoral Roll of 27-Pynursla
under Urksew-Wahpathaw polling station, his ration card as well as his job card
under NREGS and finally his Contractor Registration Certificate all has his
residential address as Urksew-Wahpathaw and not Siatbakon village.
5.
Mr. Majaw has however submitted that though it is a fact that he was
a permanent resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw as that is his place of birth,
however, since his marriage in the year 2002, he went and cohabited with his
wife at Siatbakon village since she is from that village as can be seen from her
EPIC card at Annexure-10 of this petition. That the petitioner being a permanent
resident of Siatbakon village was also affirmed by the Headman of Saitbakon
village who has issued a Residential Certificate in favour of the petitioner herein
on 14.12.2012 (Annexure 9).
6.
Referring to the affidavit filed by the respondents to bring on record
certain documents, particularly pertaining to the fact that the petitioner is a
resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw, Mr. Majaw has submitted that the annexures
annexed to the said affidavit wherein at Annexure-1, a correspondent dated
01.09.2007 was issued upon one owner of a limestone burning unit by the
petitioner in his capacity as the Headman Urksew-Wahpathaw and at
Annexure-2 of the same, a letter was sent by the Secretary, Pdeng Raid, Raid
Shabong to the headmen of four villages, which includes the name of the
petitioner as the Headman of Urksew-Wahpathaw, the same is not denied by
the petitioner, however, it is submitted that Pdeng Raid, Raid Shabong consists
of four villages, namely; Rangthylliang, Pynursla, Urksew-Wahpathaw and
Siatbakon. In these four villages, only members of the three clans, that is,
Khongmaloh, Khongthaw and Sohkhlet can become the headman, which is why
the petitioner is the headman of Urksew-Wahpathaw.
7.
In support of his case, the petitioner has cited the following cases:
i)
Bhagwan Dass & Anr v. Kamal Abrol & Ors.: (2005) 11
SCC 66, Paras 6, 7 & 8;
ii)
Smt. Jeewanti Pandey v. Kishan Chandra Pandey: (1981) 4
SCC 517, Para 12;
iii)
Nabin Kumar Sahu v. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.:
(2018) 14 SCC 478, para 13;
iv)
In Re: Suo Motu Proceedings Against R. Karuppan,
Advocate: (2001) 5 SCC 289, para 16;
v)
Shri. Ngon Khongmawloh v. Shri. Phron Khongjawar.
Appeal in WP(C) No. 112 (SH) 99.
8.
Per contra, Mr. S. M. Suna, learned counsel for the respondents has
submitted that the main grievance of the respondents against the petitioner is
that in the said writ petition filed before this Court, which petition has since
been disposed of, the petitioner, in the affidavit of the said case, has mentioned
that he is a resident of Siatbakon village, when he is not a permanent resident
of Siatbakon village at that point of time which has therefore compelled the
respondents to file the said complaint for making a false statement before the
court.
9.
Another point raised is that the name of petitioner in the Electoral
Roll for Pynursla Constituency, the name of the petitioner is shown at serial
number 721 under Urksew-Wahpathaw polling station, whereas if he is a
permanent resident of Siatbakon village, his name would have appeared in the
Electoral Roll of Siatbakon village.
10.
Again, it is submitted that the petitioner has obtained a ration card
from Urksew-Wahpathaw village for which he could have availed of the same
from Siatbakon village if he is actually a permanent resident of that village as
claimed by him that he has resided permanently at Siatbakon village since his
marriage.
11.
As to the Residential Certificate said to have been issued by the then
headman of Siatbakon village in the year 2012, certifying that the petitioner is
a permanent resident of the village, the learned counsel for the respondents has
submitted that interestingly, at that particular point of time, he was the headman
of Urksew-Wahpathaw. Under the relevant laws of the District Council, a
person cannot become a headman of one village and be a resident of another
village.
12.
Even while referring to the affidavit filed by the respondents in this
case, the learned counsel has submitted that the all the documents annexed
thereto has clearly indicated that the petitioner was the headman of UrksewWahpathaw and was also nominated to be a representative of Urksew-
Wahpathaw village before the Pdeng Raid, Raid Shabong at the relevant point
of time.
13.
In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the
case of Mst. Jagir Kaur & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh: AIR 1963 SC 1521, para
9 and the case of K. Mohan v. Balakanta Lakshmi: 1983 CRI. L. J. 1316,
paras 7 & 9.
14.
Lastly, the learned counsel has submitted that the Trial Court before
taking cognizance of the complaint have examined all the materials placed
before it and on being satisfied, have accordingly taken cognizance of the same
and as such, it would be too premature to interfere with the said proceedings at
this stage but rather the same should be allowed to reach to its conclusion.
15.
Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court has given
due consideration to the same. What has been argued by the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that there is no materials to link him to the allegations made in
the complaint, inasmuch as he is accused of swearing a false affidavit before
this Court in the writ petition filed by him as mentioned above by citing his
place of residence as Siatbakon village when he is actually a permanent resident
of Urksew-Wahpathaw village.
16.
The petitioner went on to say that though he was born and brought up
at Urksew-Wahpathaw village, yet he is now a permanent resident of Siatbakon
village by virtue of being married to his wife who is a resident of Siatbakon
village and that after his marriage in the year 2002, he is permanently residing
at Siatbakon village.
17.
Both sides have produced documents as annexures in this petition as
well as in the affidavit filed by the respondents to bring on record certain
documents said to be relevant to the case to prove that the petitioner is a
permanent resident of Urksew-Wahpathaw village, while the petitioner has
asserted that his place of permanent residence can only be Siatbakon village.
18.
This Court is of the opinion that at this stage, it is not necessary to
consider the said documents since that would amount to touching the merits of
the case between the parties. However, for this Court to interfere with the
proceedings before the Trial Court, exercise of its inherent power under section
482 Cr.P.C is to be resorted to. Section 482 Cr.P.C reads as follows:
"482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.– Nothing in this
Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
19.
Inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C include power to quash
FIR, investigation or any criminal proceedings pending before any Courts
subordinate to the High Court. Such power can be exercised to secure ends of
justice, prevent abuse of the process of any Court and to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, depending upon the facts of a given case. However, such inherent
power are to be exercised with circumspection and due caution.
20.
In the landmark case State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal &
Ors.: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has
considered the provisions of section 482 and the power of the High Court to
quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Supreme Court in the case has laid
down certain guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their
inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint:
1.
Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
2.
Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3.
Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
4.
Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5.
Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
6.
Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
7.
Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
21.
Tested on the basis of the abovementioned guidelines, the first test is
to see whether the allegations made in the complaint prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused/petitioner herein.
22.
The allegation against the petitioner is that he had sworn an affidavit
giving false information or statement as far as his status as a permanent resident
of Siatbakon village is concerned. The respondents as complainants had
accordingly filed the complaint primarily alleging that an offence under Section
191 IPC was committed by the petitioner. Section 191 reads as follows:“191. Giving false evidence.—Whoever, being legally bound by an
oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being
bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any
statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be
false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.”
23.
Before this Court, the petitioner has sought to justify even by
documentary evidence that his place of permanent residence is at Siatbakon
village while the respondents would maintain that he is a permanent resident of
Urksew-Wahpathaw village.
24.
It appears that the issue as to what or where is the permanent residence
of the petitioner has to be decided, to determine as to whether he has committed
an offence under Section 191 IPC and that this issue has only to be decided by
the Trial Court.
25.
Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that this petition is
too premature and cannot be allowed at this juncture, a prima facie case having
been made out against the petitioner, this Court is restrained from exercising its
inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.
26.
The judgments cited by the parties relates mainly to the question and
issue as regard resident/residence and as such, need not be discussed by this
Court as it involves an issue of facts to be determined by the Trial Court.
27.
In view of the above, this petition is dismissed as devoid of merits.
Judge
Meghalaya
12.08.2022
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