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2026:HHC:7147
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 3070 of 2025
Reserved on: 27.2.2026
Date of Decision: 16.3.2026.
Salman
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
M/s Suresh Singh Saini and
Dhruv Thakur, Advocates.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Ajit Sharma,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 54 of 2025, dated 11.5.2025,
registered at Police Station BSL Colony, Sundernagar, District
Mandi, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 309(6), 333, 127(2), 351, 115(2), 61(2), 24 (a) of
Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Sections 25 and 27 of
the Indian Arms Act.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:7147
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution,
Shahid, Sartaj and Javed entered informant Naresh Kumar’s
house and committed robbery by pointing a knife at his wife.
They looted ₹80,000-90,000/- along with jewellery. The
petitioner was part of the conspiracy, which was hatched on
10.5.2025 in the residence of co-accused Junaid, where all the
accused persons had gathered and taken meals. Sartaj and Javed
had stolen a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-28A-6631
from Mandi Bazaar. The petitioner was in regular touch with coaccused Javed between 9.5.2025 and 11.5.2025. The petitioner was
not present on the crime scene, and he is being implicated based
on the confessional statement made by the co-accused. The
investigation is complete, and the custodial interrogation of the
petitioner is not required. The petitioner is ready and willing to
abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by a filing status report
asserting that the informant Naresh Kumar, his wife Sharda
Devi, his mother and his children were present in their home on
11.5.2025 at about 2.00 PM. Three masked persons came to the
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house and threatened them with a knife. They demanded the
mobile phones of the informant and his wife. They removed
₹80,000-90,000/- and jewellery from the almirah and took
them away. The matter was reported to the police, and the police
investigated it. The police checked the CCTV footage and found
that the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-28A-6631 was
moving around the informant’s house in suspicious condition.
This motorcycle was found to be stolen from Mandi on 10.5.2025.
Subsequently, the motorcycle was seen going towards Pungh on
11.5.2025 in the CCTV footage.
4.
The police of Police Station Jaansath, District
Mujjafarnagar, found four persons who were conspiring to loot
on 12.5.2025. They apprehended Javed, son of Khaleel and Javed
alias Sablu, son of Irshad. The police recovered the firearms from
their possession. The police also recovered motorcycles bearing
registration No. UP-20S-5189, DL-13SJ-1954, UP-12V-2096 and
UP-12G-6172. The motorcycle bearing registration No. UP-20S5189 was originally allotted registration No. HP-28A-6631.
Similarly, registration numbers of other motorcycles were found
to be different. The police apprehended Shahid on 13.5.2025 and
recovered firearms from his possession. The police arrested
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Sartaj alias Bhura and Salman (the petitioner). The police
recovered
firearms,
jewellery
and
a
motorcycle
bearing
registration No. UP-11C-3692 from their possession. Himachal
Police brought the jewellery to Mandi, and it was identified by
the informant. The petitioner was found in touch with the coaccused, and the location of his mobile phone was found to be in
Himachal Pradesh at the time of the incident. Sartaj made a
disclosure statement leading to the recovery of the knife, which
was used to threaten the informant. Sartaj, Javed and Shahid and
the motorcycle could be seen in CCTV Footage. The petitioner
would indulge in the commission of a similar offence if released
on bail. Hence, the status report.
5.
I have heard M/s Suresh Singh Saini and Dhruv
Thakkur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma,
learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.
6.
Mr Suresh Singh Saini, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he
was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the
petitioner to the commission of the crime except the statement
made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. The
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petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the
Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement 2024 INSC 595 and Maulana Mohd.
Amir Rashadi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. Cr. Appeal No. 159 of 2012,
decided on 16.1.2012 in support of his submission.
7.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved
in the commission of heinous offences. He would indulge in the
commission of a similar crime if released on bail. Therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. InGudikantiNarasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
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under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
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thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
2026:HHC:7147
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
2026:HHC:7147
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
10.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
2026:HHC:7147
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
11.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12.
The status report shows that the U.P. Police arrested
the petitioner on 16.5.2025. He was found in possession of
jewellery and firearms. The jewellery was identified by the
informant. The call detail record also shows that the petitioner
was present in Himachal Pradesh during the incident. These
circumstances prima facie show the petitioner’s involvement in
the commission of the crime.
13.
The offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous,
which is punishable with life imprisonment. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
2026:HHC:7147
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115:
1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the
person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must
revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person
is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different
footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and
the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to
secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be
liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In
this perspective, the relevance of considerations is
regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the
applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible
in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime
charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of
the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned
by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably
presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of
bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage
of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50
ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this
approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order
of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in
custody because of his guilt, but because there are
sufÏcient probable grounds for the charge against
him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and
because the detention is necessary to ensure his
appearance at trial .... It is a very important element
in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail,
would appear to take his trial; and I think that in
coming to a determination on that point three
elements will generally be found the most
important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by
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which it is supported, and the punishment to which
the party would be liable if convicted. In the present
case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the
evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of
the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the
offence is, by law, death.”
7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
14.
Considering the nature of the offence and the severity
of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail.
15.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner.
Considering the gravity of the offence, the nature of the crime
and the severity of the punishment, the delay by itself is not
sufÏcient to grant bail to the petitioner. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine
SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle
a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page
141:
“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the
grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the
2026:HHC:7147
Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more
than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact
that the accused was in custody for more than one
year may not be a relevant consideration. In
Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008)
3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that
the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle
the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was
reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”
16.
In Manish Sisodia (supra) and Maulana Mohd. Amir
Rashadi's (supra) bail was granted because of the delay. In the
present case, the petitioner was arrested on 16.5.2025 by Uttar
Pradesh Police, and there is no delay in the progress of the trial.
Therefore, the cited judgments do not apply to the present case.
17.
No other point was urged.
18.
In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to
bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
19.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
16th March, 2026
(Chander)
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