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2026:HHC:29327
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 683 of 2025
Reserved on: 7.7.2026
Date of Decision: 17.7.2026.
Salig Ram
...Petitioner
Versus
Shimla Urban Cooperative Ltd.
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr T.K. Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Nemo.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment
dated 22.07.2025, passed by Learned Additional Sessions JudgeII, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide
which the judgment of conviction dated 24.05.2024 and order of
sentence dated 27.05.2024, passed by learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial
Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:29327
the same manner as they were read before the learned Trial Court
for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint in the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is
engaged in banking activities. The complainant advanced a loan
of ₹50,000/- to the accused on 17.08.2014, and the accused
executed various documents. The accused promised to repay the
amount along with interest in equated monthly instalments. The
accused issued a cheque of ₹1,00,000/- to discharge his liability
on 08.10.2015. The complainant presented the cheque at its
bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient
funds’. The complainant issued a notice to the accused asking
him to repay the amount within 15 days from the date of receipt
of the notice. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but
the accused failed to repay the money. Hence, the complaint was
filed before the learned Court for taking action as per the law.
3.
2026:HHC:29327
Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
The complainant examined L.D. Verma (CW1) to
prove its complaint.
5.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), stated that he had
taken a loan of ₹2,00,000/- and handed over the cheque as
security. He denied that he had received any notice. He claimed
that a false case was made against him. He did not produce any
evidence to prove his defence.
6.
Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the
cheque was not disputed, and a presumption would be attracted
that the accused had issued the cheque to the complainant for
consideration to discharge debt/liability. The complainant failed
to rebut this presumption. The cheque was dishonoured with an
endorsement of ‘insufficient funds’. The notice was duly served
upon the accused, and he had failed to repay any money. All the
2026:HHC:29327
ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the Learned
Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and
sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days and
pay a fine of ₹1,70,000/- to the complainant.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was
decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla,
District Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate
Court concurred with the findings recorded by the Learned Trial
Court that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed; hence, a
presumption would arise that the cheque was issued to the
complainant in discharge of the legal liability. The accused failed
to rebut this presumption by leading any satisfactory evidence.
The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient
funds’, and the notice was duly served upon the accused. He
failed to repay the money despite the receipt of a valid notice of
demand. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was
dismissed.
8.
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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the material on record. The complainant admitted
that the instalment of ₹6,000/- per month was being regularly
deducted from the salary of the accused towards the repayment
of the loan in question, and this deduction continued until
14.05.2020. Therefore, the complainant had no reason to present
a cheque of ₹1,00,000/- before the bank. The complainant's
version
was
doubtful
that
the
cheque
was
issued
for
consideration to discharge the debt/liability. Hence, it was
prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments
and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
9.
I have heard Mr T.K. Verma, learned counsel for the
petitioner. None appeared on behalf of the respondent despite
service; hence, none could be heard on the respondent’s behalf.
10.
Mr T.K. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the accused was regularly paying the monthly
instalments from his salary as per the admission made by the
complainant’s witness, and there was no question of any default
2026:HHC:29327
in the repayment of the loan. An amount of ₹50,000/- was
advanced to the accused as per the complaint. However, a
cheque of ₹1,00,000/- was presented after one year, which could
not have been the amount due. The accused had regularly paid
the installments and the monthly instalments were being
deducted from his salary. The learned courts below failed to
appreciate the significance of the cross-examination of the
complainant's witnesses and erred in convicting the accused.
Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and
the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be
set aside.
11.
I
have
given
a
considerable
thought
to
the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
12.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional
court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent
defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page
207-
2026:HHC:29327
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent
findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
detailed appreciation of the material and evidence
brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision
against conviction is not supposed to exercise the
jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of
interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests
jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence
or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error
that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases.
It is also well settled that while considering the same, the
Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts
and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
13.
This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
DilipsinhKishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to
call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect
or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which
has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has
2026:HHC:29327
been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC
p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise
the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token
of careful consideration and appear to be in
accordance with law. If one looks into the various
judgments of this Court, it emerges that the
revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the
decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous,
there is no compliance with the provisions of law,
the finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each
case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the
inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an
interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself
should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is
dealing with the question as to whether the charge has
been framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing
of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the
proceedings under CrPC.”
14.
2026:HHC:29327
It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala
v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC
452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of
the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court
has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can
call for and examine the record of any proceedings
to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other
words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for
correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said
revisional power cannot be equated with the power
of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a
second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,
it would not be appropriate for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its
conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well
as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring
feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise amount to a gross
miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the
impugned judgment of the High Court from the
aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in
concluding that the High Court exceeded its
2026:HHC:29327
jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the
respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court
in SanjaysinhRamrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke,
(2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held
that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the
Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or
there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the
order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that
another view is possible. The following has been laid
down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading of
records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting
aside the order, merely because another view is possible.
The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate
court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is
to preserve the power in the court to do justice in
accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to
401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal.
Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought
to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law
or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or where the
material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the
courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of
their revisional jurisdiction.”
15.
This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
2026:HHC:29327
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it
is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional
Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by
a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a
jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,
therefore, in the negative.”
16.
A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir
Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales
& Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008)
14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that
the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong
order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the
absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the
absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in
the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions
Court.
17.
The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18.
2026:HHC:29327
The accused, Salig Ram (DW1), stated that he had
taken a loan of ₹2,00,000/- in the year 2014. He was regularly
paying the instalment at the rate of ₹6,000/- per month with
effect from September, 2015 till March, 2020. The complainant
had obtained 3-4 blank cheques as security at the time of
advancing the loan. The complainant presented a cheque of
₹1,00,000/- despite the fact that the instalments were being
paid regularly. He stated in his cross-examination that he had
taken a loan of ₹50,000/- and ₹2,00,000/- and was paying the
instalments of ₹6,000/- and ₹4,000/- per month. He admitted
that he could not pay the regular instalments in between.
19.
The accused has not disputed his signature on the
cheque or the issuance of the cheque. He claimed that he had
issued the security cheque at the time of taking the loan. Thus,
the learned Courts below had rightly held that the issuance of
the cheque and the signatures on the cheque were not in dispute.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex
Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12
SCC 724, that when the issuance of a cheque and signature on the
cheque are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the
2026:HHC:29327
cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was
observed: “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and
considering the fact that the accused has admitted the
issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque
and that the cheque in question was issued for the second
time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that
even according to the accused some amount was due and
payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the
NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or
liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable.
However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was
required to lead evidence that the full amount due and
payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present
case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The
story put forward by the accused that the cheques were
given by way of security is not believable in the absence of
further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more
particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the
second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured.
Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in
not properly appreciating and considering the
presumption in favour of the complainant that there
exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section
139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial
court as well as the High Court have committed an error in
shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the
debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above,
Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus
clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has
been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has
been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of
the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt
or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut
such presumption by leading evidence.”
20.
2026:HHC:29327
This position was reiterated in N. Vijay Kumar v.
Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held
as under:
“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable
instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while
Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a
cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or
liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable,
meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a
probable defence.”
21.
A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI
ACT ARISE
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.
This Court is of the view that once the execution of the
cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of
the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for
consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of
the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said
cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to
mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge
Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,
(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge
Bench in Rangappa (supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques
as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
2026:HHC:29327
17. Needless to mention that the presumption
contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is
rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the
cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is
on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
22.
Thus, the Court has to start with the presumption
that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for
consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this
presumption.
23.
L.D. Verma (CW1) stated in his cross-examination
that the loan instalments were being deducted from the salary of
the accused till 14.5.2020. Thus, as per the statement of L.D.
Verma, the loan instalments were being paid regularly, and
there was no question of presenting a cheque of ₹1,00,000/- on
08.10.2015.
24.
The statement of account (Ex.C7/CW1) was with
effect from 18.01.2017 and does not establish the liability in the
year 2015. Another loan account statement shows an amount of
₹2,48,070/- as a withdrawal. It only mentions a cash deposit of
₹7,000/- on 04.11.2015. Thus, it is contrary to the statement of
L.D. Verma (CW1) that the loan amount was being regularly
deducted from the salary of the accused. The specific case of the
2026:HHC:29327
complainant is that a loan of ₹50,000/- was advanced, and it is
not explained how an amount of ₹2,48,070/- has been shown in
the statement of account. Therefore, it is difficult to rely upon
the statement of the account to determine the liability of the
accused.
25.
The accused admitted in his statement on oath that
he had taken the loan of ₹2,50,000/-. This admission will not
help the complainant because the complaint has not been filed
regarding the loan of ₹2,00,000/-, and it is not stated by the
complainant in the complaint or by L.D. Verma on oath that both
the loans were consolidated. The complaint's case is simple: a
loan of ₹ 50,000 was advanced to the accused, and he failed to
repay the amount. Thus, the statement of account is not
connected to the present complaint.
26.
It is further not explained how an amount of
₹50,000/- would become ₹1,00,000/- after the lapse of one
year, and that too when the loan instalments were being
regularly paid. This shows that the amount of ₹1,00,000/mentioned in the cheque is not towards the repayment of the
2026:HHC:29327
debt/liability, and the accused would be entitled to the benefit of
the doubt.
27.
The learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that
a cheque carries with it a presumption of correctness which had
not been rebutted. However, this premise is not correct, as the
cross-examination of L.D. Verma makes it doubtful that an
amount of ₹1,00,000/- was due when the loan instalments were
being paid regularly. Further, the statement of account of the
accused was not proper as it does not show the amount of loan
advanced by the complainant or the deduction from the salary of
the accused. The accused does not have to prove his defence
beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is sufficient that he satisfies
the Court on the preponderance of the probability that the
defence taken by him is correct.
28.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1275 that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and
disappears after the evidence is produced. It was observed:
“38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the
Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on
Evidence states as follows:
2026:HHC:29327
“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is
merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury
to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence
to the contrary from the opponent but if the
opponent does offer evidence to the contrary
(sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of
some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a
rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free
from any rule’.”
29.
Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in convicting
and sentencing the accused and the learned Appellate Court
erred in upholding the conviction and the sentence.
30.
In view of the above, the present revision is allowed,
judgment of conviction dated 24.05.2024 and order of sentence
dated 27.05.2024, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, No. 2, Shimla, H.P., as affirmed by Learned
Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., are
ordered to be set aside. The petitioner/accused is acquitted of the
charges framed against him. The fine, if deposited, be refunded
to the petitioner/accused after the expiry of the period of
limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal,
the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India.
31.
2026:HHC:29327
In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the accused is directed to
furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar
(Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks,
which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in
the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this
judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused, on
receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
32.
A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the
learned
Trial
Court,
be
sent
back
forthwith.
Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
17th July, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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