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CGHC010453262025
Digitally
signed by
YOGESH
YOGESH TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.10.13
17:23:13
+0530
2026:CGHC:43125
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 21.08.2026
Order Delivered on : 06.10.2026
WPC No. 5598 of 2025
Radha Krishna Rice Mill Through Its Proprietor, Shri Mohan Agrawal,
S/o Late Bhagirath Ji Agrawal, Aged About 71 Years, R/o Village Paragaon, Tehsil Gobara-Nawapara, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Rajim Through Its Secretary, District Gariaband, Chhattisgarh
3 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti - Nawapara Through Its Secretary, District
- Raipur Chhattisgarh
4 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Additional Director Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5610 of 2025
Yash Parboiling Unit Through Its Proprietor, Shri Manmohan Agrawal,
S/o Late Phoon Chand Agrawal, Aged Agbout 68 Years, R/o Ward No.
3, Gobara- Nawapara, District Raipur (C.G.)
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti- Rajim, Through Its Secretary, District Gariaband (C.G.)
3 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti- Nawapara, Through Its Secretary, District
Raipur (C.G.)
4 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Through
Its Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan,
G.E. Road, Telibandha, Raipur (C.G.)
5 - Additional Director, Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri- Kanpa, Raipur (C.G.)
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5599 of 2025
Vaibhav Agrotech Pvt. Ltd. Through Its Authorised Signatory Shri
Mukesh Agrawal, S/o Shri Prahlad Agrawal, Aged About 49 Years, R/o
Fingeshwar Road, Rajim, District- Gariyaband, C.G.- 493889.
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur C.G.
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti-Rajim, Through Its Secretary, DistrictGariaband C.G.
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Through
Its Managing Director/additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, C.G.
4 - Additional Director, Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, C.G.
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5595 of 2025
Satnam Industries Through Its Partner, Shri Premchand Sundrani, S/o
Late Shri Aadatmal Ji Sundrani, Aged About 71 Years, R/o VillageParagaon, Tehsil- Gobara, Nawapara, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh493881.
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur C.G.
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti-Rajim, Through Its Secretary, DistrictGariyaband C.G.
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Through
Its Managing Director/additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, C.G.
4 - Additional Director, Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, C.G.
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5594 of 2025
Girdhar Gopal Rice Product Through Its Proprietor, Shri Nayan
Agrawal, S/o Shri Gopal Agrawal, Aged About 40 Years, R/o Chhanta
Road, Gobara Nawapara, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh - 493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Rajim, Through Its Secretary, DistrictGariaband, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti - Nawapara Through Its Secretary, DistrictRaipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director / Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Additional Director Joint Director - In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri- Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5602 of 2025
Gurudev Rice Mill Through Its Proprietor, Shri Gambhirmal Sankhala,
S/o Late Daulatraj Ji Sankhala, Aged About 61 Years, R/o Village Patharra, Tehsil - Rajim District - Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti - Rajim Through Its Secretary, District Gariaband, Chhattisgarh
3 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti - Nawapara Through Its Secretary, District
- Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Additional Director, Joint Director - In-Charge Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5606 of 2025
Laddu Gopal Rice Mill Through Its Partner Shri Girdhari Agrawal, S/o
Late Jhumuklal Ji Agrawal Aged About 64 Years R/o Village - Paragaon,
Tehsil- Gobara, Nawapara, District Raipur C.G.- 493881.
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District – Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti-Rajim, Through Its Secretary, DistrictGariyaband, Chhattisgarh
3 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti-Nawapara, Through Its Secretary, District
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Through
Its Managing Director/additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Additional Director, Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5660 of 2025
Shivam Industries Through Its Proprietor, Shri Naveen Kumar Lalwani,
S/o Shri Mahesh Lalwani, Aged About 39 Years R/o Village – Kurra,
Tehsil - Gobara, Nawapara, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh - 493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Nawapara Through Its Secretary, DistrictRaipur Chhattisgarh
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road Telibandha, Raipur Chhattisgarh
4 - Additional Director Joint Director - In – Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj Mandi
First Floor, Pandri - Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5605 of 2025
Shri Mohini Agrotech Through Its Partner, Shri Bhagwan Das Sundrani,
S/o Late Sadoramal Ji Sundrani Aged About 54 Years, R/o VillageGobara, Nawapara, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh-493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Department of
Agriculture Development and Farmers Welfare and Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti- Nawapara Through Its Secretary, DistrictRaipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director / Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Additional Director, Joint Director- In-Charge Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri- Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5699 of 2025
Vikas Industries Through Its Partner, Shri Kishanchand Sankhala, S/o
Late Daulatraj Ji Sankhala, Aged About 59 Years, R/o Village- Patharra,
Tehsil- Rajim, District- Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh- 493889
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department of
Agriculture Development and Farmers Welfare and Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District – Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti- Rajim Through Its Secretary, District Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh
3 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti- Nawapara Through Its Secretary, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director / Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Additional Director Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5730 of 2025
Sagri Agro Product Pvt. Ltd., Through Its Authorised Signatory, Shri
Mukesh Agrawal, S/o Shri Prahlad Agrawal, Aged About 49 Years, R/o
Village-
Kurra,
Tehsil-
Gobara-
Nawapara,
District-
Raipur,
Chhattisgarh- 493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti - Nawapara Through Its Secretary, District
- Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director / Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Additional Director Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5722 of 2025
Sai Hanumant Industries Pvt. Ltd Through Its Authorised Signatory, Shri
Sandeep Dhamejani, S/o Shri Nanak Ram Dhamejani, Aged About 42
Years, R/o Ghat Road, Village- Paragaon, Tehsil- Gobara Nawapara,
District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh- 493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti- Nawapara Through Its Secretary, DistrictRaipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Additional Director Joint Director-In-Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri- Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5697 of 2025
Shri Laxmi Paddy Processing Unit Through Its Proprietor, Shri Santosh
Kumar Sundrani S/o Late Chandulal Ji Sundrani Aged About 56 Years,
R/o Village - Kurra Tehsil Gobara- Nawapara, District - Raipur
Chhattisgarh - 493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department of
Agriculture Development and Farmers Welfare and Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District – Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Rajim Through Its Secretary, DistrictGariyaband , Chhattisgarh
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road Telibandha, Raipur Chhattisgarh
4 - Additional Director Joint Director-In-Charge Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj Mandi
First Floor, Pandri - Kanpa, Raipur Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5636 of 2025
Baanke Bihari Rice Mill Through- Its Proprietor Shri Prateek Agrawal,
S/o Late Shri Girdhar Agrawal Aged About 39 Years, R/o Village Kurra, Tehsil- Gobara-Nawapara, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh- 493881.
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Its Secretary Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar, District- Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Rajim Through- Its Secretary, DistrictGariyaband, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Nawapara Through- Its Secretary, DistrictRaipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi ) Board ThroughIts Managing Director/Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road Telibandha, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
5 - Additional Director Joint Director - In – Charge, Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Officer, New Ganj
Mandi First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh,
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5753 of 2025
Shri Ganesh Rice Mill Through Its Partner, Shri Prakash Chand Bothra,
S/o Late Ranulal Ji Bothra, Aged About 74 Years, R/o Village – Tarri,
P.O. Patewa, Tehsil - Gobara-Nawapara, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh
- 493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti - Nawapara Through Its Secretary, District
- Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Through Its
Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Additional Director, Joint Director - In-Charge Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 5786 of 2025
Vijay And Co., Through Its Proprietor, Shri Vijay Agrawal, S/o Late Shri
Harishchandra, Aged About 62 Years, R/o Village- Kurra, TehsilGobara- Nawapara, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh - 493881
---Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Agriculture Development And Farmers Welfare And Bio Technology,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Nawapara, Through Its Secretary, DistrictRaipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Chhattisgarh State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board Though Its
Managing Director/ Additional Managing Director, Beej Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Additional Director, Joint Director-In-Charge Chhattisgarh State
Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Regional Office, New Ganj
Mandi, First Floor, Pandri-Kanpa, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners
: Mr. Ankit Singhal, Advocate
For State
: Dr. Arham Siddiqui, Panel Lawyer
For Respective Respondents : Mr. Amrito Das, Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Shreyansh Mehta,
Advocate as well as Mr. Navoday
Singh, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1.
Heard Mr. Ankit Singhal, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners as well as Dr. Arham Siddiqui, learned Panel Lawyer,
appearing for the State, and Mr. Amrito Das, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr. Shreyansh Mehta, learned counsel as
also Mr. Navoday Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
respective respondents.
2.
The present batch comprises sixteen writ petitions, wherein the
petitioners have called in question the legality, propriety and
validity of the common order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the
Chhattisgarh
State
Agricultural
Marketing
(Mandi)
Board/competent authority, whereby their respective claims for
refund/adjustment of the excess market fee/mandi shulk and
Farmers' Welfare Fee paid during the period to which the
exemption notification dated 29.07.2022 was made retrospectively
applicable have been rejected.
3.
Since all the writ petitions arise out of the same controversy,
involve substantially identical questions of law and fact, and the
impugned orders in all the matters are founded upon the same
reasoning, the petitions have been clubbed together, heard
analogously and are being decided by this common order.
4.
The grievance raised by the petitioners in all the matters is
essentially common, namely, that being rice millers and not
traders, they were entitled to the benefit of the exemption/reduced
rate of market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee prescribed by the
notification dated 29.07.2022 with retrospective effect, and that
the excess amount collected from them for the period covered by
the said notification was liable to be refunded or, in the alternative,
adjusted against their future liability. The petitioners further
contend that the rejection of their claims on the premise that they
had passed on the burden of the market fee to their consumers is
based upon an erroneous assumption and is contrary to the
material placed by them before the authority.
5.
Since the controversy involved in all the writ petitions is common
and the pleadings and documents placed on record are
substantially similar, for the sake of convenience and to avoid
repetition, the facts of W.P.(C) No. 5598 of 2025, Radha Krishna
Rice Mill v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others are being taken as
the lead matter. The findings recorded in the present common
order shall, therefore, govern all the connected writ petitions,
subject to the individual figures, periods and amounts claimed by
the respective petitioners. The principal grievance of all the
petitioners is that they are rice millers engaged in the business of
purchasing paddy, processing/milling the same and thereafter
selling the resultant rice in the open market, and are not traders
carrying on the business of purchase and resale of agricultural
produce in the ordinary course.
6.
According to the petitioners, the paddy purchased by them from
the Krishi Upaj Mandi is procured for the specific purpose of
processing/milling in their respective rice mills and, therefore, they
fall within the class of rice millers for whose benefit the reduced
rate of market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee was subsequently
notified by the State Government.
7.
The case of the petitioners is that the purchase and sale of
agricultural produce within the market area are regulated by the
provisions of the Chhattisgarh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1972"). Under the statutory
scheme, the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti regulates and facilitates
transactions in agricultural produce within the market area and is
empowered to levy the prescribed market fee/mandi shulk and
other charges in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the
notifications issued thereunder. In exercise of the powers
conferred by Section 19 of the Act of 1972, the State Government
issued notification dated 30.11.2021, whereby the market
fee/mandi shulk was prescribed at the rate of Rs.3/- for every
Rs.100/- of the value of the agricultural produce, while the
Farmers' Welfare Fee was prescribed at the rate of Rs.2/- for
every
Rs.100/-.
The
said
rates
were
made
applicable
prospectively with effect from 01.12.2021. It is not in dispute that,
pursuant to the said notification and during the period when the
aforesaid rates were operative, the petitioners duly discharged the
market fee/mandi shulk and Farmers' Welfare Fee as demanded
by the respective Mandi authorities in respect of their transactions
of purchase of paddy.
8.
The petitioners further submit that the statutory position
underwent a material change with the issuance of the notification
dated 29.07.2022, whereby, in exercise of the power available to
the State Government under Section 69 of the Act of 1972, the
earlier levy was modified and the market fee/mandi shulk was
reduced to Rs.1/- for every Rs.100/- of the value of the agricultural
produce, and the Farmers' Welfare Fee was also reduced to
Rs.1/- for every Rs.100/-. Significantly, the benefit of the said
notification was made available retrospectively for the period
commencing from 01.04.2022 and continuing up to 31.03.2023,
and, according to the petitioners, the reduced rate was specifically
intended to extend the benefit to rice millers purchasing paddy
from the Mandi for the purpose of processing/manufacturing the
same. Thus, according to the petitioners, although they had
initially paid market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee at the rates
prevailing prior to the notification dated 29.07.2022, the
subsequent retrospective operation of the notification entitled
them to claim refund or adjustment of the differential amount paid
by
them
for
the
period
covered
by
the
retrospective
exemption/reduction.
9.
It is the further case of the petitioners that, being directly covered
by the class of beneficiaries contemplated under the notification
dated 29.07.2022, they approached the respective Mandi
authorities and sought refund/adjustment of the excess amount of
market fee/mandi shulk and Farmers' Welfare Fee already paid by
them for the period commencing from 01.04.2022. The respective
authorities, however, declined to grant such refund or adjustment.
By communications issued in the year 2022, including letters
dated 29.09.2022 and 13.10.2022, the petitioners were informed
that, in view of the instructions received by the authorities, the
excess market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee could neither be
refunded nor adjusted on the ground that the petitioners were
presumed to have already recovered the said amount from their
respective end consumers. The petitioners disputed the aforesaid
reasoning, contending that the assumption that the burden of the
market fee had been passed on to their consumers was factually
incorrect and had been arrived at without examining their books of
accounts, invoices, sale bills and other relevant financial material.
In
the
lead
matter,
refund/adjustment
of
the
petitioner
specifically
claimed
the
differential
amount,
including
Rs.5,85,549/- towards excess market fee/mandi shulk and
Rs.2,92,774/- towards excess Farmers' Welfare Fee for the
relevant period.
10. Aggrieved by the rejection of their respective claims, the
petitioners initially approached this Court by filing separate writ
petitions. In the lead matter also, the petitioner had instituted W.P.
(C) No.43 of 2023, challenging the action of the authorities in
refusing to refund/adjust the excess amount paid towards market
fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee. Similar writ petitions were filed by
the other rice millers raising the same grievance. All those
petitions were considered together and were disposed of by a
common order dated 16.01.2025. This Court, while examining the
rejection of the petitioners' claims, found that the claims had been
rejected essentially on the assumption that the petitioners had
shifted the burden of payment of the market fee to their
consumers. The orders were consequently quashed and the
competent authority was directed to reconsider the claims afresh,
after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioners
and after examining, in particular, the factual question as to
whether the petitioners had actually collected the market
fee/mandi shulk and the corresponding Farmers' Welfare Fee
from their respective customers. Thus, the matter was remitted for
a fresh determination on the specific issue of passing on the
burden, rather than permitting the authorities to reject the claim
merely on the basis of a presumption.
11.
Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 16.01.2025, the competent
authority initiated fresh proceedings. By communication dated
14.02.2025, the petitioner in the lead matter was called upon to
furnish relevant financial and accounting material, including audit
reports, financial statements, balance sheets, sale invoices and
other documents, so as to enable the authority to ascertain
whether the burden of the market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee
had in fact been passed on to the consumers. The petitioner duly
participated in the proceedings and submitted the relevant
statement of accounts, balance sheets, invoices and other
supporting documents, including bills raised upon its customers
before and after the issuance of the notification dated 29.07.2022.
The specific case of the petitioner was that there was no separate
component of mandi fee/market fee charged or recovered from its
customers and that the amount paid by it to the Mandi authorities
could not, merely because it was reflected in its books of account
as an expenditure, be treated as an amount recovered from the
consumers.
12. A personal hearing was thereafter afforded to the petitioner on
22.07.2025, which was attended by the petitioner and its
authorised representative. During the course of hearing, the
petitioner reiterated that, under the statutory scheme governing
market fee, it had no authority to levy or separately recover mandi
fee from its consumers and that the market fee paid by it to the
Mandi authorities was its own statutory liability in respect of the
purchase transaction. The petitioner further submitted that the
invoices and other contemporaneous documents produced before
the authority demonstrated that there was no corresponding
increase in the sale price or any separate recovery from the
consumers representing the market fee or Farmers' Welfare Fee.
It was, therefore, contended that the mere accounting treatment of
the amount as an expenditure in the profit and loss account could
not establish that the burden had been passed on to the
consumers. The petitioner also relied upon the documentary
material produced pursuant to the direction of this Court and
submitted that the test directed to be examined by the earlier
order dated 16.01.2025 was required to be determined on the
basis of actual evidence and not on conjecture or presumption.
13. Notwithstanding the aforesaid material placed on record and the
specific opportunity afforded pursuant to the order of this Court,
the competent authority, by the common impugned order dated
10.09.2025, rejected the claims of the petitioners. In substance,
the authority concluded that the petitioners had failed to establish
that the burden of the market fee/mandi shulk had not ultimately
been passed on to their respective consumers. In arriving at such
conclusion, reliance was placed, inter alia, upon the audit reports
and the manner in which the market fee was reflected in the
books of account of the petitioners as an expenditure in the profit
and loss account. From such accounting treatment, the authority
proceeded to infer that the amount paid towards market fee had
ultimately formed part of the cost of the goods and, consequently,
that the burden stood shifted to the end consumers. The
petitioners assail the said conclusion as being contrary to the
documentary evidence available on record, as well as contrary to
the specific issue for which the matter had been remanded by this
Court. According to them, the impugned order proceeds on an
erroneous understanding of the distinction between incurring a
statutory levy as a business expenditure and actually passing on
the burden of such levy to the consumer, and therefore suffers
from perversity, non-application of mind and failure to properly
appreciate the material placed before the authority.
14. The principal reliefs sought in the lead petition, i.e. W.P.(C)
No.5598 of 2025, are as follows:
“10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to pass any appropriate writ, order or
direction
to
quash
and
set
aside
the
impugned order dated 10.09.2025, being
perverse, illegal and without application of
mind, in the interest of justice;
10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to pass any appropriate writ, order or
direction and direct Respondent Nos.2 and 3
to refund the excess market fee/mandi shulk
and Farmers' Welfare Fee paid by the
petitioner for the period from 01.04.2022 to
29.07.2022; or, in the alternative;
10.3 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to pass any appropriate writ, order or
direction and direct Respondent Nos.2 and 3
to adjust the excess market fee/mandi shulk
and Farmers' Welfare Fee paid by the
petitioner for the period from 01.04.2022 to
29.07.2022 with future transactions;
10.4 Any other relief or reliefs which this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in
view of the facts and circumstances of the
case, may also kindly be granted.”
15. The aforesaid factual narration in the lead petition substantially
represents the grievance raised in all the connected writ petitions.
Though the respective petitioners have claimed different amounts
and the precise period and quantum of excess market
fee/Farmers' Welfare Fee may vary from case to case, the
foundation of their claims is identical. All the petitioners assert that
they are rice millers and not traders, that the paddy purchased by
them from the Mandi was procured for the purpose of
processing/milling, that they were covered by the class of
beneficiaries
contemplated
under
the
notification
dated
29.07.2022, and that, owing to the retrospective operation of the
said notification from 01.04.2022, they became entitled to the
benefit of the reduced rate and consequently to refund or
adjustment of the differential amount already paid. All the
petitioners further contend that their respective claims were
initially rejected on the same premise that the burden had been
passed on to the consumers; that such rejection was set aside by
this Court by order dated 16.01.2025 with a direction to undertake
a fresh factual determination; that the petitioners thereafter
produced their financial records, invoices, statements and other
relevant documents and were afforded an opportunity of hearing;
and that, despite the same, the competent authority has again
rejected their claims by the common order dated 10.09.2025
substantially on the basis of the accounting treatment of the
market fee as an expenditure. It is in this backdrop that all the
sixteen writ petitions have been heard together, as they raise
common questions concerning the entitlement of the petitioners to
the benefit of the notification dated 29.07.2022 and the legality of
the reasoning adopted by the authority while rejecting their claims
for refund/adjustment.
16. Mr. Ankit Singhal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in
all the writ petitions, at the outset, submits that the controversy
involved in the present batch of writ petitions is required to be
examined in the backdrop of the statutory scheme of the Act of
1972 and, in particular, the distinction between the power of the
Market Committee to levy market fee under Section 19 of the Act
of 1972 and the power of the State Government to grant
exemption, wholly or partly, from payment of such market fee
under Section 69 thereof. Learned counsel submits that the
notification dated 29.07.2022 was not merely a fresh charging
notification but was specifically issued in exercise of the statutory
power of exemption conferred upon the State Government under
Section 69 of the Act of 1972. According to him, the said
notification was issued for the benefit of a particular and
identifiable class, namely, rice millers, and the petitioners
admittedly fall within the very class for whose benefit the
exemption was introduced. It is submitted that the notification
dated 29.07.2022 reduced the market fee to Rs.1/- for every
Rs.100/- and the Farmers' Welfare Fee to Rs.1/- for every
Rs.100/-, and, significantly, gave such benefit retrospective effect
from 01.04.2022. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that once
the State Government, in exercise of its statutory power, extended
the benefit of reduced levy to rice millers with retrospective effect,
the authorities administering the Mandi legislation could not
defeat, dilute or nullify such benefit by refusing to refund or adjust
the excess amount already collected from the petitioners.
17. Learned counsel further submits that the earlier notification dated
30.11.2021 had been issued under Section 19 of the Act of 1972,
pursuant to which the market fee payable in respect of
transactions in agricultural produce was prescribed at the rate of
Rs.3/- for every Rs.100/- of the value of the produce and the
Farmers' Welfare Fee at Rs.2/- for every Rs.100/-. The
petitioners, being purchasers of paddy from the Mandi for the
purpose of milling and processing, duly discharged the levy
demanded by the concerned Market Committees. However,
subsequently, the State Government exercised its statutory power
under Section 69 and issued the notification dated 29.07.2022
granting exemption/reduction in the levy to the specified category
of rice millers and made the notification operative retrospectively
from 01.04.2022. It is submitted that the retrospective operation of
the notification necessarily has to be given full effect. If the excess
amount already collected for the period from 01.04.2022 onwards
is permitted to be retained by the Market Committee, the very
purpose of granting retrospective benefit would stand frustrated.
Learned counsel submits that the Market Committee, which is
merely an authority administering the levy, cannot claim a power
superior to that of the State Government which has exercised its
statutory power under Section 69 to grant exemption.
18. Learned counsel submits that the statutory scheme does not
confer any discretion upon the Market Committee to withhold the
benefit of an exemption validly granted by the State Government.
According to him, once the State Government has reduced or
exempted the levy for a specified class and for a specified period,
the Market Committee is bound to give effect to the same. The
Market Committee cannot continue to retain an amount which,
after the retrospective notification, is no longer legally recoverable
at the earlier rate. It is argued that the excess amount collected
from the petitioners represents an amount which has been paid
under
the
earlier
rate
but
has
subsequently
become
refundable/adjustable by virtue of the retrospective exemption.
Learned counsel submits that permitting the Market Committee to
retain such excess amount, despite the State Government having
consciously extended the benefit retrospectively, would amount to
defeating the statutory notification itself and would result in unjust
enrichment of the Market Committee at the expense of the
petitioners. According to learned counsel, the market fee paid by
the petitioners remains with the Market Committee and forms part
of the funds administered under the statutory scheme; therefore,
there is no justification for permitting the authorities to retain an
amount which, on account of the subsequent retrospective
exemption, is not legally payable at the rate at which it was
originally collected.
19. In support of his submission that an exemption notification has to
be interpreted in a manner which advances rather than defeats
the object for which it was issued, learned counsel places reliance
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector of
Central Excise & Others v. Himalayan Cooperative Milk
Product Union Ltd. & Others, (2000) 8 SCC 642. Referring to
the said decision, learned counsel submits that where the
Government grants exemption or other statutory benefit in
exercise of its delegated statutory power, such exemption
ordinarily represents a conscious policy decision intended to
confer a benefit upon a particular class or to achieve a particular
object. The authority administering the provision cannot adopt an
interpretation which, while technically referring to the language of
the notification, defeats the purpose for which the notification was
issued. According to learned counsel, the principle laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court squarely applies in the present case
because the notification dated 29.07.2022 was consciously issued
for the benefit of rice millers and was given retrospective effect
from 01.04.2022. The interpretation adopted by the respondents,
if accepted, would deprive precisely those persons for whose
benefit the notification was issued and would thereby render the
retrospective component of the notification wholly ineffective.
20. Learned counsel next places reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Corporation Bank v. Saraswati
Abharansala & Another, (2009) 1 SCC 540, and submits that
where a notification conferring a benefit has been given
retrospective operation, its provisions must necessarily be
construed having regard to the purpose and object sought to be
achieved by the notification. It is submitted that the principle of
purposive construction assumes particular significance in the
present case because the State Government itself consciously
selected 01.04.2022 as the commencement date of the reduced
levy, notwithstanding the fact that the notification was issued on
29.07.2022. Learned counsel submits that if the excess amount
collected between 01.04.2022 and 29.07.2022 is not refunded or
adjusted, the retrospective operation granted by the State
Government would become illusory. The petitioners would be
deprived of the very benefit which the State Government intended
to confer upon them. According to learned counsel, a construction
which renders a statutory benefit nugatory or produces an
unreasonable result has to be avoided. He, therefore, submits that
the retrospective notification must be given meaningful and
effective operation, which necessarily entails refund or adjustment
of the differential market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee already
paid by the petitioners for the period covered by the notification.
21. Learned counsel further submits that there is no plausible
explanation in the pleadings of the respondents as to why the
notification dated 29.07.2022 was made retrospectively operative
from 01.04.2022. It is contended that during the course of hearing,
an attempt was made on behalf of the Mandi Board to explain the
retrospective operation by submitting that 01.04.2022 was chosen
because it marks the commencement of the financial year.
Learned counsel submits that such an explanation is neither
pleaded in the return nor supported by any material placed before
this Court. More importantly, according to him, the previous
charging notification dated 30.11.2021 had itself been issued
during the middle of a financial year and was made operative from
01.12.2021. Therefore, the explanation that the retrospective date
was selected merely because 01.04.2022 constituted the
beginning of the financial year does not, according to learned
counsel, satisfactorily explain the legislative or administrative
object behind the notification. It is submitted that the Court must
instead ascertain the substantive object of the notification, which
was to extend the reduced levy to rice millers for the specified
period, and the notification must consequently be interpreted so
as to give full effect to that object.
22. Learned counsel also places reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
in
Coastal
Paper
Limited
v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Visakhapatnam, (2015) 10
SCC 664, to contend that while interpreting an exemption
notification, the Court is required to examine not merely the words
used therein but also the objective and purpose for which the
notification has been issued. It is submitted that the provisions of
an exemption notification are required to be read harmoniously so
as to advance and not defeat the object sought to be achieved.
Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, learned
counsel submits that the notification dated 29.07.2022 clearly
identifies the class intended to receive the benefit, namely rice
millers, and consciously extends the benefit retrospectively.
Therefore, the respondents cannot adopt an interpretation under
which the petitioners, though admittedly falling within the
beneficiary class, are deprived of the benefit for the very period
for which the State Government intended the benefit to operate.
Learned counsel submits that once the State Government has
consciously reduced the market fee for the relevant period, the
differential amount collected at the earlier rate cannot legally be
retained by the Market Committee and must necessarily follow the
statutory benefit granted by the State Government.
23. Learned counsel then turns to the principal reason assigned by
the respondents for denying refund, namely, the alleged passing
on of the burden of market fee to the end consumers. He submits
that the entire basis of the impugned order is fundamentally
erroneous because the petitioners, under the Act of 1972, have
neither the statutory authority nor the legal mechanism to levy or
separately recover market fee from their customers. According to
learned counsel, the liability to pay market fee arises under the
statutory scheme in respect of the specified transaction in the
market area and is to be discharged to the Market Committee in
the manner prescribed by the Act. The petitioners cannot, merely
because they have incurred a statutory liability towards the Market
Committee, be presumed to have separately recovered such
amount from their customers. Learned counsel submits that the
principle of unjust enrichment can operate only where the person
seeking refund has actually passed on the burden of the levy to
another person. Mere payment of a statutory levy by the
petitioners and its reflection as an expenditure in their books of
account cannot, by itself, establish such passing on of burden.
24. Elaborating the aforesaid submission, learned counsel submits
that Section 19 of the Act of 1972 places the statutory obligation in
relation to market fee upon the concerned transaction and
provides the mechanism by which the Market Committee is
entitled to collect the fee. The petitioner, being the purchaser of
paddy in the market area, pays the market fee to the Market
Committee in accordance with the statutory scheme. There is no
provision in the Act which authorises the petitioner, after
purchasing paddy, to levy a separate amount described as market
fee upon the person to whom the processed rice is subsequently
sold, particularly when such subsequent sale takes place outside
the market area. It is argued that the statutory levy cannot be
equated with an indirect tax such as GST, where the statute
expressly permits the supplier to collect the tax component from
the recipient and thereafter deposit the same with the
Government. In the case of market fee under the Act of 1972, the
petitioners submit that no such statutory authority exists.
Consequently, the mere fact that the petitioner has incurred
market fee as a business expenditure cannot lead to the
conclusion that the same amount has been collected from the
ultimate consumer.
25. Learned counsel further submits that the statutory scheme does
not contemplate multiple points of levy of market fee in respect of
the same agricultural produce and the same transaction chain
within the same market area. Once the prescribed market fee has
been paid at the stage contemplated by the statute, the same levy
cannot again be imposed upon the processed product merely
because the original agricultural produce has undergone
processing. To buttress the submission, learned counsel places
reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram
Chandra Kailash Kumar & Company & Others v. State of U.P.
& Another, 1980 (Supp) SCC 27, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court examined the question of levy of market fee in a series of
transactions and held that there cannot be a multi-point levy of
market fee in the same market area. Learned counsel submits
that the principle laid down therein assumes significance in the
present case because both paddy and rice may be covered by the
relevant statutory scheme, but the market fee cannot be levied
repeatedly upon the same agricultural produce and the product
manufactured therefrom merely because the produce has passed
through different stages of processing and sale. According to
learned counsel, the statutory scheme contemplates levy at the
prescribed point and does not authorise the petitioner to recover
the same levy again from its customers.
26. Learned counsel submits that the reasoning adopted by the
authority from the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the
petitioner is wholly misconceived. According to him, the authority
has noticed that the petitioner has shown the market fee/mandi
fee as an expenditure in its accounts and has, on that basis,
inferred that the petitioner must have recovered the same from its
consumers. Learned counsel submits that the inference is
precisely the opposite of what the accounting entry demonstrates.
If the market fee has been shown as an expenditure incurred by
the petitioner, it demonstrates that the petitioner has borne the
statutory liability as a cost of its business. Such accounting
treatment, by itself, cannot establish that the same amount was
separately recovered from the consumers. Learned counsel
submits that the authority was required to examine the actual sale
invoices and other transactional records to ascertain whether the
petitioner had in fact charged or collected any amount towards
market fee from its customers, rather than drawing an inference
merely from the manner in which the expenditure was recorded in
the books.
27. It is further submitted by learned counsel that the petitioner had
specifically placed before the competent authority its invoices,
bills, balance sheets, audit reports, financial statements and
statements
of
accounts,
including
documents
relating
to
transactions before and after the issuance of the notification dated
29.07.2022. According to learned counsel, a scrutiny of the
invoices would demonstrate that no separate component towards
mandi fee/market fee or Farmers' Welfare Fee was charged from
the end consumers. It is argued that the competent authority itself
examined the invoices but failed to give due consideration to the
fact that the invoices did not disclose any separate recovery of
market fee from the consumers. The impugned order, therefore,
suffers from non-consideration of relevant material and proceeds
upon an inference which is unsupported by the documents
actually produced by the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that
once the petitioner had produced the primary documents which
could demonstrate whether the levy had been passed on, the
authority was required to record a specific finding based upon
those documents and could not reject the claim merely by relying
upon an accounting entry.
28. Learned counsel also disputes the submission of the respondents
that the market fee paid by the petitioner necessarily forms part of
the ultimate sale price of the rice. According to him, the sale price
of rice is determined by various market factors, including demand
and supply, prevailing market conditions and other commercial
considerations, and there is no basis for presuming that every
expenditure incurred by a rice miller automatically becomes a
separately recoverable component of the sale price. The mere
fact that the petitioner has incurred market fee as an expenditure
cannot establish that the petitioner has recovered an identical
amount from the purchaser. Learned counsel submits that actual
passing on of the burden has to be established by evidence and
cannot be presumed merely because the levy constitutes one of
the business expenses incurred by the petitioner.
29. Learned counsel further contends that the very nature of the
market fee distinguishes the present case from cases involving
indirect taxation. According to him, the respondents themselves
have admitted that market fee is a fee and not a tax. Once its
character
as
a
fee
is
accepted,
the
authorities
cannot
mechanically apply principles applicable to an indirect tax without
examining the statutory mechanism governing the particular levy.
Learned counsel submits that an indirect tax such as GST is
ordinarily structured so as to permit collection from the ultimate
consumer, whereas the market fee under the Act of 1972 is
imposed and collected at the statutorily prescribed stage of the
transaction. The market fee is not a tax component which the
petitioner is statutorily authorised to add to its sale invoice and
recover from the consumer. It is, therefore, submitted that the
concept of "passing on" cannot be imported into the present case
merely by treating market fee as an indirect tax.
30. Learned counsel submits that, in any event, the petitioners have
discharged the burden cast upon them by producing all relevant
material before the authority. The petitioners were specifically
called upon to establish that they had not passed on the burden of
the market fee to their consumers, and in response thereto they
produced their audit reports, balance sheets, financial statements,
statements of accounts and sale invoices. According to learned
counsel, these documents constitute the best available evidence
for determining whether any separate amount was actually
collected from the consumers. None of the documents produced
by the petitioners records any separate recovery of mandi fee
from their customers. On the contrary, the accounting records
show the market fee as an expenditure incurred by the petitioners.
Learned counsel submits that the authority has effectively
required the petitioners to prove a negative, namely, to prove that
they had not recovered an amount from their consumers, despite
the fact that the invoices and financial records themselves do not
disclose any such recovery. The absence of any separate levy or
collection in the invoices, coupled with the accounting treatment of
the amount as expenditure, according to learned counsel, clearly
negatives the allegation of unjust enrichment.
31. Learned counsel finally addresses the reliance placed by the
Market Committee upon the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in Shree Sita Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Chhattisgarh & Others, W.P.(C) No.1639 of 2012 decided on
21.03.2014, and submits that the said decision is clearly
distinguishable on facts and cannot govern the controversy
involved in the present batch. According to learned counsel, in
Shree Sita Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the petitioner was a
trader engaged in the purchase and sale of agricultural produce
within the market area, whereas the petitioners in the present
batch are admittedly rice millers who purchase paddy from the
market for the purpose of processing/milling it into rice. The
nature of the business activity and the statutory context are,
therefore, materially different. Learned counsel further submits
that the scope and interplay of Sections 19 and 69 of the Act of
1972, particularly in the context of the specific exemption
notification dated 29.07.2022 issued for rice millers and given
retrospective
operation,
were
not
the
questions
under
consideration in the said decision. It is further submitted by
learned counsel that the decision in Shree Sita Agro Foods Pvt.
Ltd. (supra) cannot be mechanically applied for another reason,
namely, that the nature of the levy and the question of passing on
of the burden have been considered by the respondents on an
assumption that the market fee operates in the same manner as
an indirect tax. According to learned counsel, the present
petitioners have specifically demonstrated from the statutory
scheme that market fee is a fee payable at the prescribed point of
transaction and that the Act does not confer upon the petitioners
any authority to collect the same from their consumers. Therefore,
the factual and statutory foundation upon which the respondents
seek to rely upon Shree Sita Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is
absent in the present case. Learned counsel submits that the said
judgment, therefore, cannot be treated as an authority for denying
the petitioners the benefit of the retrospective exemption
notification dated 29.07.2022. He has also placed reliance upon
the order passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Yash
Parboiling
Unit
v.
State
of
Chhattisgarh
in
W.P.(C)
No.5871/2022 and analogous cases, decided on 16.01.2025, to
buttress his submissions.
32. In conclusion, learned counsel submits that the common
impugned order dated 10.09.2025 is liable to be set aside as
being contrary to the statutory scheme, the retrospective
exemption notification dated 29.07.2022, the material produced by
the petitioners and the directions contained in the earlier order
dated 16.01.2025. According to learned counsel, the competent
authority, instead of undertaking an objective examination of
whether the petitioners had actually passed on the burden of
market fee to their customers, has proceeded upon an erroneous
presumption based principally upon the accounting treatment of
the levy as an expenditure. Such an approach, according to him,
defeats the very purpose of the remand order as well as the
retrospective
benefit
consciously
granted
by
the
State
Government. He, therefore, submits that all the writ petitions
deserve to be allowed, the impugned common order dated
10.09.2025 deserves to be quashed and set aside, and the
concerned authorities be directed to refund the excess market
fee/mandi shulk and Farmers' Welfare Fee paid by the respective
petitioners for the period covered by the retrospective operation of
the notification dated 29.07.2022, or, in the alternative, to adjust
the said excess amount against their future transactions.
33. On the other hand, Dr. Arham Siddiqui, learned Panel Lawyer
appearing for the State, submits that the State Government is only
a formal party to the present proceedings and that the actual
controversy pertains to the claim of the petitioners for
refund/adjustment of the market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee
collected by the concerned Mandi authorities. He submits that the
impugned order has been passed by the competent authority of
the Mandi Board upon consideration of the material placed by the
respective petitioners and, therefore, the State has no separate or
independent role in determining the individual claims of refund
raised by the petitioners. It is further submitted that the State
Government has already issued the notification dated 29.07.2022
in exercise of its statutory powers, and the consequential issue as
to whether the petitioners are entitled to refund or adjustment of
the amount allegedly paid in excess is essentially a matter
between the petitioners and the concerned Mandi authorities. He,
therefore, submits that the State has no objection to the matter
being considered by this Court in accordance with law and in the
light of the statutory provisions and the notification issued by the
State Government. It is submitted that the State does not seek to
advance any independent defence with regard to the individual
computation or entitlement of the petitioners, as the same falls
within the domain of the concerned Mandi authorities.
34. Mr. Amrito Das, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr.
Shreyansh Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the Chhattisgarh
State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, opposing the writ
petitions, submits that the challenge laid by the petitioners to the
common order dated 10.09.2025 is wholly misconceived and that
no ground is made out for exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that the impugned order has not been
passed mechanically or without affording an opportunity to the
petitioners. On the contrary, pursuant to the earlier order dated
16.01.2025 passed by this Court, the competent authority
afforded full opportunity to the petitioners to substantiate their
claim that the incidence of market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee
had not been passed on to their respective end consumers or
traders. The petitioners were specifically called upon to produce
their audit reports, financial statements, balance sheets, invoices,
statements of accounts and other relevant material. Thereafter, a
personal hearing was also afforded to them, wherein they were
permitted to explain their case and place their documents and
submissions before the authority. It is, therefore, submitted that
the impugned order is the result of a fresh consideration
undertaken in compliance with the directions issued by this Court
and cannot be characterized as an order passed in violation of the
principles of natural justice.
35. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the real controversy in the
present batch is not as to whether the petitioners fall within the
class of rice millers covered by the notification dated 29.07.2022,
but as to whether, having claimed refund of the amount of market
fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee already paid by them, they have
established that the economic burden of such levy was actually
borne by them and was not ultimately recovered from their
customers. According to learned Senior Counsel, the notification
dated 29.07.2022 cannot be construed as conferring an automatic
and unconditional right of refund upon every rice miller who had
earlier paid market fee at the higher rate. The claim for refund
necessarily has to be examined in the context of the settled
principle that a person cannot obtain restitution of a levy if he has
already passed on its incidence to another person. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that the authority, therefore, rightly
examined the financial records of the petitioners to determine
whether the burden of the levy had been incorporated into the
cost structure and sale price of the goods. It is argued that the
petitioners cannot simultaneously contend that the market fee
constituted part of their business expenditure for the purpose of
accounting and computation of profit and, at the same time,
contend that such expenditure had no bearing whatsoever upon
the price at which the finished product was ultimately sold.
According to learned Senior Counsel, the financial records
produced by the petitioners themselves furnished the basis for the
conclusion reached by the competent authority.
36. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the audit reports and
financial statements produced by the petitioners constitute
material evidence against their own claim. It is pointed out that the
petitioners have admittedly shown the market fee and Farmers'
Welfare Fee as expenditure in their books of account while
arriving at the gross profit/net profit from the business. According
to learned Senior Counsel, once a statutory levy is treated as a
component of the cost incurred in acquiring the raw material and
such cost is taken into account while determining the profitability
and pricing of the finished product, it cannot be said, as an
absolute proposition, that the burden of the levy has necessarily
remained upon the assessee or purchaser who initially paid it.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the economic incidence of a
levy has to be determined from the overall financial transaction
and not merely from the nomenclature used in an invoice. The
absence of a separate line item describing "market fee" in the sale
invoice does not, according to him, conclusively establish that the
economic burden of the levy was not passed on. The relevant
consideration is whether the levy formed part of the cost of
acquisition/production and was ultimately factored into the price at
which the finished product was sold. It is submitted that the
authority, after examining the accounts and audit reports, arrived
at a factual conclusion that the market fee had been included as
an expenditure in the cost structure and that the petitioners had
failed to produce cogent material sufficient to rebut the resulting
inference.
37. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners are
attempting to draw an artificial distinction between "charging
market fee separately" and "passing on the burden of market fee".
According to him, passing on the burden does not necessarily
mean that the exact amount of market fee must be separately
identified and collected from the consumer under the description
"market fee". In a commercial transaction, various components of
expenditure incurred by a manufacturer or processor necessarily
enter into the determination of the ultimate sale price. A
manufacturer may incur expenditure towards raw material,
transportation, labour, electricity, statutory levies, establishment
charges and other overheads, and all such expenditures may
ultimately be reflected in the price at which the finished product is
sold. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners'
contention that they did not have statutory authority to separately
levy market fee upon their customers does not answer the
question of economic incidence. The issue before the authority
was not whether the petitioners had issued an invoice specifically
recovering "market fee" from their customers, but whether the
burden of the levy had, in substance, been passed on through the
price of the finished product. Learned Senior Counsel submits that
the petitioners failed to establish, by reliable financial material,
that the retrospective reduction in the market fee was not reflected
in their pricing or that the higher levy earlier paid had been
absorbed by them without any corresponding recovery from the
purchasers of rice.
38. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the doctrine against
unjust enrichment is founded upon the basic principle that a
person who has not ultimately borne the burden of a levy cannot
obtain a refund merely because he was the person who initially
deposited the amount with the statutory authority. The doctrine
prevents a person from retaining a benefit to which, in equity and
law, he is not entitled. Applying the said principle to the present
case, it is submitted that if the petitioners have already recovered
the economic burden of the market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee
through the sale price of the rice, refunding the amount to them
would result in a double benefit—first, by allowing them to recover
the levy from the purchasers through the price, and secondly, by
permitting them to recover the same amount once again from the
Market Committee by way of refund. According to learned Senior
Counsel, the statutory exemption/reduction notification cannot be
interpreted so as to authorize such double recovery. The burden
of establishing that no such benefit has accrued to the petitioners
was specifically placed before the competent authority, and
despite being granted an opportunity to produce relevant material,
the petitioners failed to establish the same to the satisfaction of
the authority. Learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submits that the
finding recorded in the impugned order cannot be said to be
perverse merely because another possible view could be taken on
the accounting material.
39. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the reliance placed by
the petitioners upon the retrospective operation of the notification
dated 29.07.2022 does not, by itself, answer the issue relating to
refund. It is submitted that there is a distinction between the
applicability of an exemption notification and the manner in which
the monetary benefit flowing from such exemption is to be worked
out. Even assuming that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit
of the reduced rate with effect from 01.04.2022, the question
whether an amount already collected at the earlier rate is
refundable to the person who initially paid it is a separate
question, particularly where the incidence of the levy is alleged to
have been passed on. Learned Senior Counsel submits that
retrospective applicability cannot be treated as an automatic
statutory direction for payment of refund irrespective of the actual
incidence of the levy. The authority was consequently justified in
examining the petitioners' claim from the standpoint of whether
refund would result in unjust enrichment. It is submitted that the
petitioners' interpretation would effectively mean that once a
retrospective exemption is granted, every person who had earlier
paid the levy would automatically become entitled to its refund,
regardless of whether the burden had already been incorporated
into the price charged from the ultimate purchaser.
40. Learned Senior Counsel places reliance upon the decision of this
Court in Shree Sita Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra), and submits
that the principles governing the levy of market fee and the
question of its incidence have already received consideration by
this Court. According to learned Senior Counsel, the aforesaid
judgment supports the proposition that the statutory character of
market fee and the commercial incidence of the levy cannot be
examined in isolation from the actual transactions undertaken by
the person claiming refund. It is submitted that the petitioners
have sought to distinguish the said judgment merely on the
ground that they are rice millers and not traders; however, such
distinction, according to learned Senior Counsel, does not take
the case out of the principle applicable to the question of
economic burden. The relevant consideration remains whether
the amount claimed as refund has ultimately been borne by the
claimant or has been recovered through the price charged from
the subsequent purchaser. Learned Senior Counsel submits that
the authority was, therefore, justified in taking into consideration
the aforesaid precedent while adjudicating the petitioners' claims.
The official record of this Court confirms that Shree Sita Agro
Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
41. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the contention of the
petitioners that market fee cannot be separately recovered from
their customers because the statute authorizes the Market
Committee alone to levy and collect the same does not, in itself,
establish their entitlement to refund. According to learned Senior
Counsel, the respondents do not dispute that the statutory power
to levy and collect market fee vests in the Market Committee. The
question, however, is whether the economic burden of the amount
so paid remained with the petitioners. The statutory inability of the
petitioners to impose a separate statutory levy upon their
customers is, therefore, distinct from the commercial question as
to how the petitioners determined the sale price of their finished
product. Learned Senior Counsel submits that a manufacturer or
processor is not required to separately identify each individual
component of its cost in every sale invoice. The fact that a
particular expenditure is not separately reflected in the invoice
cannot, therefore, lead to an automatic conclusion that the
expenditure had not entered into the ultimate sale price.
According to learned Senior Counsel, the authority has adopted a
legally permissible approach by examining the petitioners' own
financial records to determine the actual incidence of the levy.
42. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners' reliance
upon the invoices raised before and after the notification dated
29.07.2022 is also insufficient to discharge the burden resting
upon them. It is argued that a mere comparison of the invoices,
without establishing the complete pricing mechanism and without
demonstrating that the sale price remained wholly unaffected by
the market fee component, cannot conclusively establish that the
burden was not passed on. Learned Senior Counsel submits that
the authority was required to examine the entire financial picture
of the petitioners, including the manner in which expenditure was
accounted for and the manner in which the gross and net profits
were arrived at. The audit reports specifically showed the market
fee as expenditure, and the petitioners did not furnish any
independent
accounting
analysis
demonstrating
that
such
expenditure was absorbed by them without being reflected in the
price of the finished product. Thus, according to learned Senior
Counsel, the authority's conclusion was based upon material
available on record and cannot be characterized as an
unsupported presumption.
43. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the earlier order of
this Court dated 16.01.2025 did not record any finding that the
petitioners were automatically entitled to refund. The direction was
limited to requiring the competent authority to reconsider the
matter after examining whether the petitioners had in fact passed
on the burden of the market fee to their consumers and after
providing them an opportunity of hearing. The competent
authority, pursuant to the said direction, called for the relevant
documents, considered the audit reports and financial statements,
afforded personal hearing and thereafter recorded its conclusion.
Therefore, according to learned Senior Counsel, the petitioners
cannot seek to reopen the issue as though the earlier order had
already determined their substantive entitlement to refund. The
only issue left for fresh determination was whether the petitioners
had discharged the burden of establishing that the incidence of
the levy had not been passed on, and that issue has now been
decided against them on the basis of the material placed on
record.
44. Learned Senior Counsel finally submits that the scope of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited,
particularly
where
the
competent
statutory
authority
has
undertaken a factual examination on the basis of documents
produced by the parties and has recorded reasons for its
conclusion. It is not the function of the writ Court to substitute its
own appreciation of accounting material for that of the competent
authority unless the conclusion is shown to be perverse, based on
no evidence, contrary to the statutory provisions, or arrived at in
violation of principles of natural justice. In the present case, none
of these circumstances exists. The petitioners were granted
adequate opportunity, their documents were considered, personal
hearing was afforded and a reasoned order was thereafter
passed. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners are
essentially seeking a re-appreciation of the financial and
accounting material to obtain a finding contrary to that recorded
by the competent authority, which is impermissible in exercise of
writ jurisdiction.
45. It is, therefore, submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the common impugned
order dated 10.09.2025 suffers from any jurisdictional error,
perversity, violation of natural justice or non-application of mind.
The finding that the petitioners failed to establish that the burden
of market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee had not been passed on
to their end consumers/traders is, according to him, a finding
based upon the financial material furnished by the petitioners
themselves. In such circumstances, granting refund would,
according to learned Senior Counsel, result in an unjust
enrichment of the petitioners. He, accordingly, submits that the
common order dated 10.09.2025 calls for no interference and that
all the connected writ petitions, being devoid of merit, deserve to
be dismissed.
46. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel places reliance upon the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Vyankatlal and Another, (1985) 2 SCC 544, and
Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and
Others, (1997) 5 SCC 536, and submits that the principle
underlying the doctrine of unjust enrichment squarely governs the
claim for refund raised by the petitioners. It is contended that
refund of a statutory levy cannot be granted merely because the
levy has subsequently been reduced or exemption has been
granted, unless the claimant establishes that the incidence of
such levy has in fact been borne by him and has not been passed
on to the ultimate consumer or any other person. Learned Senior
Counsel submits that the Court must guard against a situation
where refund of the levy would confer a monetary benefit upon a
person who has already recovered its incidence through the price
charged from the purchaser, as such refund would amount to
unjust enrichment. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid decisions,
it is submitted that the burden of establishing that the incidence of
the levy has not been passed on assumes significance in a claim
for refund, and that the statutory authority was, therefore, justified
in examining the petitioners' books of accounts, audit reports and
other financial material for determining the actual incidence of the
market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee. According to learned
Senior Counsel, since the petitioners failed to establish that the
burden of the levy had remained with them and, on the contrary,
their own accounts reflected the market fee as an element of
expenditure/cost, the claim for refund was rightly rejected in order
to prevent unjust enrichment.
47. Mr. Navoday Singh, learned counsel appearing for the concerned
Krishi Upaj Mandi, opposing the writ petitions, submits that the
impugned common order dated 10.09.2025 has been passed
after affording due and adequate opportunity of hearing to the
petitioners and upon consideration of the material produced by
them. He submits that the petitioners were specifically called upon
to establish that the burden of market fee and Farmers' Welfare
Fee had not been passed on to their respective end
consumers/traders. However, the petitioners failed to produce any
cogent or conclusive material to establish that the amounts paid
towards market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee had been borne by
them without being factored into the cost and sale price of the
rice. Learned counsel submits that, on the contrary, the audit
reports and financial statements produced by the petitioners
themselves disclose that the market fee and Farmers' Welfare
Fee were treated as expenditure/cost while computing the
gross/net profits. According to learned counsel, such accounting
treatment clearly demonstrates that the levy had formed part of
the cost structure of the produce and had consequently been
incorporated
in
the
sale
price
charged
from
the
end
consumers/traders. It is, therefore, submitted that refund of the
amount in such circumstances would confer an unintended
financial benefit upon the petitioners and would result in unjust
enrichment, particularly when the petitioners have failed to
establish that the burden of the levy was actually borne by them.
He further submits that the market fee levied under Section 19 of
the Act of 1972 is a statutory fee collected by the Market
Committee for providing and maintaining the market infrastructure
and facilities and for carrying out activities connected with the
welfare of agriculturists. He submits that the mere fact that the
Market Committee is empowered to collect the fee from the
person statutorily liable to pay it does not mean that the economic
burden of such levy cannot ultimately be reflected in the price of
the goods sold by such person. According to learned counsel, the
petitioners' contention that they have not separately mentioned
market fee in their sale invoices is not by itself sufficient to
establish that the burden was not passed on, particularly when
their own accounts show the levy as an element of expenditure in
arriving at the profitability of the business. Learned counsel
submits that the decision-making authority was, therefore, justified
in examining the books of account and audit reports for
determining the actual incidence of the levy. He further submits
that the judgment relied upon by the petitioners is distinguishable,
whereas the decision in Shree Sita Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra)
relied upon by the Mandi authorities, supports the stand taken in
the impugned order. It is accordingly submitted that the petitioners
have failed to establish any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional
error in the common order dated 10.09.2025 warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the
writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
48. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
and perused the pleadings of the respective parties, the
documents placed on record, the notifications dated 30.11.2021
and 29.07.2022, the order dated 16.01.2025 passed by this Court
in the earlier round of litigation, as also the common impugned
order dated 10.09.2025.
49. Before proceeding further, this Court considers it appropriate to
notice the relevant statutory provisions which govern the
controversy. Section 19 of the Act of 1972 provides for levy of
market fee by the Market Committee at the rate prescribed in
accordance with the Act. Section 69 of the Act of 1972, on the
other hand, confers upon the State Government the power, by
notification and subject to such conditions and restrictions as may
be specified, to exempt, wholly or partly, any agricultural produce
brought for sale or brought or sold in the market area from
payment of market fee for such period as may be specified. The
distinction between the two provisions is of considerable
significance in the present controversy. While Section 19
constitutes the source of the levy, Section 69 clothes the State
Government with the power to subsequently modify, reduce or
exempt the levy in respect of the specified agricultural produce or
specified class and for a specified period. The statutory scheme,
therefore, necessarily requires the authorities administering the
levy to give effect to a notification validly issued by the State
Government in exercise of the power under Section 69 of the Act
of 1972. The relevant provision of Section 69 of the Act of 1972,
for ready reference, reads as under:
“69. Power to grant exemption from market
fee.— (1) The State Government may, by
notification and subject to such conditions
and restrictions, if any, as may be specified
therein exempt in whole or in part any
agricultural produce brought for sale or
brought or sold in the market area specified in
such notification from the payment of market
fees for such period as may be specified
therein.”
50. The statutory position, therefore, is not in dispute that the State
Government
possesses
the
legislative/delegated
statutory
authority to grant exemption, either wholly or partly, from payment
of market fee for a specified period. In exercise of the power so
conferred, the State Government had earlier issued notification
dated 30.11.2021, whereby the market fee/mandi shulk was
prescribed at the rate of Rs.3/- on the value of every Rs.100/- and
the Farmers' Welfare Fee at the rate of Rs.2/- on the value of
every Rs.100/-, with effect from 01.12.2021. The petitioners, who
are rice millers, admittedly paid the market fee and Farmers'
Welfare Fee at the rates then prevailing. Thereafter, the State
Government issued the subsequent notification dated 29.07.2022
in exercise of the power under Section 69 of the Act of 1972,
whereby the market fee was reduced to Re.1/- on the value of
every Rs.100/- and the Farmers' Welfare Fee was also reduced to
Re.1/- on the value of every Rs.100/-. The significant feature of
the notification is that the benefit was made operative
retrospectively with effect from 01.04.2022 and was intended to
operate for the specified period.
51. Thus,
the
first
and
foremost
question
which
arises
for
consideration is as to what is the effect of the notification dated
29.07.2022 upon the amount already deposited by the petitioners
at the earlier rate during the period commencing from 01.04.2022.
Having carefully considered the statutory scheme, this Court is of
the considered opinion that once the State Government, in
exercise of the specific power conferred upon it under Section 69
of the Act of 1972, consciously reduced the rate of market fee and
Farmers' Welfare Fee and expressly gave such reduction
retrospective
operation
from
01.04.2022,
the
authorities
administering the Mandi cannot defeat the substantive benefit of
such notification by retaining the differential amount already
collected at the higher rate. The retrospective operation of the
notification is not an incidental or inconsequential part of the
notification. It is a deliberate legislative/administrative act and has
to be given its full and meaningful effect.
52. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar &
Company (supra), while dealing with the issue pertaining to levy
or collection it has been held that there cannot be any multipoint
levy or collection of market fee in the same area and the market
fee shall be levied once in the series of transactions, while
observing as under :“13. It is clear and it was expressly conceded
to on behalf of the market State committees
and the State that there cannot be any multi
point levy of market fee in the same market
area. The reason is obvious. Section 17 (is)
(b), as amended by U. P. Act 7 of 1978 reads
as follows:
Market fee, which shall be payable on
transactions
of
sale
of
specified
agricultural produce in the market area at
such rates, being not less than one per
centum and not more than one and half
per centum of the price of the agricultural
produce so sold, as the State Government
may specify by notification, and such fee
shall be realised in the following manner(1) if the produce is sold through a
commission agent, the commission agent
may realise the market fee from the
purchaser and shall be liable to pay the
same to the committee;
(2) if the produce is purchased directly by
a trader from a producer the trader shall be
liable to pay the market fee to the
committee;
(3) if the produce is purchased by a trader
from another trader, the trader selling the
produce may realise it from the purchaser
and shall be liable to pay the market fee to
the committee; and
(4) in any other case of sale of such
produce, the purchaser shall be liable to
pay the market fee to the committee.
All the four sub-clauses of clause (b) are
mutually
exclusive.
If
the
produce
is
purchased from a producer directly the trader
shall be liable to pay the market fee to the
committee in accordance with sub-clause (2).
But if the trader sells the same produce or
any product of the same produce to another
trader
neither
the
seller-trader
nor
the
purchaser-trader can be made to pay the
market fee under sub-clause (3). So far the
position was not disputed by the market
committee, rather it was conceded, and in our
opinion, rightly. But some difficulty arises in
regard to the products of the agricultural
produce which has been subjected to the levy
of market fee. This will be relevant when we
come to consider the various agricultural
produce in respect of which challenge was
made on the ground that it amounts to multi
point levy. At this stage we may explain our
viewpoint by taking a few examples from the
schedule appended to the Act. Wheat, an
agricultural
produce,
is
mention
wheat
purchased from a producer by a trader has
been subjected market fee under Section 17
(i) (b) (2) no further levy of market fee in the
same market area could be made, not even
on wheat flour if flour were to be included in
the schedule. The better example can be
found in the items under the heading 'Animal
Husbandry Products' wherein in the schedule
milk and ghee both are mentioned. Milk, of
course, is not mentioned in the Notification
dated April 11, 1978. But if it would have been
mentioned then only the transaction of milk in
a particular market area could be subjected to
levy of fee and ghee manufactured from milk
could not be so subjected. But since milk is
not
mentioned
in
the
notification
the
transaction of ghee can be subjected to the
levy of fee in accordance with the principle to
be
discussed
hereinafter.
The
greater
difficulty arises with respect to paddy and rice
as both of them are mentioned in the
schedule as well as in the notification. We
shall show hereinafter that in a particular
market area market fee cannot be levied both
in relation to the transaction of purchase and
sale of paddy and the rice produced from the
same paddy. Fee can be charged only on one
transaction. This finds support from the
unamended rules as they are, wherein it is to
be found sub-rule (2) of Rule 66. But we find
nothing in the provisions of the Act or the
Rules to warrant the taking of the view that in
another market area the market committee of
that area cannot levy fee on a fresh
transaction of sale and purchase taking place
in that area. wheat is purchased in area X by
a trader producer, fee will be chargeable
under Section 17 (iii) (b) (2). If the same
wheat is taken to another market area say Y
and another transaction of sale and purchase
takes place there between a trader and a
trader the market fee will be leviable under
sub-clause (3). It is also not correct to say
that the agricultural produce must have been
produced in the market It might have area in
which the first levy is made. It might have
been produced in another market area or
even outside the State of Uttar Pradesh but if
a transaction of sale and purchase takes
place of an agricultural produce as defined in
the Act and covered by the notification within
a particular market area then fee can be
charged in relation to the said transaction.”
53. The principle that a statutory notification granting an exemption or
concession has to be construed in a manner which advances the
object for which it was issued and does not defeat the very benefit
intended to be conferred has been recognized by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise & Others (supra).
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasized that where an
exemption or other benefit is granted by the Government in
exercise of statutory power, such benefit ordinarily has a purpose
and policy behind it and the interpretation adopted by the Court
ought not to deprive the persons for whose benefit the notification
has been issued by observing as under :“8. Such notifications by which exemption or
other
benefits
are
provided
by
the
Government in exercise of its statutory power,
normally have some purpose and policy
decision behind it. Such benefits are meant to
be
provided
to
the
investors
and
manufacturers. Therefore, such purpose is
not to be defeated nor those who may be
entitled to it are to be deprived by interpreting
the notification which may give it some
meaning other than what is clearly and plainly
flowing from it.”
54. The principle assumes greater significance in the present case
because the notification dated 29.07.2022 was not issued
generally and prospectively alone; rather, the State Government
consciously extended the benefit to the concerned class and
made the same operative from an anterior date, i.e. 01.04.2022.
55. The aforesaid principle is further fortified by the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saraswati Abharansala (supra),
wherein the effect of retrospective operation of a notification was
considered and the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that such
notification has to be construed on the touchstone of the purpose
and object which it seeks to achieve. The doctrine of purposive
construction requires the Court to adopt an interpretation which
gives meaningful effect to the statutory provision and avoids a
construction which would frustrate the very object sought to be
achieved by observing as follows :“23. Furthermore, the notification having been
given
a
retrospective
effect
must
be
construed on the touchstone of the purpose
and object it sought to achieve. Principle of
purposive construction should be applied in a
case of this nature to find out the object of the
Act. When a statute cannot be considered in
such a manner which would defeat its object,
the legislature is presumed to be aware of the
consequences flowing therefrom. The statute
should be considered in such a manner so as
to hold that it serves to seek a reasonable
result. The statute would not be considered in
such a manner so as to encourage defaulters
and discourage those who abide by the law.
24. The statute furthermore, it is trite, should
be read in a manner so as to do justice to the
parties. If it is to be held, without there being
any statutory provision that those who have
deposited the amount in time would be put to
a disadvantageous position and those who
were defaulters would be better placed, the
same would give rise to an absurdity.
Construction of the statute which leads to
confusion must be avoided.
25. Thus, the condition of non-refund of the
excess amount must be held to have been
repealed by necessary implication as the rate
of tax so applied to the transaction of sale of
gold bullion was with retrospective effect.”
56. Applying the said principle to the facts of the present case, if the
retrospective operation of the notification dated 29.07.2022 is
accepted in theory but the benefit of the reduced rate is denied in
respect of the amount already collected between 01.04.2022 and
29.07.2022, the retrospective component of the notification would
become wholly otiose. Such an interpretation cannot be accepted.
57. This Court is conscious of the submission advanced on behalf of
the Mandi Board that refund cannot be claimed as an automatic
consequence of the retrospective reduction of the levy and that
the principle of unjust enrichment requires examination of the
question as to whether the burden of the levy was passed on to
the ultimate consumer. There can be no quarrel with the general
proposition that a person who has not ultimately borne the
incidence of a levy cannot, merely because he initially deposited
the amount with the statutory authority, claim a refund so as to
obtain an unintended monetary benefit. The doctrine of unjust
enrichment is a well-recognized principle of restitution and has
been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vyankatlal
(supra), as well as in the Constitution Bench judgment in Mafatlal
Industries Ltd. (supra). The said principle undoubtedly requires
the Court and the statutory authority to examine whether the
incidence of the levy has actually been passed on. However, the
aforesaid principle cannot be applied mechanically or merely on
the basis of an assumption. The question whether the petitioners
have passed on the burden of market fee to their consumers is
essentially a question which must be determined on the basis of
the statutory scheme and the actual material available on record.
In the present case, the authority has principally proceeded on the
reasoning that since the petitioners have shown market fee and
Farmers' Welfare Fee as expenditure in their audited accounts,
the same must necessarily have been incorporated in the sale
price and, therefore, the burden stood passed on to the end
consumers. In the opinion of this Court, such an inference, by
itself, is insufficient to establish actual passing on of the incidence
of the levy.
58. The distinction between incurring an expenditure and passing on
the incidence of such expenditure cannot be overlooked. Every
statutory levy paid by a businessman or manufacturer necessarily
becomes an expenditure in the books of account. Merely because
such amount is debited in the profit and loss account, it does not
ipso facto follow that the identical burden has been recovered
from the consumer. The accounting treatment only establishes
that the amount was incurred by the assessee as an expenditure;
it does not, without further material, establish that the same
amount was separately or otherwise recovered from the
purchaser. The competent authority was required to examine the
actual invoices, pricing pattern, transaction-wise material and
other relevant evidence to arrive at a finding that the incidence of
the market fee was, in fact, passed on to the consumers. A
presumption of passing on cannot be substituted for proof where
the consequence is denial of a statutory benefit which has been
expressly granted retrospectively.
59. The petitioners have specifically pleaded that they are rice millers
and not traders and that the paddy purchased by them from the
Mandi was processed into rice and thereafter sold in the open
market. The petitioners have further asserted that they did not
separately charge or collect market fee or Farmers' Welfare Fee
from their customers. They produced invoices, statements of
accounts, balance sheets, audit reports and other financial
documents before the competent authority. The record further
indicates that the petitioners were afforded an opportunity to
explain their stand and were heard personally. The question,
therefore, is not whether an opportunity was granted; rather, the
question is whether the material produced by the petitioners was
examined in its proper perspective and whether the conclusion
that the burden stood passed on necessarily follows from that
material.
60. In this regard, this Court finds considerable substance in the
submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the
petitioners do not possess any independent statutory authority
under the Act of 1972 to impose a separate market fee upon their
customers. Section 19 of the Act of 1972 authorizes the Market
Committee to levy the market fee in accordance with the statutory
scheme. The petitioners' liability to deposit the fee with the Market
Committee is thus a statutory obligation. The fact that the
petitioners have accounted for such statutory payment as
expenditure cannot, without something more, be treated as proof
that they have recovered the same amount from the ultimate
purchaser. There is a material distinction between statutory
incidence of levy and economic incidence of levy, and the latter
cannot be presumed solely from the former.
61. The reliance placed by the Mandi Board upon the decision in
Shree Sita Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra), also does not, in the
facts of the present batch, justify sustaining the impugned order.
The said decision has to be considered in the factual and
statutory context in which it was rendered. The present petitioners
have specifically relied upon the subsequent exercise of statutory
power by the State Government under Section 69 and the
retrospective operation of the notification dated 29.07.2022. The
question before this Court is, therefore, not merely whether
market fee can form part of the cost of a commodity in a
commercial sense, but whether the respondents can deny to the
petitioners the benefit of a subsequently issued statutory
exemption/reduction notification which has expressly been made
operative from 01.04.2022, solely on the basis of an inference
drawn from the accounting treatment of the fee.
62. The issue assumes significance also because the notification
dated 29.07.2022 was issued specifically with retrospective effect.
Once the State Government itself has decided that, for the
specified period commencing from 01.04.2022, the liability of the
concerned rice millers would stand reduced from Rs.3/- to Re.1/per Rs.100/- towards market fee and from Rs.2/- to Re.1/- per
Rs.100/- towards Farmers' Welfare Fee, the authorities cannot
continue to treat the petitioners as liable for the higher rate for the
period covered by such retrospective operation. To permit
retention of the differential amount by the Mandi authorities would,
in substance, amount to permitting the authorities to collect an
amount at a rate which the State Government subsequently
determined was not payable by the class of persons covered by
the notification.
63. This Court is also unable to accept the proposition that the mere
fact that the petitioners deposited the amount without protest
would permanently foreclose their right to claim the benefit flowing
from the subsequent notification. The right to claim the benefit
arises not merely from the manner in which the amount was
initially
deposited,
but
from
the
subsequent
statutory
determination made by the State Government. The notification
dated 29.07.2022 operates retrospectively and, therefore, the
legal position applicable to the relevant period has to be examined
in the light of the notification as it stands after its retrospective
operation. The petitioners' failure to anticipate the subsequent
notification cannot be held against them. Equally, the mere fact
that they had already deposited the amount cannot confer upon
the Mandi authorities a right to retain an amount which, by virtue
of the retrospective notification, is no longer payable at the earlier
rate.
64. The aforesaid principle has also received consideration in the
recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Property
Owners Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra &
Others, (2024) 18 SCC 1, wherein a Nine-Judge Constitution
Bench, while examining the scope and applicability of the
principles emanating from Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Others v.
Union of India & Others, (1997) 5 SCC 536, noticed that the
question of refund of an impost is intrinsically connected with the
issue as to whether the burden of such impost has ultimately been
borne by the person claiming refund or has been passed on to
another. The principle emerging from the aforesaid line of
authorities is that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is intended to
prevent a claimant from obtaining a benefit which he has already
recovered from another person; however, the applicability of the
doctrine necessarily depends upon a proper determination of the
actual incidence of the levy. The mere existence of a levy or its
reflection as an item of expenditure in the books of account
cannot, in every case, be treated as conclusive proof that its
burden has actually been passed on to the consumer. The
question has to be determined upon consideration of the totality of
the circumstances and the material available on record. In the
present case, as noticed hereinabove, the competent authority
has proceeded substantially on the basis that since the market fee
and Farmers' Welfare Fee were reflected as expenditure in the
profit and loss account, the same must necessarily have been
recovered from the purchasers. Such an inference, without any
further examination of the actual sale price, invoices, pricing
mechanism and other relevant material, cannot by itself constitute
sufficient proof of passing on of the incidence of the levy. The
recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore,
reinforces the requirement that the doctrine of unjust enrichment
must be applied on the basis of an objective determination of the
actual incidence of the levy and not upon a mere presumption, by
observing as under :“474. The context in Mafatlals was a claim for
refund made by a taxpayer owing to an
unconstitutional or illegal levy. With regard to
the arguments made by Shri K. Parasaran,
learned Senior Counsel on the distinction
between the constitutional values as they
obtained in countries like United States of
America,
Canada,
United
Kingdom
and
Australia and the Indian Constitution which
has set the goal of "justice, social, economic
and political"a total restructuring of our society
as envisaged in Articles 38 and 39 of the
Constitution, certain observations were made
by the nine-Judge Bench of this Court headed
by learned Ahmadi, C.J. and speaking through
Jeevan Reddy, J. in paras 84 to 86.
475. In this context, the observations of
Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy were
extracted, which are very apposite to the
reference under consideration and which read
as under: (Mafatlal cases, SCC p. 617, para
85)
"85.... '45. ... Constitutional problems
cannot be studied in a socio-economic
vacuum, since socio-cultural changes
are the source of the new values, and
sloughing off old legal thought is part of
the process of the new equity-loaded
legality.
***
47.... It is right that the rule of law
enshrined in our Constitution must and
does reckon with the roaring current of
change which shifts our social values
and shrivels our feudal roots, invades
our lives and fashion our destiny. '6b"
476. It is in the above context that reference
was made to the expression "the material
resources
of
the
community"
and
the
exposition by Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy
and in Sanjeev Coke and Abu Kavur Bai82.
Therefore,
those
construed
only
observations
in
the
could
context
of
be
the
submissions made in the said case on the
goal of justice as envisaged under the Indian
Constitution.
477. In this context, the observations of S.C.
Sen. J. who wrote a dissenting opinion are
instructive. He said: (Mafatlal cases, SCC p.
653, para 161)
"161. Article 39 cannot be a basis for
retaining whatever has been gathered
unlawfully
by
the
common
good.
Government
Simply
stated.
for
the
directive principles of the State policy do
not licence the Government to rob Peter
to pay Paul."
They have a persuasive value. Therefore,
those observations may be obiter in nature but
have persuasive value in view of my aforesaid
discussion.
478. In Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal
Kumar Shah135 ("Bimal Kumar Shah"), P.S.
Narasimha. J. has observed that
"to hold that all private property is
covered
by
the
phrase
"material
resources of the community" and that
the ultimate aim is State control of
private resources would be incompatible
with the constitutional protection detailed
above."**
Summary of conclusion
479. Having regard to the lengthy discussion
made above, it is necessary to have the
summary of conclusions as under:
479.1. Articles
37,
and
of
the
Constitution of India which are part of the
directive principles of State policy have to be
interpreted by bearing in mind the changing
economic policies of the State and not in a
rigid watertight compartment. The flexibility of
interpretation is having regard to the dynamic
changes in the Indian socio-economic policies
meant for the welfare and progress of the
people of India. An interpretation of the
aforesaid articles or for that matter any other
provision of the Constitution must be viewed in
the historical backdrop of the period in which
the interpretation was made by this Court
during
the
course
of
adjudication.
Any
interpretation which was found to be sound
and in consonance with the socio-economic
policy of the State during a particular period of
time, cannot be critiqued at a later point of
time in any quarter including by a court of law
merely because the socio-economic policies of
the State have changed over a period of time
or there is a paradigm shift in the thinking and
policies of the State.
479.2. Articles 37 and 38 of the Constitution
have to be borne in mind by the Courts while
considering the validity of any policy or statute
which intend to further any of the directive
principles of State policy.
479.3. Article 39(b) has to be read in the
context of Article 39(c). Articles 39(b) and (c)
supplement and complement each other and
cannot be construed in silos.
479.4. Article 39(b) comprises of the following
five components, namely,
(i) ownership and control;
(ii) material resources;
(iii) of the community:
(iv) so distributed; and
(v) as best to subserve the common
good.
479.4.1. The expression "ownership and
control" must be given its widest connotation
in the context of "distribution of" "material
resources of the community" "as best to
subserve
the
common
good".
479.4.2.
"Material resources" can in the first instance
be divided into two basic categories, namely,
(1) State-owned resources which belong to the
State which are essentially material resources
of the community, held in public trust by the
State; and (if) privately owned resources.
However, the expression "material resources"
does
not
include
"personal
effects"
or
"personal belonging" of individuals, such as,
clothing
or
apparel,
household
articles,
personal jewellery and other articles of daily
use
belonging
household
personal
and
in
to
the
which
nature
individuals
are
and
of
intimate
use.
a
and
Excluding
"personal effects", all other privately owned
resources can be construed as "material
resources". Thus, all resources whether they
are public resources or privately owned
resources which come within the scope and
ambit of the expression "material resources"
as stated above are included within that
expression.
479.4.3.
"Material
resources"
which
are
privately owned could be transformed as
"material resources of the community", inter
alia, in the following five ways:
(a) by nationalisation, which could be
either by way of an enactment made by
Parliament or a State Legislature or in
any other manner in accordance with
law;
(b) by acquisition, which could be by way
of
a
special
enactment
made
by
Parliament or a State Legislature having
regard to Entry 42 List III of the Seventh
Schedule
to
the
Constitution.
Alternatively, the acquisition could be
made under the extant parliamentary or
State laws dealing with acquisition;
(c) by operation of law, such as vesting
of private resources in the State, which
could be by virtue of statutes dealing
with land reforms, land tenures, abolition
of inams, village offices or any other law
where by operation of law there would
be vesting of private material resources
in the State or in any other manner in
accordance with law;
(d) by purchase of the material resource
from private persons by the State, its
agencies and instrumentalities in the
manner known to law; and
(e) by the private owner of the material
resource
converting
his
"material
resources" as a "material resource of the
community" by donation, gift, creation of
an endowment or a public trust or in any
other manner known to law, 479.4.4. In
(a) to (d) above, the provision of Article
300-A which is a constitutional right to
property has to be complied with.
479.4.5. The "material resources of the
community" have to be "distributed as best to
subserve the common good". Distribution
could be in two ways:
Firstly, by the State itself retaining the
material resource for a public purpose
and/or for public use; and
Secondly,
privately
owned
material
resources when converted as "material
resources of the community" can be
distributed to eligible and deserving
persons either by way of auction, grant,
assignment, allocation, lease, sale or
any other mode of transfer known to law
either
temporarily
or
permanently
depending upon the mode adopted and
unconditionally
or
with
conditions
depending upon:
(a) nature of the resource and its
inherent characteristics;
(b) the impact of the resource on the
well-being of the community;
(c) the scarcity of the resource;
(d) the consequences of such a resource
being concentrated in the hands of the
private owners; and
(e) any such factors.
479.4.6. The expression "common good"
would, inter alia, mean that the distribution of
the
"ownership
and
control
of
material
resources of the community" would not lead to
concentration of the wealth and means of
production in the hands of few which is a
directive principle in clause (c) of Article 39.
Thus, "distribution of material resources of the
community"
cannot
violate
the
directive
principle in clause (c) of Article 39 of the
Constitution.
479.5. The majority judgment of this Court in
Ranganatha Reddy and the judgment in Abu
Kavur Bai82 relate to nationalisation of
contract carriages/State carriages which were
upheld by this Court. Nationalisation of coking
coal mines was upheld by this Court in
Sanjeev
Coke.
In
Bhim
Singhji37
and
Basantibai19, certain provisions of the Urban
Land Ceiling Act and the provisions of
MHADA, respectively, were upheld on the
touchstone of Article 39(b) of the Constitution.
479.6. The nine-Judge Bench in Mafatlal
referred to the judgments of this Court in
Ranganatha Reddy, Abu Kavur Bai82, etc. in
the context of the submission made before i.e.
the Indian Constitution envisages Justicesocial, economic and political, to all citizens of
India as enshrined in the Preamble. This was
by way of an obiter but having persuasive
value.”
65. The principle of unjust enrichment, no doubt, is intended to
prevent a claimant from obtaining a double benefit. But the said
doctrine equally operates against the unjust enrichment of the
authority retaining an amount which, by virtue of a subsequent
statutory notification having retrospective effect, has ceased to be
legally recoverable at the earlier rate. The doctrine is founded
upon restitution and fairness and cannot be invoked as a
mechanical formula in favour of the authority. As observed by the
Constitution Bench in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (supra), the
question of refund has to be considered within the statutory
framework and with due regard to the principle that the benefit of
refund should not result in unjust enrichment. In the present case,
however, the conclusion of the authority that there was passing on
of the burden rests essentially upon the accounting treatment of
the levy and not upon any cogent material demonstrating actual
recovery of the market fee from the consumers.
66. The Court is also of the view that the interpretation sought to be
placed by the respondents would lead to an anomalous
consequence. The State Government, exercising statutory power
under Section 69 of the Act of 1972, granted a benefit to the
specified class with effect from 01.04.2022. If a rice miller who
had paid the fee at the higher rate prior to issuance of the
notification is denied the benefit merely because the amount had
already been deposited, whereas a similarly situated rice miller
who happened to transact after 29.07.2022 receives the benefit of
the reduced rate, the retrospective character of the notification
would have no meaningful operation. The Court must avoid such
an interpretation which produces an artificial distinction between
similarly situated beneficiaries solely on the basis of the date of
actual collection of the levy, despite the State Government having
consciously selected 01.04.2022 as the effective date.
67. The judgment in Coastal Paper Limited (supra), relied upon by
the petitioners, also reinforces the principle that an exemption
notification has to be considered having regard to its object and
purpose. The Court is required to adopt a construction which
advances the statutory object and does not frustrate the benefit
intended by the Government. In the said case, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under :“15. .......At the same time, it is also
necessary to go behind the objective for
which the notification itself is issued thereby
giving become it a purposive interpretation,
which has become the cardinal rule of
interpretation. In our opinion, it is only after
examining all these factors that the final
decision should be arrived at.
***
25. …………As explained in CCE v. Parle
Exports (P) Ltd. (SCC at p. 357) and Tata Oil
Mills Co. Lid. v. CCE, (SCC at p. 545-46) in
interpreting the scope of any notification, the
Court has first to keep in mind the object and
purpose of the notification. All parts of it
should be read harmoniously in aid of, and
not in derogation of, that purpose……...”
68. Similarly, the principle laid down in Collector of Central Excise
(supra), is attracted in the present case inasmuch as the benefit
granted by the Government to the identified class cannot be
rendered illusory by an interpretation which effectively deprives
the very beneficiaries of such benefit.
69. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that the principal grievance of the petitioners
deserves acceptance. The market fee and Farmers' Welfare Fee
were initially collected from the petitioners at the rates prescribed
under the notification dated 30.11.2021. Subsequently, the State
Government, in exercise of its statutory power under Section 69 of
the Act of 1972, issued notification dated 29.07.2022 whereby the
rate of market fee was reduced from Rs.3/- to Re.1/- per Rs.100/and the Farmers' Welfare Fee was reduced from Rs.2/- to Re.1/per Rs.100/-. More importantly, the said benefit was expressly
made operative retrospectively from 01.04.2022. The petitioners
admittedly fall within the class of rice millers for whom the benefit
of the notification was intended. Consequently, the petitioners
cannot be deprived of the benefit of the retrospective reduction
merely because the differential amount had already been
deposited with the concerned Mandi authorities before issuance
of the notification dated 29.07.2022.
70. The finding recorded in the impugned order dated 10.09.2025 that
the petitioners had passed on the burden of the market fee and
Farmers' Welfare Fee to their end consumers is, in the opinion of
this Court, not founded upon sufficient material. The mere fact
that the petitioners have shown the statutory fee as expenditure in
their audited accounts does not, by itself, establish that the exact
incidence of the levy was recovered from the consumers. The
authority was required to examine the entire material produced by
the petitioners, including the invoices and relevant financial
records, and to determine actual passing on of the burden rather
than proceeding on a presumption arising solely from the
accounting treatment of the expenditure. Such an approach does
not adequately address the question which was required to be
determined pursuant to the earlier order dated 16.01.2025.
71. It is also relevant that the earlier order dated 16.01.2025 did not
finally adjudicate the petitioners' entitlement to refund; rather, the
matter was remitted for a fresh determination after examining
whether the petitioners had collected the fee in question from their
customers and after affording them sufficient opportunity of
hearing. The petitioners thereafter produced their documents and
participated in the proceedings. The purpose of the remand was
thus to undertake a genuine and objective examination of the
factual question of passing on of the burden. In the considered
opinion of this Court, the said exercise cannot be regarded as
satisfactorily completed merely by noticing that the market fee
was shown as expenditure in the profit and loss account and then
drawing an automatic conclusion that the same had been
recovered from the customers.
72. This Court is not holding that in every case where a retrospective
exemption is granted the claimant would be automatically entitled
to refund irrespective of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The
principle of unjust enrichment remains an important consideration.
However, such principle has to be established on the basis of
relevant material and cannot be invoked merely by way of
presumption. In the present case, the material relied upon by the
respondents falls short of establishing that the petitioners had
actually passed on the incidence of the disputed differential levy
to
their
consumers.
Conversely,
the
State
Government's
notification dated 29.07.2022 expressly grants retrospective
benefit to the class to which the petitioners belong. The balance of
the statutory scheme, therefore, lies in giving effect to the
retrospective exemption/reduction.
73. Consequently, the common impugned order dated 10.09.2025
cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed and set aside.
The petitioners are entitled to the benefit flowing from the
notification dated 29.07.2022 for the period for which the said
notification has been made retrospectively operative. The
concerned Mandi authorities are consequently required to give
effect to the reduced rates prescribed under the said notification
and to work out the differential amount paid by each of the
petitioners during the relevant period.
74. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are allowed. The common order
dated 10.09.2025 passed by the Chhattisgarh State Agricultural
Marketing (Mandi) Board/competent authority, insofar as it rejects
the claims of the respective petitioners for refund/adjustment of
the excess market fee/mandi shulk and Farmers' Welfare Fee, is
hereby quashed and set aside.
75. The concerned Mandi authorities are directed to extend to the
respective petitioners the benefit of the notification dated
29.07.2022, by applying the reduced rate of Re.1/- per Rs.100/-
towards market fee/mandi shulk and Re.1/- per Rs.100/- towards
Farmers'
Welfare
Fee
for
the
period
commencing
from
01.04.2022, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
said notification. The authorities shall accordingly calculate the
differential amount paid by each petitioner for the period covered
by the retrospective operation of the notification and shall refund
the excess amount to the respective petitioners. In the alternative,
where permissible under the applicable statutory scheme and the
accounts maintained by the concerned Mandi, the differential
amount may, at the option of the respective petitioner and subject
to verification of the amount payable, be adjusted against future
market fee/other permissible statutory dues. The exercise of
calculation and verification shall be confined to determining the
actual amount paid by the respective petitioner at the higher rate
during the period covered by the retrospective notification and the
amount payable at the reduced rate prescribed therein. The
authorities shall not reopen any issue which has already been
conclusively determined by this Court in the present proceeding.
76. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the concerned
authorities within a period of three months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order. The respective petitioners shall furnish the
necessary particulars/documents, if required, for facilitating
computation of the differential amount. Upon such verification, the
amount found refundable shall be released to the respective
petitioners without insisting upon any further adjudication on the
question of entitlement to the benefit of the notification dated
29.07.2022.
77. It is made clear that the present order and the declaration of law
contained herein shall govern all the connected writ petitions,
notwithstanding the fact that the amount of market fee/Farmers'
Welfare Fee claimed, the period of the transactions in question
and the quantum of refund sought may vary from petitioner to
petitioner. The concerned authorities shall, therefore, undertake
the necessary computation separately in respect of each
petitioner, on the basis of the transactions actually undertaken
and the payments actually made by the respective petitioner, and
shall determine the differential amount payable strictly in
accordance with the notification dated 29.07.2022 and the
principles and directions contained in the present common order.
While undertaking such exercise, the authorities shall confine
themselves to verification and computation of the amounts and
shall not reopen the question of the petitioners' entitlement to the
benefit of the retrospective reduction, which stands adjudicated by
this Court in the present proceedings.
78. Before parting, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that the
State Government, having consciously exercised the statutory
power vested in it under Section 69 of the Act of 1972 and having
extended the benefit of reduced market fee and Farmers' Welfare
Fee with retrospective effect from 01.04.2022, cannot be
permitted to have such statutory benefit rendered illusory by an
administrative interpretation which, in substance, deprives the
very class of beneficiaries of the benefit for the period for which
the State Government intended the notification to operate. Once
the competent statutory authority has consciously determined the
reduced rate and has expressly given such determination
retrospective effect, the authorities entrusted with implementation
of the statutory scheme are required to give full and faithful effect
to the same.
79. A statutory benefit cannot be permitted to remain merely
declaratory in character; it must be translated into an effective and
meaningful benefit for the persons falling within the class covered
by the notification. The administrative authorities are, therefore,
bound to implement the notification in its true letter and spirit and
cannot, by adopting an interpretation inconsistent with its express
retrospective operation, defeat or dilute the benefit intended to be
conferred by the State Government.
80. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons recorded
hereinabove, all the writ petitions succeed and are accordingly
allowed in the aforesaid terms. The common impugned order
dated 10.09.2025, insofar as it rejects the claim of the respective
petitioners for the benefit arising from the retrospective reduction
of market fee/mandi shulk and Farmers' Welfare Fee and
consequential refund/adjustment of the differential amount, is
hereby quashed and set aside. The concerned authorities shall
act in accordance with the directions contained in this order and
complete the consequential exercise within the time stipulated
hereinabove.
81. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
The date when the
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pronounced
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------
13.10.2026
Head-Note
Retrospective reduction of the rate of market fee cannot be denied
merely because the higher levy had already been deposited; mere
accounting of the levy as expenditure does not, by itself, establish that
its incidence was passed on to the consumers.
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