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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
_A_G_A_R_T_A_L_A_
CRP No.44 of 2023
CRP No.45 of 2023
CRP No.46 of 2023
CRP No.47 of 2023
Sahajahan Majumdar Prop. of M/S Sahajahan Majumdar, Durgapur, P.O.
Sonamura, P.S. Sonamura, District- Sepahijala, Tripura, Pin-799131 having
registration TVAT (TIN) 16130094028 represented by the dealer-petitioner,
Sahajahan Majumder aged about 57 years.
...... Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
1. The State of Tripura, represented by the Chief Secretary, Government of
Tripura, Agartala, New Civil Secretariat, P.O. New Capital Complex (NCC),
P.S New Capital Complex (NCC), District- West Tripura, Pin-799006.
2. The Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Tripura, New Civil
Secretariat, P.O. New Capital Complex (NCC), P.S. New Capital Complex
(NCC), District- West Tripura, Pin-799006.
3. The Commissioner of Taxes (Revisional Authority), Government of
Tripura, P.N. Complex, Gurkhabasti, P.O. New Capital Complex (NCC), P.S.
New Capital Complex (NCC), Agartala, District- West Tripura, Pin-799006.
4. The Superintendent of Taxes, Government of Tripura, Charge-Bishalgarh,
P.O. Bishalgarh, P.S. Bishalgarh, District- Sepahijala, Pin-799102.
..…. Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Biplabendu Roy, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
: Mr. K. De, Addl. G.A.
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Date of argument and delivery of Judgment & Order : 6th February, 2025.
Whether Fit for Reporting : YES.
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. Biplabendu Roy, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and also heard K. De, learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the respondent-State.
[2]
The present revision petition (CRP No.44 of 2023) under
Section 72 of the TVAT Act, 2004 relates to the assessment year 2017-2018
(i.e. April, May and June 2017). By the common impugned order dated 15th
October, 2022, the learned Commissioner of Taxes, respondent No.3 herein
has decided the revision petitions in respect of assessment years 2014-15,
2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18. The matter was earlier remanded for the
petitioner to avail alternative remedy vide order dated 7th March, 2022
passed in WP(C) No.221 of 2022. The Assessing Authority had by the order
dated 29.07.2019 imposed tax, interest and penalty upon the petitioner which
was challenged in revision under Section 70(2) of the TVAT Act, 2004
before the learned Commissioner of Taxes after liberty granted by this
Court. The revision petitions have been decided vide order dated 15th
October, 2022 by remanding the matters relating to A.Y. 2015-16, 2016-17
& 2017-18 on the question of imposition of penalty after due notice whereas
the matters relating to the period 2014-15 was remanded to the Assessing
Authority to take a fresh decision after due notice. Thereafter, the petitioner
preferred a review petition under Section 74 of the TVAT Act, 2004 which
was dismissed on 11th May, 2023. Petitioner has approached this Court
through the instant revision petition under Section 72 of the TVAT Act,
2004 and also invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India. By order
dated 24th January, 2024, delay of 239 days in preferring the instant revision
petitions was condoned in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
relying upon the decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of
Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas
Management Board (PW) Slapper and another versus Excise and
Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority, reported in (2020) 17
SCC 692.
[3]
CRP No.45 of 2023 relates to the assessment year 2016-17;
CRP No.46 of 2023 relates to the assessment year 2015-16 and CRP No.47
of 2023 relates to the assessment year 2014-15. Counter affidavit has been
filed by the respondents though no rejoinder has been filed. When the matter
was heard on 28th November, 2024, learned Additional Government
Advocate was asked to show as to whether notice under Section 31(1) of
TVAT Act, 2004 for the relevant tax period 2014-15 had been issued by the
Assessing Authority since a common assessment order was passed on 29th
July, 2019 covering periods 2014-15 to 2017-18 (up to June, 2017). Notice
under Section 31(1) for the tax periods 2015-16 to 2017-18 (up to June,
2017) is dated 13th February, 2019 (Annexure-3 to CRP No.44 of 2023) i.e.
the present revision petition. The Commissioner of Taxes has by the
common impugned order dated 15th October, 2022 remanded the matter for
passing fresh assessment order in respect of tax period 2014-15 whereas
remitted the matter for the remaining years 2015-16 to 2017-18 on the
question of imposition of penalty after due notice. Learned counsel for the
revenue was also asked to obtain the assessment records for the relevant
assessment years as certified to be true for assistance to the Court on the
next date.
[4]
Mr. K. De, learned counsel for the revenue has on the basis of
instructions and the records of the assessment proceedings submitted that no
notice under Section 31(1) was issued for the tax period 2014-15. The same
is also reflected in the revisional order. Therefore, the revisional order so far
as it relates to 2014-15 is not sustainable in law as the proceedings for
assessment beyond five years is barred by Section 33 of the TVAT Act,
2004. Section 33 of the TVAT Act is extracted hereunder:
"33. No assessment after five years :- (1) No assessment under section 31
and 32 shall be made after the expiry of five years from the end of the tax
period to which the assessment relates; Provided that in case of offence
under this Act for which proceeding for prosecution has been initiated, the
limitation as specified in this subsection shall not apply.
(2) Any assessment made or penalty imposed under this Chapter shall be
without prejudice to prosecution for any offence under this Act."
If the Assessing Authority had not issued any notice before
proceeding for assessment for the relevant year 2014-15 and had erroneously
assessed the tax returns for the said period by the common impugned order
dated 29th July, 2019, the same cannot be reopened on the basis of revisional
order dated 15th October, 2022 as it would be barred beyond five years from
the relevant date of the tax period 2014-2015. Apart from that, learned
counsel for the petitioner and the revenue both have pointed out that as per
the common assessment order dated 29th July, 2019 the Assessing Authority
has found Nil tax liability. The return filed by the petitioner has been
accepted. In that way, the revisional order dated 15th October, 2022
remanding the matter for re-assessment for the year 2014-15 is unsustainable
in law and is accordingly set aside.
[5]
During course of argument, learned counsel for the petitioner
does not press CRP No.45 of 2023 relating to the assessment period 2016-17
and CRP No.46 of 2023 relating to the assessment year 2015-16 as the tax
liability even after imposition of penalty under Section 25(4)(d) came to
Rs.200/- and Rs.800/- respectively for the relevant assessment years.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that remanding the matter on the
point of penalty would be fruitless as petitioner has already deposited the
total tax liability including interest and penalty. Learned counsel for the
revenue has also on the basis of records available with him submitted that
the total tax liability for these relevant assessment years have been duly
deposited by the petitioner. If that be so, then the order of remand for the
A.Y. 2015-16 and 2016-17 on the point of penalty by the common revisional
order dated 15th October, 2022 also requires interference as it would be a
meaningless exercise. As such, the common impugned order dated 15th
October, 2022 passed by the Revisional Authority so far it relates to the
assessment years 2014-15 (CRP No.47 of 2023); 2015-16 (CRP No.46 of
2016) are also set aside.
[6]
We now proceed to determine the legal issue and the question
of law raised in CRP No.44 of 2023 which relates to assessment year 201718 (up to June, 2017). Let it be once again indicated herein that by the order
dated 29th July, 2019, the Assessing Authority had passed a common
assessment order for the years 2014-15 to 2017-18 (up to June, 2017). The
relevant part of the common assessment order is extracted hereunder :
“The dealer furnished all returns in the time except for the month of December, 2015, September,
2016, November, 2016, May, 2017 and June, 2017 as under:
Month
Due
Date
submission
return
December,2015
Return
Submission
date
Delay(days)
Penalty
liable(Rs.)
31/1/2016
02/02/2016
2 days
200/-
September,2016
30/10/2016
05/11/2016
5 days
500/-
November,
31/12/2016
03/01/2017
3 days
300/-
May, 2017
30/06/2017
05/07/2017
5 days
500/-
June, 2017
31/07/2017
31/10/2017
92 days
9200/-
107 Days
10700/-
TOTAL
of
of
Regarding late submission of return the dealer is here by asked to show cause as to why penal action
should not be taken again you, on the request of Md. Sahajahan Majumder, proprietor of the firm
separate notice is not issued. Md. Sahajahan fails to give any satisfactory reply. So the dealer is liable
to given penalty @ 100 per delay u/s 25(4)(d) of the TVAT Act.
During the period of under assessment the dealer did not obtain any statutory permits in form XXIV,
form XXVI, form XXVII, “C” form and “F” form. The dealer furnish audited balance sheet for the
year 2014-15 to 2017-18 (up to 30th June, 2017)
The facts and figures have been viewed carefully and it appears from the records that the dealer
shown huge amount of stock. The dealer has earned margin of profit @ 1.52% for the assessment year
2014-15 to 2015-16 and 1.54% for the assessment year 2016-17 and 2017-18 (up to 30th June, 2017).
The dealer is here by asked to explain regarding low profit of margin and variation of profit margin
during the period of under assessment. Md. Majumder proprietor of the firm stated that due to tough
competition of market and to survive in competition market for wholesale business he had to sold the
goods profit margin @ 1.52% for the assessment year 2014-15 to 2015-16 and profit margin @ 1.54%
for the assessment year 2016-17 and 2017-18 (up to 30th June, 2017). His explanation is accepted. The
dealer shown the sale price of per MT cement of Rs.5417.86 for the financial year 2014-15, Rs.5440
for the financial year 2015-15, Rs.5480 for the financial year 2016-17 and Rs.5500 for the financial
year 2017-18 (up to 30th June, 2017). The sale price of the dealer is here by accepted.
Regarding huge stock of goods, Md. Majumder stated that he had already sold the goods. As the
dealer already sold the goods but did not deposit the tax, so the dealer violated the provision of u/s 75
A of the TVAT Act, 2004. The dealer is here by asked to show cause as to why penal action should
not be taken against you as per u/s 75 A of the TVAT Act, 2004, on request of Md. Majumder
separated notice is not issued. Md. Majumder fails to adduce any satisfactory reply. As the dealer
already sold the goods so closing stock as on 30-06-2017 is Nil. As the dealer did not deposit the tax
so penalty @ 10% u/s 75A of the TVAT Act, 2004 imposed on the dealer. Also imposed interest @
1.5% per month on balance amount and thus completed the cases as under:
[7]
A/Y
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18(up to 30th June, 2017)
TOR
38781382
32993312
17103448
45190069
TOD
38781382
32993312
17103448
118890541 (Cement 118699406
+ Stone 191135)
Tax payable
5623300
4784030
2480000
17239128
Tax Paid (-)
5623300
4784030
2480000
6552560
Balance Due
NIL
NIL
NIL
10686568
Add. Penalty u/s
75A @ 10%
NIL
NIL
NIL
1068657
Interest @ 1.5%
per month
NIL
NIL
NIL
3847164
Add. Penalty u/s
25(4)(d) of the
TVAT Act, 2004
NIL
Total sum payable
NIL
15612089
The order of the Revisional Authority for the assessment years
2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17 have been set aside for the reasons indicated
hereinabove. In respect of the assessment for the year 2017-18 up to 30th
June, 2017, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken a specific plea that
the Assessing Authority has on the one hand not rejected the return filed by
the petitioner in the prescribed form under Schedule-VIII as per Rule 18(1)
of the TVAT Rules for the month of April, May and June, 2017 which is to
the tune of Rs.4,51,90,069/- but it has proceeded to determine the turnover
as Rs.11,88,90541/- which includes sale of cement and stone. If the
Assessing Authority has not rejected the return filed for the relevant months
of the assessment year 2017-18, this determination of turnover could have
been only on the basis of best judgment assessment. However, no such
exercise is reflected from the assessment order passed by the respondent
No.4. Petitioner has, therefore, raised this ground before the Revisional
Authority as well at paragraph (F) and (G) of the present revision petition.
The Revisional Authority has completely failed to take note of the plea
raised by the petitioner that the determination of enhanced turnover by the
Assessing Authority without rejecting the returns for the relevant year 201718 is without any materials and, therefore, unsustainable in law. As a result
of enhancement of the turnover to Rs.11,88,90541/- the total tax liability
payable by the petitioner has risen to Rs.1,72,39,128/- compared to the tax
of Rs.65,52,560/- as per the return filed by the petitioner.
[8]
It is further submitted that learned Assessing Authority had
proceeded to impose penalty under Section 75A and also under Section
25(4)(d) of the TVAT Act, 2004 for delay in filing returns for the month of
May and June, 2017 which was also unsustainable in law as no notice to that
effect was issued. The learned Revisional Authority has while remanding the
matter only on the question of penalty on the ground of non-service of notice
under Section 25(4)(d) and under Section 75A of the TVAT Act, 2004
completely failed to take note that determination of turnover by the
Assessing Authority without rejection of the return of the petitioner is
unsustainable in law and on facts. Petitioner has in the present revision
petition taken such a plea in ground No.(J). He has also raised the question
of law as required under Section 72 of the TVAT Act at paragraph 22, subparagraph (c) and (d). Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits
that the order of Revisional Authority warrants interference to the extent that
the matter be remanded not only on the question of imposition of penalty
after issuance of notice upon the petitioner but also for opening of the
assessment made by the common assessment order dated 29th July, 2019
otherwise it would lead to miscarriage of justice. Section 25(4)(d) & Section
75A are extracted hereunder:
"25. Return defaults:***
***
***
(4)(d) having paid the tax payable according to a return in time, fails to
furnish along with the return proof of payment made in accordance with
sub-section (4) of section 24 ; the Commissioner may, after giving the
dealer reasonable opportunity of being heard, direct him to pay in addition
to any tax, interest and penalty under sub-section (3) payable or paid by
him, a penalty of a sum of rupees one hundred per day of default subject to
a maximum of rupees ten thousand.
***
***
***
75A. Notwithstanding anything contained elswhere in the Act, if the
Commissioner, in course of any proceeding under this Act is satisfied that
any dealer has evaded in any way the liability to pay tax, he may direct that
such dealer shall pay by way of penalty in addition to the tax payable by
him, a sum not exceeding one & half time of that amount but which shall
not be less than ten percent of that amount. Provided that no order under
this section shall be made unless the dealer has been heard or has been
given a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
[9]
Mr. K. De, learned counsel for the revenue has relied upon the
contents of the counter affidavit and supported the impugned order. He,
however, has at the outset also averred that reopening of assessment without
issuance of notice under Section 31(1) of the TVAT Act for the assessment
year 2014-15 beyond the period of five years would not be tenable in law.
[10]
So far as the assessment years concerning the tax period 2015-
16 and 2016-17 are concerned since both the parties submit that the total tax
liability has been deposited including the penalty component. In such
circumstances, the impugned revisional order remanding the matter for
imposition of penalty after fresh service of notice upon the petitioner for
these two years would be meaningless and have been accordingly interfered
with in the forgoing part of this order. So far as the tax period 2017-18
concerning the months of April to June, 2017 is concerned, learned counsel
for the revenue has not been able to show that the returns for these three
months submitted by the petitioner have been rejected. On the other hand,
the assessment order dated 29th July, 2019 does not reflect any exercise for
determining a turnover of Rs.11,88,90541/- on the basis of best judgment
assessment as there is no exercise to that effect undertaken by the Assessing
Authority nor are there any materials reflected in the assessment order. In
this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh vrs. M/S. H.M.
Esufali, H.M. Abdulali, Siyaganj, Main Road, Indore reported in (1973) 2
SCC 137; paragraphs-7 to 9 are extracted hereunder as they provide the
principle for any such exercise in cases where the returns filed by the
assessee are rejected or no returns have been filed by the assessee:
"7.
Before proceeding to examine the contentions advanced on behalf of
the parties, it is necessary to clarify certain aspects. It may be noted that the
first assessments were made by the Sales Tax Officer primarily on the basis
of the returns submitted by the assessee. In the proceedings relating to
those assessments, the Sales Tax Officer relied on the books of account of
the assessee. While making re-assessments on the basis of the information
gathered from the bill book seized, the Sales Tax Officer rejected the
accounts maintained by the assessee as unreliable and assessed the assessee
on the basis of his “best-judgment”. The distinction between a “bestjudgment” assessment and assessment based on the accounts submitted by
an assessee must be borne in mind. Sometime there may be innocent or
trivial mistakes in the accounts maintained by the assessee. There may be
even certain unintended or unimportant omissions in those accounts; but
yet the accounts may be accepted as genuine and substantially correct. In
such cases, the assessments are made on the basis of the accounts
maintained even though the assessing officer may add back to the accounts
price of items that might have been omitted to be included in the accounts.
In such a case, the assessment made is not a “best-judgment” assessment. It
is primarily made on the basis of the accounts maintained by the assessee.
But when the assessing officer comes to the conclusion that no reliance can
be placed on the accounts maintained by the assessee, he proceeds to assess
the assessee on the basis of his “best-judgment”. In doing so, he may take
such assistance as the assessee's accounts may afford, he may also rely on
other information gathered by him as well as on the surrounding
circumstances of the case. The assessments made on the basis of assessee's
accounts and those made on “best-judgment” basis are totally different
types of assessments.
8.
Now coming to the facts of this case, it is necessary to remember
that at the initial stage, the assessee denied that the bill book seized was his
bill book and the entries therein related to his dealings. He asserted that he
had nothing to do with the bill book in question and the entries therein do
not relate to nil dealings. But at a later stage, he conceded that that bill
book was his and the entries therein related to his dealings. It is now
proved as well as admitted that his dealings outside his accounts during a
period of 19 days were of the value of Rs 31,171.28. From this
circumstance, it was open to the Sales Tax Officer to infer that the assessee
had large scale dealings outside his accounts. The assessee has neither
pleaded nor established any justifiable reason for not entering in his
accounts the dealings noted in the bill book seized. It is obvious that he
was maintaining false accounts to evade payment of sales tax. In such a
situation, it was not possible for the Sales Tax Officer to find out precisely
the turnover suppressed. He could only make an estimate of the suppressed
turnover on the basis of the material before him. So long as the estimate
made by him is not arbitrary and has nexus with facts discovered, the same
cannot be questioned. In the very nature of things the estimate made may
be an over-estimate or an underestimate. But that is no ground for
interfering with his “best-judgment”. It is true that the basis adopted by the
officer should be relevant to the estimate made. The High Court was wrong
in assuming that the assessing authority must have material before it to
prove the exact turnover suppressed. If that is true, there is no question of
“best-judgment” assessment. The assessee cannot be permitted to take
advantage of his own illegal acts. It was his duty to place all facts truthfully
before the assessing authority. If he fails to do his duty, he cannot be
allowed to call upon the assessing authority to prove conclusively what
turnover, he had suppressed. That fact must be within his personal
knowledge. Hence the burden of proving that fact is on him. No
circumstance has been placed before the assessing authority to show that
the assessee's dealings during September 1, 1950 to September 19, 1960,
outside his accounts were due to some exceptional circumstance or that
they were proportionately more than his dealings outside his accounts,
during the remaining periods. The assessing authority could not have been
in possession of any correct measure to find out the escaped turnover
during the periods November 1, 1959 to August 31, 1960 and September
20, 1960 to October 20, 1960. The task of the assessing authority in finding
out the escaped turnover was by no means easy. In estimating any escaped
turnover, it is inevitable that there is some guess-work. The assessing
authority while making the “best-judgment” assessment no doubt should
arrive at its conclusion without any bias and on rational basis. That
authority should not be vindictive or capricious. If the estimate made by
the assessing authority is a bona fide estimate and is based on a rational
basis, the fact that there is no good proof in support of that estimate is
immaterial. Prima facie, the assessing authority is the best judge of the
situation. It is his “best-judgment” and not of any one else's. The High
Court could not substitute its “best-judgment” for that of the assessing
authority. In the case of “best-judgment” assessments, the courts will have
to first see whether the accounts maintained by the assessee were rightly
rejected as unreliable. If they come to the conclusion that they were rightly
rejected, the next question that arises for consideration is whether the basis
adopted in estimating the turnover has a reasonable nexus with the estimate
made. If the basis adopted is held to be a relevant basis even though the
courts may think that it is not the most appropriate basis, the estimate made
by the assessing authority cannot be disturbed. In the present case, there is
no dispute that the assessee's accounts were rightly discarded. We do not
agree with the High Court that it is the duty of the assessing authority to
adduce proof in support of its estimate. The basis adopted, by the Sales Tax
Officer was a relevant one whether it was the most appropriate or not.
Hence the High Court was not justified in interfering with the same.
9.
The law relating to “best-judgment” assessment is the same both in
the case of Income Tax assessment as well as in the case of sales tax
assessment. The scope of “best-judgment” assessment under the Income
Tax law came up for consideration before the Judicial Committee as early
as 1937 in Commissioner of Income Tax, Central and U.P. v. Laxminarain
Badridas. [(1937) 5 ITR 170] Therein Lord Russel of Killowen speaking
for the Judicial Committee observed (at p. 180):
“The Officer is to make an assessment to the best of his judgment
against a person who is in default as regards supplying information.
He must not act dishonestly, or vindictively or capriciously because
he must exercise judgment in the matter. He must make what he
honestly believes to be a fair estimate of the proper figure of
assessment, and for this purpose he must, Their Lordships think, be
able to take into consideration local knowledge and repute in regard
to the assessee's circumstances, and his own knowledge of previous
returns by and assessments of the assessee, and all other matters
which he thinks will assist him in arriving at a fair and proper
estimate, and though there must necessarily be guess-work in the
matter, it must be honest guess-work. In that sense, too, the
assessment must be to some extent arbitrary.”
[11]
Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the
parties, we are therefore of the considered opinion that the petitioner has
been able to make out sufficient grounds to interfere in the matter. The
Revisional Authority has also failed to decide the question of law which was
raised in the revision petition i.e. determination of a fresh turnover beyond
the returns without rejection of the returns of the petitioner for the above
periods April to June, 2017 or reflecting any exercise as to whether the
turnover was increased relying on the same materials produced by the
Assessee along with his returns. The assessment order dated 29th July, 2019
does not reflect any exercise undertaken or any material relied upon to
undertake the best judgment assessment for the financial year 2017-18. The
matter therefore, requires to be remanded for a fresh assessment for the
relevant year 2017-18 including on the question of penalty. Petitioner has
not been able to dispute that notices for assessment proceedings for the
relevant year 2017-18 were issued on 13.02.2019 which was well within the
period of five years prescribed for assessment under Section 33 of the TVAT
Act. In conclusion, the common impugned revisional order dated 15th
October, 2022 is set aside so far as it relates to tax periods 2014-15, 2015-16
and 2016-17 whereas the same stands interfered to the extent that the matter
is remanded to the Assessing Authority for carrying out a fresh assessment
proceeding for the year 2017-18, tax periods April to June, 2017 in
accordance with law.
[12]
CRP No.45 of 2013, CRP No.46 of 2013 and CRP No.47 of
2023 are accordingly allowed by setting aside the common impugned
revisional order dated 15th October, 2022 for the reasons indicated
hereinabove. CRP No.44 of 2023 is also allowed in the manner and to the
extent indicated above. The records of assessment proceedings as certified to
be true produced by the learned counsel for the revenue be kept on record.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(BISWAJIT PALIT), J
DIPESH DEB
Date: 2025.02.19 15:33:13
+05'30'
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH), CJ
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