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GAHC010254022022
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Principal Seat at Guwahati
WP(C)/8147/2022
1.
Sadou Axom Prathamik TET Uttirno Sikshak Samaj,
Having its Registered Office at House No.4, Mulagabharu Path,
Hatigaon Road, Dispur, Guwahati
Dist-Kamrup(M), Assam,
Represented by its President, Sri Trailokya Deka.
2.
Sri Trailokya Deka,
S/o- Late Thaneswar Deka,
R/o Dispur, Guwahati,
P.O. & P.S. Dispur,
Dist-Kamrup(M), Assam,
…..Petitioners
-Versus-
1.
The State of Assam,
Represented by the Commissioner and Secretary to the Govt. of Assam,
Department of School Education (Elementary),
Assam (Civil) Secretariat,
Block-C, Dispur, Guwahati, Assam, PIN-781006.
2.
The Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Assam,
Department of School Education (Elementary),
Assam (Civil) Secretariat,
signed by
Deepjyoti Digitally
Deepjyoti Sarkar
Date: 2026.01.09
Sarkar
12:29:30 +05'30'
Block-C, Dispur, Guwahati, Assam, PIN-781006.
3.
The Director of Elementary Education, Assam,
Kahilipara, Guwahati, Assam,
PIN- 781019.
4.
The Mission Director, Sarba Siksha Abhijan,
Assam, Kahilipara, Guwahati- 781019
5.
The Commissioner and Secretary to the Govt. of Assam,
Department of Finance, Assam, Civil Secretariat, Dispur,
Guwahati, Assam, PIN-781006.
…….Respondents
- B E F O R E-
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
Advocate for the petitioners
:
Mr. S. Borthakur
Advocate for the respondents
:
Mr. N.J. Khataniar, SC, Ele. Edu.;
Mr. S. Bora, SC, SSA,
Mr. A. Chaliha, SC, Finance
Date on which judgment is reserved
:
18.12.2025
Date of pronouncement of judgment
:
09.01.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment?
:
N/A
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
:
Yes
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Also heard Mr. N.J. Khataniar, learned Standing Counsel for the
Elementary Education Department, being respondent Nos.1 - 3,
Mr. S. Bora, learned standing counsel, SSA, appearing for the
respondent No.4 and Mr. A. Chaliha, learned Standing Counsel for
Finance department, being respondent No. 5.
2.
In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioners have challenged the order, dated 01-092022, issued under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A by the
Secretary
to
the
Govt.
of
Assam,
Elementary
Education
Department and/or any other consequential order(s)/ action(s)
and/ or to issue direction to the respondent authority to release
the arrear 5% Dearness Allowance/ Dearness Relief from July,
to
December,
and
11%
&
3%
Dearness
Allowance/Dearness Relief from July, 2021 to August, 2022
payable to the members of the petitioner Association who have
been
working
as
Assistant
Teacher
in
different
Lower
Primary/Upper Primary schools in the State of Assam.
Background Facts:3.
The background facts, leading to filing of the present
petition, is briefly stated as under:-
“The members of the Petitioner Association, are all TET
qualified Teachers appointed in different LP/UP Schools
in the state of Assam since 2012, onwards under SSA.
They were initially appointed on fixed pay and since
April, 2013 they have been receiving their salary at par
with the pay structure of regular teacher. They have
been granted the benefit of the 7th Pay Commission
w.e.f. 01-04-2017. Thereafter, the Government, Vide
notification
dated
1-7-2020,
has
provided
some
additional service benefits to the contractual teachers,
who were engaged during 2012-2017 and joined on or
before 01-01-2018.
Thereafter, the Govt. has decided to pay 5% DA/DR
to the teachers w.e.f. July, 2019, 11% D.A w.e.f.
01/07/2021, 3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 and 3% w.e.f.
01/01/2022 and issued different OM/Notifications. The
Government also paid to the regular teachers the arrear
amount accrued on such enhanced D.A. But, the
Government, instead of paying the arrear of the said
DA/DR, had passed the impugned order, dated 01-092022, issued under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A,
and thereby depriving of the members of the petitioner
Association from getting the arrear DA/DR. Being
aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the present
application for equitable relief.”
4.
The respondent No.1 has filed its affidavit in opposition,
wherein, it had taken a stand that the said claim of the petitioner
association is wholly misconceived, untenable and devoid of legal
foundation. Being contractual employees engaged under a specific
scheme, the petitioners cannot claim parity with regular
Government employees, whose service conditions are governed
by statutory rules. It is also stated that the entitlement of the
petitioners to D.A. and other allowances is strictly regulated by
the terms of their contractual engagement and by specific orders
or
notifications,
issued
by
the
competent
administrative
department, from time to time and as such they have no vested
right or enforceable claim to seek D.A. benefits from the dates
applicable to regular employees of the State Government. It is
also stated that the Government in the Department of School
Education, after due consideration of all relevant facts including
the financial and resource position of the State, had taken a
conscious decision to extend the benefit of enhanced Dearness
Allowance to contractual teachers and staff under SSA, Assam
only prospectively.
Accordingly, vide Notification No. PMA.52/2020/170, dated
19.01.2022, the Government allowed payment of ennanced D.A.
@ 5% w.e.f. 01.01.2022, to the Contractual and State Pool
Teachers under SSA, Assam, and subsequently, vide Notification
No. PMA.52/2020/Pt./30, dated 01.09.2022, further enhancement
of 10% w.e.f. 01.09.2022 and 7% w.e.f. 01.04.2023 was
sanctioned. Said notifications were issued in exercise of the
powers vested in the competent authority of the Elementary
Education Department and represent independent policy decisions
applicable to contractual employees under the SSA framework.
The same cannot be equated with or automatically linked to the
Office Memorandum of the Finance (Estt-A) Department, which
are applicable only to regular State Government employees
governed by statutory service rules. As such, there arises no
occasion or legal justification for payment of arrears of D.A. for
the earlier periods as claimed by the petitioners.
The Government, having extended the benefit of enhanced
D.A.
prospectively,
has
fully
discharged
its
obligation
in
accordance with policy decisions applicable to the category of
employees, to which the petitioners belong. Further, it is stated
that the Office Memorandum of the Finance (Estt-A) Department
No. FEG.08/2017/95, dated 18.08.2021 (enhancement @ 11%
w.e.f. 01.07.2021), OM No. FEG.08/2017/108 dated 06.12.2021
(enhancement
@
3%
w.e.f.
01.07.2021),
and
OM
No.
FEG.08/2017/115 dated 25.04.2022 (enhancement @ 3% w.e.f.
01.01.2022) are applicable only to regular Government employees
and pensioners. These OMs are not automatically applicable to
contractual employees, serving under schemes such as SSA. The
petitioners' reliance upon these OMs to claim parity is, therefore,
misplaced and legally unsustainable. It is also stated that the
petitioners' members were initially engaged on contractual basis
at a fixed remuneration, under a written agreement with the
respective School Management Committees for a specific term.
The said contractual terms did not confer entitlement to Dearness
Allowance
or
other
allowances
as
admissible
to
regular
employees. Their service conditions remained distinct and
independent from those of permanent Government employees.
Subsequently, vide Notification No. ΡΜΑ.38/2020/26 dated
01.07.2020, the Government, as a matter of policy, extended
certain benefits to these contractual teachers, such as continuity
of service, leave and entitlement of salary, with effect from
01.07.2020. However, the said notification does not confer any
right to Dearness Allowance or any other allowance as applicable
to regular employees of the State Government. Similarly, vide
Notification No. PMA.38/2020/27, dated 01.07.2020, analogous
benefits were extended to Assistant Teachers (State Pool) under
SSA, but even this notification remains silent with regard to any
entitlement of allowances including D.A. Hence, the contractual or
State Pool teachers under SSA cannot derive any right to claim
D.A. at par with regular employees of the Government. Further, it
is stated that the Government, in extending the benefit of D.A.
prospectively,
under
Notifications
dated
19.01.2022,
and
01.09.2022, has acted within its lawful authority and financial
prudence. The petitioners cannot demand retrospective monetary
benefits merely by analogy or comparison with regular employees,
in the absence of any statutory or contractual provision
supporting such a claim.
Further contention is that the Director of Elementary
Education, Assam, vide advertisement No. E-532785/8, dated
06.08.2024, initiated a Special Recruitment Drive (SRD) for
regularization of Contractual and State Pool Teachers under SSA,
Assam, against 35,133 regular posts of Assistant Teachers. And
pursuant to the said drive, a substantial number of such teachers
have already been regularized and brought under the regular pay
structure of the State Government, thereby enjoying full benefits
admissible under service rules. And as such, the claims and reliefs
sought by the petitioners are wholly untenable both in law and on
facts. The petitioners have already been granted enhanced D.A.
benefits in accordance with departmental policy decisions, and no
arrears or retrospective benefits are admissible to them. The writ
petition is therefore liable to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioners association has filed reply to the affidavit in
opposition of the respondent No.1, denying the statement and
averments made therein. It is stated that the members of the
petitioner Association are the contractual employees. And that
only on the basis of the promise made by the authorities, the
petitioner Association has raised the grievance. It is stated that as
disclosed by the letter, dated 28-07-2017, the Govt. has taken
decision for giving same benefit to the contractual teachers that
of regular teachers in the year 2017 itself. Having deciding to do
so the authority, cannot now say that the enhancement of
Dearness Allowance from July 2019 to August, 2022 at different
rates will not be applicable with respect of the members of the
petitioner Association.
The
argument
that
the
members of
the
petitioner
Association cannot claim parity of regular Govt. employees is
contrary to the decision taken by the Govt., and that the
petitioner have been seeking enhancement of their Dearness
Allowance prior to January, 2022 to which they are entitled on the
basis of the decision taken by the Govt. and the stand so taken by
them is bereft of merit and liable to be discarded. Having taken a
policy decision to give the members of the petitioner Association
benefit equal that of regular employees, now they cannot turn
back to say that the members of the petitioner Association are not
entitled to such benefit.
It is more surprising that the authorities of the Education
department, for number of occasions, have submitted before this
Court that the Govt. is positively considering the grievance of the
petitioners. Based on such assurance, this Court was also pleased
to give time to the Education department, as is apparent from the
order dated 7-1-2025, 7-2-2025, 22-4-2025, 14-5-2025, 23-52025, 6-8-2025 and 29-8-2025 of this Court. It is further stated
that respondent No.1 has confused the State Pool Teachers with
the Contractual Teachers, while the state pool teachers were
appointed since the period 2017 on contractual basis, the
members of the petitioner Association, on the other hand, were
appointed since 2012 and the salary structure of the petitioners
was fixed at per Revision of Pay Rule, 2010, w.e.f.1-4-2013. The
members of the petitioner Association are not raising the
grievance on behalf of State Pool teachers.
6.
Mr. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits
that the members of the petitioners’ Association are all TET
qualified Teachers and they were appointed in different LP/UP
Schools in the state of Assam since 2012, onwards under SSA.
Though, initially they were appointed on fixed pay, since April,
2013 they have been paid salary at par with the pay structure of
regular Teacher and they have been granted the benefit of the
7th Pay Commission w.e.f. 01-04-2017, vide letter 28.07.2017,
No. PMA-457/2017/30. He also submits that vide Notification
dated 1-7-2020, the Govt. has provided some additional service
benefits to the Contractual Teachers, who were engaged during
2012-2017 and joined on or before 01-01-2018.
6.1.
Mr. Borthakur also submits that by issuing different
OM/Notifications, the Govt. has decided to pay 5% DA/DR to the
teachers w.e.f. July, 2019, 11% D.A w.e.f. 01/07/2021, 3% w.e.f.
01/07/2021 and 3% w.e.f. 01/01/2022 and also paid to the
regular Teachers the arrear amount accrued on such enhanced
D.A. But, vide impugned order, dated 01-09-2022, the Govt. has
deprived of such benefit to the members of the petitioner’s
Association.
6.2.
Mr. Borthakur also submits that the members of the
petitioner’s Association and the regular teachers are discharging
the same responsibility and works and as such depriving them of
the benefit of arrear pay amounts to discrimination and violative
of Article 14,16(1) of the Constitution of India. Under such
circumstances, Mr. Borthakur has contended to allow this petition.
In support of his submissions, Mr. Borthakur has referred
following decisions:(i) E.P.
Royappa
v.
State
of
T.N.,
reported in
(1974) 4 SCC 3,
(ii)
Rofiqul Islam vs. State of Assam & Ors.
reported in 2025 (6) GLT 810,
7.
Per contra, Mr. Khataniar, learned standing counsel for the
respondent Nos.1—3, has opposed the petition and raised
following points for consideration of this Court:
(i)
The members of the petitioners' Association were initially
engaged on contractual basis at a fixed remuneration,
under a written agreement with the respective School
Management Committees for a specific term. The said
contractual terms did not confer entitlement to
Dearness Allowance or other allowances as admissible
to
regular
employees.
Their
service
conditions
remained distinct and independent from those of
permanent Government employees.
(ii)
The Government, having extended the benefit of
enhanced D.A. prospectively, has fully discharged its
obligation
in
accordance
with
policy
decisions
applicable to the category of employees to which the
petitioners belonging.
(iii)
They have no vested right or enforceable claim to seek
D.A. benefits from the dates applicable to regular
employees of the State Government, whose service
conditions are governed by statutory rules.
(iv)
The Govt., after due consideration of all relevant facts
including the financial and resource position of the
State, had taken a conscious decision to extend the
benefit of enhanced Dearness Allowance to contractual
teachers
and
prospectively.
staff
under
SSA,
Assam
only
(v)
The petitioners cannot demand retrospective monetary
benefits merely by analogy or comparison with regular
employees, in the absence of any statutory or
contractual provision supporting such a claim.
7.1.
Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, Mr. Khataniar
submits that there is no merit in this petition and therefore, it is
contended to dismiss the same. He has also referred following
decisions in support of his submission:
8.
(i)
State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh, reported in
(2009) 9 SCC 514.
(ii)
State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers
Struggle Committee, reported in (2019) 18
SCC 301.
In view of the rival contentions made by the parties in their
respective pleading and also the rival submissions made by the
their respective counsels, the issue to be decided by this Court is:(i)
Whether the members of the petitioners
Association are discharging the same duties
like the regular teachers and if so denial
of arrear DA to the member of petitioners’
Association has violated the provision of
Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of
India?
9.
Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both
the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the
documents placed on record and also perused the order, dated
01-09-2022,
issued
Secretary
the
to
under
Govt.
of
No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30
Assam,
Elementary
by
the
Education
Department (Annexure-H). Also gone through the decisions
referred by Mr. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioners.
10.
From the contentions being made in the respective
pleadings of the parties and also from the submissions of learned
counsel for both the parties, following facts and circumstances
emerges:(i)
Sadou Axom Prathamik TET Uttirno Sikshak Samaj, is an
association of all TET qualified Teachers appointed in
different LP/UP Schools in the state of Assam since 2012,
onwards under SSA.
(ii)
They were appointed on fixed pay and since April, 2013
they have been receiving their salary at par with the pay
structure of regular Teacher.
(iii)
They have been granted the benefit of the 7th Pay
Commission w.e.f. 01-04-2017.
(iv)
The Government, vide notification dated 1-7-2020, has
provided some additional service benefits to them, who
were engaged during 2012-2017 and joined on or before
01-01-2018.
(v)
The Govt. has decided to pay 5% DA/DR to the teachers
w.e.f. July, 2019, 11% D.A w.e.f. 01/07/2021, 3% w.e.f.
01/07/2021 and 3% w.e.f. 01/01/2022 and issued
different OM/Notifications.
(vi)
The Govt. has also paid to the regular Teachers the
arrear amount accrued on such enhanced D.A.
(vii) The Govt. instead of paying the arrear of the said DA/DR,
to the members of the petitioner’s Association, had
passed the impugned order, dated 01-09-2022, issued
under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A, and depriving
the members of the petitioner’s Association from getting
the arrear DA/DR.
(viii) It is not in dispute that the members of the petitioners
Association,
being
the
contractual
teachers
are
discharging the same duties like the regular teachers.
There is no contention in this regard in the affidavit filed
by the respondent No.1 nor there is any submission
made by Mr. Khataniar, learned standing counsel for the
respondent Nos.1—3, during argument.
11.
In this context, this Court deemed it appropriate to re-
produce the impugned order, dated 01-09-2022, issued under
No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30, and depriving the members of the
petitioner’s Association from getting the arrear DA/DR, herein
under:-
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
Dispur, Guwahati-6
No. PMA.52/2020/Pt/30
Dated Dispur, the 1st
September, 2022
O R D E R
In pursuance of the Govt. Notification No.
PMA.52/2020/170 dated 19/01/2022, the Contractual
Teachers (Contractual & State Pool) and Other Staff/
Officers under SSA, Assam have been drawing 17%
Dearness Allowance (D.A.) w.e.f. January, 2022.
Meanwhile, Govt. in Finance Department further
enhanced 17% D.A. (11% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 vide OM No.
FEG.08/2017/95 dated 18/08/2021.3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021
vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/108, dated 06/12/2021 and 3%
w.e.f. 01/01/2022 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/115 dated
25/04/2022). As such Government in Elementary
Education Department is pleased to allow the
following D.A. benefits to the Contractual Teachers
and Other Staff/Officers under SSA, Assam.
1. 10% enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st September,
2022.
2. Balance 7% enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st
April, 2023.
3. Henceforth, D.A. will be released immediately
as and when State Govt. announces.
Sd./Dr. Bijoya Choudhury, IAS,
Secretary to the Govt. of Assam
Elementary Education Department
Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A Dated Dispur, the 1st September, 2022
12.
It is to be noted here the letter, dated 28.07.2017, by which
the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Assam has
decided to extend the benefit of 7th Pay Commission is also
reproduced herein below for proper appreciation of the rival contention
of the parties.
GOVT. OF ASSAM
ELEMENTARY EDGUCATION DEPARTMENT
Dispur, Guwahati-6
No.PMA 457/2017/30
From:
To:
Dated,
Dispur the 28th July 2017
Shri Preetom Saikia, IAS,
Commissioner & Secretary
Assam.
to
the
Govt.
of
The Mission Director, SSA, Assam, Kahilipara,
Guwahati-19.
Sub.: Regarding giving benefits of 7th Pay Commission
to the teachers and staff of SSA, Assam.
Ref.: Your letter (sic) dated 29-06-2017 in File
No.SSA/
Esstt./
Enhancement/SalaryIA/530/2011/Vol.I.
Madam,
In inviting a reference to the above, I am
directed to state that from the beginning it was
decided that the contractual L.P/UP teachers under
SSA will get same benefit of regular teacher under
the Directorate of Elementary Education, Assam.
Accordingly, you are requested to extend the
7th Pay Commission benefit to the contractual teacher
of SSA w.e.f. 01-04-2017. Here, it may be pointed out
that regarding allowing Grade Pay of Rs.8700/- to
untrained Graduate Teachers as per 7th Pay Commission
under the Directorate of Elementary Education, Assam
who have been drawing Grade Pay of Rs.2500/- as per
ROP 2010, the matter was referred to Finance (PRU)
Deptt., and as per their advice, the matter has been
placed before the Anomaly Committee and their
decision recommendation is awaited. As such, while
extending benefit of 7th Pay Commission to the
contractual teachers under SSA, above matter may be
kept in mind.
As regards, for extending benefit of 7th Pay
Commission to the non-teaching staff under SSA,
matter may be placed before the Executive Committee
for their guidance and subject to availability of
fund under contingency unlike teachers and also in
the line of the Notification No.SSA/Esstt./33/2003
/2152 dated 03-07-2012.
Accordingly, you will make a calculation with
regard to the similar categories of employees under
the State Govt. and then place it before the
Executive Committee for their consideration. The
Executive Committee may extend the same benefit or
70% as per Notification dated 03-07-2012.
It may be noted that issues of extending
benefit of 7th Pay Commission to contractual teachers
& non-teaching staff under SSA are not same.
Yours faithfully
Sd./-Illegible
Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Assam,
Elementary Education Department
Memo No.PMA.457/2017/30-A
13.
Dated Dispur, the 28th July, 2017
Thus, from the letter No.PMA 457/2017/30, Dated,
28.07.2017, issued by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt.
of Assam, Elementary Education Department and addressed to
the Mission Director, SSA, Assam reveals that the Govt. has
decided that the contractual L.P/UP teachers under SSA will get
same benefit of regular teacher under the Directorate of
Elementary Education, Assam.
13.1. It also appears that the impugned order dated 01.09.2022
was passed based upon Govt. Notification, No. PMA.52/2020/170
dated 19.01.2022, (Annexure-F), which read as under:GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR OF ASSAM, DISPUR GUWAHATI-6
NOTIFICATION
Dated Dispur, the 19th January, 2022
No.
PMA.52/2020/170.
In
pursuance
of
the
Cabinet decision in the meeting held on 01.01.2022,
the
Governor
of
Assam
is
pleased
to
enhance
5%
Dearness Allowance for Contractual Teachers and other
Staff/Officers
01.01.2022.
under
SSA,
Assam
with
effect
from
Further, decisions on repayment of arrears will
be taken later on.
Sd./Dr. B.K. Chakravarthy. IAS
Principal Secretary to the Government of
Assam, Education Department
Memo No.PMA.52/2020/170-A Dated Dispur, the 19th January, 2017
14.
Form the impugned order dated 01.09.2022, it becomes
apparent that Govt. in Finance Department further enhanced 17%
D.A. (11% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/95 dated
18/08/2021, 3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/108
dated
06/12/2021
and
3%
w.e.f.
01/01/2022,
vide
OM
No.
FEG.08/2017/115 dated 25/04/2022). However, the Secretary to the
Govt. of Assam, Elementary Education Department had allowed the
D.A. benefit to the contractual teachers as under i.e.
10%
enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st September, 2022, and balance 7%
enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st April, 2023. The dates can be depicted
in the chart below:-
Sl.
No.
01.
02.
03.
Regular Teachers
Percentage With
effect
Of D.A.
from
11%
01.07.2021
3%
01.07.2021
3%
01.01.2022
Contractual Teachers
Percentage With
effect
Of D.A.
from
10%
01.09.2022
7%
01.04.2023
15.
Thus, it appears that though the respondent No.1 had
passed the impugned order dated 01.09.2022, pursuant to the
Notification No. PMA.52/2020/170, dated 19.01.2022, yet a
careful perusal of the said Notification, dated 19.01.2022,
indicates that the Governor of Assam has decided to enhance 5%
DA for the contractual teachers and other staffs/Officers under
SSA with effect from 01.01.2022. In view of above facts and
circumstances, the impugned order dated 01.09.2022, appears to
be contradictory not only to the Notification, dated 19.01.2022,
but also to its own letter dated 28.07.2017, whereby the
Government had decided to extend the benefit of 7th Pay
Commission to the teachers and staffs of SSA. In view of the
letter dated 28.07.2017, whatever benefit is being extended to
the regular Teachers under the 7th Pay Commission, the same has
to be extended to the Contractual Teachers and staffs also.
16. However, a classification is being sought to be made by the
respondent No.1 in its affidavit in opposition and also by the
learned standing counsel for the respondent No.1 between the
regular teachers and contractual teachers that the contractual
terms of the petitioners, who were initially engaged on
contractual basis at a fixed remuneration, did not confer
entitlement to Dearness Allowance or other allowances as
admissible to regular employees and that their service conditions
remained distinct and independent from those of permanent
Government employees.
16.1.
Unfortunately, such contractual terms had not been
placed on record before this Court to substantiate such a plea.
Rather, the letter dated 28.07.2017 (Annexure-B) goes to show
that the Government had decided to extend the benefit of 7th Pay
Commission to the teachers and staffs of SSA. If D.A. is enhanced
to the regular teachers under the 7th Pay Commission from time
to time, the respondent No.1 is bound by its own decision to
extend similar benefit to the contractual teachers also.
16.2.
Moreover, in para No.10 of this judgment it has already
been held that there is no dispute that the members of the
petitioner’s Association, being the contractual teachers are
discharging the same duties like the regular teachers. There is no
contention in this regard in the affidavit filed by the respondent
No.1 nor any submission was made by Mr. Khataniar, learned
standing counsel during his argument. In view of above, the
classification, being sought to be made between the regular
teachers and contractual teachers appears be not based upon any
intelligible differentia.
16.3. It is to be noted here that classification, to be reasonable,
must fulfill the following two conditions:(i)
The classification must be founded on the intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or thing that
are grouped together from others left out of the
group;
(ii)
The differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the act.
The differentia, which is the basis of the classification and the
object of the act are two distinct things. What is necessary is that
there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the
object of the act which makes the classification. It is only when
there is no reasonable basis for a classification that legislation
making such classification may be declared discriminatory.
16.4.
It is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution of India
forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification
of persons, objects, and transactions by the legislature for the
purpose of achieving specific ends. But, classification must not be
“arbitrary, artificial or evasive”. It must always rest upon some
real and substantial distinction, bearing a just and reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
Notably, Article 14 read as under:‚The
State
equality
shall
before
not
deny
to
any
person
the
law
or
the
equal
protection of the laws within the territory of
India‛.
The first portion of the article speaks of equality is a guarantee
that no individual is above the law. This guarantee is affected by
its analogy in the second portion, which provides equal protection
of the legislation to individuals. Therefore, any exception to
equality is only permissible, if the State has reasonable grounds
for different treatment of individuals. Therefore, the validity of
state action relies on an assessment of the reasons for state
action. This is an important connection in Article 14 between
equality and rationality.
16.5. Thus, as submitted by Mr. Borthakur, the learned counsel
for the petitioners, this Court afraid the impugned order, dated
01.09.2022,
may
not
withstand
the
test
of
reasonable
classification, as laid down in the case of E.P Royappa (supra),
so referred by him. Notably, in the case of E.P. Royappa
(supra) in para No.85, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:“85. The last two grounds of challenge may be
taken up together for consideration. Though we
have formulated the third ground of challenge
as a distinct and separate ground, it is
really in substance and effect merely an
aspect of the second ground based on violation
of Articles 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the
fundamental guarantee that there shall be
equality of opportunity for all citizens in
matters relating to employment or appointment
to any office under the State. Though enacted
as a distinct and independent fundamental
right because of its great importance as a
principle ensuring equality of opportunity in
public employment which is so vital to the
building up of the new classless egalitarian
society envisaged in the Constitution, Article
16 is only an instance of the application of
the concept of equality enshrined in Article
14. In other words, Article 14 is the genus
while Article 16 is a species. Article 16
gives effect to the doctrine of equality in
all matters relating to public employment. The
basic principle which, therefore, informs both
Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition
against discrimination. Now, what is the
content and reach of this great equalising
principle? It is a founding faith, to use the
words of Bose. J., ‚a way of life‛, and it
must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or
lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance
any attempt to truncate its all-embracing
scope and meaning, for to do so would be to
violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a
dynamic
concept
with
many
aspects
and
dimensions and it cannot be ‚cribbed, cabined
and
confined‛
within
traditional
and
doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point
of
view,
equality
is
antithetic
to
arbitrariness.
In
fact
equality
and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs
to the rule of law in a republic while the
other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute
monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is
implicit in it that it is unequal both
according
to
political
logic
and
constitutional law and is therefore violative
of Article 14, and if it effects any matter
relating to public employment, it is also
violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16
strike at arbitrariness in State action and
ensure fairness and equality of treatment.
They require that State action must be based
on valid relevant principles applicable alike
to all similarly situate and it must not be
guided by any extraneous or irrelevant
considerations because that would be denial of
equality. Where the operative reason for State
action, as distinguished from motive inducing
from the antechamber of the mind, is not
legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and
outside
the
area
of
permissible
considerations, it would amount to mala fide
exercise of power and that is hit by Articles
14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and
arbitrariness are different lethal radiations
emanating from the same vice: in fact the
latter comprehends the former. Both are
inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.‛
16.6.
Again in the case of D.S. Nakara vs. Union of
India, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has reiterated the principle enunciated in the case of E.P.
Royappa (supra). In the said case, the Government issued an
office memorandum announcing a liberalized pension scheme for
retired government servants, but made it applicable to those who
had retired after 31st March, 1979.
16.7. Then dealing with the issue, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that the division, that distinguished pensioners into two
classes based on their specific date of retirement is completely
void of any rational principle and is both arbitrary and
unscrupulous, being unrelated to the objective sought to be
accomplished by granting liberalized pension. It also violates the
equal treatment guaranteed in Art. 14 of the Constitution as well
as the pension rules, which were statutory in nature, meted out
differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of
calculation of pension from the dates specified in the challenged
memorandum.
16.8.
In the case of Madhu Limaye v. Supdt. Tihar Jail
Delhi, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 525, Hon’ble Supreme Court
has reiterated the same principle. In the said case, there were
Indian and European Prisoners in the jail. Both were treated
differently. European gets better diet. Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that difference between Indian and European prisoners in
the matter of treatment and diet violates right to equality under
Article 14 of Indian prisoners. They all are prisoners they must be
treated equally.
16.9.
Therefore, the classification sought to be made by the
respondent No.1 and its counsel, left this Court unimpressed. And
therefore, this Court is unable to agree with the same. This Court
has already held about absence of quarrel at the Bar about the
similar nature of duties performed by the members of the
petitioner’s Association, being the contractual teachers and also
by the regular teachers. In the case of the State of Punjab &
Ors. vs. Jagjit Singh, reported in (2017)1 SCC 148, Hon’ble
Supreme Court while dealing with the principle of ‚equal pay for
equal work‛,
considering some of its earlier decisions, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has deduced the following principles :‚42.1. The ‚onus of proof‛ of parity in the
duties and responsibilities of the subject post
with the reference post under the principle of
‚equal pay for equal work‛ lies on the person who
claims it. He who approaches the court has to
establish that the subject post occupied by him
requires him to discharge equal work of equal
value,
as the
reference
post
(see- Orissa
University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj
K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188, U.T. Chandigarh,
Admn. v. ManjuMathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452 : (2011) 1
SCC (L&S) 348], SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya,
(2011) 11 SCC 122 and National Aluminium Co.
Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756).
42.2. The mere fact that the subject post
occupied by the claimant is in a ‚different
department‛ vis-à-vis the reference post does not
have any bearing on the determination of a claim
under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal
work‛. Persons discharging identical duties
cannot be treated differently in the matter of
their pay, merely because they belong to
different
departments
of
the
Government
(see Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1
SCC 618 and D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983)
1 SCC 3050).
42.3. The principle of ‚equal pay for equal
work‛, applies to cases of unequal scales of pay,
based
on
no
classification
or
irrational
classification (see- Randhir Singh v. Union of
India, (1982) 1 SCC 618). For equal pay, the
employees concerned with whom equation is sought,
should be performing work, which besides being
functionally equal, should be of the same quality
and sensitivity (see -Federation of All India
Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union
of
India,
(1988)
SCC
91], Mewa
Ram
Kanojia v. All
India
Institute
of
Medical
Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235, GrihKalyan Kendra
Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC
619] and S.C. Chandra case [S.C. Chandra v. State
of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279).
42.4. Persons holding the same rank/designation
(in different departments), but having dissimilar
powers, duties and responsibilities, can be
placed in different scales of pay and cannot
claim the benefit of the principle of ‚equal pay
for equal work‛ (see - Randhir Singh v. Union of
India,
(1982)
SCC
618, and
State
of
Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal
Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72). Therefore, the
principle would not be automatically invoked
merely because the subject and reference posts
have the same nomenclature.
42.5. In determining equality of functions and
responsibilities under the principle of ‚equal
pay for equal work‛, it is necessary to keep in
mind that the duties of the two posts should be
of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively
similar. Differentiation of pay scales for posts
with difference in degree of responsibility,
reliability and confidentiality, would fall
within the realm of valid classification, and
therefore,
pay
differentiation
would
be
legitimate and permissible (see –Federation of
All
India
Customs
and
Central
Excise
Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91
and SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556).
The nature of work of the subject post should be
the same and not less onerous than the reference
post. Even the volume of work should be the same.
And so also, the level of responsibility. If
these parameters are not met, parity cannot be
claimed under the principle of ‚equal pay for
equal
work‛
(see -State
of
U.P. v. J.P.
Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121) and GrihKalyan
Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1
SCC 619.
42.6. For placement in a regular pay scale, the
claimant has to be a regular appointee. The
claimant should have been selected on the basis
of a regular process of recruitment. An employee
appointed on a temporary basis cannot claim to be
placed in the regular pay scale (see Orissa
University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj
K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188).
42.7. Persons performing the same or similar
functions, duties and responsibilities, can also
be placed in different pay scales. Such as —
‚selection grade‛, in the same post. But this
difference must emerge out of a legitimate
foundation, such as — merit, or seniority, or
some other relevant criteria (see -State of
U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121).
42.8. If the qualifications for recruitment to
the subject post vis-à-vis the reference post are
different, it may be difficult to conclude that
the duties and responsibilities of the posts are
qualitatively similar or comparable (see Mewa Ram
Kanojia v. All
India
Institute
of
Medical
Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235) and State of
W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347.In such a
case the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛
cannot be invoked.
42.9. The reference post with which parity is
claimed under the principle of ‚equal pay for
equal work‛ has to be at the same hierarchy in
the service as the subject post. Pay scales of
posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the
posts in question, and their channels of
promotion, are different. Even if the duties and
responsibilities are same, parity would not be
permissible, as against a superior post, such as
a promotional post (see Union of India v. Pradip
Kumar Dey, (2000) 8 SCC 580] and Hukum Chand
Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666.
42.10. A comparison between the subject post and
the reference post under the principle of ‚equal
pay for equal work‛ cannot be made where the
subject post and the reference post are in
different establishments, having a different
management. Or even, where the establishments are
in different geographical locations, though owned
by the same master (see -HarbansLal v. State of
H.P.,
(1989)
SCC
459.
Persons
engaged
differently, and being paid out of different
funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1.
42.11. Different
pay
scales,
in
certain
eventualities, would be permissible even for
posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in
the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and
responsibilities of one of the posts are more
onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of
operational work/risk, the principle of ‚equal
pay for equal work‛ would not be applicable. And
also when the reference post includes the
responsibility to take crucial decisions, and
that is not so for the subject post (see SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556).
42.12. The priority given to different types of
posts under the prevailing policies of the
Government can also be a relevant factor for
placing different posts under different pay
scales. Herein also, the principle of ‚equal pay
for equal work‛ would not be applicable (see State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat
Personal Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72).
42.13. The parity in pay, under the principle of
‚equal pay for equal work‛, cannot be claimed
merely on the ground that at an earlier point of
time the subject post and the reference post,
were placed in the same pay scale. The principle
of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ is applicable only
when it is shown, that the incumbents of the
subject post and the reference post, discharge
similar duties and responsibilities (see -State
of W.B. v. W.B. Minimum Wages Inspectors Assn.,
(2010) 5 SCC 225).
42.14. For parity in pay scales under the
principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, equation
in the nature of duties is of paramount
importance. If the principal nature of duties of
one post is teaching, whereas that of the other
is non-teaching, the principle would not be
applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of
one post is of control and management, whereas
the subject post has no such duties, the
principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if
the central nature of duties of one post is of
quality control, whereas the subject post has
minimal duties of quality control, the principle
would not be applicable (see -U.T. Chandigarh,
Admn. v. ManjuMathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452.
42.15. There can be a valid classification in the
matter of pay scales between employees even
holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e.
between
those
discharging
duties
at
the
headquarters,
and
others
working
at
the
institutional/sub-office level (see Hukum Chand
Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12
SCC 666), when the duties are qualitatively
dissimilar.
42.16. The principle of
work‛
would
not
be
‚equal pay
applicable,
for equal
where
a
differential higher pay scale is extended to
persons discharging the same duties and holding
the same designation, with the objective of
ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of
promotional
avenues
(see -Hukum
Chand
Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666.
42.17. Where there is no comparison between one
set of employees of one organisation, and another
set of employees of a different organisation,
there can be no question of equation of pay
scales under the principle of ‚equal pay for
equal work‛, even if two organisations have a
common employer. Likewise, if the management and
control of two organisations is with different
entities which are independent of one another,
the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ would
not
apply
(see S.C.
Chandra
case [S.C.
Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 :
(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897 : 2 SCEC 943] and National
Aluminium Co. Ltd. case [National Aluminium Co.
Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756 :
(2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] ).
16.10.
Thereafter, Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph No.60 and
61 has held as under:-
‚60. Having traversed the legal parameters with
reference to the application of the principle of
‚equal pay for equal work‛, in relation to
temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc
appointees, employees appointed on casual basis,
contractual employees and the like), the sole
factor that requires our determination is,
whether the employees concerned (before this
Court),
were
rendering
similar
duties and
responsibilities as were being discharged by
regular employees holding the same/corresponding
posts.
This
exercise
would
require
the
application of the parameters of the principle of
‚equal pay for equal work‛ summarised by us in
para 42 above. However, insofar as the instant
aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not
difficult for us to record the factual position.
We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by
the learned counsel representing the State of
Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the
present bunch of appeals were appointed against
posts which were also available in the regular
cadre/establishment. It was also accepted that
during the course of their employment, the
temporary employees concerned were being randomly
deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities
which at some point in time were assigned to
regular employees. Likewise, regular employees
holding substantive posts were also posted to
discharge the same work which was assigned to
temporary employees from time to time. There is,
therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties
and responsibilities discharged by the temporary
employees in the present set of appeals were the
same as were being discharged by regular
employees. It is not the case of the appellants,
that the respondent employees did not possess the
qualifications prescribed for appointment on
regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of
the State that any of the temporary employees
would not be entitled to pay parity on any of the
principles
summarised
by
us
in
para
hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the
principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ would be
applicable to
all
the temporary
employees
concerned, so as to vest in them the right to
claim wages on a par with the minimum of the pay
scale of regularly engaged government employees
holding the same post.
61. In view of the position expressed by us in
the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in
holding
that
all
the
temporary
employees
concerned, in the present bunch of cases would be
entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay
scale (at the lowest grade, in the regular pay
scale), extended to regular employees holding the
same post.‛
16.11.
In view of the finding of this Court in para No.10 of this
judgment, and examining the facts and circumstances on the record,
and applying the proposition of law that has been laid down in the case
of Jagjit Singh (supra), especially in para No. 42, it can safely be
concluded that petitioners have been discharging similar duties and
responsibilities like those of regular teachers. And that being so, the
principle of “equal pay for equal work” as summarised by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in para No.42 above, is clearly applicable in the present
case.
17. Further, in the case of Surjit Singh and Others (supra)
so referred by Mr. Khataniar, Hon’ble Supreme Court has, while
dealing with similar issue, held as under:‚16. In our constitutional scheme, the doctrine
of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ has a definite
place in view of Article 39(d) of the
Constitution of India read with Article 14
thereof. Although as an abstract principle the
existence of the applicability of the said
doctrine cannot be ignored, the question which
arises for our consideration is as to whether
the said doctrine could have been mechanically
applied as has been done by the High Court in
the instant case.
17. We must also place on record the fact that
in different phases of development of law by
this Court, relying on or on the basis of the
said principle, a clear cleavage of opinion has
emerged. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, this
Court liberally applied the said principle
without insisting on clear pleadings or proof
that the persons similarly situated with others
are equal in all respects; of late also; this
Court has been speaking in different voices as
would be evident from the following. This has
been noticed specifically by a Division Bench
of this Court in S.C. Chandra v. State of
Jharkhand [(2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC
(L&S) 897] , wherein it was held: (SCC p. 289,
para 21)
‚21. Learned counsel for the appellants have
relied on Article 39(d) of the Constitution.
Article 39(d) does not mean that all the
teachers working in the school should be
equated with the clerks in BCCL or the
Government of Jharkhand for application of the
principle of equal pay for equal work. There
should be total identity between both groups
i.e. the teachers of the school on the one hand
and the clerks in BCCL, and as such the
teachers cannot be equated with the clerks of
the State Government or of BCCL. The question
of application of Article 39(d) of the
Constitution has recently been interpreted by
this Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit
Singh [(2006) 9 SCC 321 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1804]
wherein Their Lordships have put the entire
controversy
to
rest
and
held
that
the
principle, ‘equal pay for equal work’ must
satisfy the test that the incumbents are
performing
equal
and
identical
work
as
discharged by employees against whom the equal
pay is claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed
all the cases bearing on the subject and after
a detailed discussion have finally put the
controversy to rest that the persons who
claimed the parity should satisfy the court
that the conditions are identical and equal and
same duties are being discharged by them.
Though a number of cases were cited for our
consideration but no useful purpose will be
served as in Charanjit Singh [(2006) 9 SCC 321
: 2006 SCC (L&S) 1804] all these cases have
been reviewed by this Court. More so, when we
have already held that the appellants are not
the employees of BCCL, there is no question
seeking any parity of pay with that of the
clerks of BCCL.‛
24. It is no longer in doubt or dispute that
grant of the benefit of the doctrine of ‚equal
pay for equal work‛ depends upon a large number
of factors including equal work, equal value,
source
and
manner
of
appointment,
equal
identity of group and wholesale or complete
identity. This Court, even recently, in Union
of India v. Mahajabeen Akhtar [(2008) 1 SCC 368
: (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 183] , categorically held
as under: (SCC pp. 376-77, paras 19 & 24)
‚19. The question came to be considered in a
large number of decisions of this Court wherein
it unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that a
large number of factors, namely, educational
qualifications, nature of duty, nature of
responsibility,
nature
of
method
of
recruitment,
etc.
will
be
relevant
for
determining equivalence in the matter of
fixation
of
scale
of
pay.
(See Finance
Deptt. v. W.B. Registration Service Assn. [1993
Supp (1) SCC 153 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 157 : (1993)
ATC
403]
, State
of
U.P. v. J.P.
Chaurasia [(1989) 1 SCC 121 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 71
: (1988) 8 ATC 929] , Union of India v. Pradip
Kumar Dey [(2000) 8 SCC 580 : 2001 SCC (L&S)
56] and State of Haryana v. Haryana
Civil
Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [(2002) 6 SCC
72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] )
***
24. On the facts obtaining in this case,
therefore, we are of the opinion that the
doctrine of equal pay for equal work has no
application.
The
matter
may
have
been
different,
had
the
scales
of
pay
been
determined
on
the
basis
of
educational
qualification, nature of duties and other
relevant factors. We are also not oblivious of
the fact that ordinarily the scales of pay of
employees working in different departments
should be treated to be on a par and the same
scale of pay shall be recommended. The
respondent did not opt for her services to be
placed on deputation. She opted to stay in the
government service as a surplus. She was placed
in list as Librarian in National Gallery of
Modern Art. She was designated as Assistant
Librarian and Information Assistant. Her pay
scale was determined at Rs 6500-10,500 which
was the revised scale of pay. Her case has
admittedly not been considered by the Fifth Pay
Revision Commission. If a scale of pay in a
higher category has been refixed keeping in
view the educational qualifications and other
relevant factors by an expert body, no
exception thereto can be taken. Concededly it
was for the Union of India to assign good
reasons for placing her in a different scale of
pay. It has been done. We have noticed
hereinbefore that not only the essential
educational qualifications are different but
the nature of duties is also different. Article
39(d) as also Article 14 of the Constitution of
India must be applied, inter alia, on the
premise that equality clause should be invoked
in respect of the people who are similarly
situated in all respects.‛
How the said principle is to be applied in
different fact situation is the only question.
Whereas this Court refused to apply the said
principle as the petitioners therein did not
have the requisite qualification; in Union of
India v. Dineshan K.K. [(2008) 1 SCC 586 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 248] , the application of
the rule was advocated to be left to an expert
body, stating: (Dineshan K.K. case [(2008) 1
SCC 586 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 248] SCC pp. 59293, para 16)
‚16. Yet again in a recent decision in State of
Haryana v. Charanjit Singh [(2006) 9 SCC 321 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 1804] a Bench of three learned
Judges, while affirming the view taken by this
Court
in State
of
Haryana v. Jasmer
Singh [(1996) 11 SCC 77 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 210]
, Tilak Raj [(2003) 6 SCC 123 : 2003 SCC (L&S)
828] , Orissa University of Agriculture &
Technology v. Manoj
K.
Mohanty [Orissa
University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj
K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S)
645] and Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [Govt.
of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 :
2004 SCC (L&S) 225] has reiterated that the
doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not an
abstract doctrine and is capable of being
enforced in a court of law. Inter alia,
observing that equal pay must be for equal work
of equal value and that the principle of equal
pay for equal work has no mathematical
application in every case, it has been held
that
Article
permits
reasonable
classification
based
on
qualities
or
characteristics
of
persons
recruited
and
grouped together, as against those who are left
out.
Of
course,
the
qualities
or
characteristics must have a reasonable relation
to
the
object
sought
to
be
achieved.
Enumerating a number of factors which may not
warrant application of the principle of equal
pay for equal work, it has been held that since
the said principle requires consideration of
various dimensions of a given job, normally the
applicability of this principle must be left to
be evaluated and determined by an expert body
and the court should not interfere till it is
satisfied that the necessary material on the
basis whereof the claim is made is available on
record with necessary proof and that there is
equal work of equal quality and all other
relevant factors are fulfilled.‛
17.1.
In the case of Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle
Committee(supra), so referred by Mr. Khataniar, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under:‚104. If a pay structure is normally to be
evolved keeping in mind factors such as ‚method
of recruitment‛ and ‚employer's capacity to
pay‛ and if the limitations or qualifications
to the applicability of the doctrine of ‚equal
pay for equal work‛ admit inter alia the
distinction on the ground of process of
recruitment, the stand taken on behalf of the
State
Government
is
not
unreasonable
or
irrational. Going by the facts indicated above
and the statistics presented by the State
Government, it was an enormous task of having
the spread and reach of education in the
remotest corners. Furthermore, the literacy
rate of the State which was lagging far behind
the national average was also a matter which
required attention. The advances made by the
State on these fronts are quite evident. All
this was possible through rational use of
resources. How best to use or utilize the
resources and what emphasis be given to which
factors are all policy matters and in our
considered view the State had not faltered on
any count. As laid down by this Court in the
decisions
in Joginder
Singh [State
of
Punjab v. Joginder Singh, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 169
: AIR 1963 SC 913] and Zabar Singh [Zabar
Singh v. State of Haryana, (1972) 2 SCC 275] ,
the State was justified in having two different
streams or cadres. The attempt in making over
the process of selection to Panchayati Raj
institutions and letting the cadre of State
Teachers to be a dying or vanishing cadre were
part of the same mechanics of achieving the
spread of education. These issues were all part
of an integrated policy and if by process of
judicial intervention any directions are issued
to make available same salaries and emoluments
to Niyojit Teachers, it could create tremendous
imbalance and cause great strain on budgetary
resources.‛
18. But, a careful analysis of both the decisions would reveal that
the factual backgrounds of the said two cases are distinguishable
from the case in hand. In the case of Bihar Secondary
Teachers Struggle Committee (supra), it has been held
that the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” admit inter alia
the distinction on the ground of mode of recruitment, and in the
said case, the method of recruitment and standard of selection of
Niyojit Teachers was completely different
from that of the
government teachers. Again, in the case of Surajit Singh
(supra)
educational
qualification,
mode
of
appointment,
experience was considered.
19. Herein this petition, it is nobody’s case that the recruitment
method,
selection
agency,
educational
qualification,
and
experience of the petitioners, with that of the regular teachers are
different. The affidavit in opposition of the respondent No.1 is
silent in this regard. There is also no dispute that the members of
the petitioner’s Association are discharging the same duties like
regular teachers. Over and above, it is the own decision of the
respondent authorities to extend the same benefits to the
contractual teachers which were extended to the regular teachers
in view of Annexure-B, the letter dated 28.07.2017. Therefore,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in
the said case would not advance the argument of Mr. Khataniar,
learned
standing
counsel
for
the
Accordingly, the same stands overruled.
respondent
Nos.1—3.
19.1. Yet, another ground is also being taken by the respondent
No.1 in its affidavit that the Government in the Department of
School Education, had also considered all relevant facts including
the financial and resource position of the State, and thereafter, it
had taken a conscious decision to extend the benefit of enhanced
Dearness Allowance to contractual teachers and staff under SSA,
Assam only prospectively, yet it is well settled in the case of D.S.
Nakara (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that financial
burden
not
a
valid
justification
for
discrimination.
While
acknowledging the financial implications of the decision, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the financial capacity of the
government
cannot
be
a
valid
ground
for
perpetuating
discrimination. The government must find ways to meet its
obligations to all pensioners equally. Notably, the decision in D.S.
Nakara (supra) is five Judges Constitutional Bench decision.
20.
In the result, this Court finds sufficient merit in this petition
and accordingly the same stands allowed. The impugned order
dated 01-09-2022, issued under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A,
by the Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Elementary Education
Department, stands set aside and quashed. By a mandamus of
this Court, the respondent authority is directed to release the
arrear 5% Dearness Allowance/ Dearness Relief from July, 2019
to December, 2021 and 11% & 3% Dearness Allowance/Dearness
Relief from July, 2021 to August, 2022 payable to the members of
the petitioner’s Association.
21.
Let the aforesaid exercise be carried out within a period of
two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this
judgment and order. The petitioner’s Association shall obtain a
certified copy of this judgment and order and place the same
before the respondent authorities within a period of one week
from today.
22.
In terms of above, this writ petition stands disposed of
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
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