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SUNITA
GOSWAMI
Digitally signed
by SUNITA
GOSWAMI
Date: 2026.01.02
18:16:45 +0530
2026:CGHC:165-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MA No.247 of 2025
Reserved on 16/12/2025
Pronounced on 02/01/2026
SAAR Enterprises, Through Its Partner Ankur Agrawal, Aged About 34 Years,
S/o- Shri Surendra Agrawal, Having Its Principal Place Of Business At SAAR
Chambers, Above IndusInd Bank, First Floor (Back Side), Shrikant Verma
Marg, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.)
...Appellant/Plaintiff
versus
Trent Limited, Through Its Chief Executive Officer, Trent House, G Block, 5th
Floor, Plot C-60, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra (East), Mumbai – 400051
---- Respondent/Defendant
For Appellant
For Respondent
: Shri Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate appears
along with Shri Sourav Agrawal, Advocate
: Shri Raja Sharma, Advocate appears along with
Ms. Aditi Parakh, Advocate
DB : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
CAV Judgment
Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J.
1)
The appellant/plaintiff has preferred this appeal under Section 13(1A)
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, questioning the legality and
propriety of the order dated 14.11.2025 passed by the Commercial
Court (District Judge Level), Raipur (CG) in Commercial Suit
No.03A/2025, whereby, the suit instituted by the plaintiff for declaration
and injunction has been held to be barred by jurisdiction under Section
20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as
‘the CPC’) and, thereby, directed for its presentation before the court
having its territorial jurisdiction.
2)
A Retail Business Arrangement Agreement (hereinafter referred to as
‘the RBA Agreement’) was executed between the plaintiff, a partnership
firm, known as “SAAR Enterprises” having its principal office at Bilaspur
and, the defendant, a public limited Company, known as “TRENT
Limited” incorporated under the Companies Act, having its office at
Bandra (East), Mumbai, on 01.09.2017 and according to it, the plaintiff
operates as a ‘Business Associate/Franchisee’ for the defendant’s retail
operations, named and styled as “WESTSIDE” situated at Survey
No.517/P, village Attapur, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, District Rangareddy,
Telangana. According to the plaintiff, the defendant in exercise of the
powers enumerated under clause 15.2 of the alleged “RBA Agreement”
issued a six months’ notice of termination on 19.05.2025 and after
receiving the same, it was realized by the plaintiff regarding the unfair
nature of the said clause, therefore, it was urged for its removal along
with other clauses, like clause 6.2 and 14.3 by way of issuing a legal
notice dated 03.07.2025, as the same were one sided, contrary to the
Public Policy and have been made in contravention of Section 23 of the
Indian Contract Act, but since the same were not removed, despite the
issuance of the alleged legal notice dated 03.07.2025, a suit was,
therefore, instituted for declaration and injunction for removal of those
clauses from the alleged “RBA Agreement” and also for the declaration
to the effect that the alleged notice of termination dated 19.05.2025 be
declared as null and void, with a further prayer for issuance of
permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking over the
possession of its business.
3)
With the aforesaid plea, a claim was made before the court at Bilaspur,
as the cause of action has arisen on 19.05.2025 within its territorial
jurisdiction when the alleged notice of termination dated 19.05.2025
issued by the defendant was served upon it at its principal office,
Bilaspur in view of clause 17 of the “RBA Agreement” and, was arising
continuously, as the defendant has failed to rectify and/or, remove the
alleged clauses despite the issuance of said legal notice dated
03.07.2025.
4)
The cause of action has, thus, been claimed to be arisen at the
territorial jurisdiction of the court at Bilaspur, mainly on the ground that
the alleged notice of the defendant, issued on 19.05.2025, was served
upon it at its office of Bilaspur, while claiming the aforesaid claim.
5)
Though, it was alleged as such, but, merely the service of the alleged
notice upon the plaintiff would, however, not confer the territorial
jurisdiction at Bilaspur, particularly, when the entire business is to be
run outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Bilaspur as per the
terms and conditions stipulated in the alleged “RBA Agreement” which
too was executed beyond its territorial jurisdiction with a clause to
arbitrate the matter at Mumbai, in case of arising any difference
between them in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1996’) or any
law relating to arbitration in force at the time of reference of dispute.
The said observation is fortified by the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan and Others Vs.
M/s Swaika Properties and Anr., reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217, as
relied upon by the counsel appearing for the respondent, as in the said
matter, the petitioner-Company, who owned certain land at Calcutta
having its registered office there at the said place, received a notice
issued by the Special Town Planning Officer, Jaipur under subsection(2) of Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959
for acquisition of the land for public purposes, was questioned mainly
on the ground that since the alleged notice of acquisition of land was
served upon it, at its registered office at Calcutta, therefore, the High
Court of Calcutta would have jurisdiction to entertain its petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The question, therefore, arisen
before the Supreme Court, like the present one “as to whether the
service of alleged notice was an integral part of the cause of action
and, service of notice on the petitioner-Company at its registered office
at Calcutta would be sufficient to confer the jurisdiction of the High
Court at Calcutta to entertain the petition”, was considered and the
answer was given in negative, while observing at para 8 as under :“8.…………….The mere service of notice under
Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their
registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta
i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West
Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action
within that territory unless the service of such notice
was an integral part of the cause of action. The
entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition
of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose
within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur
Bench. The answer to the question whether service
of notice is an integral part of the cause of action
within the meaning of Art. 226(2) of the Constitution
must depend upon the nature of the impugned order
giving rise to a cause of action. The notification
dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became
effective the moment it was published in the official
Gazette as thereupon the notified land became
vested in the State Government free from all
encumbrances. It was not necessary for the
respondents to plead the service of notice on them
by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department,
Jaipur under Section 52 (2) for the grant of an
appropriate writ, direction or order under Art.226 of
the Constitution for quashing the notification issued
by the State Government under Section 51(1) of the
Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the
acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and
wanted to challenge the validity of the notification
issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under
Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Art.226
of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents
for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing
such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court,
Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in
part arose”.
6)
Service of notice at Calcutta for acquisition of land in Jaipur was, thus,
not held to be sufficient to confer jurisdiction in the High Court of
Calcutta to entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
and, similar was the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the
matter of ONGC vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, reported in (1994) 4 SCC
711, wherein, while referring to the principles laid down in the abovereferred matter, it was held at para 8 as under :-
“8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is
clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the
cause of action had arisen within its territorial
jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware
of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on
reading the advertisement which appeared in the
Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it
submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office
and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt
that
it
was
considered
ineligible
it
sent
representations, including fax messages, to EIL,
ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As
stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally
rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the
contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993.
Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a
part of the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it
became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it
submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made
representations demanding justice from Calcutta
on learning about the rejection of its offer. The
advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders
should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that
those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a
final decision whether or not to award the contract
to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of
course, the execution of the contract work was to
be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore,
merely because it read the advertisement at
Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and
made representations from Calcutta would not, in
our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral
part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact
that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and
received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not
constitute an Integral part of the cause of
action…..”
7)
In the instant matter, as revealed from the RBA Agreement, the
registered office of the defendant is at Mumbai and the office of the
plaintiff is at village Attapur, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, District,
Rangareddy of the State of Telangana and, according to clause 12 of
the RBA Agreement, the dispute if arises has to be referred to the
Arbitration which is to be held at Mumbai in accordance with the
provisions of the Act, 1996 or any law relating to Arbitration in force at
the time of reference of dispute. Since the alleged impugned notice,
dated 19.05.2025 was issued outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
court of Bilaspur, therefore, merely on the ground that the alleged
notice was served upon the plaintiff at its registered office at Bilaspur
would not confer its territorial jurisdiction, as alleged by the plaintiff at
para 15 of its plaint, in the light of the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in the above-referred matters, so as to call for any
interference in the order impugned dated 14.11.2025 passed by the
Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Raipur (CG) in Commercial
Suit No.03A/2025, holding the suit, as framed and instituted, to be
barred by the territorial jurisdiction of the court of Bilaspur under
Section 20(c) of CPC.
8)
Insofar as the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matters
of S. Vanathan Muthuraja Vs. Ramalingam Alias Krishnamurthy
Gurukkal and Ors., ITI Ltd. Vs. Siemens Public Communications
Network Ltd. and N. Radhakrishnan Vs. Maestro Engineers and
Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 143, (2002) 5 SCC 510 and (2010) 1
SCC 72, respectively, as relied upon by learned counsel appearing for
the appellant are, however, of no use, as the principles laid down in the
matters of S. Vanathan Muthuraja and ITI Ltd. (supra) are
distinguishable from the facts involved herein, while the principles laid
down in the matter of N. Radhakrishnan (supra), has already been
overruled by the Supreme Court in the matter of Vidya Drolia and Ors.
Vs. Durga Trading Corporation, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 1 and,
therefore, no reliance could be placed upon those decisions.
9)
In view of the aforesaid background, the appeal, being devoid of merit
is dismissed at the admission stage itself
No order as to cost(s).
sunita
Sd/-
Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal)
Judge
(Radhakishan Agrawal)
Judge
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