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2026:MLHC:119
Serial No. 02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
BA. No. 6 of 2026
Date of Decision: 26.02.2026
Shri. Ronaldo Khongwir,
Aged about 42 years,
S/o (L) L. Dkhar,
R/o- 7th mile, Mawnianglah,
Upper Shillong,
East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya
…….. Petitioner
- Vs1.
The State of Meghalaya
Represented by Secretary (Home)
Government of Meghalaya.
2.
The Superintendent of Police,
Ri- Bhoi District, Meghalaya.
……… Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S.S. Yadav, Adv.
Ms. E. Law, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Mr. E.R. Chyne, GA.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
2026:MLHC:119
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
1.
Heard Mr. S.S. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, who has
submitted that this application has been made on behalf of Shri. Pradeep Das,
who is an accused undergoing trial before the Court of the learned Special Judge
(NDPS), East Jaintia Hills, District, Khliehriat. The petitioner herein is the
brother-in-law of the said accused person.
2.
The learned counsel has submitted that on the basis of an FIR dated
17.09.2025 lodged before the In-Charge, Umkiang Police Patrol Post, East
Jaintia Hills District, wherein, it was alleged that contraband substance suspected
to be heroin contained in a soap box along with 20(twenty) strips of Nitrazepam
tablets was seized from the accused person (Pradeep Das), who was a passenger
in the transport vehicle coming from Silchar towards Shillong on the said date,
and accordingly, he was arrested on the said FIR being registered as Lumshnong
P.S Case No. 20 (09) 2025 under Section 8(c)/21(b)/22(a) and 29 of the NDPS
Act.
3.
On investigation being completed, and charge sheet filed by the
Investigating Officer on 03.10.2025, the case of the accused has been forwarded
to the competent court of jurisdiction for him to stand trial thereto. The stage of
the case is for consideration of charges.
4.
The learned counsel has however submitted that the grievance raised
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by the petitioner herein is that the constitutional mandate of Article 22 as well as
the statutory provision of Section 47 BNSS, having been flouted, inasmuch as,
the grounds of arrest were never communicated or furnished to the accused in
writing, therefore, his arrest can be considered illegal, and he is to be released
forthwith.
5.
The learned counsel has further submitted that under Article 22 (1)
of the Constitution of India, it has been mandated that no person who is arrested
shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the
grounds of such arrest. On this premise, Section 47 (1) of the BNSS has also
provided that every police officer or other person arresting any person without
warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for
which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.
6.
In the case involving the accused person in question, amongst the
police papers enclosed in the charge sheet, is found a communication dated
17.09.2025 by the I/O issued upon the accused person under the heading
“Intimation of Grounds of Arrest”, which is a format in the form of a checklist,
the relevant box being tick marked contained the contents as “ You are suspected
of being involved in a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a
term that may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years,
whether with or without a fine”, this according to the learned counsel does not
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satisfy the requirement of law, and is therefore in violation of the right of the
accused to be intimated of the grounds of arrest.
7.
Further, elaborating on this as to what ‘grounds of arrest’ would
constitute, the learned counsel has referred to the case of Prabir Purkayastha
v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2024) 8 SCC 254, wherein at para 48, the
Apex Court has held as follows:
“48. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a
significant difference in the phrase "reasons for arrest" and "grounds
of arrest". The "reasons for arrest" as indicated in the arrest memo
are purely formal parameters viz. to prevent the accused person from
committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the
offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of
the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any
manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat
or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as
to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to the
investigating officer. These reasons would commonly apply to any
person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the "grounds of arrest"
would be required to contain all such details in hand of the
investigating officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused.
Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must
convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being
arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself
against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the "grounds of
arrest" would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be
equated with the "reasons of arrest" which are general in nature.”
8.
Grounds of arrest should be factual in nature and must indicate all
the basic facts which has necessitated the arrest of a person and such grounds
has to be intimated to the accused person which has not been done so in this case,
at best, only the nature of the offence has been made known to the accused
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person, further submits the learned counsel.
9.
The learned counsel has however maintained that the accused person
was never handed over the grounds of arrest in writing. This is evident on perusal
of the first forwarding report filed by the Investigating Officer on 17.09.2025,
informing the learned Special Judge (NDPS) of the facts surrounding the arrest
of the accused person, wherein it was only remarked that the accused person was
informed of the ground of his arrest. The corresponding order dated 17.09.2025
passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, East Jaintia Hills, in the
said Lumshnong P.S Case No. 29 (09) 2025, has also only indicated that the
intimation of the grounds of arrest has been noticed, but nothing is said as to
whether it was actually furnished to the accused person.
10.
To strengthen the contention of the petitioner in this regard, the
learned counsel has also cited the case of Ahmed Mansoor and Ors. v. The State
Rep. by Assistant Commissioner of Police, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2650, wherein
in that case, the Supreme Court has dwelt at length on the issue of the
requirement of furnishing the copy containing the grounds of arrest to the
accused person which should be in writing.
11.
Per contra, Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned AAG assisted by Mr. E.R.
Chyne, learned GA, in reply on behalf of the State respondent, has countered the
contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and has asserted that
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the materials on record, would show that the accused person has been duly
intimated as far as the grounds of arrest is concerned referring to the
communication annexed at page 38 (Annexure-VIII) of this petition, the learned
AAG has submitted that the intimation of the grounds of arrest has been made
known to the accused person and he has also acknowledged receipt of the same
by putting his thumb impression on the said document.
12.
This fact was also confirmed on perusal of the order dated
17.09.2025, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, who has
indicated in the said order that the accused person on being asked, has submitted
that he knows why he has been arrested. Copy of the intimation of grounds of
arrest have also been perused by the learned Magistrate. Furthermore, in the said
order, it has also been shown that the accused person is represented by the
learned ALADC, as such, the accused person cannot say that he was never
intimated as to the grounds of his arrest.
13.
In support of his contention, the learned AAG has relied upon the
case of State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702, and
has referred to para 20.1.1 to 20.1.7 which is reproduced herein below as:
“20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents – accused
contended that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not
furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of
the Constitution and Section 50 Cr. P.C. (now Section 47 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This submission, however, is
devoid of merit.
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20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that “no person
who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed,
as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be
denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner
of his choice”. Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr.P.C. requires that “every
police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant
shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for
which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.
20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates
that the arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest –
but neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon
written communication in every case. Judicial precedents have
clarified that substantial compliance with these requirements is
sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown.
20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
456, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is
made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed
in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, 2025 INSC 768, it was observed that when arrest is made
pursuant a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient
compliance. Both these post-Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that
written, individualised grounds are not an inflexible requirement in
all circumstances.
20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr.P.C is mandatory, the consistent judicial
approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining
alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does
not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in
demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend.
20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged
procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the
gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a
prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the
remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45);
the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised
(para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at
the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 and Prabir
Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43,
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49 – 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed,
written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest
was a violation entitling the accused to bail.
20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records
clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their
arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for
bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed
understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on
record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged
procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as
irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant
release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a
determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge
under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its
reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as
those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory
contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled
principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest,
absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle
the accused to bail.”
14.
The learned AAG has submitted that since, it is evident from the
record that the accused person has been duly intimated as far as the grounds of
arrest is concerned, having been duly represented by a counsel before the court,
no prejudice would be caused to him in this regard. Apart from the fact that the
allegations against the accused person are serious in nature involving offences
under the NDPS Act for being in possession of heroin which is a contraband
substance, therefore, the court cannot overlook this aspect of the matter and
focus only on the alleged procedural lapse. As has been held in the case of Sri
Darshan (supra), procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent
prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail,
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submits the learned AAG. It is prayed that this petition is devoid of merits and
the same is liable to be dismissed.
15.
This Court has carefully considered the argument of the respective
parties, and is made to understand that the only ground for preferring this instant
application with a prayer for grant of bail, is made on the basis that there have
been procedural lapses on the part of the prosecution in the process of arrest of
the accused person in question, inasmuch as, he was not intimated in writing as
to the grounds of arrest, and further, that there was no factual and specific details
of the allegations made against him noted down in the said format of the
intimation shown to him.
16.
On the question of the application of law as regard the mode, manner
and requirement of what is to be done at the time when the person is arrested in
respect of any allegation against such person said to have committed offences
for which such person is criminally liable, reference being made to the
constitutional provision of Article 22(1) read with Section 47(1) BNSS, the
learned counsel for the petitioner has elucidated this aspect of the matter by
referring to relevant case laws, the case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra) being one
such authority which is holding the field till date.
17.
What has emerged from this proposition of law is that on his or her
being arrested a person must be immediately informed of the grounds of arrest,
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and that too in writing. Secondly, that such grounds must be specific to the
factual allegations against the arrested person, that is, the arrested person is to be
made known the details of why he or she was arrested. This is to afford the
arrested person with an opportunity to prepare his or her defence.
18.
Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has admitted that there
is found a format under the heading “Intimation of Grounds of Arrest”, which
form was acknowledged by the accused person in question by putting his thumb
impression, the contention is that, no such communication was ever intimated to
the accused person in writing and that he has not been supplied with a copy of
such intimation. This was refuted by the State respondent when the learned AAG
has stressed on the fact that since the accused person has acknowledged the
same, therefore, it is deemed that he has been intimated of the grounds of arrest.
19.
On this, what is noted and have been missed out by the petitioner is
that a perusal of such intimation found at page 38 (Annexure VIII) of this
petition, it is seen that such intimation was addressed to the accused person. As
has been admitted by the parties herein, on the following page, it is also seen the
thumb impression of the accused person. The date of such intimation was also
noted down as 17.09.2025 which is the date the accused person was arrested.
This can only mean one thing, that is, that such communication was indeed
addressed to the accused person and that he has received the same. Therefore, to
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say that there was no intimation of the grounds of arrest in writing, the records
would say otherwise. Accordingly, the authorities citied by the petitioner in this
regard would not help his case as such authorities cited, including the case of
Prabir Purkayastha (supra), the issue therein was about non-communication of
the grounds of arrest in writing.
20.
The next contention of the petitioner that even, if such intimation has
actually been communicated to the accused person, however, since the same is
in the form of a format with a checklist, the relevant box being ticked marked,
wherein the accused person was only informed that he is involved in a cognizable
offence, without any specific details cited, therefore, the law in this regard has
also been violated, this Court would agree with such contention since the same
has been borne out from the records.
21.
However, in this respect, looking into the facts and circumstances of
the case of the accused person, that he is prima facie found to be involved in a
case under the NDPS Act concerning seizure of contraband substance said to be
heroin, and also the fact that the investigation stage has already been completed
with the charge sheet filed, the same being within the knowledge and possession
of the accused person, it stands to reason that at this stage, he is aware of the
specific allegation against him. As has been canvassed by the learned AAG, at
this stage of the proceedings, no prejudice would be caused to him. In fact, the
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petitioner has also approached this Court too late in the day.
22.
In view of the above observation, this Court is not inclined to allow
this petition, the same being devoid of merits and is hereby rejected.
23.
Petition disposed of. No Costs.
Judge
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2026.02.26 19:59:26 IST
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