Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2025:MLHC:757
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
BA No. 38 of 2025
Date of Decision: 26.08.2025
Shri. Robinus Ripnar,
Aged about 45 years,
S/o (L) Paulus Lapang, R/o- Umsning, Ri-Bhoi District,
Meghalaya.
…..Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Meghalaya
Represented by Secretary (Home)
Government of Meghalaya.
2. The Superintendent of Police,
Ri-Bhoi District, Meghalaya.
…..Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. S.S. Yadav, Adv.
Mr. S. Purkayastha, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG, with
Mr. E.R. Chyne, GA
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Addl. P.P
2025:MLHC:757
ORDER
1.
Heard Mr. S.S. Yadav, learned counsel who has submitted that the
petitioner has approached this Court by way of this application under Section
483 of the BNSS with a prayer for grant of bail since he was arrested on
12.03.2024 in connection with Nongpoh P.S. Case No. 25(03) 2024 under
Section 120B/121A IPC read with Section 10/13/18 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 read with Section 5 & 6 of the Explosive
Substances Act.
2.
It is also the submission of the learned counsel that this is the
third bail application preferred before this Court and four other bail
applications preferred before the learned Trial Court. The bail application
filed before this Court was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh one, hence
this application.
3.
The learned counsel has submitted that since the time when the
petitioner was arrested, on investigation conducted, the Investigating Officer
has filed the final report along with the chargesheet, finding a prima facie
case well made out against the petitioner herein as well as against other coaccused persons. However, till date the charges have not been framed even
though the prosecution has cited about 31 witnesses to be examined from its
side.
4.
Again, the learned counsel has submitted that records would
show that there is no evidence against the petitioner except that he is related
to one of the accused persons, Shri Damanbha Ripnar and is connected with
him by way of phone calls via mobile phone.
5.
The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel is that at
2025:MLHC:757
the time when the petitioner was arrested, the arresting agency have flouted
the mandatory provision of law as far as application of Section 43B of the
UAP Act is concerned, inasmuch as at such time, he was not informed of the
grounds of his arrest.
6.
The learned counsel has submitted it is an admitted fact that the
petitioner was arrested, inter alia, for an offence under Section 18 of the UAP
Act, which falls under Chapter IV where there is an embargo under Section
43D for grant of bail which is pari materia with Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985. However, in the case of the petitioner, because of non-compliance of
the provision of Section 43B of the said UAP Act and the Constitutional
mandate as found under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, he is liable
to be released on bail forthwith.
7.
The learned counsel has further submitted that the applicability
of the provision of Section 43B to the fact situation of a case has been dealt
with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabir Purkayastha v.
State(NCT of Delhi) reported in (2024) 8 SCC 254 at paras 3, 8(vi), (vii),
(viii), (ix), (x), 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 37, 38 and 44 to 51, wherein it was held that it the statutory and
constitutional right of a person arrested under this Act, who at the time of his
arrest, is required to be informed of the grounds of his arrest as is provided
under Section 43B. At para 20 of this judgment, the Supreme Court has
observed as follows:
“20. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that
any person arrested for allegation of commission of offences
under the provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other
offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed
about the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such written
grounds of arrest have to be furnished to the arrested person as a
2025:MLHC:757
matter of course and without exception at the earliest. The
purpose of informing to the arrested person the grounds of arrest
is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as, this information would be
the only effective means for the arrested person to consult his
Advocate; oppose the police custody remand and to seek bail.
Any other interpretation would tantamount to diluting the
sanctity of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1)
of the Constitution of India.”
8.
The learned counsel has again referred to a number of judgments,
particularly the case of Thokchom Shyamjai Singh & Ors v. Union of India
through Home Secretary & Ors., para 1, 11.3, 15, 15.1, 17 to 29, 30 to 33
and 38, wherein vide order dated 20.02.2025 passed in W.P.(Crl) 1929/2024
& CRL.M.A. 18784/2024, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has elaborately
dealt with this issue by referring to a number of relevant judgments passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court viz., Prabir Purkayastha(supra), Pankaj
Bansal v. Union of India & Ors., (2024) 7 SCC 576 and Vihaan Kumar v.
State of Haryana & Anr., 2025 SCC Online SC 269 amongst others, where
the same proposition of whether the grounds of arrest are required to be
furnished to a person as soon as he is arrested, the same being mandatory or
obligatory has been discussed in details.
9.
To confirm that the grounds of arrest were never communicated
to the petitioner, the learned counsel has referred to the Arrest Memo at page
13 (Annexure II) of this application at para 8 wherein it has been noted that
the arrested person, that is, the petitioner herein has been informed of the
grounds of arrest, but the fact remain that it has not been done so, as such
grounds have not been communicated to him in writing.
10.
Even in the first remand report filed before the court by the Addl.
Superintendent of Police, Ri-Bhoi District, Nongpoh on 12.03.2024, nothing
is said about the grounds of arrest being made known or communicated to
2025:MLHC:757
the accused/petitioner and likewise, the related order of the learned Special
Judge, dated 12.03.2024 taking such report on record, has also failed to note
that the arrestee was ever supplied with the grounds of arrest, submits the
learned counsel.
11.
Besides the fact that the said grounds of arrest have not been
communicated to the accused/petitioner, the learned counsel has also
submitted that from the chargesheet, there is nothing found to implicate the
accused/petitioner in the case as the Investigating Officer has linked the
petitioner to one of the accused persons Damanbha Ripnar on the basis that
the petitioner’s phone number has appeared in the phone records of the said
Damanbha Ripnar, but nothing incriminating has been found to connect the
petitioner with the commission of the alleged offences.
12.
Furthermore, learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner
has been in custody for more than 1 year 4 months and the stage of the case
is for framing of charges, which have not been framed till date. There are
about 33 listed witnesses and as such, delay in the proceedings would
invariably occur, the petitioner only on this ground is entitled to be enlarged
on bail. The case of Athar Parwez v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal No.
5387 of 2024 was cited in this regard wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
vide order dated 17.12.2024, at para 32 has held as under:
“32. The Appellant was arrested on 12.07.2022. He has
undergone custody for more than two years and four months.
Chargesheet was filed on 07.01.2023 but till date charges have
not been framed which is an admitted position. There are 40
accused and 354 witnesses cited by the prosecution to be
examined. There can be no doubt that the trial is not likely to
complete soon, and as has been laid down by various judgments
of this Court as has been referred to above, the Appellant cannot
be allowed to languish in jail indefinitely and that too without a
2025:MLHC:757
trial. If such an approach is allowed Article 21 of the Constitution
of India would stand violated. The ratio as laid down by this
Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (supra) as also the other
judgments in Javed Ghulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra
(supra) and Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (supra) would be
applicable to this case and would squarely apply entitling the
Appellant for grant of bail.”
13.
Per contra, Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned AAG while strenuously
opposing the prayer made by the petitioner and the submission and
contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of such
prayer, has submitted that the first ground of challenge to this petition is
fundamental inasmuch as this is the fifth bail application filed by the
petitioner, the earlier four applications being rejected by the learned Trial
Court on respective dates. There being no pleading made in this petition as
regard change in circumstances or the fact situation since the last bail
application was rejected, therefore this petition is not maintainable and is
liable to be rejected.
14.
To support this contention, the learned AAG has referred to the
case of State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, 1989 Supp
(2) SCC 605, para 7 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
“…For the above reasons we are of the view that there was no justification
for passing the impugned order in the absence of a substantial change in the
fact-situation…”. Similarly, in the case of Mohd Salman v. The State GNCT
of Delhi passed in Bail Appln. 836/2024 decided on 06.03.2024, it was
observed at para 13 that “It has been held in the catena of judgments that
there must be change in circumstances to warrant fresh consideration of the
bail application. The successive bail applications filed without there being
any change in circumstances, is strongly discouraged, and is a gross abuse
of the process of law.”.
2025:MLHC:757
15.
It is also the submission of the learned AAG that the petitioner
has tried to improve his case this time around by raising the issue of “grounds
of arrest not being communicated to the person accused” in the first bail
application filed before the Trial Court since such ground could have been
raised by the petitioner at the first instance, the same being within his
knowledge right from inception. This cannot be construed as fresh ground to
maintain a subsequent application for bail. The case of Sohrab Patel v.
Directorate of Enforcement being the subject matter of MCRC-17324 of
2019 decided on 03.05.2019 by the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court
(Indore Bench) where reliance was placed on the case of Atar Singh v. State
of M.P. 1997 (1) JLJ 123 at para 9 and also the case of Arjun Bhanot & Ors.
v. State of Punjab & Anr., I.L.R. Punjab & Haryana, 2021(2) 412, para 23
where this proposition was confirmed by the abovementioned High Courts
have also been cited by the learned AAG in this regard.
16.
As to the contention of the petitioner that the grounds of arrest
have not been informed or communicated to him, the learned AAG has
submitted that records would show that the petitioner is well aware of the
contents of the Arrest Memo dated 12.03.2024, which has been annexed by
him in this petition and wherein at para 8 of the same it has been noted that
the arrested person was informed of the grounds of arrest and his legal right
and thereafter he was taken into custody on 12.03.2024. It is also noticed that
the petitioner has appended his signature in the said Memo and therefore it
cannot be said that the grounds of arrest have not been communicated to the
accused/petitioner. The case of Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of
Enforcement, (2024) 7 SCC 599, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 22 of
the same had referred to the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of
India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 wherein it has been categorically held that so long as
2025:MLHC:757
the person has been informed about the grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient
compliance with mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
17.
The learned AAG has also contended that the reliance of the
petitioner on the case of Prabir Purkayastha(supra) cannot come to his rescue
since the ratio passed in this case, judgment of which was delivered on
15.05.2024 would not be applicable to the case of the petitioner who was
arrested on 12.03.2024, the judgment not having retrospective effect.
18.
The last contention of the learned AAG is that the bail application
preferred by the petitioner herein has to be scrutinized through the provision
of Section 43D (5) of the UAP Act (1967) wherein as has been held in the
case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., 2024 SCC Online SC
109, that “bail is an exception and jail is the rule under UAP Act”. Paras 26,
27 and 28 of this judgment have also been referred in this regard, the same
being reproduced herein below:
“26. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis
ordinary penal offences that the discretion of courts must tilt in
favour of the oft-quoted phrase – “bail is the rule, jail is the
exception” – unless circumstances justify otherwise – does not
find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP
Act. The “exercise” of the general power to grant bail under the
UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words
used in proviso to Section 43-D(5)– ‘shall not be released’ in
contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1)
CrPC – “may be released” – suggests the intention of the
legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
27. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on
hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts
are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The
“justifications” must be searched from the case diary and the final
report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has
prescribed a low, “prima facie” standard, as a measure of the
degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising
2025:MLHC:757
the justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be
contrasted with the standard of “strong suspicion”, which is used
by courts while hearing applications for “discharge”. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Zahoor Ali Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] has
noticed this difference, where it said: (SCC p. 24, para 23)
“23. …In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded
by the court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against the accused is prima
facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be
recorded for considering a discharge application or framing
of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act.”
28. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain.
Bail must be rejected as a “rule”, if after hearing the Public
Prosecutor and after perusing the final report or case diary, the
court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the
test for rejection of bail is not satisfied – that the courts would
proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the
“tripod test” (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with
evidence). This position is made clear by sub-section (6) of
Section 43-D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting
of bail specified in sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other
law for the time being in force on grant of bail.”
19.
The proposition laid down in the case of Gurwinder Singh(supra)
and other related judgments in this regard in the context of the case of the
petitioner, wherein there are found materials on record, prima facie, to
connect the involvement of the petitioner with the offence alleged including
the records of the ‘CDR’ pertaining to the many conversations he had with
one of the main accused persons, Damanbha Ripnar, as such, the provision
of Section 43D (5) of the Act is applicable to his case, therefore bail cannot
be granted to him at this point of time, submits the learned AAG.
20.
It is prayed that this petition being devoid of merits, the same is
liable to be dismissed.
2025:MLHC:757
21.
This Court has carefully considered the argument advanced by
the respective counsels in support of their contention and is also conscious
of the fact that the allegation made against the petitioner are serious in nature,
being one under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 where the purpose of the Act is to provide an effective prevention of
certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations, including terrorist
activities, such activities being directed against the integrity and sovereignty
of India.
22.
However, in our country even the most stringent Act or canon of
law has to confirm with the constitutional provisions, wherein the life and
liberty of a citizen and the accompanying rights guaranteed therein has to be
kept in mind, particularly when it comes to a point where such rights are
curtailed as in when such a citizen is detained in custody, albeit within due
process or procedure of law.
23.
The law makers and the courts have throughout sought to bring
about a balance in this regard, to ensure that there is peace and tranquility in
the country and that no citizen is being unduly or unnecessarily or illegally
detained in custody in connection with any accusations made as far as
violation of the law is concerned.
24.
The facts in this case have been detailed hereinabove and need
not be repeated. Suffice it to say that the petitioner has been arrested under
the provision of the UAP Act and is in custody for more than a year. Though
the Special Court has taken cognizance of the allegation made, no charges
have been framed against the petitioner or other co-accused till date.
25.
At this juncture, the petitioner has approached this Court mainly
on a one-agenda stand, that is, that his constitutional rights have been
2025:MLHC:757
violated by the relevant authority, when at the time of his arrest, he was not
informed of, nor the grounds of arrest ever communicated to him, even till
date.
26.
Reliance has been placed by the petitioner on Article 22(1) which
reads as follow:
“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.–
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody
without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for
such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be
defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.”
27.
From this flows the provision of Section 43B(1) which reads as:“43B. Procedure of arrest, seizure, etc.–(1) Any officer
arresting a person under section 43A shall, as soon as may be,
inform him of the grounds for such arrest.”
28.
Now, how these grounds are to be informed to the arrestee,
judicial pronouncements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other High
Courts in this regard have brought clarity to such a process within the ambit
of the constitutional and legal provisions connected thereto.
29.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar v. State
of Haryana & Anr. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 799 at para 18 and 19 of the
same has more or less answered this question, the same are reproduced
herein as:
“18. Therefore, as far as Article 22(1) is concerned, compliance
can be made by communicating sufficient knowledge of the basic
facts constituting the grounds of arrest to the person arrested. The
grounds should be effectively and fully communicated to the
arrestee in the manner in which he will fully understand the same.
Therefore, it follows that the grounds of arrest must be informed
2025:MLHC:757
in a language which the arrestee understands. That is how, in
Pankaj Bansal, this Court held that the mode of conveying the
grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve
the intended purpose. However, under Article 22(1), there is no
requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing.
Article 22(1) also incorporates the right of every person arrested
to consult an advocate of his choice and the right to be defended
by an advocate. If the grounds of arrest are not communicated to
the arrestee, as soon as may be, he will not be able to effectively
exercise the right to consult an advocate. This requirement
incorporated in Article 22(1) also ensures that the grounds for
arresting the person without a warrant exist. Once a person is
arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21 is curtailed. When
such an important fundamental right is curtailed, it is necessary
that the person concerned must understand on what grounds he
has been arrested. That is why the mode of conveying
information of the grounds must be meaningful so as to serve the
objects stated above.
19. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of the
grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional
requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of the Constitution
under the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the
fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in
custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as
possible. If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may
be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the
fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1).
It will also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The
reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person can be
deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The procedure established by law also
includes what is provided in Article 22(1). Therefore, when a
person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are
not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will
amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under
Article 21 as well. In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is
not followed while arresting a person or after arresting a person,
it will also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under
Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal. On the failure
to comply with the requirement of informing grounds of arrest as
soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the
2025:MLHC:757
arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in
custody even for a second.”
30.
The next question is whether compliance in terms of the said para
18 and 19 in the Vihaan Kumar case has been affected as far as the case of
the petitioner herein is concerned. Except for the bald statement found at para
8 of the Arrest/Court Surrender Form or in other words the ‘Arrest Memo’
which says that the arrested person has been informed of the grounds of
arrest, there is nothing on record to show that such grounds have been duly
spelt out and communicated to the accused/petitioner in writing. In the
opinion of this Court, this can only mean that such grounds of arrest have
not been communicated to the petitioner.
31.
The consequences of such action or inaction of the arresting
authority, would therefore have a telling effect on the case of the petitioner
vis-à-vis his entitlement to bail.
32.
In this connection, it would not be out of place to refer to the
observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vihaan
Kumar(supra) wherein at para 26.1 to 26.6 which are found to be applicable
to the case of the petitioner herein, such observations being the following:
“26.1. The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds
of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);
26.2. The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided
to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge
of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and
communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language
which he understands. The mode and method of communication
must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is
achieved;
26.3. When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the
2025:MLHC:757
investigating officer/agency to prove compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1);
26.4. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of
the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said
Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to
personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.
Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article
22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. [Emphasis laid] Hence,
further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also
vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation,
charge-sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under
Article 22(1);
26.5. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial
Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain
whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory
safeguards has been made; and
26.6. When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the
duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused.
That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory
restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory
restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail
when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is
established. [Emphasis laid]”
33.
In the final analysis, without further requirement of discussion of
the case laws cited by the learned AAG on the other aspects of the case of
the petitioner, since the observations at 26.1 to 26.6 are sufficient to render
such reliance on behalf of the prosecution, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the petitioner has made out a case for grant of bail.
34.
In view of the above, this petition is hereby allowed. The
accused/petitioner is directed to be released on bail, if not wanted in any
other case, on the following conditions:i)
That he shall not abscond or tamper with the witnesses;
2025:MLHC:757
ii)
That he shall attend court as and when called for;
iii)
That he shall not leave the jurisdiction of Meghalaya,
except with due permission of the court concerned; and
iv)
That he shall bind himself on a bond of ₹ 50,000/- (Rupees
fifty thousand) only along with one surety of like amount
to the satisfaction of the trial court.
35.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2025.08.26 16:36:22 IST
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review