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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A.No.73 of 2025
Badal Miah,
S/o: Md. Kuddus Miah, aged about 43 years,
Resident of Sachindralal Charipara, P.S. Amtali,
District: West Tripura.
----Accused-in-custody(s)
The accused person being lodged in judicial custody, the
present petition is preferred and presented by the wife
of accused person, namely:
Rina Begam,
W/o: Badal Miah, aged about…..years,
Resident of Sachindralal Charipara,
P.S. Amtali, District: West Tripura.
----Applicant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s)
:
Mr. Prasanta Sen Chowdhury, Adv.
Mr. Partha Ranjan Sarkar, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
18/09/2025
This bail application under Section 483(1) of BNSS, 2023 is
filed for granting bail to the accused in custody namely, Badal Miah
who is lodging in jail in connection with Amtali PS Case No.2024 AMT
104 under Sections 21(b)/22(c)/23/25/27/27(A)/29 of NDPS Act, 1985
corresponding to Special NDPS 35 of 2025.
Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Prasanta Sen Chowdhury
appearing on behalf of the accused in custody. Also heard Learned P.P.,
Mr. Raju Datta appearing on behalf of the respondent-State.
Today, Learned P.P. has produced the case diary and by
this time, record from the Learned Trial Court has also been received.
(2)
At the time of hearing, Learned Counsel for the accused in
custody first of all drawn the attention of this court that initially by
order dated 06.09.2024, the present accused in custody was granted
interim bail by the Court of Learned Special Judge, Court No.4, West
Tripura, Agartala till 30.09.2024 on the ground that nothing was seized
from his possession in course of investigation and on the basis of
confessional statement of another accused, Ibrahim Miah he was taken
into
custody.
Thereafter,
the
same
was
further
extended
till
05.11.2024 which was again extended till 20.11.2024. By this time, the
State-respondent challenged the order of interim bail granted to the
present accused and this Court by order dated 17.01.2025 in
connection with BA No.88 of 2024 cancelled the interim bail granted to
the accused with a direction to surrender before the Learned Court
below. After that, on 06.05.2025, the present accused surrendered
before the Court of Learned Special Judge and since then he is lodging
in custody.
It was further submitted by Learned Counsel for the
accused in custody that by this time, the charge-sheet is submitted by
the I.O. of this case and other accused persons namely, Kabir Hossen
and Helal Miah @ Abdul Miah are still absconding. It is not known to
the Court when the rest of the accused persons would appear before
the Court and as such, considering the period of detention of the
accused person in custody, Learned Counsel, Mr. Sen Chowdhury urged
for releasing him on bail in any condition.
Learned
Counsel
for
the
accused
in
custody
further
submitted that the ground of arrest was not communicated to the
accused and no contraband item was directly
seized from his
possession. Moreso, the accused was not F.I.R. named. So, considering
(3)
the materials on record, there is very least scope that the present
accused would be convicted on conclusion of trial. So, Learned Counsel
urged for releasing the accused on bail on any condition.
On the other hand, Learned P.P. for the respondent-State
submitted that it is the admitted position that the accused was granted
interim bail initially by the Court of Learned Special Judge. So, the
argument of Learned Counsel for the accused in custody that no
ground of arrest was communicated to him is immaterial. Learned P.P.
further submitted that the plea of Learned Counsel for the accused in
custody that nothing was found from his possession is also not a
ground for granting bail to the accused. It was also submitted that the
State-respondent has challenged the order of interim bail dated
06.09.2024 granted to the accused and this Court, after elaborate
consideration of all the materials on record, by order dated 17.01.2025
in connection with BA No.88 of 2024, cancelled the interim bail granted
to the accused. Learned P.P. further submitted that although by the
said order dated 17.01.2025, a direction was given to the accused to
surrender before the Learned Trial Court within a period of 7(seven)
days but, he did not surrender and ultimately warrant of arrest was
issued against him and in pursuance of warrant of arrest the present
accused was produced under arrest before the Learned Court below.
So, considering the materials on record and the conduct of the accused
in custody, there is no scope to grant him bail at this stage.
Learned P.P. further submitted that even if it is found that
other accused persons of this case are absconding, in that case a
direction may be given to Learned Trial Court to split up the trial for
the sake of justice.
(4)
In support of his contention, Learned P.P. relied upon one
citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Karnataka
vs. Sri Darshan Etc., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702,
wherein in para No.20.1.7, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand
records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of
the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented
from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest,
evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of
the accusations. No material has been placed on record to
establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged
procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice,
such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot,
by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the
High Court treated it as a determinative factor while
overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC
and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on
Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as
those decisions turned on materially different facts and
statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is
inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural
lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do
not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused
to bail.”
Referring the same, Learned P.P. submitted that in view of
the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, there is no
scope to consider the bail application of the accused in custody on the
ground of arrest at this stage.
Learned P.P. also referred another order passed by a
Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(Crl) No.6 of 2025 titled as Sima
Aktar on behalf of Ikbal Hossain vs. The State of Tripura & Anr.,
wherein in para No.16 it was observed as under:
“[16] As regards the judgment relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, wherein it was observed that
once a violation of Article 22(1) is alleged, the burden shifts
upon the State to show effective compliance, this Court is of
the view that the said authority is not applicable to the
facts of the present case. That judgment dealt with a
situation where the very communication of the grounds of
arrest was in dispute. In the present matter, however, the
grounds of arrest were sufficiently conveyed, and more
importantly, the recovery of contraband dry ganja from the
house of the accused in his presence itself constituted a
clear and tangible ground for his arrest. Thus, the ratio laid
down in the said case does not advance the cause of the
petitioner and cannot be relied upon by this Court.”
(5)
Learned P.P. further referred the order dated 08.09.2025 in
connection with BA No.71 of 2025 passed by this Court. In addition to
this, Learned P.P. also referred the citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in Union of India vs. Rattan Mallik alias Habul reported in
(2009) 2 SCC 624, wherein in para Nos.16 and 17, Hon’ble the Apex
Court observed as under:
“16. Merely because, according to the learned Judge,
nothing was found from the possession of the respondent, it
could not be said at this stage that the respondent was not
guilty of the offences for which he had been charged and
convicted. We find no substance in the argument of learned
counsel for the respondent that the observation of the
learned Judge to the effect that “nothing has been found
from his possession” by itself shows application of mind by
the learned Judge tantamounting to “satisfaction” within
the meaning of the said provision. It seems that the
provisions of the NDPS Act and more particularly Section 37
were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge.
17. Thus, in our opinion, the impugned order having been
passed ignoring the mandatory requirements of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, it cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the
appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the
High Court for fresh consideration of the application filed by
the respondent for suspension of sentence and for granting
of bail, keeping in view the parameters of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, enumerated above. We further direct that the
bail application shall be taken up for consideration only
after the respondent surrenders to custody. The respondent
is directed to surrender to custody within two weeks of the
date of this order, failing which the High Court will take
appropriate steps for his arrest.”
Referring the same, Learned P.P. submitted that in view of
the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, even if the
contraband item is not recovered from the possession of the accused
person, still there is no scope to grant bail to the accused.
Learned P.P. further referred another citation of Hon’ble the
Apex Court in Union of India through Narcotics Control Bureau,
Lucknow vs. Md. Nawaz Khan, reported in (2021) 10 SCC 100
wherein in para Nos.28 and 29, it was observed as under:
“28. As regards the finding of the High Court regarding
absence of recovery of the contraband from the possession
of the respondent, we note that in Union of India v. Rattan
Mallik [Union of India v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624 :
(6)
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 831] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court
cancelled the bail of an accused and reversed the finding of
the High Court, which had held that as the contraband
(heroin) was recovered from a specially made cavity above
the cabin of a truck, no contraband was found in the
“possession” of the accused. The Court observed that
merely making a finding on the possession of the
contraband did not fulfil the parameters of Section 37(1)(b)
and there was non-application of mind by the High Court.
29. In line with the decision of this Court in Rattan Mallik
[Union of India v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 831] , we are of the view that a finding of the
absence of possession of the contraband on the person of
the respondent by the High Court in the impugned order
does not absolve it of the level of scrutiny required under
Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act.”
Again, referring another citation of this Court in State of
Tripura represented by Ld. Public Prosecutor vs. Mahabul Alam
& Ors., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Tri 777, wherein in para
Nos.17 to 21, this Court observed as under:
“17. From the aforesaid enunciations of law on the subject,
it is abundantly clear, that the Courts while considering the
application for bail must strictly adhere to the two
conditions embodied in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and
must record its reason of satisfaction that there are
substantial probable causes for believing that the accused
is not guilty of committing such offence and that there is no
likelihood of repetition of committing such offence by the
accused while on bail. It is re-iterated that while
considering the bail application filed by the accused
arrested under the penal provisions of the NDPS Act,
learned Special Judges should be confined within the limits
embodied in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Procedural
violations, if any, shall be taken into consideration during
the course of trial, and not at the stage of consideration of
bail application.
18. I have given due consideration to the submissions of
Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the
accused-respondents and the decisions he relies upon in
order to support his plea that very cogent and
overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order
seeking cancellation of the bail as held by the Supreme
Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi,
(1978) 2 SCC 411 : AIR 1978 SC 961; Bhagirath Singh
Judeja v. State of Gujarat, (1984) 1 SCC 284 : AIR 1984 SC
372; Bhuri Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw
(SC) 956.
19. A Full-Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay
Gandhi (supra) held that in order to succeed in an
application for cancellation of a bail the Court should make
an endeavour to test the balance of probabilities that the
accused has abused his liberty or that there is a reasonable
apprehension that he will interfere with the course of
justice. The bench further held that:
“24. Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure confers jurisdiction on the High Court
(7)
or Court of Session to direct that any person who
has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII
be arrested and committed to custody. The power
to take back in custody an accused who has been
enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and
circumspection. But the power, though of an
extraordinary nature, is meant to be exercised in
appropriate cases when, by a preponderance of
probabilities, it is clear that the accused is
interfering with the course of justice by
tampering with witnesses. Refusal to exercise
that wholesome power in such cases, few though
they may be, will reduce it to a dead letter and
will suffer the courts to be silent spectators to the
subversion of the judicial process. We might as
well wind up the courts and bolt their doors
against all than permit a few to ensure that
justice shall not be done.”
20. Similar view has been expressed in Bhagirath Singh
Judeja (supra) and Bhuri Bai (supra). At this juncture, I
must say, as I said earlier, the Courts should not forget the
limitations under Section 37 of the NDPS Act in addition to
the limitations prescribed in Cr. P.C.
21. In the context of the case, it is found that after being
enlarged on bail two of the accused, namely, Mahabul Alam
and Piklu Bhowmik had abused the benefit of liberty
granted by the Court by way of allowing their applications
for bail. The accused-respondents were found to be
involved in two other cases registered under different
police stations during the period of bail.”
Referring the same citations, Learned P.P. submitted that in
view of the settled position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India, there is no scope to grant bail to the accused at this
stage. Learned P.P. finally submitted that since the I.O. by this time
has laid charge-sheet against the accused and there are sufficient
materials against him showing his implication with the alleged offence
so, there is no scope to grant bail to him at this stage and urged for
dismissal of the bail application.
I have heard detailed submissions of both the sides and
perused the record of Learned Trial Court as well as the case diary
produced by Learned P.P.
This case was registered on the basis of an F.I.R. laid by
one Om Prakash Swami, Assistant Commandant, ‘D’ COY 42 Bn BSF to
O/C Amtali PS on 19.08.2024 and on the basis of that F.I.R., this case
(8)
was registered. In course of investigation, on the basis of confessional
statement of another accused, Ibrahim Miah, the present accused in
custody was produced under arrest before the Learned Trial Court on
06.09.2024 but, on that day the Learned Trial Court considering the
materials on record, granted him interim bail which was extended for
certain period time to time. Later on, his interim bail was challenged
before this Court and this Court by order dated 17.01.2025 cancelled
the order of interim bail granted to him and subsequent orders
thereon. In the meantime, the I.O. has also collected some evidences
i.e. recorded the statement of some of the witnesses of the prosecution
from whose statements, the involvement of the accused in custody has
been revealed. Finally, the I.O. in this case has laid charge-sheet
against: 1. Badal Miah 2. Abdul Husain 3. Kabir Hossen, 4. Abdul Miah
@ Helal Miah and 5. Ibrahim Miah and accordingly, by order dated
28.02.2025,
cognizance
of
offence
punishable
under
Section
21(b)/22(c)/25/27/27(A)/29/23 of NDPS Act has been taken against all
the accused persons.
From the record it appears that accused, Ibrahim Miah was
released on default bail and accused Abdul Husain later on was
enlarged on bail by order dated 01.08.2025. Accused Kabir Hossen and
Abdul Miah @ Helal Miah are still absconding and the present accused
Badal Miah is lodging in jail on and from 06.05.2025.
On perusal of the record of Learned Trial Court, the case
dairy and the materials so far collected by the I.O. in course of
investigation against the present accused it is revealed that in
pursuance of the order of this Court the accused person did not
surrender before the Court below and ultimately warrant of arrest was
issued against him. On the basis of warrant of arrest the present
(9)
accused was again produced before the Court below on 06.05.2025.
So, the submission of Learned defense counsel that the accused
surrendered and he could not appeared before the Court below due to
his illness does not appears to be true and correct.
I have also perused the citations referred by Learned P.P.
representing the prosecution.
In a case of this nature, it is not necessary that the accused
person should be F.I.R. named. If during investigation his/her name
reveals in that case there is no scope to presume that he/she was
innocent. Since, after completion of the investigation the I.O. has laid
charge-sheet against the present accused in custody and others. So,
prima facie, at this stage, there is no scope to presume the accused to
be innocent. However, the grounds referred by Learned Counsel for the
accused in custody cannot be accepted at this stage because the plea
of ground of arrest is not a valid ground for releasing the accused on
bail and in view of the principle of law laid down by Hon’ble the Apex
Court in the aforenoted case of Darshan (supra) there is no scope to
consider his bail application. Furthermore, it is the admitted position
that the accused is not F.I.R. named but at the same time it is also on
record that on the basis of confessional statement he was taken into
custody and in course of investigation the I.O. has collected some
materials against him showing his implication with the alleged offence.
So, the submission of Learned Counsel for the accused in custody also
cannot be considered that there are no materials against him showing
his implication with the alleged offence.
Now, at this stage, whether in view of the present
circumstances, where the two accused persons are still absconding is
there any scope to consider the bail application to the accused?
(10)
In this regard, the answer is ‘No’. Each case will proceed
according to its own merit.
It is on record that two accused persons are absconding and
against them process has been issued. Now, it is for the executing
authority to execute the order of the Court. As, already stated accused,
Ibrahim Miah was granted default bail and another accused, Abdul
Husain was granted bail by order dated 01.08.2025 and the present
accused is in custody. On perusal of the record it appears that the
conduct of the accused was not at all satisfactory. Even, considering
the materials on record, at this stage, there is no scope to grant the
benefit of Section 37 of NDPS Act as because Learned Counsel for the
accused in custody in course of hearing failed to place any satisfactory
grounds to consider the bail application of the accused in custody.
So, considering the materials on record, at this stage, I find
no scope to release the present accused on bail. Hence, the instant bail
application stands rejected. The accused is to remain in J/C as before.
However, considering the present situation it is ordered that
the Learned Court below may split up the case record and proceed for
trial against the accused persons who are available, keeping the case
pending against the rest absconding accused persons.
With this observation, the present bail application stands
disposed of.
Send down the record of the Learned Trial Court along with
a copy of this order. Return back the case diary to I.O. through
Learned P.P. along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
Snigdha
signed by
MOUMIT Digitally
MOUMITA DATTA
2025.09.19
A DATTA Date:
13:24:44 +05'30'
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