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[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 723/2026
Kala Chauhan Wife Of Jay Singh Chauhan, Aged About 67 Years,
Resident Of 28, Rohat House, Omnkar Nagar, Gokhle Lane, Civil
Lines, Ajmer-305 001.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State Of Rajasthan, Through The District Collector- Ajmer,
Situated At Collectorate, Ajmer (Rajasthan).
2.
Office Of The Liquidator- Adarsh Credit Co Operative
Society Limited, Through The Liquidator, Situated At 14,
Vidhya Vihar Colony, Opp. Hotel Fortune, Usmanpura,
Ashram Road, Ahemdabad (Gujarat).
3.
Office Of The Central Registrar Of Cooperative Societies,
Through The Central Registrar And Additional Secretary,
Situated At 900, 9Th Floor, Tower E, World Trade Centre
Nauroji Nagar, New Delhi-110 029.
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11480/2025
Ashapurna Hotels Pvt. Ltd. @ Ashapurna Infra Project Pvt. Ltd.,
A Company Registered Under The Provisions Of Companies Act
1956 Having Registered Office At Flat No.101, Vardhman
Complex,
Bhopalpura,
Udaipur
(Raj)
313001
Through
Its
Authorized Signatory Shri Harsh Sharma S/o Shri V.k. Sharma
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
Official
Liquidator,
Cooperative
Shri
Society
H.s.
Limited
Patel
(Accsl),
Adarsh
14,
Credit
Vidyavihar
Colony, Usmanpura, Ashram Road, Ahemdabad.
2.
The District Collector, Jaipur Collectorate, Collectorate
Circle, Banipark Jaipur
3.
The Central Registrar, Multi State Cooperative Society,
New Delhi, Ministry Of Cooperation, Atal Akshay Urja
Bhawan, Cgo Complex, Behind Nia Building, New Delhi 110003
----Respondents
(2 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11999/2025
Ashapurna Hotels Pvt. Ltd. @ Ashapurna Infra Project Pvt. Ltd.,
A Company Registered Under The Provisions Of Companies Act
1956 Having Registered Office At Flat No.101, Vardhman
Complex,
Bhopalpura,
Udaipur
(Raj)
313001
Through
Its
Authorized Signatory Shri Harsh Sharma S/o Shri V.k. Sharma
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
Official
Liquidator,shri
H.s.
Patel
Adarsh
Credit
Cooperative Society Limited (Accsl), 14, Vidya Vihar
Colony, Usmanpura, Ashram Road, Jaipur
2.
The District Collector, Jaipur Collectorate, Collectorate
Circle, Banipark Jaipur
3.
The Central Registrar, Multi State Cooperative Society,
New Delhi, Ministry Of Cooperation, Atal Akshay Urja
Bhawan, Cgo Complex, Behind Nia Building, New Delhi 110003
4.
Enforcement Directorate Through Its Deputy Director,
Jyothi Nagar, Lalkothi, Jaipur, Rajasthan 302007.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12000/2025
Ashapurna Hotels Pvt. Ltd. @ Ashapurna Infra Project Pvt. Ltd.,
A Company Registered Under The Provisions Of Companies Act
1956 Having Registered Office At Flat No.101, Vardhman
Complex,
Bhopalpura,
Udaipur
(Raj)
313001
Through
Its
Authorized Signatory Shri Harsh Sharma S/o Shri V.k. Sharma
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
Official
Liquidator,shri
H.S.
Patel
Adarsh
Credit
Cooperative Society Limited (Accsl), 14, Vidya Vihar
Colony, Usmanpura, Ashram Road, Jaipur.
2.
The District Collector, Jaipur Collectorate, Collectorate
Circle, Banipark Jaipur
3.
The Central Registrar, Multi State Cooperative Society,
New Delhi, Ministry Of Cooperation, Atal Akshay Urja
Bhawan, Cgo Complex, Behind Nia Building, New Delhi 110003
4.
Enforcement Directorate, Through Its Deputy Director,
(3 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Jyothi Nagar, Lalkothi, Jaipur, Rajasthan 302007
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12001/2025
Ashapurna Hotels Pvt. Ltd. @ Ashapurna Infra Project Pvt. Ltd.,
A Company Registered Under The Provisions Of Companies Act
1956 Having Registered Office At Flat No.101, Vardhman
Complex,
Bhopalpura,
Udaipur
(Raj)
313001
Through
Its
Authorized Signatory Shri Harsh Sharma S/o Shri V.k. Sharma
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
Official
Liquidator,
Shri
H.s.
Patel
Adarsh
Credit
Cooperative Society Limited (Accsl), 14, Vidya Vihar
Colony, Usmanpura, Ashram Road, Jaipur.
2.
The District Collector, Jaipur Collectorate, Collectorate
Circle, Banipark Jaipur
3.
The Central Registrar, Multi State Cooperative Society,
New Delhi, Ministry Of Cooperation, Atal Akshay Urja
Bhawan, Cgo Complex, Behind Nia Building, New Delhi 110003
4.
Enforcement Directorate Through Its Deputy Director,
Jyothi Nagar, Lalkothi, Jaipur, Rajasthan 302007.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13572/2025
Riddhi Siddhi Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd., Through Its Authorised
Signatory Sh. Shubham J. Bharagva, Having Its Registered
Office At Corporate Tower, Rsgs The Universe Campus, Hiran
Magri Extension, Opposite Sector-9, Udaipur (Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State Of Rajasthan, Through The District Collector- Ajmer,
Situated At Collectorate, Ajmer (Rajasthan).
2.
Office Of The Liquidator, Adarsh Credit Co Operative
Society Limited Through The Liquidator, Situated At 14,
Vidhya Vihar Colony, Opp. Hotel Fortune, Usmanpura,
Ashram Road, Ahemdabad (Gujarat).
3.
Office Of The Central Registrar Of Cooperative Societies,
Through The Central Registrar And Additional Secretary,
(4 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Situated At 900, 9Th Floor, Tower E, World Trade Centre
Nauroji Nagar, New Delhi - 110 029.
4.
Enforcement Directorate Through Its Director, Office At
Second Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-Ii, Lic Building, Bhawani Singh
Road, Jaipur-302005.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13578/2025
Riddhi Siddhi Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd., Through Its Authorised
Signatory Sh. Shubham J. Bharagva, Having Its Registered
Office At Corporate Tower, Rsgs The Universe Campus, Hiran
Magri Extension, Opposite Sector-9, Udaipur (Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State Of Rajasthan, Through The District Collector- Ajmer,
Situated At Collectorate, Ajmer (Rajasthan).
2.
Office Of The Liquidator- Adarsh Credit Co Operative
Society Limited, Through The Liquidator, Situated At 14,
Vidhya Vihar Colony, Opp. Hotel Fortune, Usmanpura,
Ashram Road, Ahemdabad (Gujarat).
3.
Office Of The Central Registrar Of Cooperative Societies,
Through The Central Registrar And Additional Secretary,
Situated At -900, 9Th Floor, Tower E, World Trade Centre
Nauroji Nagar, New Delhi - 110 029.
4.
Enforcement Directorate, Through Its Director, Office At
Second Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-Ii, Lic Building, Bhawani Singh
Road, Jaipur-302005
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Sandeep Singh Shekhawat with
Mr. Akshay Dutt Sharma in CWP
Nos.723/2026, 13572/2025 and
13578/2025
Mr. Shantanu Sharma,
Mr. Parth Vashishtha and
Mr. Aditya Doda in CWP
No.11480/2025, 11999/2025,
12000/2025 and 12001/2025
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. C.S. Sinha with
Mr. Mayank Kamwar and
Mr. Dev Yadav for respondent No.1
and 3
(5 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Mr. Akshay Bhardwaj with
Ms. Ashmita Sharma and
Mr. Mohit Kumar Soni for ED in CWP
No.11999/2025, 12000/2025,
12001/2025, 13572/2025 and
13578/2025
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA
Order
Reportable
Arguments concluded on
:::
February 13, 2026
Reserved on
:::
February 13, 2026
Pronounced on
:::
February 26, 2026
1.
Since the controversy and the issue involved in all
the seven writ petitions is common, hence, all these seven
petitions are being decided by a common order.
Facts of SBCWP No. 723/2026:
2.
The facts borne out from the pleadings are that the
petitioner claims that he lawfully purchased parcel 53/132th
share of land ad-measuring 6.02000 hectares (for short ‘the
subject property’) situated at Khasra Nos. 1931, 1932, 1933,
1937 and 1938 at Village Kayad, R.I. Gangwana, Tehsil &
District Ajmer by way of a registered sale deeds which were
executed
on
08.02.2019,
13.02.2019,
15.02.2019,
10.09.2015, 01.02.2016 and 09.05.2016. Since acquisition,
the petitioner has remained in peaceful, continuous and
lawful
possession
formalities
of
including
the
land
mutation,
with
all
payment
compliance with applicable laws duly fulfilled.
requisite
legal
of
and
taxes
(6 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
In connection with multiple criminal investigations
initiated against the founders and directors of the Adarsh
Credit Cooperative Society Limited (for short ‘the ACCSL’) by
agencies
including
the
Rajasthan
Police,
Enforcement
Directorate (ED) and Serious Fraud Investigation Office (for
short ‘the SFIO’), several properties alleged to be proceeds of
crime, were provisionally attached by the ED. However, the
petitioner's property was neither said to have been attached
nor implicated in any such proceedings.
Despite the above, the Official Liquidator appointed
under Section 89 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act,
2002 (for short ‘the Act of 2002’) issued an attachment order
dated
18.12.2025.
The
Liquidator
is
already
pursuing
separate legal proceedings for restoration of ED-attached
properties before the competent court.
The petitioner submitted objections and detailed
representations to the concerned authorities asserting her
ownership and highlighting legal infirmities in the attachment,
which remained unconsidered.
Facts of SBCWP No. 11480/2025:
3.
The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-
Ashapurna Hotel Pvt Ltd. is said to have purchased a land
bearing Plot No. 4-C-7, Indira Gandhi Nagar, Jagatpura,
Jaipur, measuring 4992 sq. meters (for short ‘the subject
property’) in the year 2007 through auction from Rajasthan
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(7 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
Housing Board and executed the sale deed in the year 2008.
Subsequently, in year 2011 a loan by sanctioned by ACCSL
which has no nexus with the purchase or title of the said
property. Despite this, respondent no. 1 has sought to attach
the property in question vide impugned order of attachment
dated 20.06.2025, acting beyond the scope of powers under
Multi State Cooperative Societies Act 2002 and without
following the due process or affording any opportunity of
hearing in gross violation of principle of natural justice. The
petitioner has submitted detailed objection which remained
unconsidered.
Facts of SBCWP No. 11999/2025:
4.
Facts of the case in nutshell are that the petitioner
is said to have lawfully purchased the land bearing Khasra
No. 168, Village Chamanpura, Patwar Halka: Lalwar, District
Jaipur, measuring 5.10 Bigha (for short ‘the subject property’)
in the year 2007. Subsequently, in year 2011 a loan by
sanctioned by ACCSL which has no nexus with the purchase
or title of the said property. Despite this, respondent no. 1
has sought to attach the property in question vide impugned
order of attachment dated 20.06.2025, acting beyond the
scope of powers under Multi State Cooperative Societies Act
2002 and without following the due process or affording any
opportunity of hearing in gross violation of principle of natural
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(8 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
justice. The petitioner has submitted detailed objection which
remained unconsidered.
Facts of SBCWP No. 12000/2025:
5.
The facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner
is said to have lawfully purchased a land bearing Khasra No.
175, Village Chamanpura, Patwar Halka: Lalwar, District
Jaipur, measuring 3.8 Bigha (for short the subject property’)
in the year 2007. Subsequently, in year 2011 a loan by
sanctioned by ACCSL which has no nexus with the purchase
or title of the said property. Despite this, respondent no. 1
has sought to attach the property in question vide impugned
order of attachment dated 20.06.2025, acting beyond the
scope of powers under Multi State Cooperative Societies Act
2002 and without following the due process or affording any
opportunity of hearing in gross violation of principle of natural
justice. The petitioner has detailed objection which submitted
remained unconsidered.
Facts of SBCWP No. 12001/2025:
6.
The facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner
is said to have lawfully purchased a land bearing Khata
No.54, Village Chamanpura, Patwar Halka: Lalwar, District
Jaipur, measuring 13.5 Bigha (for short ‘the subject property’)
in the year 2008. Subsequently, in year 2011 a loan by
sanctioned by ACCSL which has no nexus with the purchase
or title of the said property. Despite this, respondent no. 1
(9 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
has sought to attach the property in question vide impugned
order of attachment dated 20.06.2025, acting beyond the
scope of powers under Multi State Cooperative Societies Act
2002 and without following the due process or affording any
opportunity of hearing in gross violation of principle of natural
justice.
The
petitioner
has
submitted
detailed
remain
objection which remained unconsidered.
Facts of SBCWP 13572/2025:
7.
The facts of the case in brief are that the ptitioner
is said to have lawfully purchased parcel of land admeasuring 467 yards including portion of Plot No.10, situated
at In-front of Central Jail, Near Board of Secondary Education
Office, Jaipur Road, District Ajmer (for short ‘the subject
property), by way of a registered sale deed which was
executed and registered on 29.05.2009. Since acquisition,
the petitioner has remained in peaceful, continuous and
lawful
possession
formalities
of
including
the
land
mutation,
with
all
payment
requisite
legal
of
and
taxes
compliance with applicable laws duly fulfilled.
In connection with multiple criminal investigations
initiated against the founders and directors of ACCSL by
agencies
including
the
Rajasthan
Police,
Enforcement
Directorate (ED) and Serious Fraud Investigation Office
(SFIO) several properties alleged to be proceeds of crime
were
provisionally
attached
by
the
ED.
However,
the
(10 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Petitioner's property was neither attached nor implicated in
any such proceedings.
Despite the above, the Official Liquidator appointed
under Section 89 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act,
issued
an
impugned
attachment
order
dated
21.07.2025 including the Petitioner's property within the
ambit of the liquidation process and the Liquidator is already
pursuing separate legal proceedings for restoration of EDattached properties before the competent court.
The petitioner submitted objections and detailed
representations to the concerned authorities on 06.08.2025,
asserting its ownership and highlighting legal infirmities in the
attachment, which remained unconsidered.
Facts of SBCWP No. 13578/2025:
8.
The facts of the case in nutshell are that the
petitioner is said to have lawfully purchased a parcel of land
ad-measuring ad-measuring 12674.02 sq. yards situated at
Khasra No. 503/2 and 504/2, Village Pushkar, Tehsil & District
Ajmer (for short ‘the subject property’), by way of a
registered sale deed which was executed on 12.11.2007 as
well as the same was registered on 12.03.2008. Since
acquisition, the petitioner remained in peaceful, continuous
and lawful possession of the land with all requisite legal
formalities
including
mutation,
payment
compliance with applicable laws duly fulfilled.
of
taxes
and
(11 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
In connection with multiple criminal investigations
initiated against the founders and directors of ACCSL by
agencies
including
the
Rajasthan
Police,
Enforcement
Directorate (ED) and Serious Fraud Investigation Office
(SFIO) several properties alleged to be proceeds of crime
were
provisionally
attached
by
the
ED.
However,
the
petitioner's property was neither attached nor implicated in
any such proceedings.
Despite the above, the Official Liquidator appointed
under Section 89 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act,
issued
an
impugned
attachment
order
dated
21.07.2025 including the Petitioner's property within the
ambit of the liquidation process and the Liquidator is already
pursuing separate legal proceedings for restoration of EDattached properties before the competent court.
9.
Learned counsels appearing for the petitioners
submitted that the impugned orders of attachment regarding
petitioners own property having no nexus with the Society,
are without jurisdiction of the Liquidator. It is submitted by
the counsels appearing for the petitioners that the properties
in question in all these writ petitions are beyond the assets of
ACCSL in respect of which an order of winding up has been
made and the
Liquidator has been appointed as the
properties have not been purchased with the funds or loans
alleged to have been advanced by the ACCSL. It is further
(12 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
submitted that the land in question, which is the subject
matter
in
CWP
No.11999/2025,
was
purchased
on
31.10.2007, whereas the loan was borrowed on 23.02.2011
i.e. after four years of the purchase of the land and in such
circumstances it cannot be said that the land has been
purchased with siphoned funds of the ACCSL. It is also
submitted by the counsels appearing for the petitioners that
one of the petitioner namely; Kala Chauhan (in CWP No.
723/2026) has never borrowed loan from the ACCSL. It is
submitted that the property was purchased by her with her
own funds and there is no evidence as regards the connection
of the purchase of the land in question and the funds of the
ACCSL. It is further submitted that Section 90(1) of the Act of
2002 does not include the properties alleged to have been
purchased from the Multi-State Cooperative Society funds.
The said section covers only the assets of Multi-State
Cooperative Societies which is in its name. It is also
submitted by the counsels appearing for the petitioners that
no provision under the Act of 2002 provides for attachment of
any property which is not in the name of the Society and in
that situation the Liquidator appointed on winding up of the
Society has also no authority to attach such properties. It is
also submitted that the properties which are subject matters
in these petitions have no nexus with the loans or funds of
the Society.
(13 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
10.
[CW-723/2026]
Learned counsels appearing for the petitioners
submitted that if at all the Liquidator can show any
connection of the property in question that the funds or loans
of the Society then he was having remedy to initiate the suit
proceedings as provided under Rule 28 of the Multi-State
Cooperative Societies Rules, 2002 (for short ‘the Rules of
2002’), wherein the limitation of three years has been
provided from the date of appointment of the Liquidator.
Since the limitation period has already lapsed, the Liquidator
has adhered to the illegal proceedings by issuing attachment
orders though he has no authority to issue the attachment
orders. It is also submitted that in the impugned attachment
orders the Liquidator has directed the concerned District
Collector and the Urban Development Authority to carry out
the mutation of the land in question and transferred the land
in question in the name of Liquidator- ACCSL and has further
ordered that the Tehsildar and
the Sub-Registrar shall not
register any document without permission of the LiquidatorACCSL. Such order of the
is wholly illegal, arbitrary and
beyond his jurisdiction. It is submitted by them that a
property can be transferred from one individual to other by
way of procedure provided under the Transfer of Property Act
or by way of auction or allotment provided under any law. It
is
also
submitted
by
the
counsels
appearing
for
the
petitioners that the arbitration proceedings are pending, still
(14 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
the Liquidator has gone beyond his jurisdiction and passed
the impugned attachment orders. It is also submitted by the
counsels appearing for the petitioners that as per SFIO
report, loan was advanced to 186 companies / firms/
associates/
APOs
by
the
ACCSL
amounting
to
Rs.
25,82,41,11089.72. Counsels appearing for the petitioners
also submitted that the provisions of the Act of 2002 and the
Rules of 2002 provide for legal remedy of filing a suit for any
claim
but
the
respondents
have
no
faith
in
judicial
proceedings and have acted in an illegal and arbitrary manner
and
issued
the
impugned
attachment
orders
without
jurisdiction.
11.
Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted
that as regards the impugned attachment orders, the
petitioners have an alternative, efficacious statutory remedy
of an appeal as provided under section 99 of the Act of 2002.
He also submitted that on conjoint reading of provisions of
sections 89, 90(2)(b) and 95 of the Act of 2002 empowers
the Liquidator to attach the properties which are alleged to
have been purchased with the siphoned of ACCSL. Counsel
further submitted that the provision of section 95 of the Act
of 2002 provides that every order passed by the Liquidator
shall be executed according to the law for the time being in
force for recovery of arrears of land revenue and in view of
the provisions of sections 256 and 228 of the Rajasthan Land
(15 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Revenue Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act of 1956’) the impugned
orders of attachment are just and proper and do not suffer
from any illegality. He also submitted that
along-with the
counter affidavit submitted in SBCW P.No. 11999/2025, the
respondents have placed on record the loan sanction orders
in the name of one Mr. Mahendra Kumar Tak without
completion of the formalities required, which show that the
loan was obtained from the siphoned of the Society. Counsel
also submitted that the Society has also issued reminder
notices for the outstanding loans on 29.06.2018 to M/s.
Ashapurna
Infra
Projects
Private
Limited
and
it
was
specifically mentioned that the legal proceedings would be
drawn in case the said firm fail to repay the loan amount. He
also submitted that there is no method or procedure provided
under the law to recover the loan. Learned counsel appearing
for the respondents has also submitted that the Rule 28(d) of
the Rules of 2002 is in two parts; firstly, the Multi-Story
Cooperative Societies can institute a suit so as to recover all
all the sums and properties; and, secondly, the Liquidator
may proceed in other way, whichever he thinks proper and
the Liquidator has chosen the second one and there is no
illegality committed by him.
12.
Considered the submissions made at Bar and also
gone through the material placed on record.
(16 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
13.
One
of
the
objection
[CW-723/2026]
raised
by
the
counsel
appearing for the respondents is that the petitioners are
having an alternative statutory remedy of an appeal under
section 99 of the Act of 2002, the present writ petitions
deserve to be dismissed.
14.
By filing these writ petitions the petitioners have
challenged the attachment orders passed by the Liquidator.
The Liquidator has also directed the Revenue Authorities to
carry out the mutation of the land in question and transfer
the name of the
Liquidator-
ACCSL in place of the
petitioners and has also directed the other authorities not to
register any document without prior permission of the
Liquidator- ACCSL.
15.
It is a well settled principle of law in catena of
judgments delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in certain
exceptional circumstances such petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India can be entertained against any
impugned order for which an appeal is also provided under
the Statute. It has been settled that in cases where there is
gross violation of principles of natural justice apparent on
record and so also if the impugned attachment orders are
without jurisdiction or by an authority not competent to issue
the same, the writ can be entertained even though there may
be an alternative statutory remedy available. On perusal of
the impugned attachment orders, the
Liquidator of the
(17 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
ACCSL appointed by the Government of India before issuing
such attachment orders has not issued any show-cause notice
or allowed any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. It is
a fact on record that the land in question in all the petitions is
not in the name of the ACCSL and therefore, any order
regarding any land which is not in the name of the ACCSL,
the Liquidator of the ACCSL has no authority without issuing
any show cause notice or allowing an opportunity of hearing
to the petitioners.
16.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.,
reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771, has laid down certain
principles as regards the writ jurisdiction in cases where there
is a statutory remedy. Paras 27 and 28 of the said judgment
are relevant, which are quoted as under:“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1.
The
power
under
Article
of
the
Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not
only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but
for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to
entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions
placed on the power of the High Court is where an
effective alternate remedy is available to the
aggrieved person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy
arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for
the enforcement of a fundamental right protected
(18 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a
violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the
order
or
proceedings
are
wholly
without
jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is
challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest
the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution in an appropriate case though
ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided
by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which
itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for
enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had
to that particular statutory remedy before invoking
the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory
remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions
of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High
Court is objectively of the view that the nature of
the controversy requires the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be
interfered with.
28. These principles have been consistently upheld
by this Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad
[Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399],
Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot
[Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas
Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v.
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(19 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
Union of India [Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India,
(2008) 5 SCC 632] among other decisions.”
17.
As per the provisions of Section 90(1) of the Act of
2002, only the assets of a Multi-State Cooperative Society in
respect of which an order of winding up has been made, shall
vest in the Liquidator appointed under section 89 of the Act
of 2002. At the time of appointment of the Liquidator for the
ACCSL, the properties in question in these petitions were not
in the name of the ACCSL. Until and unless the
Liquidator
able to prove that the property has been purchased by the
loan amount advanced by the ACCSL, he cannot claim any
right over the said property as a property of the ACCSL.
In view of the above, the preliminary objection of
alternative remedy of an appeal raised by the counsel
appearing for the respondents, is not sustainable.
18.
From the submissions made by the counsels
appearing for the parties and the pleadings, the material
questions require to be considered are:A.
Whether the property in question, which is not in
the name of the ACCSL, for which the Liquidator has been
appointed under section 89 of the Act of 2002 vests with the
Liquidator without even proving that the same has been
purchased by the funds of the ACCSL?
B.
Whether the property in question which is not in the
name of the ACCSL on the date of appointment of the
(20 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Liquidator is included under the assets as referred in Section
90(1) of the Act of 2002?
C.
If the property in question is not in the name of the
ACCSL at the time of appointment of the Liquidator, whether
the Liquidator has an authority to issue the attachment order
claiming that the property in question has been purchased
with the loans/ siphoned of the ACCSL or has to file a suit as
provided under Rule 28(d) of the Rules of 2002 for such
claims?
D.
Whether the impugned attachment orders can be
said to be issued by the Liquidator in exercise of the powers
given under Section 90(2)(g) of the Act of 2002?
19.
The provisions which are relevant for consideration
of the aforesaid issues are quoted as under:Sections 89 and 90 of the Multi-State Co-operative
Societies Act, 2002:
“89. Liquidator
(1) Where the Central Registrar has made an order
under section 86 for the winding up of multi-state
cooperative society, the Central Registrar may
appoint a liquidator for the purpose and fix his
remuneration.
(2) A liquidator shall, on appointment, take into his
custody or under his control all the property,
effects and actionable claims to which the multistate cooperative society is or appears to be
entitled and shall take such steps as he may deem
necessary
or
expedient
to
prevent
loss
or
(21 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
deterioration of, or damage to, such property,
effects and claims and he may carry on the
business of the multi-state cooperative society so
far as may be necessary with the previous approval
of the Central Registrar.
(3) Where an appeal is preferred under clause (f)
of sub-section (1) of section 99, an order for the
winding up of a multi-state cooperative society
made under section 86 shall not operate thereafter
until the order is confirmed in appeal:
PROVIDED that the liquidator shall continue to have
custody or control of the property, effects and
actionable claims mentioned in subsection (2) and
have authority to take the steps referred to in that
sub-section.
(4) Where an order for the winding up of a multistate cooperative society is set aside in appeal, the
property, effects and actionable claims of the
society shall re-vest in the society.
90. Powers of liquidator
(1) Subject to any rules made in this behalf, the
whole of the assets of a multi-state cooperative
society in respect of which an order for winding up
has
been
made,
shall
vest
in
the
liquidator
appointed under section 89 from the date on which
the order takes effect and the liquidator shall have
power to realise such assets by sale or otherwise.
(2) Such liquidator shall also have power, subject
to the control of the Central Registrar(a) to institute and defend suits and other legal
proceedings
on
behalf
of
the
multi-state
cooperative society by the name of his office;
(22 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
(b) to determine from time to time the contribution
(including debts due and costs of liquidation) to be
made or remaining to be made by the members or
past members or by the estates or nominees, heirs
or legal representatives of the deceased members
or by an officers or former officers, to the assets of
the multi-state cooperative society;
(c) to investigate all claims against the multi-state
cooperative society and subject to the provisions of
this Act, to decide questions of priority arising
between claimants;
(d)
to
pay
claims
against
the
multi-state
cooperative society, including interest up to the
date of winding up according to their respective
priorities, if any, in full or rateably, as the assets of
the society may permit; and the surplus, if any,
remaining after payment of the claims being
applied in payment of interest from the date of
such order or winding up at a rate fixed by him but
not exceeding the contract rate in any case;
(e) to determine by what persons and in what
proportions the costs of the liquidation are to be
borne;
(f) to determine whether any person is a member,
past member or nominee of a deceased member;
(g) to give such directions in regard to the
collection and distribution of the assets of the
multi-state cooperative society as may appear to
him to be necessary for winding up the affairs of
that society;
(h) to carry on the business of the multi-state
cooperative society so far as may be necessary for
the beneficial winding up of the same;
(23 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
(i) to make any compromise or arrangement with
creditors or persons claiming to be creditors or
having or alleging to have any claim, present or
future, whereby the multi-state cooperative society
may be rendered liable;
(j) to make any compromise or arrangement with
any person between whom and the multi-state
cooperative society there exists any dispute and to
refer any such dispute for decision;
(k) after consulting the members of the multi-state
cooperative society, to dispose of the surplus, if
any, remaining after paying the claims against the
society, in such manner as may be prescribed.
(l) to compromise all calls or liabilities to calls and
debts and liabilities capable of resulting in debts,
and all claims, present or
future, certain or
contingent, subsisting or alleged to be subsisting
between the multi-state cooperative society and a
contributory
or
other
debtor
or
person
apprehending liability to the multi-state cooperative
society and all questions in any way relating to or
affecting the assets or the winding up of the society
on such terms as may be agreed and take any
security for the discharge of any such call, liability,
debt or claim and give a complete discharge in
respect thereof.
(3) When the affairs of a multi-state cooperative
society have been wound up, the liquidator shall
make a report to the Central Registrar and deposit
the records of the society in such place as the
Central Registrar may direct.”
(24 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Rule 28 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Rules,
2002:
“28. Procedure to be adopted by liquidator
When liquidator has been appointed under subsection (1) of section 89, the following procedure
shall be adopted.
(a) ***
(b) ***
(c) ***
(d) The liquidator shall recover all sums and
other properties to which the multi-state
cooperative
society
is
entitled
and
may
institute such suits for that purpose or such
suits incidental to liquidation proceedings as
he may think proper.
(e) *** ”
20.
Now first of all, the Court has to see whether the
properties in question which are not in the name of the
ACCSL are included in the assets of Multi State Cooperative
Society as referred in section 90(1) of the Act of 2002?. The
facts on record as well as the contents of the impugned
attachment
orders
clearly
speak
that
on
the
date
of
appointment of the Liquidator, the properties in question were
not recorded in the name of the ACCSL. The language of
Section 90(1) of the Act of 2002 clearly provides for powers
of liquidator and says that the whole of the assets of a multiState co-operative society in respect of which an order for
winding up has been made, shall vest in the liquidator
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(25 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
appointed under section 89 from the date on which the order
takes effect and the liquidator shall have power to realize
such assets by sale or otherwise. The plain reading of the
said provision can very well be concluded that only the assets
which were recorded in the name of Multi-State Cooperative
Society are included in the assets which vest in the
Liquidator. The Liquidator has no authority over any other
property merely because he claims that the said property has
been purchased with the funds of the society. If the
Liquidator on the basis of the record of the society is of the
opinion that any property has been purchased with the funds
of the society then for claiming rights over such property he
has to file a suit as provided under Rule 28(d) of the Rules of
2002 because only a competent court can decide the title or
ownership over a property. It is not the wisdom of the
Liquidator that he can claim right over any property alleging
that such property has been purchased by the funds of the
society and can pass directions to the concerned authorities
to transfer the title and ownership in the name of the
Liquidator and that too without even providing an opportunity
of hearing to the party in whose name the land/ property
vests.
21.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has
relied upon para 45 of the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Writers and Publishers Private
(26 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Limited v. Dr. A.K. Mishra, Official Liquidator, reported
in (2021) 13 SCC 279, which is quoted as under:“Statutory Scheme applicable to Super Bazar
45. Chapter X of the Multi-State Co-operative
Societies Act 2002 deals with the winding up of
multi-state
co-operative
societies.
Under
sub-
section (1) of Section 86, the Central Registrar is
empowered to direct the winding up of a multistate co- operative society after an audit, special
audit or an inquiry or, as the case may be, or an
inspection under Sections 70, 77, 78 and 79
respectively.
Sub-section
2(b)
empowers
the
Central Registrar of his own motion to direct the
winding up of a multi- state co-operative society
which has ceased to function in accordance with cooperative principles. Section 89 provides for the
appointment of a liquidator
while
Section
provides for the powers of the liquidator. Under
Section 90(1), all the assets of a multi-state cooperative society in respect of which an order of
winding up has been passed, vest in the liquidator
from the date on which the order takes effect. The
liquidator is entrusted with the power to realise
monies from the assets. Under clause (b) of subsection
of
Section
90,
the
liquidator
is
empowered to determine the contribution to be
made or remaining to be made by the members or
past members or by officers or former officers to
the assets of the society. Under clause (c) of subSection
(2)
of
Section
90,
the
liquidator
is
empowered to investigate all claims against the
society and subject to the other provisions of the
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(27 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
statute, to decide questions of priority between
claimants. Under clause (d), the liquidator is
empowered to pay claims against the society,
including interest up to the date of winding up
according to their respective priorities in full or
rateably, as the assets of the society may permit.
The surplus, if any that remains, has to be applied
in the payment of interest from the date of the
order of winding up.”
Looking to the peculiar facts of this case that the
properties in question are not in the name of the Society, the
observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court, are not applicable in
the present case.
22.
It is not in dispute that at the time of appointment
of the Liquidator, the properties in question in all these
petitions were not recorded in the name of the ACCSL. Article
300-A of the Constitution of India recognizes the right of
property and provides that nobody can be deprived of the
property and right of residence otherwise in the manner
prescribed by law. When the Statute prescribes a mode, the
properties deprivation cannot be done in other modes.
23.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of M.C.
Mehta vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2020 SCC
Online SC 648, has observed as under:"106. The power of sealing of property carries civil
consequences. A person can be deprived of the
property by following a procedure in accordance
(28 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
with
law.
The
[CW-723/2026]
Monitoring
Committee
is
not
authorized to take action concerning the residential
premises situated on the private land. If there is
unauthorized construction or in case of deviation,
the requisite provisions are under the DMC Act,
such as sections 343, 345, 347(A), 347(B). The
mode of action and adjudication under the Act is
provided including appellate provisions and that of
the Tribunal. It would not be appropriate to the
Monitoring Committee to usurp statutory powers
and act beyond authority conferred upon it by the
Court. The Monitoring Committee could not have
sealed the residential premises, which were not
misused for the commercial purpose as done vide
Report No. 149, nor it could have directed the
demolition of those residential properties.
107. Article 300A of the Constitution provides that
nobody can be deprived of the property and right
of residence otherwise in the manner prescribed by
law. When the statute prescribes a mode, the
property's deprivation cannot be done in other
modes since this Court did not authorize the
Committee to take action in the matter. An action
could have been taken in no other manner except
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
as laid down in the decisions referred to at the Bar
thus:
(a) State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata,
(2005)
SCC
77,
wherein
this
Court
of
substantive
observed:
"59.
....In
absence
any
provisions contained in a parliamentary or
(29 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
legislative act, he cannot be refrained from
dealing with his property in any manner he
likes.
Such
opposed
statutory
to
envisaged
one's
under
interdict
would
be
property
as
right
of
Article
300-A
Pvt.
v.
of
the
State
of
Constitution."
(b)
K.T.
Plantation
Ltd.
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 in which it was
opined:
"168. Article 300-A proclaims that no person
can be deprived of his property save by
authority of law, meaning thereby that a
person cannot be deprived of his property
merely by an executive fiat, without any
specific legal authority or without the support
of law made by a competent legislature. The
expression
confined
"property"
not
intangibles
to
land
like
in
Article
alone,
copyrights
it
300-A
includes
and
other
intellectual property and embraces every
possible interest recognised by law.
169.
This
Court
Vishnunarayan
in
and
State
of
Associates
W.B.
v.
(P)
Ltd.
[(2002) 4 SCC 134], while examining the
provisions of the West Bengal Great Eastern
Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980,
held in the context of Article 300-A that the
State or executive officers cannot interfere
with the right of others unless they can point
out the specific provisions of law which
authorises their rights."
(emphasis supplied)
(30 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
(c) In T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning
Member,
(2006)
SCC
502,
the
Court
legislations
are
observed:
"13.
Town
Planning
regulatory in nature. The right to property of
a person would include a right to construct a
building. Such a right, however, can be
restricted by reason of a legislation. In terms
of the provisions of the Karnataka Town and
Country
Planning
development
Act,
plan
a
comprehensive
was
prepared.
It
indisputably is still in force. Whether the
amendments
to
the
development
plan
said
as
comprehensive
proposed
by
the
Authority would ultimately be accepted by
the State or not is uncertain. It is yet to
apply
its
mind.
development
provisions
of
hereinbefore,
objection
balance
plan
must
the
the
from
no
Amendments
Act.
State
the
doubt
conform
As
has
citizens.
is
to
a
to
the
noticed
called
for
Ecological
required
to
be
maintained and the courts while interpreting
a statute should bestow serious consideration
in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is
trite, are ordinarily a part of the town
planning legislation. If in the legislation itself
or
in
the
statute
governing
the
field,
ecological aspects have not been taken into
consideration keeping in view the future
need, the State and the Authority must take
the blame therefor. We must assume that
these aspects of the matter were taken into
(31 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
consideration by the Authority and the State.
But the rights of the parties cannot be
intermeddled with so long as an appropriate
amendment in the legislation is not brought
into force.
***
15. The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of
a person to construct residential houses in
the residential area is a valuable right. The
said right can only be regulated in terms of a
regulatory statute but unless there exists a
clear provision the same cannot be taken
away. ...."
(emphasis supplied)
(d) In the matter of State of U.P. v. Manohar,
(2005) 2 SCC 126, this Court observed:
"7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and
the
rights
available
to
the
citizens
are
declared by the Constitution. Although Article
19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A
has been placed in the Constitution, which
reads as follows:
"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of
property save by authority of law.--No
person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law."
8. This is a case where we find utter lack of
legal
authority
for
deprivation
of
the
respondent's property by the appellants who
are State authorities. ..."
(32 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
(e) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of
U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court held:
"83. The expression "law" which figures both
in Article 21 and Article 300-A must be given
the same meaning. In both the cases the law
would mean a validly enacted law. In order to
be valid law it must be just, fair and
reasonable having regard to the requirement
of Articles 14 and 21 as explained in Maneka
Gandhi. This is especially so, as "law" in both
the Articles 21 and 300-A is meant to prevent
deprivation of rights. Insofar as Article 21 is
concerned, it is a fundamental right whereas
in Article 300-A it is a constitutional right
which has been given a status of a basic
human right."
(f) It was further argued that planning laws are
expropritory and should be strictly construed,
and any ambiguity is to be construed in favour
of the property owner as laid down in Delhi
Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (supra)
thus:
"129. Statutes which encroach upon rights,
whether as regards person or property, are
subject to strict construction in the same way
as penal Acts. It is a recognised rule that
they should be interpreted, if possible, so as
to respect such rights and if there is any
ambiguity, the construction which is in favour
of the freedom of the individual should be
adopted. (See Maxwell on The Interpretation
of Statutes, 12th Edn. by P. St. J. Langan.)
(33 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
130. This Court in Devinder Singh7 held that
the Land Acquisition Act is an expropritory
legislation and followed the case of Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. v. Darius Shapur Chenai
[(2005) 7 SCC 627]. Therefore, it should be
construed strictly. The Court has also taken
the view that even in cases of directory
requirements, substantial compliance with
such provision would be necessary."
(emphasis supplied)
(g) In Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v.
Indore Municipal Corporation, (2017) 1 SCC
667, it was opined:
"67. It was also submitted that town planning
and municipal institutes are regulating and
restricting the use of private property under
the aforesaid Acts. They are "expropritory
legislation".
Thus
they
are
liable
to
be
construed strictly as laid down in Indore
Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke &
Chemicals Ltd. [(2007) 8 SCC 705]"
(h) In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v.
Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007)
8 SCC 705, it was held:
"57. The Act being regulatory in nature as by
reason thereof the right of an owner of
property
to
use
and
develop
stands
restricted, requires strict construction. An
owner of land ordinarily would be entitled to
use or develop the same for any purpose
unless there exists certain regulation in a
statute
or
statutory
rules.
Regulations
(34 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
contained in such statute must be interpreted
in such a manner so as to least interfere with
the right to property of the owner of such
land. Restrictions are made in larger public
interest. Such restrictions, indisputably must
be reasonable ones. (See Balram Kumawat v.
Union of India [(2003) 7 SCC 628]; Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar
Beej Ltd[(2004) 1 SCC 391] and Union of
India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.[(2004) 2
SCC
747]
The
statutory
scheme
contemplates that a person and owner of
land should not ordinarily be deprived from
the user thereof by way of reservation or
designation.
58. Exproprietory legislation, as is wellknown, must be given a strict construction."
(i) In State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas,
(1969) 1 SCC 509, it was held:
"55.
......
Once
the
draft
town-planning
scheme is sanctioned, the land becomes
subject
to
the
provisions
of
the
Town
Planning Act, and on the final town- planning
scheme
being
sanctioned,
by
statutory
operation the title of the various owners is
readjusted and the lands needed for a public
purpose vest in the local authority. Land
required for any of the purposes of a town
planning
scheme
cannot
be
acquired
otherwise than under the Act, for it is a
settled rule of interpretation of statutes that
when power is given under a statute to do a
(35 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
certain thing in a certain way the thing must
be done in that way or not at all:"
(emphasis supplied)
(j) In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar
Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111, it was opined:
"40. The statutory interdict of use and
enjoyment of the property must be strictly
construed. It is well settled that when a
statutory authority is required to do a thing
in a particular manner, the same must be
done in that manner or not at all. The State
and other authorities while acting under the
said Act are only creature of statute. They
must act within the four corners thereof."
(emphasis supplied)
(k)
In
Shrirampur
Municipal
Council
v.
Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, (2013) 5
SCC 627 it was held:
"43. ...... This is the reason why time-limit of
ten years has been prescribed in Section
31(5) and also under Sections 126 and 127
of the 1966 Act for the acquisition of land,
with a stipulation that if the land is not
acquired within six months of the service of
notice under Section 127 or steps are not
commenced for acquisition, reservation of the
land will be deemed to have lapsed. Shri
Naphade's interpretation of the scheme of
Sections 126 and 127, if accepted, will lead
to absurd results and the landowners will be
deprived of their right to use the property for
(36 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
an
indefinite
[CW-723/2026]
period
without
being
paid
compensation. That would tantamount to
depriving
the
citizens
of
their
property
without the sanction of law and would result
in
violation
of
Article
300-A
of
the
Constitution."
(emphasis supplied)”
24.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Rajasthan & Ors. v. Basant Nahata, reported in (2005)
12 SCC 77 has observed in para 59 as under:“59. The question can be considered from another
angle. A person may not have any near relative or
is otherwise unable to attend the office of the SubRegistrar or Registrar within whose jurisdictions the
property is situated. He may even be out of the
country. In absence of any substantive provisions
contained in a parliamentary or legislative act, he
cannot be refrained from dealing with his property
in any manner he likes. Such statutory interdict
would be opposed to one's right of property as
envisaged under Article 300-A of the Constitution.”
25.
Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &
Anr., reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 has observed in
para 48 as under:“48. The word ‘property’ used in Article 300-A must
be
understood
in
the
context
in
which
the
sovereign power of eminent domain is exercised by
the State and property expropriated. No abstract
principles
could
be
laid.
Each
case
must
be
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(37 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
considered in the light of its own facts and setting.
The phrase “deprivation of the property of a
person” must equally be considered in the fact
situation of a case. Deprivation connotes different
concepts.
Article
300-A
gets
attracted
to
an
acquisition or taking possession of private property,
by necessary implication for public purpose, in
accordance with the law made by Parliament or a
State Legislature, a rule or a statutory order having
force of law. It is inherent in every sovereign State
by exercising its power of eminent domain to
expropriate
private
property
without
owner's
consent. Prima facie, State would be the judge to
decide whether a purpose is a public purpose. But
it is not the sole judge. This will be subject to
judicial review and it is the duty of the court to
determine whether a particular purpose is a public
purpose or not. Public interest has always been
considered to be an essential ingredient of public
purpose. But every public purpose does not fall
under Article 300-A nor every exercise of eminent
domain an acquisition or taking possession under
Article 300-A. Generally speaking preservation of
public health or prevention of damage to life and
property are considered to be public purposes. Yet
deprivation of property for any such purpose would
not amount to acquisition or possession taken
under Article 300-A. It would be by exercise of the
police power of the State. In other words, Article
300-A only limits the powers of the State that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. There has to be no deprivation
without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(38 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
other mode is not acquisition or taking possession
under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no
law, there is no deprivation. Acquisition of mines,
minerals and quarries is deprivation under Article
300-A.”
26.
Counsel appearing for the respondents has referred
para 52 of the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of M/s. R.K. Industries (Unit-II) LLP v. M/s.
H.R. Commercials Private Limited & other and one
other connected matter, reported in 2022 Supreme
(SC) 854, which is quoted as under:“52. We are of the firm view that it is not for the
court to question the judiciousness of the decision
taken by the respondent No.2 – Liquidator with the
idea of enhancing the value of the assets of the
Corporate Debtor being put up for sale. The right to
refuse the highest bid or completely abandon or
cancel the bidding process was available to the
respondent No.2 – Liquidator. The appellant has
not been able to demonstrate that the decision of
the respondent No.2 – Liquidator to discontinue the
Second Swiss Challenge Process and go in for a
Private Sale through direction negotiations with
prospective bidders was a malafide exercise. It is a
well-settled principle that in matters relating to
commercial transactions, tenders, etc., the scope of
judicial review is fairly limited and the court ought
to refrain from substituting its decisions for that of
the tendering agency [Ref.: State of Madhya
Pradesh and Others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others,
Tata Cellular (supra) and Air India (supra)]. In
(39 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Nandlal Jaiswal and Others (supra), this Court held
that while granting a licence for setting up a new
industry, the State Government is not under any
obligation to advertise and invite offers for the said
purpose and that the State Government is well
entitled to negotiate with those who have come up
with an offer to set up such an industry. In 5 M & T
Consultants, Secunderabad v. S.Y. Nawab and
Another, the court concluded as under:
“17. …… It is by now well settled that nonfloating of tenders or absence of public auction or
invitation
alone
is
no
sufficient
reason
to
castigate the move or an action of a public
authority as either arbitrary or unreasonable or
amounting to mala fide or improper exercise or
improper
abuse
of
power
by
the
authority
concerned. Courts have always leaned in favour
of
sufficient
latitude
being
left
with
the
authorities to adopt their own techniques of
management
economic
of
projects
expediencies
with
depending
concomitant
upon
the
exigencies of a situation guided by appropriate
financial policy in the best interests of the
authority motivated by public interest as well in
undertaking such ventures……..”
27.
Having gone through the material made available
on record and so also the case law, as quoted above, this
Court can safely held that the properties which vest in the
name of a particular individual cannot be transferred without
the procedure and mode prescribed under the law as like the
provisions for transfer of property under the Transfer of
(40 of 42)
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
[CW-723/2026]
Property Act or any other mode provided under other
particular
Act.
In
the
present
case,
at
the
time
of
appointment of the Liquidator, the properties in question in all
these petitions were in the names of the petitioners but the
Liquidator claiming that the properties have been purchased
with the funds of the ACCSL, he cannot direct the concerned
competent authorities to transfer in the name of the
Liquidator by carrying out the mutation in the revenue survey
numbers/ town planning area. Such mode of transfer of the
property is not sustainable as the provisions of the Act of
2002 do not provide for such kind of transfer. When the Rules
of 2002 provide that if the Liquidator claims any right over
any property then he has to file a suit but it seems that since
from the date of his appointment, the limitation for filing the
suit has expired, the Liquidator has adhered to this kind of
illegal practice for transferring the properties in question for
which this Court can safely held that it is wholly illegal,
arbitrary, without competence and not sustainable.
28.
In view of the discussion made above as regards
the questions formulated by this Court, this Court can safely
held that the Liquidator has no right over any of the
properties which were not the assets of the Society and the
Liquidator cannot issue any attachment orders that too
without issuing any notice to the effected party. If at all the
Liquidator claims any right over any property which is in the
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(41 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
name of the third party, he has to initiate the suit
proceedings as provided under Rule 28(d) of the Rules of
2002.
29.
One more legal question has also arose that
‘Whether the impugned attachment orders passed by the
Liquidator are in gross violation of the principles of natural
justice? It is settled principle of law that whenever any order
adverse to an individual is passed by any authority that
individual is entitled to be issued a show cause notice and
proper opportunity of hearing so as to defend and establish
his rights. In the present case, on perusal of the impugned
attachment orders and the pleadings of the parties it is very
much clear that no any show cause notice was ever issued to
the petitioners and no opportunity of hearing was allowed to
them before issuing the attachment orders, which in a
manner is an order taking away the rights of the petitioners
from the property in question. In the opinion of this Court,
such action of the Liquidator is wholly illegal and in gross
violation of the principles of natural justice.
30.
In view of the discussion made above, all the writ
petitions are allowed. The impugned attachment orders dated
18.12.2025 (CWP No. 723/2026), 20.06.2025 (CWP No.
11480/2025),
20.06.2025
(CWP
No.
11999/2025),
20.06.2025 (CWP No. 12000/2025), 20.06.2025 (CWP No.
12001/2025),
21.07.2025
(CWP
No.
13572/2025)
and
[2026:RJ-JP:7458]
(42 of 42)
[CW-723/2026]
21.07.2025 (CWP No. 13578/2025) are quashed and set
aside with all consequential orders and proceedings in respect
of the properties in question in these writ petitions.
31.
In view of the orders passed in the main petitions,
the stay application and pending application/s, if any, also
stand disposed of.
32.
The Registry is directed to place a copy of this
order in all the connected petitions.
(GANESH RAM MEENA),J
Sharma N.K./Dy. Registrar
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