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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Reserved on 09.02.2026
Pronounced on 16.06.2026
Uploaded on 16.06.2026
HIFZURRAHMAN
ANSARI
HIFZURRAHMAN
ANSARI
Date: 2026.06.16
17:59:41 +0530
WP227 No. 87 of 2026
1 - Ravindra Saraf S/o Shri Raj Kumar Saraf Aged About 46 Years R/o 23, Aishwarya
Residency, Vishal Nagar, Telibandha, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1 - Smt. Rajlaxmi Saraf (Director) W/o Shri Raj Kumar Saraf Aged About 71 Years R/o Near
Peetal Factory, Gaurav Path, Baloda Bazar, District - Baloda Bazar, Chhattisgarh.
(Respondent No. 2 In Mjc No. 1421/25)
2 - M/s Dhamtari Kpex Private Limited Office No. 417, 4th Floor, Lalganga Business Park,
Ward No. 51, Pachpedi Naka, Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 1 In
Mjc No. 1421/25)
3 - Abhishek Gupta (Director) S/o Kashi Prasad Soni R/o 19, Marathapara Ward No. 26,
Sadar Road, Dhamtari, C.G. 493773. (Respondent No. 3 In Mjc No. 1421/25)
4 - Kaushal Soni S/o Kailash Soni R/o 68, Salenhwarpara Road, Near Kachari Chowk,
Dhamtari, C.G. 493773 (Guarantor No. 1 In Mjc No. 1421/25)
5 - Saurabh Kumar Parekh S/o Kishor Kumar Parekh R/o Salenhwarpara Road, Ward No.
25, Dhamtari, C.G. 493773. (Guarantor No. 2 In Mjc No. 1421/25)
6 - Ravindra Soni S/o Anil Soni R/o 01, Azaad Chowk, Koshtapara, Dhamtari, C.G. 493773.
(Guarantor No. 3 In Mjc No. 1421/25)
7 - Smt. Pushpa Soni W/o Kailash Soni R/o 68, Salenhwarpara Road, Near Kacchari Chowk,
Sadar Uttar Ward, Dhamtari, C.G. 493773. (Guarantor No. 4 In Mjc No. 1421/25)
8 - Santosh Ramani S/o Shyamlal Ramani R/o 8/187, H.No. 25, Ward No. 11. Manjhapara,
Near Kanker, Uttar Bastar, Kanker, C.G. 494334 (Guarantor No. 5 In Mjc No. 1421/25)
9 - Union Bank Of India Branch - U M F B, District - Raipur Through Its Authorised Officer
Shri Pradeep Kumar Thawait, General Manager, Office Address - Plot No. 71 Sector 24, Atal
Nagar Naya Raipur C.G. Pin - 492018 (Details Not Completely Mentioned In The
Annexure) (Application In Mjc No. 1421/25)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Rajkamal Singh, Adv through VC along with Mr.
Suryapratap Yudhveer Singh, Adv.
For Respondent No.9
:
Mr. Sharad Mishra, Adv.
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput)
C A V Order
1. What is assailed in this writ petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India
is an order dated 03.12.2025 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Raipur (for short “ACJM”) in MJC No.1421/ 2025 by which the application under
Section 14 of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short “ Act of 2002”) filed by the respondent/ bank
was allowed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the subject property in this writ
petition is comprised in piece of Khasra No. 1799/ 1, 1800 Area 0.470 & 0.882
Hectare respectively which is situated at village Pangaon, P. H. N. 91/2, R.I.C.
Lahod, Tahsil- Lavan, District- Balodabazar, Bhatapara (CG). He further submits that
respondents No. 1 to 3 made an application for grant of financial assistance to
respondent No.9. Their application was processed and a loan was sanctioned in
favour of respondents No. 1 to 3, for which respondents No. 4 to 8 stood as
guarantors. He further contends that the subject property was said to have been
mortgaged with respondent No.9 by way of deposit of title deeds. He submits that
there is a bona fide dispute regarding the ownership, title and share of the subject
property. A civil suit was filed on 10.12.2024 by the petitioner, claiming his title and
share over the suit property. Thus, the subject property, which is said to have been
mortgaged with respondent No.9, does not possess a clear title. Apart from this, he
submits that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds (equitable mortgage) under the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short “Act of 1882”) is not recognized in the
State of Chhattisgarh. He contends that if such a mortgage is created by those means,
it would be non-est and would not constitute a valid mortgage in the eyes of
law. He further submits that to create a valid mortgage as security for a loan,
there must be a registered mortgage deed. In the present case, no such registered
mortgage deed exists, thus even arguendo, if the title deeds were deposited with the
bank, such an act would not create a ‘security interest’ as defined under Section 2
(zb) of Act of 2002. He submits that in order to attract Section 14 of Act of 2002,
there has to be a valid security interest created in favour of bank or financial
institution. In the case at hand, since the title and share of the alleged security interest
are the subject of a civil suit filed by the petitioner, no legal or valid mortgage was
created by respondents No. 1 to 3 in favour of respondent No.9. As the alleged
equitable mortgage fails to satisfy the definition under Section 2 (zb) of the Act of
2002, there cannot be any order of taking over the possession of the subject property
by the learned ACJM. Furthermore, he submits that the ACJM, Raipur does not have
the territorial jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 14 of the Act of 2002. He
contends that as the subject property is situated in the District BalodabazarBhatapara, the learned ACJM traveled beyond his jurisdiction and authority while
passing the impugned order allowing the application filed under Section 14 of Act of
2002 by respondent No.9. He submits that the petitioner, though neither the borrower
nor the owner in the loan transactions, finds his rights adversely affected by the
impugned order, therefore, this writ petition assailing the impugned order is
maintainable. It is submitted that the law is no longer res integra the provisions of
Act of 2002 cannot be invoked by the Banks or any financial institutions unless a
valid, legal security interest is created in their favour. Thus, he submits that the
impugned order suffers from a jurisdictional error and was passed beyond the
capacity to grant an order of possession in respect of the subject property, as it does
not constitute a ‘security interest’ under the Act of 2002. To elaborate his
submissions regarding the creation of a mortgage, he placed reliance upon the
decision of this Court passed in FA No. 95/2001 dated 13.07.2009. Regarding the
maintainability of the writ petition and the powers of the ACJM to invoke Section 14
of Act of 2002 in the absence of any security interest, he placed reliance upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of North Eastern Development
Finance Corporation Ltd. (NEDFI) Vs. L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co.
Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2026) 3 SCC 310; Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited Vs.
Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited and Others reported in (2018) 14 SCC 783;
M. D. Frozen Foods Exports Private Limited and Others Vs. Hero Fincorp
Limited reported in (2017) 16 SCC 741 and Transcore Vs. Union of India and
Another reported in (2008) 1 SCC 125. Thus, he prays that the impugned order
deserves to be set aside.
3. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent No.9 raised a preliminary objection
regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, as there exists an alternative
remedy to file an appeal Section 17 of the Act of 2002. He further submits that if any
person is aggrieved by any action of a Bank or financial institutions under the Act of
2002, the same can be challenged by the petitioner before the Debt Recovery
Tribunal (DRT). As the petitioner has not resorted to alternative remedy, this writ
petition may not be entertained by this Court. He placed reliance upon the decision of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of PHR Invent Educational society Vs. Uco
Bank and Others reported in (2024) 6 SCC 579; South Indian Bank Limited and
others Vs. Naveen Mathew Philip and Another reported in (2023) 17 SCC 311
and Agarwal Tracom Private Limited Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others
reported in (2018) 1 SCC 626. Alternatively, he submits that the petitioner, being a
stranger to the loan transactions, has no locus standi to challenge the order of the
ACJM. He submits that the borrowers in the loan transaction i.e. respondents No. 1
to 3 had already challenged the order passed by learned ACJM before the DRT,
Jabalpur, under Section 17 of the Act of 2002. Thus, since the validity of the
impugned order is already under consideration before the DRT, this Court may not
exercise its power under Article 227 of Constitution of India. He further submits that
Section 14 of Act of 2002 has a broad connotation; if the subject property or related
documents are situated or found within the territorial jurisdiction of the ACJM or
District Magistrate, as the case may be, such authority would assume jurisdiction
under Section 14 of the Act of 2002. In the present case, the Maudhapara Branch,
Raipur of respondent No.9 sanctioned and disbursed the loan to respondents No. 1 to
3 and the security documents were executed in relation to the property with the said
branch, thus, the submissions of Mr. Singh are liable to be rejected. Apart from this,
he submits that the Section 2 (zb) of Act of 2002 recognizes a mortgage by deposit of
title deeds. In view of the matter, the said title deeds had been deposited by
respondents No. 1 to 3 which creates a valid mortgage. Thus the argument that an
equitable mortgage is not recognized in the State of Chhattisgarh and that the
reliance placed on the aforementioned judgment is misplaced. He further submits the
subject property has been put to auction, a sale notice has been issued, and upon the
completion of the necessary formalities prescribed under the relevant Rules, the sale
certificate would be issued. Hence, he prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. First this Court would like to deal with the submission of Shri Mishra with regard to
maintainability of the writ petition. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has
challenged the order passed by the learned ACJM by which an application under
Section 14 of the Act of 2002 filed by the respondent-bank was granted. It is also not
in dispute that the petitioner is not a party to this proceedings.
6. The petitioner counsel tried to persuade this Court that the mortgage was not done in
accordance with law and SARFAESI Act can be invoked in respect of security
interest as defined in the Act of 2002 as such there was no creation of any valid
security interest, the order passed by the learned ACJM is beyond jurisdiction hence
this writ petition is maintainable.
7. Supreme Court in case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and others
reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 has held as under:
“55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated
pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore
the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and
SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for
passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of
banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We
hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their
discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and
circumspection.”
8. Likewise, in the case of PHR Invent (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
paragraph 38 has observed and held as under:
“It has however been clarified that the High Court will not
entertain a a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person
or the statute under which the action complained of has been
taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance.”
9. Likewise in the matter of Authorized Officer State Bank of Authorized Officer,
State Bank of Travancore and another vs. Mathew K.C., 2018 SCC OnLine 55
in reference to challenge to the proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act and the
Supreme Court held that :
"4. The SARFAESI Act is a complete code by itself, providing
for expeditious recovery of dues arising out of loans granted by
financial institutions, the remedy of appeal by the aggrieved
under Section 17 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, followed
by a right to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section
18. The High Court ought not to have entertained the writ
petition in view of the adequate alternate statutory remedies
available to the Respondent. The interim order was passed on
the very first date, without an opportunity to the Appellant to file
a reply. Reliance was placed on United Bank of India V.
Satyawati Tandon, 2010 (8) SCC 110, and General Manager,
Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Limited V. Ikbal, (2013)
10 SCC 83. The writ petition ought to have been dismissed at
the threshold on the ground of maintainability. The Division
Bench erred in declining to interfere with the same."
10. In the matter of Standard Chartered Bank vs. V. Noble Kumar and others, 2014
(1) MPLJ 396, the Supreme Court has held that :
"30. The "appeal" under Section 17 is available to the borrower
against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking
possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that
can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature
of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security
agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the
secured asset are possible under Section 13(4). Alienating the
asset either by lease or sale etc. and appointing a person to
manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures.
On the other hand, section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to
take possession of the property and forward the asset along with
the connected documents to the borrower. Therefore, the
borrower is always entitled to prefer an "appeal" under section
17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the
secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured
creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not
specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by
the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under
section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the
secured creditor obtains possession either through the process
contemplated under section 14 or without resorting to such a
process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always
a measure against which a remedy under section 17 is
available."
11. In light of the aforesaid authorities, it is quite evident that, against the impugned
order, the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy of filing an application
under Section 17 of Act of 2002.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to persuade this Court to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on the ground that,
notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy, the impugned order had
been passed without jurisdiction and suffered from patent illegality. It was contended
that there was no valid mortgage in existence and that a civil suit concerning the
subject property was already pending adjudication; therefore, the creation of a
security interest in favour of Respondent No. 9 was not legally sustainable. However,
this Court is not inclined to accept the said submission.
13. All the aforesaid grounds can appropriately be examined by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal (DRT) if an application is filed by the petitioner under Section 17 of the Act
of 2002. It is also noteworthy that Shri Mishra, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No. 9 submitted that the borrower has already approached the DRT
challenging the impugned order. In such circumstances, the appropriate remedy
available to the petitioner is also to approach the DRT. Shri Mishra further contended
that the petitioner, being a stranger to the transaction in question, cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court. However, this submission does not find favour with this
Court in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Jagdish
Singh V/s. Heeralal & Others, (2014) 1 SCC 479 as any person as envisaged in
Secton 17 of the Act of 2002 would also include the petitioner.
14. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to
avail the statutory remedy under Section 17 of the Act of 2002.
15. Another contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the ACJM lacked
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 14 of the Act of
2002, as the property in question is not situated within his territorial limits. For a
proper appreciation of this contention, it would be apposite to refer to the provisions
contained in Section 14 of the Act, which clearly indicate that the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, may entertain an
application where the secured asset or the documents relating thereto are situated or
found. In the present case, it has been submitted by learned counsel for Respondent
No. 9 that the loan was advanced from Raipur and according to him, the necessary
documents were executed within the jurisdiction of the concerned ACJM .
Therefore, this contention also deserves to be rejected. Moreover, this Court is not
inclined to entertain the present petition in view of the availability of an efficacious
alternative remedy.
16. In light of the above case law, which has been cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, with due respect, the same may not come to the rescue of the petitioner in
the given facts and circumstances of the case, particularly when this Court is not
inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 on account of the alternative
remedy available.
17. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However,
liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to approach the Debts Recovery
Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17 of the Act of 2002. In the event
such an application is filed, the learned DRT shall consider and decide the same in
accordance with law without being influenced by any of the observation made in this
writ petition.
Sd/(Sachin Singh Rajput)
JUDGE
H.Ansari/Parul
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