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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Civil Extra-Ordinary Jurisdiction)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, CHIEF JUSTICE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W.P. (C) No. 60 of 2022
SHRI RAVI TAMANG,
S/o Dhan Bahadur Tamang,
Aged about 35 years,
Resident of Majitar Compound, Melli Road,
Near Jorethang,
P.O. Majitar Bazar, P.S. Jorethang,
Namchi District, Sikkim – 737121
...
Petitioner
Versus
1.
STATE OF SIKKIM,
Through its Chief Secretary,
Tashiling Secretariat,
Gangtok, Sikkim – 737101.
2.
THE DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL,
Administrative Reforms and Training,
Through the Secretary,
Government of Sikkim,
Tashiling Secretariat,
Gangtok, Sikkim – 737101.
3.
THE SIKKIM PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
Through its Secretary,
Old Tourism Building, M.G. Marg,
Gangtok, Sikkim – 737101.
4.
SHRI SANTOSH KUMAR SHARMA,
Lower Division Clerk,
Office of Power and Energy Department,
Jalipool Saramsa,
P.O. and P.S. Ranipool,
Sikkim – 737102.
5.
SHRI ANIL KUMAR SHARMA,
Lower Division Clerk,
Office of the Superintendent of Police,
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
Mangan District,
Sikkim – 737116.
6.
SHRI BIVEK GURUNG,
Lower Division Clerk,
Department of Personnel,
Administrative Reforms And Training,
Government of Sikkim,
Tashiling Secretariat,
Gangtok, Sikkim – 737101.
7.
SHRI PREETAM PRADHAN,
Lower Division Clerk,
Block Administrative Centre,
Temi, Namchi District,
Sikkim – 737139.
8.
UNION OF INDIA,
Through the Secretary,
Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment,
Shastri Bhawan, C-Wing,
Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,
New Delhi – 110011.
...
Respondents
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Mr. N. Rai, Senior Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel) with
Mr. Yozan Rai, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel), for the Petitioner.
Mr. Zangpo Sherpa, Additional Advocate General
with Mr. Mohan Sharma, Advocate, for Respondent Nos.1 & 2.
Mr. Bhusan Nepal, Advocate, for Respondent No.3.
Mr. Jorgay Namka, Senior Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel) with Ms.
Mingma Lhamu Sherpa, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel), for
Respondent Nos. 4 to 7.
Ms. Sangita Pradhan, Deputy Solicitor General of India with Ms.
Natasha Pradhan and Ms. Sittal Balmiki, Advocates, for Respondent
No.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Date of Hearing
: 01.04.2026
Date of Judgment
: 17.04.2026
Date on which uploaded : 17.04.2026
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
(Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque, C.J.)
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
A.
Prologue
In a universe governed by legal principles, where relationships
are defined by law, the perceived neutrality of those laws can itself
become an impediment. In this case this Court has to deal with such
an issue where a legal classification fails to preserve the inherent
distinctions among the members of the class it created. The
litigation arose from a seemingly neutral classification that groups
individuals with total blindness and those with low vision within the
same category. Although the legality of such classification is not
under direct challenge in these proceedings, this Court is not
precluded from addressing the broader and transcending issues that
arise in the realm of public employment, where manifestations of
discrimination become evident. Public employment under the State
is a matter within the exclusive domain of the State. Therefore to
what
extent
the
State will
be
able
to
adopt measures
that
would balance the distinct interests of identifiable sub-classes is the
point required to be considered in this case. The Court has to
consider the question whether sub-classification is essential or
not to achieve substantive equality in the realm of equal opportunity
in public employment.
B.
Factual background
2.
The petitioner, Ravi Tamang, is a bonafide resident of Sikkim
and a person with disability, having lost his eyesight completely
(100%) at the age of three. The Sikkim Public Service Commission
(SPSC), through the Secretary (Respondent No. 3), issued an
advertisement vide Advertisement No. 06/SPSC/EXAM/2017 dated
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
13.06.2017, inviting applications from eligible local candidates for
filling up of 100 (Hundred) posts of Lower Division Clerk (LDC). The
advertisement specified that 04 (four) of these posts were reserved
for Persons with Disability (PwD), particularly for candidates with
blindness and low-vision.
3.
The Petitioner successfully cleared the written examination
and was subsequently declared eligible to appear for the viva voce.
However, when the final list of selected candidates was published
towards the end of January 2018, neither the Petitioner nor any of
the other visually impaired candidates who had appeared for the
viva voce, along with the Petitioner, were included in the selection
list.
4.
Subsequently, in the year 2022, Respondent No. 3 issued an
advertisement vide Advertisement No. 08/SPSC/EXAM/2022 dated
06.08.2022 to fill 100 (Hundred) posts of LDC, in which only one
post was reserved for PwD under the category of “Blindness and low
vision”. When the Petitioner attempted to submit his application
online, he encountered a technical issue, as the application system
did not accept 100% blindness as a valid entry. As a result, he was
compelled to state his disability as 99% blindness in order to
complete the form, apprehending that this discrepancy might later
operate to his disadvantage. It seems that the said online module
for submitting applications was later rectified to accept applications
from the candidates having 100% blindness and the Petitioner had
submitted his online form and appeared for the written examination
as well.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
5.
It has come out that the candidates with a benchmark
disability of low-vision have been selected and appointed. Bench
mark disability is fixed at 40%. The Petitioner therefore, would
submit preferring candidates having low-vision overlooking the claim
of totally blind is discriminatory and is against the Article 16 of the
Constitution of India. The Petitioner thus, seeks separation of the
low-vision candidates from the category of blind and low-vision.
6.
This Court need not delve into the issue concerning the
selection of candidates with low-vision, inasmuch as the prevailing
classification
treats
both
blind
and
low-vision
candidates
as
constituting a single category. Within such a unified category, merit
alone ordinarily governs selection, unless a specific mechanism is
devised to accommodate and reflect the differing needs and
capabilities arising from distinct disabilities.
7.
It is not in dispute that the Respondents are more meritorious
than the Petitioner. However, this Court cannot overlook that such a
homogenized classification may result in a denial of substantive
equality. The inherent differences in the nature and extent of
disabilities between blind and low-vision candidates bear directly
upon their respective capacities to compete, particularly in the
context of access to public employment opportunities. Treating
unequals as equals, in such circumstances, risks undermining the
very objective of equality under the law. Thus, the court proposes to
issue direction for consideration of differing needs in the light of law
to be stated hereafter.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
C.
Origin of the concept of Reasonable Accommodation
and Indirect Discrimination.
8.
The concept of reasonable accommodation emerged in the
United States after the enactment of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, which sought to address discrimination in
employment.
Initially,
the
term
was
applied
to
religious
discrimination, requiring employers to accommodate employees’
religious practices unless doing so caused undue hardship. Later,
the concepts of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
gained greater
legal significance
with
the enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, after which they became
central to legal scholarship and judicial interpretation1.
9.
Reasonable accommodation challenges the traditional idea of
equality as formal equality, which emphasizes “even-handedness”
and aims to treat everyone in the same way. This formal approach
tends to overlook individual differences, as people are ultimately
grouped under the general category of human beings, ignoring their
specific needs by treating them as if they lack distinct characteristics
requiring attention. While such indifference to the unique traits of
individuals
or
groups
may
be
appropriate
in
certain
anti-
discrimination contexts, it is especially inadequate for persons with
disabilities, since equal treatment can amount to a subtle form of
discrimination. Formal equality fails to effectively advance the rights
Letícia de Campos Velho Martel, “Reasonable Accommodation: The New Concept
from an Inclusive Constitutional Perspective” 14 International Journal on Human
Rights (2011).
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
of persons with disabilities because it cannot account for their
particular needs. Unlike race, where the primary demand is to be
treated the same, persons with disabilities seek both similar
treatment (where they are alike) and different treatment (where
they differ). This is why the concept of reasonable accommodation is
essential within anti-discrimination frameworks, as it centers on
addressing individual needs.
10.
The emphasis on individual needs is what makes reasonable
accommodation effective in addressing the inequalities that persons
with disabilities have historically experienced. The concept of
reasonable accommodation thus enables a transition from formal
equality
to
substantive
equality.
Substantive
equality
first
acknowledges that every person, simply by being human, has the
right to participate equally in society despite their differences. It
also considers that people have different ways and capacities to
participate, depending on their individual characteristics.
11.
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities calls
on states to go beyond the limited idea of formal equality where
everyone is treated the same regardless of their circumstances and
instead embrace a more substantive and meaningful form of
equality.
It
emphasizes
the
importance
of
“reasonable
accommodation,” which involves making necessary and appropriate
adjustments based on the specific needs of individuals with
disabilities. This concept recognizes that true equality cannot be
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
achieved through uniform treatment alone; rather, it must consider
each person’s unique situation and context2.
12.
The United Nations uses this term in the Convention on the
Rights
of
Persons
with
Disabilities,
saying
refusal
to
make
accommodation results in discrimination. It defines "reasonable
accommodation" in Article 2 as: “Reasonable accommodation means
necessary
and
appropriate
modification
and
adjustments
not
imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a
particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment
or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms;”3
13.
As noticed in the case of Lieutenant Colonel Nitisha and
Others. v. Union of India4,the Apex Court observed as follows:“......................
58.The genesis of the doctrine can be traced to the
celebrated United States Supreme Court judgment in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. The issue concerned manual work for
which the prescribed qualifications included the possession
of a high school education and satisfactory results in an
aptitude test. Two facts about the case bear emphasis.
First, due to the inferior quality of segregated school
education, African- American candidates were disqualified in
higher
numbers
because
of
the
aforementioned
requirements than their white counterparts. Second,
neither of these two requirements was shown to be
significantly related to successful job performance.
59. Construing the prohibition on discrimination embodied
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Burger, C.J. held:
(Griggs case), SCC OnLine US SC para 11)
"11. ... The Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation."
Frederic Megret and Dianah Msipa, “Global Reasonable Accommodation: How the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Changes the Way We Think
about Equality” 30 South African Journal on Human Rights 262-264 (2014).
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006, art. 2.
(2021) 15 Supreme Court Cases 125.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
He went on: (Griggs case, SCC OnLine US SC para
14)
"14. ... good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability."
On the question of the standard of justification for rebutting
a charge of indirect discrimination, the Court held as
follows: (Griggs case, SCC OnLine US SC para 11)
"11.... The touchstone is a business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited. "
Griggs, therefore, laid the groundwork for the thinking that
meaningful equality does not merely mean the absence of
intentional inequality. A statutory manifestation of disparate
impact was codified in US law in the shape of the Civil
Rights Act, 1991. Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act, 1991
makes a practice causing disparate impact a prima facie
violation. The presumption can be rebutted by establishing
that the practice is linked to the job and business. This can
be overcomeby a showing of alternative, equally
4efficacious, practices not causing disparate impact.
.........................”
14.
Canada is also regarded as one of the early origins of the
concept of reasonable accommodation. During the 1970s, while the
United States was actively shaping this principle, Canada maintained
a more conservative approach to discrimination law, largely because
doctrines such as adverse impact discrimination were not yet
recognized. Over time, however, Canada adopted from the United
States both the ideas of adverse impact discrimination and
reasonable accommodation. Subsequently, the principle evolved
more
extensively
within
the
Canadian
legal
framework,
and
Canadian judicial decisions became influential authorities on the
subject.
15.
In Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears
Ltd5., the Supreme Court of Canada established a foundational
1985 SCC OnLine Can SC 75.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
principle of reasonable accommodation. The matter concerned an
employee who, after joining the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was
unable to work on Saturdays due to sincere religious beliefs. As the
employer required all full-time employees to work Saturdays under
a
general
scheduling
policy,
she
was
reduced
to
part-time
employment when she could not comply.
16.
The Court held that discrimination is not limited to deliberate
or direct conduct. A rule that is neutral on its face and uniformly
applied may still be discriminatory if its practical effect imposes a
disadvantage on a person because of religion or another protected
ground. This was recognized as adverse effect discrimination.
17.
The Court further held that once such discrimination is shown,
the employer has a duty to take reasonable steps to accommodate
the employee,
unless
accommodation would result
in
undue
hardship. This requires sincere and practical efforts to modify
schedules, policies or working conditions so far as reasonably
possible, without causing excessive cost, serious disruption or
substantial interference with business operations. It is specified in
the paragraphs as outlined below:
“........................
23. Accepting the proposition that there is a duty to
accommodate imposed on the employer, it becomes necessary
to put some realistic limit upon it. The duty in a case of
adverse effect discrimination on the basis of religion or creed
is to take reasonable steps to accommodate the complainant,
short of undue hardship: in other words, to take such steps as
may be reasonable to accommodate without undue
interference in the operation of the employer's business and
without undue expense to the employer. Cases such as this
raise a very different issue from those which rest on direct
discrimination. Where direct discrimination is shown the
employer must justify the rule, if such a step is possible under
the enactment in question, or it is struck down. Where there is
adverse effect discrimination on account of creed the offending
order or rule will not necessarily be struck down. It will survive
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
in most cases because its discriminatory effect is limited to
one person or to one group, and it is the effect upon them
rather than upon the general work force which must be
considered. In such a case there is no question of justification
raised because the rule, if rationally connected to the
employment, needs no justification; what is required is some
measure of accommodation. The employer must take
reasonable steps towards that end which may or may not
result in full accommodation. Where such reasonable steps,
however, do not fully reach the desired end, the complainant,
in the absence of some accommodating steps on his own part
such as an acceptance in this case of parttime work, must
either sacrifice his religious principles or his employment.
...................”
18.
As noticed in Lieutenant Colonel Nitisha and Others
(supra), the Apex Court has mentioned as follows:“.................
55. Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan explain the concept
of indirect discrimination using Aesop’s Fable of the Fox and
the Stork. They note:
“Aesop’s fable of the fox and the stork invokes the
idea of indirect discrimination. The story tells how the fox
invited the stork for a meal. For a mean joke, the fox
served soup in a shallow dish, which the fox could lap up
easily, but the stork could only wet the end of her long bill
on the plate and departed still hungry. The stork invited the
fox for a return visit and served soup in a long-necked jar
with a narrow mouth, into which the fox could not insert his
snout. Whilst several moral lessons might be drawn from
this tale, it is often regarded as supporting the principle
that one should have regard to the needs of others, so that
everyone may be given fair opportunities in life. Though
formally giving each animal an equal opportunity to enjoy
the dinner, in practice the vessels for the serving of the
soup inevitably excluded the guest on account of their
particular characteristics.”
56. “Another excellent formulation of the doctrine can be
found in the opinion of Advocate General Maduro of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”). He notes
that the distinctive attribute of direct discrimination is that
the discriminator explicitly relies on a suspect classification
(prohibited ground of discrimination) to act in a certain
way. Such classification serves as an essential premise of
the discriminator’s reasoning. On the other hand, in indirect
discrimination, the intention of the discriminator,thereasons
for his actions are irrelevant. He pertinently observes:
“In fact, this is the whole point of the prohibition of
indirect discrimination: even neutral, innocent or good
faith measures and policies adopted with no
discriminatory intent whatsoever will be caught if their
impact on persons who have a particular characteristic is
greater than their impact on other persons.”
....................”
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
D.
Medical Difference between Blindness and Low-Vision.
19.
Blindness generally refers to severe or profound loss of vision,
where a person has little or no usable sight even after best possible
treatment or correction. According to the World Health Organization,
blindness includes persons whose visual acuity in the better eye is
worse than 3/60 (or equivalent severe field loss). Total blindness
describes those who have a complete lack of light perception,
documented as no light perception (NLP). Only about 15% of people
with eye disorders have total blindness, and the majority of those
with visual impairment have some level of vision.6
20.
“Total Blindness” was the term used in India in 1970 which
referred to persons having no perception of light. The multicentric
survey of blindness in seven centers by the Indian Council of Medical
Research in 1971–1974 reported the prevalence of “Total Blindness”
(VA less than 20/400 in better eye with spectacle correction). The
document of the “National Plan for Prevention of Visual Impairment
and Control of Blindness” launched in 1976 does not include any
definition of blindness. A Central Coordination Committee gave the
definition of blindness as (a) vision of 20/200 or less with best
possible spectacle correction.
21.
Low-vision refers to partial but significant vision loss where
some useful sight remains, but ordinary glasses, contact lenses,
P. Vashist, S.S. Senjam, V. Gupta, N. Gupta and A. Kumar, “Definition of
Blindness under National Programme for Control of Blindness: Do We Need to
Revise It?”65(2) Indian Journal of Ophthalmology 92 (2017).
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
medicine, or surgery cannot fully restore vision. The World Health
Organization classifies low vision (older ICD categories) as visual
acuity less than 6/12 but equal to or better than 3/60 in the better
eye with best correction.7
22.
Low-vision is a permanent visual impairment, broadly defined
as a best-corrected visual acuity (BCVA) worse than 20/40 in the
better eye, substantial visual field loss, or substantial loss of
contrast sensitivity that is not correctable by refraction, medical
treatment, or surgery. Low-vision describes those whose vision
cannot be fully corrected by conventional methods such as glasses,
contact lenses, medicine, surgery, magnification aids, or assistive
technology. Low-vision services that may improve a patient’s
reading ability include environmental changes (such as better
lighting), low-vision optical aids, and eccentric viewing training.8
E.
Do persons who are blind and those with low-vision
warrant
distinct
consideration
in
matters
of
public
employment?
23.
The question that arises is whether blind and low-vision
persons
require
separate
consideration
in
matters
of
public
employment.
National Technical Assistance Center on Blindness & Low Vision, available at:
https://www.ntac.blind.msstate.edu/resources/definitions-blindness-and-lowvision#:~:text=Blindness%20is%20defined%20as%20visual,services%20provide
rs%20use%20it%20extensively. (last visited on Apr. 13, 2026).
P. Shah, S.G. Schwartz, S. Gartner, I.U. Scott and H.W. Flynn, “Low
VisionServices: A Practical Guide for the Clinician” 10 Therapeutic Advances
inOphthalmology(2018).
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
24.
In Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal & Another v. Union of India
and Others9, the Apex Court has held in paragraph 37 as follows:“....................
37. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states that "[t]he State
shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India". The right to
equality under the Indian Constitution has two facets – formal
equality and substantive equality. While formal equality means
that every person, irrespective of their attributes, must be
treated equally and must not be discriminated against;
substantive equality is aimed at producing equality of outcomes
through different modes of affirmative action. The principle of
reasonable accommodation is one of the means for achieving
substantive equality, pursuant to which disabled individuals
must be reasonably accommodated based on their individual
capacities. Disability, as a social construct, precedes the medical
condition of an individual. The sense of disability is introduced
because of the absence of access to facilities. ………..
84. Article 2 of the CRPD defines “discrimination on the basis of
disability” in the following terms:
“2. … “Discrimination on the basis of disability” means any
distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability
which has the purpose of effect of impairing or nullifying the
recognistion, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It
includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of
reasonable accommodation.”
85. While the CRPD recognises the denial of reasonable
accommodation as discrimination based on disability, it also
specifically imposes a positive duty on States under Article 5 (3)
to take all appropriate steps to ensure the provision of
reasonable accommodation.
86. Article 27 of the CPRD in the context of work and
employment, inter alia, imposes the following obligations on
State Parties to:
(i) Recognise the right to work and employment of persons with
disabilities;
(ii) Prohibit discrimination in matters of employment; and
(iii) Provide reasonable accommodation at the workplace.
87. The relevant provisions of Article 27 are extracted below:
“27. Work and employement.- (1) States Parties recognise the
right of persons with disabilities to work, on an equal basis with
others; this includes the right to the opportunity to gain a living
by work freely chosen or accepted in a labour market and work
environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons
with disabilities. States Parties shall safeguard and promote the
(2023) 2 SCC 209.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
realization of the right to work, including for those who acquire
a
disability
duringthecourseof
employment,
by
taking
appropriate steps, including through legislation, to, inter alia:
(a) Prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability with regard
to all matters concerning all forms of employment, including
conditions of recruitment, hiring and employment, continuance
of employment, career advancement and safe and healthy
working conditions;
(b) Protect the rights of persons with disabilities, on an equal
basis with others, to just and favourable conditions of work,
including equal opportunities and equal remuneration for work
of equal value, safe and healthy working conditions, including
protection from harassment, and the redress of grievances...
…
(i) Ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided to
persons with disabilities in the workplace.
…
(k) Promote vocational and professional rehabilitation, job
retention and return-to-work programmes for persons with
disabilities.” (emphasis added)
88. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in
General Comment Sixprovides that to achieve de facto equality
in the workplace and to fulfil the duty of providing reasonable
accommodation under Article 5 (3), the States parties, inter
alia, should:
(i) Promote the right to supported employment, which includes
work assistance;
(ii) Recognise denial of reasonable accommodation as
discrimination and also prohibit multiple and intersectional
discrimination and harassment;
(iii) Allow proper transition into and out of employment in a
non-discriminatory manner; and
(iv) Provide equal and effective access to benefits and
entitlements, such as retirement and unemployment benefits.
These entitlements must not be infringed through exclusion
from employment, aggravating the situation of exclusion.
...................”
25.
The Apex Court in Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service
Commission
and
Others10
has
recognized
accommodation
with
intrinsic
individual
dignity
reasonable
and
held
in
paragraphs 60 to 65 as follows:-
(2021) 5 SCC 370.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
“................
60. At the heart of this case lies the principle of reasonable
accommodation. Individual dignity undergirds the 2016 RPwD
Act. Intrinsic to its realisation is recognising the worth of every
person as an equal member of society. Respect for the dignity
of others and fostering conditions in which every individual can
evolve according to their capacities are key elements of a legal
order which protects, respects and facilitates individual
autonomy. In seeking to project these values as inalienable
rights of the disabled, the 2016 RPwD Act travels beyond being
merely a charter of non-discrimination. It travels beyond
imposing restraints on discrimination against the disabled. The
law does this by imposing a positive obligation on the State to
secure the realisation of rights. It does so by mandating that
the State must create conditions in which the barriers posed by
disability can be overcome. The creation of an appropriate
environment in which the disabled can pursue the full range of
entitlements which are encompassed within human liberty is
enforceable at law. In its emphasis on substantive equality, the
enactment of the legislation is a watershed event in providing a
legal foundation for equality of opportunity to the disabled.
61. As a social construct, disability encompasses features
broader and more comprehensive than a medical condition. The
2016 RPwD Act recognises that disability results in inequality of
access to a range of public and private entitlements. The
handicaps which the disabled encounter emerge out of
disability's engagement with the barriers created by prejudice,
discrimination and societal indifference. Operating as restraining
factors, these barriers have origins which can be traced to
physical, social, economic and psychological conditions in
society. Operating on the pre-existing restraints posed by
disability, these barriers to development produce outcomes in
which the disabled bear an unequal share of societal burdens.
The legislation has recognised that remedies for the barriers
encountered by the disabled are to be found in the social
environment in which they live, work and cohabit with others.
The barriers encountered by every disabled person can be
remedied by recognising comprehensive rights as inhering in
them; rights which impose duties and obligations on others.
62. The principle of reasonable accommodation acknowledges
that if disability as a social construct has to be remedied,
conditions have to be affirmatively created for facilitating the
development of the disabled. Reasonable accommodation is
founded in the norm of inclusion. Exclusion results in the
negation of individual dignity and worth or they can choose the
route of reasonable accommodation, where each individuals'
dignity and worth is respected. Under this route, the “powerful
and the majority adapt their own rules and practices, within the
limits of reason and short of undue hardship, to permit
realisation of these ends”.
63. In the specific context of disability, the principle of
reasonable accommodation postulates that the conditions which
exclude the disabled from full and effective participation as
equal members of society have to give way to an
accommodative society which accepts difference, respects their
needs and facilitates the creation of an environment in which
the societal barriers to disability are progressively answered.
Accommodation implies a positive obligation to create
conditions conducive to the growth and fulfilment of the
disabled in every aspect of their existence — whether as
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
students, members of the workplace, participants in governance
or, on a personal plane, in realising the fulfilling privacies of
family life. The accommodation which the law mandates is
“reasonable” because it has to be tailored to the requirements
of each condition of disability. The expectations which every
disabled person has are unique to the nature of the disability
and the character of the impediments which are encountered as
its consequence.
64. For instance, for a visually impaired person, the reasonable
accommodation she requires might consist of screen
magnification software or a screen reader [which can speak out
the content on a computer screen in a mechanical voice]. It
might also consist of content being made available in Braille and
a sighted assistant. In the same way, for someone with a
hearing impairment, reasonable accommodation could consist of
speech-to-text converters, access to sign language interpreters,
sound amplification systems, rooms in which echo is eliminated
and lip-reading is possible. Similarly, for a person with dyslexia,
reasonable accommodation could consist of access to computer
programmes suited to meet their needs and compensatory
time.
65. Failure to meet the individual needs of every disabled
person will breach the norm of reasonable accommodation.
Flexibility in answering individual needs and requirements is
essential to reasonable accommodation. The principle contains
an aspiration to meet the needs of the class of persons facing a
particular disability. Going beyond the needs of the class, the
specific requirement of individuals who belong to the class must
also be accommodated. The principle of reasonable
accommodation must also account for the fact that disability
based discrimination is intersectional in nature. The
intersectional features arise in particular contexts due to the
presence of multiple disabilities and multiple consequences
arising from disability. Disability therefore cannot be truly
understood by regarding it as unidimensional. Reasonable
accommodation requires the policy-makers to comprehend
disability in all its dimensions and to design measures which are
proportionate to needs, inclusive in their reach and respecting
of differences and aspirations. Reasonable accommodation
cannot be construed in a way that denies to each disabled
person the customisation she seeks. Even if she is in a class of
her own, her needs must be met.While assessing the
reasonableness of an accommodation, regard must also be had
to the benefit that the accommodation can have, not just for
the disabled person concerned, but also for other disabled
people similarly placed in future.
......................”
26. Reliance may also be placed on Jeeja Ghosh & Anr. v. Union
of India & Ors.11, wherein the Supreme Court of India dealt with
the humiliating deboarding of a passenger with disability (cerebral
palsy) from an aircraft and affirmed that persons with disabilities are
2016 Supreme(SC) 365; (2016) 7 Supreme Court Cases 761.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
entitled
to
dignity,
equality,
accessibility,
and
reasonable
accommodation.
“……………………
36. The rights that are guaranteed to differently abled persons
under the Act, 1995 are founded on the sound principle of
human dignity which is the core value of human right and is
treated as a significant facet of right to life and liberty. Such a
right, now treated as human right of the persons who are
disabled, has it roots in Article 21 of the Constitution.
Jurisprudentially, three types of models for determining the
content of the constitutional value of human dignity are
recognised. These are: (i) Theological Models, (ii) Philosophical
Models, and (iii)Constitutional Models. Legal scholars were
called upon to determine the theological basis of human dignity
as a constitutional value and as a constitutional right.
Philosophers also came out with their views justifying human
dignity as core human value. Legal understanding is influenced
by theological and philosophical views, though these two are
not identical. Aquinas and Kant discussed the jurisprudential
aspects of human dignity based on the aforesaid philosophies.
Over a period of time, human dignity has found its way through
constitutionalism, whether written or unwritten. Even right to
equality is interpreted based on the value of human dignity.
Insofar as India is concerned, we are not even required to take
shelter under theological or philosophical theories. We have a
written Constitution which guarantees human rights that are
contained in Part III with the caption “Fundamental Rights”.
One such right enshrined in Article 21 is right to life and liberty.
Right to life is given a purposeful meaning by this Court to
include right to live with dignity. It is the purposive
interpretation which has been adopted by this Court to give a
content of the right to human dignity as the fulfillment of the
constitutional value enshrined in Article 21. Thus, human
dignity is a constitutional value and a constitutional goal. What
are the dimensions of constitutional value of human dignity? It
is beautifully illustrated by Aharon Barak [Aharon Barak
“Human Dignity – The Constitutional Value and the
Constitutional Right” Cambridge University Press (2015)]
(former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel) in the
following manner:
“The constitutional value of human dignity has a central
normative role. Human dignity as a constitutional value is the
factor that unites the human rights into one whole. It ensures
the normative unity of human rights. This normative unity is
expressed in the three ways: first, the value of human dignity
serves as a normative basis for constitutional rights set out in
the constitution; second, it serves as an interpretative principle
for determining the scope of constitutional rights, including the
right to human dignity; third, the value of human dignity has an
important role in determining the proportionality of a statute
limiting a constitutional right.”
37. All the three goals of human dignity as a constitutional
value are expanded by the author in a scholarly manner. Some
of the excerpts thereof, are reproduced below which give a
glimpse of these goals:
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
“The first role of human dignity as a constitutional value is
expressed in the approach that it comprises the foundation for
all of the constitutional rights. Human dignity is the central
argument for the existence of human rights. It is the rationale
for them all. It is the justification for the existence of rights.
According to Christoph Enders, it is the constitutional value that
determines that every person has the right to have rights...
The second role of human dignity as a constitutional value is to
provide meaning to the norms of the legal system. According to
purposive interpretation, all of the provisions of the
constitution, and particularly all of the rights in the
constitutional bill of rights, are interpreted in light of human
dignity...
Lastly, human dignity as a constitutional value influences the
development of the common law. Indeed, where common law is
recognized, judges have the duty to develop it, and if necessary
modify it, so that it expresses constitutional values, including
the constitutional value of human dignity. To the extent that
common law determines rights and duties between individuals,
it might limit the human dignity of one individual and protect
the human dignity of the other.”
38. We should, therefore, keep in mind that CAR instructions
have also been issued keeping in view the spirit of human
dignity enshrined in Article 21 and the right that are to be
ensured to such persons. The underlying message in all these
provisions is the acknowledgment that human rights are
individual and have a definite linkage to human development,
both sharing common vision and with a common purpose.
Respect for human rights is the root for human development
and realisation of full potential of each individual, which in turn
leads to the augmentation of human resources with progress of
the nation. Empowerment of the people through human
development is the aim of human rights.
39. In international human rights law, equality is founded upon
two
complementary
principles:
non-discrimination
and
reasonable differentiation. The principle of non-discrimination
seeks to ensure that all persons can equally enjoy and exercise
all their rights and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to
arbitrary denial of opportunities for equal participation. For
example, when public facilities and services are set on
standards out of the reach of persons with disabilities, it leads
to exclusion and denial of rights. Equality not only implies
preventing discrimination (example, the protection of
individuals against unfavourable treatment by introducing antidiscrimination laws), but goes beyond in remedying
discrimination
against
groups
suffering
systematic
discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it means embracing
the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable
accommodation. The move from the patronising and
paternalistic approach to persons with disabilities represented
by the medical model to viewing them as members of the
community with equal rights has also been reflected in the
evolution of international standards relating specifically to
disabilities, as well as in moves to place the rights of persons
with disabilities within the category of universal human rights.
{See – Report of United Nations Consultative Expert Group
Meeting on International Norms and Standards Relating to
Disability 10-2-2001}.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
40. Earlier the traditional approaches to disability have depicted
it as health and welfare issue, to be addressed through care
provided to persons with disabilities, from a charitable point of
view. The disabled persons are viewed as abnormal, deserving
of pity and are, and not as individuals who are entitled to enjoy
the same opportunities to live a full and satisfying life as other
members of society. This resulted in marginalising the disabled
persons and their exclusion both from the mainstream of the
society and enjoyment of their fundamental rights and
freedoms. Disability tends to be couched within a medical and
welfare framework, identifying people with disabilities as ill,
different from their non-disabled peers, and in need of care.
Because the emphasis is on the medical needs of people with
disabilities, there is a corresponding neglect of their wider social
needs, which has resulted in severe isolation for people with
disabilities and their families.
41. However, the nations have come a long way from that
stage. Real awareness has dawned on the society at large that
the problems of differently abled are to be viewed from human
rights perspective. This thinking is reflected in two major
declarations on the disability adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on December 20, 1971 and thereafter in
the year 1975. The position was reiterated in the Beijing
Conclave by the Government of Asian and Pacific Countries that
was held from December 01-05, 1992 and in order to convert
the resolutions adopted therein into reality, the Indian
Parliament also passed the enactment, i.e. Act, 1995.
42. All these rights conferred upon such persons send an
eloquent message that there is no question of sympathising
with such persons and extending them medical or other help.
What is to be borne in mind is that they are also human beings
and they have to grow as normal persons and are to be
extended all facilities in this behalf. The subject of the rights of
persons with disabilities should be approached from human
rights perspective, which recognised that persons with
disabilities were entitled to enjoy the full range of
internationally guaranteed rights and freedoms without
discrimination on the ground Page No. 30 of 33of disability. This
creates an obligation on the part of the State to take positive
measures to ensure that in reality persons with disabilities get
enabled to exercise those rights. There should be insistence on
the full measure of general human rights guarantees in the case
of persons with disabilities, as well as developing specific
instruments that refine and given detailed contextual content of
those general guarantees. There should be a full recognition of
the fact that persons with disability were integral part of the
community, equal in dignity and entitled to enjoy the same
human rights and freedoms as others. It is a sad commentary
that this perceptions has not sunk in the mind and souls of
those who are not concerned with the enforcement of these
rights. The persons suffering from mental or physical disability
experience and encounter nonpareil form of discrimination.
They are not looked down by people. However, they are not
accepted in the main stream either even when people
sympathies with them. Most common, their lives are
handicapped by social, cultural and attitudinal barriers which
hamper their full participation and enjoyment of equal rights
and opportunities. This is the worst form of discrimination which
disabled feel as their grievance is that others do not understand
them.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
43. As pointed out in the beginning, the very first sentence of
the book “NO PITY” authored by Joseph P. Shapiro reads:
“Non disabled Americans do not understand disabled ones.”
The only error in the aforesaid sentence is that it is attributed to
Americans only whereas the harsh reality is that this statement
has universal application. The sentence should have read:
“Non disabled people do not understand disabled ones.”
For, non-disabled people generally look upon disabled ones with
pity. The general feeling is that these `invalid people' are
incapable of doing anything in life. They are burden on the
society which the society bear. Of course, they sympathize with
disabled persons. They may even want to willingly bear the
burden. They may help them financially or otherwise. However,
what they do not understand is the feeling of the people with
disabilities. Disabled people no longer see their physical or
mental limitations as a source of shame or as something to
overcome in order to inspire others. What non-disabled people
do not understand is that people with disabilities also have
some rights, hopes and aspirations as everyone else. They do
not want to depend on others. They want to brave their
disabilities. They want to prove to the world at large that
notwithstanding their disabilities they can be the master of heir
own lives. They can be independent. They can be self-reliant.
They do not want sympathies of non-disabled. They want to be
trusted. They want to be treated as valued member of the
society who can contribute to the development and progress of
the society. For this they want the proper environment to grow.
Our society automatically under-estimates the capabilities of
people with disabilities. People with disabilities want this change
in the thinking of non-disabled. It is the thinking of Disability
Rights Movement, USA that it is not so much the disabled
individual who needs to change, but the society. Says disability
rights activist Judy Heumann:
“disability only becomes a tragedy for me when society fails to
provide the things we need to lead our lives-job opportunities,
or barrier-free buildings, for example. It is not a tragedy to me
that I am living in a wheel chair.” …….
48. We would like to conclude this judgment by observing that
to most disabled persons, the society they live in is a closed
door which has been locked and the key to which has been
thrown away by the others. Helen Keller has described this
phenomena in the following words:
“Some people see a closed door and turn away. Others see a
closed door, try the knob and if it doesn't open, they turn away.
Still others see a closed door, try the knob and if it doesn't
work, they find a key and if the key doesn't fit, they turn way. A
rare few see a closed door, try the knob, if it doesn't open and
they find a key and if it doesn't fit, they make one!”
These rare persons we have to find out.”
27.
In Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal (supra), in paragraph 77
opined as follows:
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
".....................
77. Since disability is a social construct dependent on the
interplay between mental impairment with barriers such as
social, economic and historical among other factors, the onesize-fits-all approach can never be used to identify the disability
of a person. Disability is not universal but is an individualistic
conception based on the impairment that a person has along
with the barriers that they face. Since the barriers that every
person faces are personal to their surroundings — interpersonal
and structural, general observations on "how a person ought to
have behaved" cannot be made.
......................"
28.
In Deepshikha v. Medical Council of India & Ors.12, while
considering the validity of exclusionary criteria framed by the
Medical Council of India, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court expressly
recognized that sub-classification within the broad category of
locomotor disability may be constitutionally permissible where
founded upon functional requirements and a rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved. As observed in paragraph 38 of the
said judgment, relying upon Transport and Dock Workers Union
v. Mumbai Port Trust13, the Court held that Article 14 does not
prohibit reasonable classification, provided the policy reasonably
classifies persons for achieving its object and treats equally all
persons belonging to a well-defined class. The Court reiterated the
settled twin tests of permissible classification, namely:
(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia distinguishing persons grouped together from others left
out of the group; and
(ii) that such differentia must have a reasonable relation to the
object sought to be achieved.
2015 SCC OnLine Del 9482.
(2011) 2 SCC 575.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
29.
Further, in paragraph 39, referring to Dr. Subramanian
Swamy
v.
Director,
CBI14,
the
Court
reaffirmed
that
the
Constitution permits the State to determine, by the process of
classification, what should be regarded as a class for purposes of
legislation. It
was
emphasized
that
though some
degree of
inequality may arise from segregation of one class from another.
Such segregation is valid so long as it is rational and not artificial or
evasive. The qualities forming the basis of classification must bear a
reasonable relation to the legislative object.
30.
In paragraph 40, while referring to S. Seshachalam v. Bar
Council of Tamil Nadu15, the Court reiterated that Article 14
forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification.
It was clarified that the classification must not be arbitrary, artificial
or evasive, but should rest upon real and substantial distinctions
having a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved. Article 14 is attracted only where equals are treated
differently without any reasonable basis.
31.
Thereafter,
applying
the
aforesaid
principles,
the
Court
concluded in paragraph 41 that the distinction drawn between
persons with locomotor disabilities of upper limbs and persons with
locomotor disabilities of lower limbs had a rational basis and
reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, and
therefore could not be held violative of Article 14. Thus, the
aforesaid authority clearly demonstrates that even within the
(2014) 8 SCC 682.
(2014) SCC Online SC 1011.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
umbrella category of locomotor disability, sub-classification has
been
judicially
recognized
as
permissible
where
functional
differences exist and where such differentiation is supported by a
legitimate
objective.
The
precedent,
therefore,
supports
the
proposition that internal classification within a disability category is
not per se unconstitutional, provided it satisfies the test of
reasonableness under Article 14.
32.
In the case of Khandige Sham Bhat and K. Krishna Bhatta
v.
Agricultural
Income-tax
Officer,
Kasaragod
and
another16, the Apex Court has opined as follows:“....................
(7) At the outset it would be convenient to notice briefly the law
on the doctrine of classification. The law on the subject is well
settled and it does not require restatement in extenso. It would
suffice if we notice the principles relevant to the enquiry. The
law has been neatly and succinctly summarised in Ram
Krishana Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 at
pp. 296-297: (AIR 1958 SC 538 at pp. 547-548) thus:
“It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. In order however, to pass the test of of
permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii)
that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The
classification may be founded on different basis, namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like.
What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the
basis of classification and the object of the Act under
consideration. It is also well established that Art. 14 condemns
discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of
procedure.” Though a law ex facie appears to treat that all that
fall within a class alike, if in effect operates unevenly on
persons or property similarly situated, it may be said that the
law offends the equality clause. It will then be the duty of the
court to scrutinise the effect of the law carefully to ascertain its
real impact on the persons or property similarly situated.
Conversely, a law may treat persons who appear to be similarly
situate differently; but on investigation they may be found not
AIR 1963 SC 591 (V 50 C 92).
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
to be similarly situate. To state it differently, it is not the
phraseology of a statute that governs the situation but the
effect of the law that is decisive. If there is equality and
uniformity within each group, the law will not be condemned as
discriminative, though due to some fortuitous circumstances
arising out of a peculiar situation some included in a class get
an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out
for special treatment.
................
(9) …...The object for making the classification was not to
discriminate against the agriculturalists of the Madras area but
to bring them into line with the agriculturalist from the rest of
the Kerala State in so far as the tax liability to pay agricultural
income-tax was concerned. The existing law had therefore to be
appropriately adapted for securing this end. In these
circumstances, can it be said that there was no reasonable
nexus between the classification and the object of the
legislation. The object of the legislation thus was to impose
agricultural income-tax on assessees in the Madras area and
also in respect of the period between November 1, 1956, and
March 31, 1957 which could not be done under the pre-existing
law. The differences between the two parts of that state have
reasonable nexus to the said object. Because of the said
differences the Legislature thought that the definition of
“previous year” should be so amended in respect of the Madras
area that the assessees in that area may not escape payment of
agricultural income-tax in respect of the period after the said
area formed part of the Kerala State. … For the reasons already
stated, we hold that the classification in the present case is
founded on intelligible differentia between the assessees of the
two parts of the state, and that the said differences have
rational relationship to the object of the Amending Act.
...................”
F.
Priority to More Disadvantaged Among Equals.
33.
The reasoning adopted by the High Court of Karnataka in The
State of Karnataka v. Ms. Latha H.N.17 deserves endorsement.
The Court correctly recognized that blindness, in itself, cannot lead
to a presumption that a candidate is unfit to perform public
functions, and that any exclusion based on preconceived notions or
stereotypes would offend the constitutional guarantee of equality. It
was further held that where both candidates with complete
blindness and those with low vision are equally capable of
2024:KHC:45381-DB.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
discharging the duties of the post, preference may legitimately be
extended to the more disadvantaged category. In paragraph 3.4, it
has been stated that:
“3.4. For the purpose of preferential treatment, as between the
candidates of ‘low vision’ and the candidates of ‘absolute
blindness’, the priority avails to the later since they are more
disadvantageously placed qua the former subject to the condition
that the blindness does not come in the way of discharging duties
attached to the post.”
34.
The reasoning adopted by the Bombay High Court in Harshad
Govind Jadhav & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.18,in
paragraph 14 commends itself for acceptance:
“14. Thus, while we are unable to accede to the demand made
by the Petitioners for reserving 50% of posts falling to the share
of “blindness and low vision” category for totally blind
candidates, we do take note of the grievance raised by the
Petitioners about totally blind candidates not securing fair deal as
compared to low vision candidates in the matter of public
employment. From Affidavits filed in the petitions, it appears that
the participation of totally blind candidates in State services
appears to be grim. Most of the reserved posts under Section
34(1)(a) appear to be filled up through low vision candidates.
Considering the above ground reality, the State Government had
issued GR dated 18 June 2007 for grant of priority to persons
possessing higher degree of disabilities. After coming into effect
of the Act of 2016, it appears that no further affidavit has been
filed on behalf of the State Government pointing out the steps
taken for ensuring adequate participation by totally blind
candidates in State services. Mr. Chandurkar has drawn our
attention to the GRs dated 20 April 2023 and 31 July 2025.
However, it is seen that GR dated 20 April 2023 deal with grant
of reservation in the matter of promotion up to lowest rank of
Group-A service to persons with disabilities. Similarly, GR dated
31 July 2025 stipulates the procedure for implementation of
reservation under the Act of 2016 in the matter of direct
recruitment. However, GR dated 31 July 2025 does not make any
specific provision for increasing participation by totally blind
candidates in State services. In our view, therefore, it would be
appropriate to direct the State Government to consider the issue
and to take appropriate steps to ensure better participation by
totally blind candidates in the State services…….”
G.
Conclusion and Direction
35.
Upon
an
analysis
of
the
principle
of
reasonable
accommodation, viewed through the lens of dignity, it becomes
2025:BHC-AS:36583-DB.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
evident that disability and dignity are inseparable. Disability law
recognizes the right of both blind and low-vision persons to live with
dignity, proportionate to the challenges and physical limitations they
endure. Disability and dignity are fundamentally interconnected. The
recognition of dignity affirms that every individual, irrespective of
disability, is entitled to respect, autonomy, and equal rights. It also
imposes a positive obligation to identify and dismantle barriers
whether visible or structural that impedes the full realization of such
dignity.
36.
While the law classifies blindness and low-vision under a single
category for the purpose of reservation, such classification does not
mandate identical treatment within that category. Classification into
one group is for the purpose of fixing a ceiling limit of one percent to
have an outer limit of reservation for such a group. Grouping them
together does not preclude differentiated consideration, particularly
when their physiological conditions and functional capacities are
inherently distinct. A person with low vision, though impaired,
retains some degree of sight and may perform certain functions with
difficulty. In contrast, a blind person suffers from a total absence of
vision and faces a qualitatively different level of limitation.
37.
The definition of “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 emphasizes the
interaction between impairment and societal barriers that hinder full
and effective participation. This necessitates an understanding of
disability
in
functional
terms.
Further,
the
Act
recognizes
“benchmark disability” as a threshold of not less than forty percent
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
of a specified disability, and within the Schedule of the Act, it
distinctly
identifies
“blindness”
and
“low
vision”
as
separate
conditions, thereby acknowledging their differing nature and impact.
38.
In the context of public employment under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India and Article 16 of the Constitution of India, the
crucial consideration is whether blind and low-vision persons can be
treated as equals in terms of opportunity. If individuals with
inherently unequal functional capacities are made to compete on the
same footing, it would amount to treating unequals as equals,
thereby undermining the guarantee of substantive equality.
39.
The principle of reasonable accommodation requires that
differing needs be acknowledged and addressed. Failure to do so
would reduce equality to a mere formality and defeat the very
purpose of disability law, which is to ensure meaningful inclusion
and uphold dignity. Disability law is not merely declaratory of rights;
it is transformative in intent, aimed at enabling full participation
within the constitutional framework.
40.
The responsibility to operationalize these principles in public
employment lies with the State. While the law provides for a broad
classification, it does not restrict the State from evolving appropriate
mechanisms for sub-classification within that category. Such subclassification may be based on merit, functional capacity, or other
relevant criteria, so long as it serves to balance competing interests
and promote fairness.
WP(C)/60/2022
(Shri Ravi Tamang Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
41.
If the State fails to account for the distinct disadvantages
faced by different groups within the disabled category, it risks
denying genuine equality of opportunity, particularly to those who
are more severely disadvantaged. Therefore, in designing any
framework of sub-classification, the State must take into account
the unique challenges faced by blind and low-vision persons and
ensure that the approach is responsive to their differing needs.
42.
Substantive equality demands not uniform treatment, but a
nuanced approach that addresses real disparities. Reasonable
accommodation, as a legal principle, exists precisely to integrate
individuals into the broader social structure and to eliminate
discrimination arising from rigid uniformity.
43.
It is well established that sub-classification is constitutionally
permissible, as recognized in various judicial pronouncements of the
Supreme Court and High Courts. Accordingly, the State Government
is directed to consider the issue of sub-classification within the
category in light of the above principles within a period of three
months.
44.
Accordingly, the writ petition being, WP(C) No.60 of 2022,
stands disposed of as above.
Chief Justice
Approved for Reporting: Yes
ami
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