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Serial No.02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP (C) No.157/2022 with
MC (WPC) No.76/2022
Date of Order: 10.05.2023
Ramona Massar
Coram:
Vs.
Union of India & ors
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner
: Dr. A. Saraf, Sr.Adv with
Mr. L. Khyriem, Adv
Mr. W. Jyrwa, Adv
For the Respondents
: Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. A. Pradhan, Adv
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The writ petition in this case questions the propriety of several
orders passed against the writ petitioner under Section 147 of the IncomeTax Act, 1961 pertaining to several assessment years beginning AY 201314.
2.
The impugned orders were passed around the same time, in or
about March, 2022. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
was carried to this Court shortly thereafter by the end of April, 2022.
3.
The principal issue raised by the writ petitioner is that the writ
petitioner being a member of a scheduled tribe and deriving income
exclusively within a notified area was entitled to the full exemption of
income under Section 10(26) of the Act and, as such, not obliged to file
any return of income under Section 139(1) of the Act or her income be
charged to tax.
4.
Some essential facts need to be noticed for the limited purpose
of the adjudication involved herein.
5.
The petitioner received a notice under Section 148 of the Act
dated March 27, 2021 by which the assessing officer informed the
petitioner that he had reason to believe that the huge income of the
petitioner had escaped assessment upon the petitioner not having been
filed the return of income for AY 2013-14 within the stipulated time.
6.
The reasons recorded under Section 148(2) of the Act indicated
that information gathered by the assessing officer revealed that the writ
petitioner had paid in excess of Rs.7.74 crore as investment in mutual
funds and had high-value banking transactions or deposits in excess of
Rs.30 lakh, totaling to transactions in excess of Rs.8.05 crore during the
relevant year. The assessing officer went on to record that despite such
huge transactions, the writ petitioner had not filed any return of income
and the assessing officer had reason to believe that the income of the writ
petitioner chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the relevant
assessment year. The assessing officer asserted that the escapement was
on account of the omission or failure on the part of the writ petitioner
herein to fully disclose material facts necessary for the purpose of
assessment.
7.
The writ petitioner did not respond to the notice of March 27,
2021 and the matter was taken up for scrutiny assessment in terms of
Section 147 of the Act read with Section 144 thereof. A further notice was
issued under Section 142(1) of the Act on July 12, 2021 requiring the
petitioner to submit her response with supporting documents on or before
July 28, 2021. Despite due receipt of such further notice, no response
emanated from the writ petitioner.
8.
The matter was thereafter transferred to the Regional Faceless
Assessment Centre (RFAC) under the Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019
and a detailed questionnaire was issued to the petitioner in December,
2021. Despite due receipt of such questionnaire, the writ petitioner did not
respond thereto. A further notice was issued under Section 142(1) on
January 5, 2022 and served on the petitioner, but the petitioner ignored
the same.
9.
It was only after a subsequent notice was physically served on
the petitioner and a show-cause notice under Section 144 of the Act was
issued that the petitioner furnished, on February 2, 2022, a copy of an
Indian Oil Corporation Limited LPG distributorship letter of intent of
June 16, 1999, a certificate of importer-exporter code, a caste-cumresidency certificate and nothing else. A further notice followed under
Section 142(1) of the Act which expressly provided the following:
“Your eligibility for exemption of income can be considered
only on filing your return of income and other relevant
information along with supporting evidences to justifying (sic)
your claim.”
10.
The writ petitioner then responded by informing the assessing
officer that investments in mutual funds had been made from a certain
ICICI bank account. She also indicated that she was an authorised
distributor of LPG gas cylinders functioning in Nongstoin and, in
addition, dealt with coal and limestone export at Borsora in Meghalaya.
The petitioner also furnished details of five bank accounts that she
maintained. In addition, the writ petitioner claimed that she belonged to
the Khasi scheduled tribe and was a resident of Shillong and her income
arose only in Meghalaya which is a Sixth Schedule State. She asserted
that she did not file any return of income for AY 2013-14 “as the same is
exempted from income-tax under Section 10(26)”. She forwarded her
scheduled tribe certificate along with her reply and indicated that she did
not maintain any books of accounts. She, however, offered to furnish her
bank account statements but suggested that since such records were
voluminous, it was not convenient to append the same with her reply.
11.
On the basis of such material before the relevant authority, an
order came to be made on March 22, 2022 finding that the writ petitioner
herein was liable to pay a huge amount by way of income-tax.
12.
In similar circumstances, the incomes of the petitioner for
several other assessment years were also taken up for consideration and
orders passed under Section 147 of the Act on similar lines.
13.
At the outset, when this writ petition was received and even at
the time that several adjournments were obtained by the petitioner, a
submission had been consistently made on behalf of the Department to
the effect that the orders impugned were amenable to appeal and, as such,
this Court should not entertain the petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution. However, since it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner
that a pure question of law was involved, the matter languished and was
ultimately taken up for consideration of the relevant question of law.
14.
According to the petitioner, the orders impugned are liable to be
set aside as being completely without jurisdiction. The petitioner asserts
that in view of the definition of “total income” in Section 10(45) of the
Act and the wording of Section 10(26) of the Act, once a person
perceived his total income in a year to be exempted under Section 10(26)
of the Act, such person was not obliged to file any return of income under
Section 139 of the Act. It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that at
the relevant point of time, Section 139 had not undergone the change by
which, notwithstanding any exemption under Section 10 of the Act, when
certain parameters were met, a person was obliged to file a return of
income and claim exemption. It is also pointed out on behalf of the
petitioner that Section 139(4C) of the Act makes a distinction between
persons entitled to certain kinds of exemption under Section 10 of the Act
and other persons also entitled to exemption. The petitioner submits that it
is only in the cases of the persons specified in Section 139(4C) of the Act
that when the total income is taken into account, notionally the exemption
under Section 10 of the Act provided to such person is not taken into
consideration and the requirement of filing a return of income is without
the exemption being considered.
15.
The point that the petitioner seeks to make is that since only
certain classes of exemptees under Section 10 of the Act are obliged to
file a return of income, subject to the total income exceeding the limit not
chargeable to tax and without taking into account the exemption granted
under Section 10, other persons who are beneficiaries of the exemption
provisions are not required to file any return of income as long as they can
bona fide maintain that the entirety of their total income stood exempted,
whether under Section 10(26) of the Act or any like provision. The logical
question that such argument throws up is that, without any return of
income being filed, how can it be verified that the entirety of the total
income earned in the year was liable to be exempted or not.
16.
A fundamental issue is raised, but it may not be necessary in the
present context to look into the same. If the petitioner is understood
correctly, the petitioner must be seen to suggest that where an exemptee
under Section 10(26) of the Act perceives the entire income accrued to
such person in an assessment year to be exempt by virtue of Section
10(26) of the Act, Section 139(1) of the Act would not come into play for
such person to be required to file a return of income. In a sense, the
petitioner seeks to suggest that as long as the relevant person is satisfied
that he is not liable to pay any income-tax by virtue of his total income
being exempted as per his perception, he cannot be touched.
17.
As a continuation of such line of reasoning, it is submitted on
behalf of the petitioner that if there is any lacuna in a taxing statute, it is
not for the Court to bridge the same or read words into a provision that do
not exist. The petitioner insists that since the expression “total income”
used in Section 139(1) of the Act has to be given the same meaning as
such expression has been defined in Section 10(45) of the Act, the
perception of a person that his income is exempt is enough to not require
such person to file any return of income. Though the Department seeks to
suggest that a person cannot be both the judge and the jury in his own
cause and once the total income exceeds the income that is not chargeable
to tax, such person should file a return under Section 139(1) of the Act
and claim the entirety of the income to be exempted, so that the
Department can verify the claim, the greater emphasis laid by the
Department is on the alternative remedy which is available to the
petitioner since a regular appeal in this case could have been carried under
Section 246A of the Act.
18.
At this stage, two objections are taken on behalf of the writ
petitioner to the effect that, ordinarily, if a preliminary issue as to whether
the matter should remain in this Court or the petitioner be required to
pursue any other alternative remedy arises, such issue should be decided
at the initial stage and within a few days of the institution of the matter in
Court and not be a consideration available at the final hearing. The second
point made on behalf of the petitioner in such regard is by referring to a
recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported at 2023 SCC Online SC
95 (Godrej Sara Lee v. Excise and Taxation Officer) where a distinction
is made between a petition not being entertained on the ground of there
being an alternative remedy and a petition not being maintainable.
19.
It is elementary that when a petition is not maintainable, the
merits of the matter, despite the highest case in equity that may be
brought by the petitioner, cannot be gone into. However, when a defence
of alternative remedy is raised, the Court exercises a kind of self-restraint
on itself and leaves the parties to work their remedies out before the
regular forum rather than allow its extraordinary jurisdiction, particularly
under Article 226 of the Constitution, to be invoked in an everyday case.
Thus, it is apparent that when a plea of alternative remedy is taken to
resist a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it cannot be said
that the petition is not maintainable; however, it is a mistake that is
committed by courts across the country by referring to petitions which
could have been carried to an alternative forum to be described as not
maintainable, in a manner of loose speaking, under Article 226 of the
Constitution. By the very use of the expression “alternative remedy” it
implies that there could be two forms of the similar remedy available to
the petitioner; whereupon the writ court exercises self-restraint and
nudges the petitioner to approach the regular forum, unless there are some
classical exceptions.
20.
There are certain cardinal tests which are to be applied in
course of the court exercising self-restraint and requiring the parties to go
to the regular forum. These tests have been noticed in several decisions
and, quite akin to a situation under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 and in cases where a first information report may be
quashed for it not indicating the ingredients of any offence or a showcause notice being challenged as without jurisdiction, the tests have been
comprehensively noticed in the judgment reported at (1998) 8 SCC 1
(Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks).
21.
Indeed, the four criteria from Whirlpool have been set out in the
judgment of Godrej Sara Lee. These tests are the following:
(i) Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any
fundamental right;
(ii) Where there is violation of the principles of natural justice;
(iii) Where the order or the proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction; or
(iv) Where the vires of an Act is challenged.
22.
It may be also added in the same breath that merely because
there is an alternative remedy does not prompt a Constitutional Court to
ask the parties before it to exhaust such remedy, the Court must consider
whether the remedy is also efficacious.
23.
In a manner of speaking, every matter carried to a Court is for
the assertion of some kind of fundamental right. For example, the moment
a petitioner asserts any impugned action or order to be unfair or
unreasonable, Article 14 of the Constitution is immediately invoked.
However, merely because a person asserts a fundamental right, it is no
ground for such person bypassing the usual process or procedure and
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution. On the other hand, when a Constitutional Court finds
that an order has been made which is contrary to all canons of natural
justice or when an order is made wholly without jurisdiction, the
Constitutional Court would not allow the suffering of the party
complaining before it to continue by sending such party to the regular
forum. But the nature of the fault complained of must be obvious and
apparent, not merely an arguable case or a possible point of view. The
error of jurisdiction or erroneous procedure adopted must be palpable and
inexcusable and going to the root of the matter.
24.
Indeed, it is the nature of the challenge which is of importance.
In the present case, the rather elongated narration at the outset was
necessary to demonstrate that this cannot be a case of violation of any
principle of natural justice. This is a case where an arrogant petitioner
refused to comply with every request of the Department and only suggest
that since she was a member of scheduled tribe, she was willy-nilly above
the law.
25.
It is also not a case of authority having been exercised without
jurisdiction. Notices were issued by referring to the relevant provisions.
On the face of it, such provisions permitted the exercise to be carried out
in the way it was sought to be. At any rate, if the writ petitioner perceived
the very notices to be without jurisdiction, the writ petitioner ought to
have challenged the authority to issue such notice at a much earlier stage
than taking a chance to participate in the proceedings and seeking to
challenge only the outcome thereafter.
26.
This case also does not involve any challenge to the vires of
any provision. There is a huge chasm between the interpretation of a
provision and the challenge to the legality of a provision. When it is a
challenge to a provision, a Constitutional Court, if prima facie satisfied of
an element of merit in the challenge, may not relegate the parties to the
usual forum since, if the alternative forum is a tribunal, it may not have
the authority even to go into the question of vires. However, by merely
challenging the vires of a provision without there being any element of
substance therein, no disingenuous knave can bypass the regular
procedure and insist on the Constitutional Court to adjudicate the lis
carried by him.
27.
In the present case, a regular appeal is maintainable and the
submission on behalf of the writ petitioner to the effect that such regular
appeal will be confined only to the order passed under Section 147 of the
Act and cannot be enlarged to look into the factual aspects going into the
making of the order, cannot be countenanced. Indeed, when an appeal is
of limited scope, the appellate provision will expressly provide therefor as
in cases where appeals are limited to questions of law and facts are
excluded. There is no expression in the entirety of Section 246A of the
Act to construe the power of the appellate authority to be limited only to
Section 147 and not take up the fundamental issue that is sought to be
raised in the present proceedings.
28.
Finally, the writ petitioner appeals to the Court to exercise its
discretion since the primary premise of the argument falls within a narrow
campus. The petitioner appeals that it would be better if the legal question
raised were to be decided and the matter left to the Department for the
Department’s further consideration.
29.
Ordinarily, there is an element of bona fides which is taken into
consideration by a writ court, particularly when allowing its discretion to
be exercised in an extraordinary manner. Quite frankly, the conduct of the
writ petitioner herein does not inspire any confidence and does not merit
any discretion to be exercised in her favour. Her income during the
relevant assessment year of 2013-14 referred to above was in excess of
Rs.8 crore. All that was required of her upon receiving the several notices
was to demonstrate that such income, in its entirety, was exempted under
Section 10(26) of the Act. Yet, notice after notice went unheeded till the
petitioner furnished the details of her bank accounts, claimed that she had
invested and reinvested in mutual funds and glibly submitted that she
maintained no accounts despite maintaining that she was an authorised
distributor of LPG gas cylinder and an exporter of coal and limestone and
the like. Such conduct on the part of a citizen would not excite to a
Constitutional Court to exercise any discretion in her favour. Indeed, the
interpretation of a provision of the statute and the considerations going
into allowing an extraordinary remedy to be pursued may sometimes
depend primarily the conduct of a party approaching the Court or an
element of prejudice suffered by such party. In this case, neither the
conduct nor the alleged prejudice suffered by the petitioner herein
prompts the Court to exercise any discretion to receive the matter and
adjudicate the same without leaving the petitioner free to approach the
regular remedy in accordance with law.
30.
It is, however, recorded that since the matter had been pending
in this Court for a substantial period of time, whatever may have been the
reasons therefor, the Department should not take point of limitation
before the appellate forum; or else, even if such objection is taken, the
appellate forum deals with the objection with a degree of latitude towards
the petitioner herein.
31.
It is made clear that the legal issues raised on merits have not
been gone into and it will be open to the appellate forum to decide the
same in accordance with law.
32.
WP (C) No.157 of 2022 is disposed of without going into the
merits thereof as aforesaid and by leaving the petitioner free to approach
the appellate forum. The latitude on the ground of delay will be exercised
in the petitioner’s favour if the appeal is carried within four weeks from
date.
33.
MC (WPC) No.76 of 2022 is disposed of.
34.
There will be no order as to costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
10.05.2023
“Lam DR-PS
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