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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 31 of 2023
Date of Decision: 07.06.2023
Shri. Ramesh Bawri
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & 4 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S. Jindal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. K. Khan, AAG with
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Addl. Sr. GA
Ms. S. Laloo, GA (R 1- 4)
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
A proceeding numbered as Executive Proceeding No. 2 of 2022
under Section 133 Cr.P.C is being conducted by the learned Executive
Magistrate (respondent No. 3), in Ri Bhoi District of Meghalaya. The said
proceeding is directed towards the petitioner herein who allegedly on a verbal
order passed by the said learned Executive Magistrate on 04.04.2023, was
directed to shut down all the business operation within his premises, housing
as many as 42 tenants.
2.
These proceedings including the said order dated 04.04.2023 are
impugned herein in this instant petition under Section 397 read with Section
482 and 401 Cr.P.C with a prayer to set aside and quash the entire
proceedings.
3.
Heard Mr. S. Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that the genesis of the matter relates to an alleged complaint filed
by the proforma respondent No. 5 in the office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Ri-Bhoi District.
4.
The petitioner came to know that in the said complaint, copy of
which has not been supplied to the petitioner, an allegation was made that a
drain adjoining the property of the petitioner was not properly maintained as a
result of which, there was seepage of drain water into the land of the
proforma respondent, on which stands a petrol pump, M/s River Umtrew
Service Station.
5.
Apparently,
in
response
to
the
said
complaint,
being
No.IOCL/RUSS/09/2022-DC-3, dated 12.09.2022, the Additional Deputy
Commissioner (Rev), Ri Bhoi District has issued a notice for spot inspection
slated to be held on 20.09.2022 at 12:00 noon, which inspection is to be
carried out by Shri. W.R. Massar, MCS, EAC. The notice has been directed at
the petitioner and the owner of the said petrol pump.
6.
The petitioner in response to the aforesaid notice has addressed a
representation before the authorities giving details of all relevant and correct
facts. However, the respondent No. 2 vide notice dated 03.10.2022 has
directed the petitioner to construct proper drainage system as far as the said
drain which is the subject matter of the dispute is concerned. It is also
directed that a compliance report is to be submitted thereto within 15 days.
The petitioner has accordingly complied with the said order and has
submitted the report in this regard on 26.10.2022.
7.
It is further submitted that the petitioner was then surprised to
receive an order dated 08.12.2022 issued by respondent No. 3 in what appears
to be a formal proceeding being Executive Proceeding No. 2/2022 being
drawn up against the petitioner under Section 133 Cr.P.C. The petitioner was
also directed to remove/clear such nuisance within 30 days from the date of
the order but has also directed that an action taken report be filed within 15
days. The status report was duly filed by the petitioner on 17.01.2023.
8.
Apart from the status report, the petitioner after carrying out the
direction in this regard, has finally filed a completion report on 15.02.2023.
The respondent No. 3 has however passed another order dated 30.03.2023 to
the effect that an observation was made that the petitioner has not filed the
work completion certificate and direction to submit the same by 03.04.2023.
9.
The petitioner then re-submitted the Completion Report on
03.04.2023, whereupon, the respondent No. 3 then passed an order dated
04.04.2023 with a direction for inspection of the site on the same day itself at
4:00 pm.
10.
Upon inspection of the site by the respondent No. 3 along with
respondent No. 4, the respondent No. 3 passed a verbal order directing that all
business activities on the land of the petitioner be immediately stopped.
11.
The petitioner thereafter on 05.04.2023 filed an application with the
respondent No. 3 with a prayer to rescind the verbal direction to close all
business activities at the site and to allow the petitioner to correct any
shortcomings in the work done in the drain within a period of 1(one) month.
This application was rejected by the respondent No. 3 who simply wrote the
word “Rejected” on the face of the said application. However, no formal
order has been passed in respect of the closure of all business activities in the
land of the petitioner.
12.
The learned counsel has then submitted that the petitioner in this
petition has challenged the legality and maintainability of the said Executive
Proceeding No. 2/2022 on the primary ground that the learned Executive
Magistrate proceeding under Section 133 Cr.P.C has no jurisdiction to pass
the orders and directions as has been done by way of the impugned orders.
13.
Attention of this Court was drawn to the provision of Section 133
Cr.P.C to show that power under the said Section can be exercised either by a
District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or even an Executive
Magistrate, but it should be one who is specially empowered in this behalf by
the State Government. In the instant case, the proceedings under Section 133
were conducted by an Executive Magistrate who was not specially
empowered in this behalf by the State Government. In fact, as was seen from
the status report dated 21.04.2023 filed by the learned Executive Magistrate
before this Court in these proceedings, the learned Executive Magistrate has
admittedly joined proceedings on the strength of an endorsement from the
Additional District Magistrate, Ri Bhoi District.
14.
In this regard, the petitioner has referred to the case of M/S. Apollo
Machinery Mart & Ors. v. State of Assam& 20 Ors.: 1997 (II) GLT 213, para
10.
15.
Another limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that, the proceedings under Section 133 Cr.P.C stems from an
alleged complaint by the proforma respondent No. 5 who has complained of
the flow of drainage water from the property of the petitioner into the
property of the said M/s River Umtrew Service Station. This apparently is an
issue of dispute between the respondent No. 5 and the petitioner, the same
being civil and of a private dispute in nature, no participation or interest of the
public at large is involved. Under such circumstances, no proceedings under
Section 133 will lie. The case of Vasant Manga Nikumba & Ors. v. Baburao
Bhikanna Naidu & Anr.: 1995 Supp (4) SCC 54, para 3 & 5, as well as the
case of Kachrulal Bhagirath Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.:
(2005) 9 SCC 36, para 10 was cited in support of this contention.
16.
The last submission made by the learned counsel is to refer to the
provision of Section 138 Cr.P.C to say that if an order under Section 133
Cr.P.C is made against a person, he is required to appear and to file a show
cause against such order, whereupon, the Magistrate shall take evidence in the
matter as in a summons case. This was not done so in the case in question,
since upon filing of the show cause by the petitioner on 29.09.2022, nothing
has proceeded or progressed so far.
17.
Mr. K. Khan, learned AAG on behalf of the State respondent has
submitted that the status report filed by the respondent No. 3 dated
21.04.2023 would show that on a complaint received from the retail outlet
M/s River Umtrew Service Station, a report by the In-charge, Byrnihat Police
Outpost has indicated that the petitioner and his manager had failed to comply
with the order of the Administration as regard the flow of dust, dirty water,
human waste and garbage from the land of the petitioner to the public drain
which poses serious threat to public health.
18.
On 08.12.2022, the respondent No. 3 has directed the petitioner to
remove the nuisance within 30 days and to submit an action taken report
thereto. The petitioner has sought extension of time to comply with the said
order, but in spite of that, the petitioner has failed to file the report. It was
only on 04.04.2023 that the respondent No. 3 went for a spot inspection that
he found the work done by the petitioner, not desirable.
19.
The learned AAG has further submitted that the petitioner has filed
show cause dated 26.10.2022 to the notice issued by the respondent No. 3 and
that too, without having received a copy of the complaint. In this show cause
he has admitted that his worker has contributed to the pollution of the said
drain. This is evident from the fact that after the inspection conducted by the
respondent No. 2 on 21.09.2022 the petitioner has taken up the cleaning drive
to clean the said drain, which included plugging up of holes in the boundary
walls on the portion of the land of the proforma respondent. This proves that
there are ingredients of public nuisance and such inconvenience is required to
be removed, therefore the claim of the petitioner that the dispute is of a
private nature is incorrect. The proceedings under section 133 Cr.P.C
undertaken by the respondent No. 3 is accordingly valid and calls for no
interference.
20.
The learned AAG has submitted that the petitioner by filing the
show cause has voluntarily surrendered to the jurisdiction under Section 138
Cr.P.C, that is, he has accepted the proceedings under Section 133. Therefore,
if the issue of jurisdiction was never raised before the learned Magistrate, can
the petitioner raise this issue now.
21.
At this juncture, the learned AAG has fairly submitted that the fact
that the alleged action of the respondent No. 3 who refused to accept the
prayer made by the petitioner in his letter dated 05.04.2023 by simply noting
the word “Rejected” on the body of the said letter may not be proper. It is,
however, submitted that there is nothing on record to substantiate the
contention of the petitioner that a verbal order was passed to direct closure of
all business activities of the petitioner and his tenants.
22.
The next point of argument raised by the learned AAG is with
regard to the provision of Section 138 Cr.P.C which speaks of the stage of
evidence upon a show cause being filed. The petitioner having filed his show
cause, therefore, it would be proper for the Magistrate (respondent No. 3) to
proceed for evidence and to come to the final findings in the said case. This is
not an exercise without jurisdiction as the same was done within the ambit of
law, the petitioner, therefore, cannot question the conduct of the respondent
No. 3 in this respect.
23.
The case of Embassy Property Developments Private Limited. v
State of Karnataka & Ors.: (2020) 13 SCC 308 was referred to by the learned
AAG to buttress his contention in this regard, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court at para 15 of the same has discussed the issue of jurisdiction to
distinguish between an exercise of jurisdiction not vested by law and cases in
which there was a wrongful exercise of available jurisdiction. Reference was
made to a decision in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission,
(1969) 2 AC 147 where the court has held that “… the real question was not
whether an authority made a wrong decision but whether they enquired into
and decided a matter which they had no right to consider.”
24.
This Court, on the facts and circumstances detailed by the parties
and their respective stand on the issue, has carefully weighed the substance of
the same on the balance of facts and law.
25.
At the outset, it may be relevant to bring out herein the provision of
Section 133 Cr.P.C as the whole case centre around this provision as to the
right or wrong application of the same. The Section reads as follows:
“133. Conditional order for removal of nuisance.–(1) Whenever a
District Magistrate or a Sub-divisional Magistrate or any other
Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the
State Government, on receiving the report of a police officer or
other information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he thinks
fit, considers–
(a) that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be
removed from any public place or from any way, river or
channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public; or
(b) that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the
keeping of any goods or merchandise, is injurious to the
health or physical comfort of the community, and that in
consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited
or regulated or such goods or merchandise should be
removed or the keeping thereof regulated; or
(c) that the construction of any building, or, the disposal of
any substance, as is likely to occasion conflagration or
explosion, should be prevented or stopped; or
(d) that any building, tent or structure, or any tree is in such a
condition that it is likely to fall and thereby cause injury to
persons living or carrying on business in the neighbourhood
or passing by, and that in consequence the removal, repair or
support of such building, tent or structure, or the removal or
support of such tree, is necessary; or
(e) that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such way
or public place should be fenced in such manner as to prevent
danger arising to the public; or
(f) that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined
or otherwise disposed of,
such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person
causing such obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or
occupation, or keeping any such goods or merchandise, or owning,
possessing or controlling such building, tent, structure, substance,
tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or
tree, within a time to be fixed in the order–
(i) to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or
(ii) to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in
such manner as may be directed, such trade or occupation, or
to remove such goods or merchandise, or to regulate the
keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or
(iii) to prevent or stop the construction of such building, or to
alter the disposal of such substance; or
(iv) to remove, repair or support such building, tent or
structure, or to remove or support such trees; or
(v) to fence such tank, well or excavation; or
(vi) to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous animal
in the manner provided in the said order
or, if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some other
Executive Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and place to be
fixed by the order, and show cause, in the manner hereinafter
provided, why the order should not be made absolute.
(2) No order duly made by a Magistrate under this section
shall be called in question in any Civil Court.
Explanation.– A "public place" includes also property
belonging to the State, camping grounds and grounds left
unoccupied for sanitary or recreative purposes.”
26.
Section 133 Cr.P.C contemplates a situation where, in a case of
complaint of public nuisance, the Magistrate acting on such information or
complaint either by way of a police report or on a written complaint by an
individual, can, after taking evidence and considering that there exists such
nuisance, he may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such
nuisance to remove the same or to desist from carrying on any act causing the
said nuisance, etc.
27.
The first limb of argument raised by the petitioner is that the learned
Magistrate who had purportedly passed the relevant orders under Section 133
directed against the petitioner is not legally empowered to do so and as such,
on this ground alone, the proceedings are vitiated. In this context, reliance has
been placed on the case of Apollo Missionary Mart (supra) particularly para
10, the same is reproduced below as:
“10. …On the plain language of sub-section (1) of section 133
Cr.P.C., it would be clear that it is not every Executive Magistrate
or any other Executive Magistrate who is conferred with the power,
it is only a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or
any Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the
State Govt. can take action making an order thereof. Both the
learned Govt. Advocate as well as the learned counsel for the
respondents were given repeated opportunities to show any such
notification or order passed by the State Govt. empowering the
concened Magistrate Shri Chakravarty to exercise power u/s 133
Cr.P.C., no such order, specially empowering Shri Chakravarty, or
notification, despite repeated opportunities granted to both of them,
was brought to our notice. Although the point was raised at the
appellate stage, being essentially and purely a question of law
going to the root of the matter touching the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate, it was entertained and it must be said that there is no
proof of Shri Chakravarty being an Executive Magistrate „specially
empowered in this behalf by the State Govt.‟ Therefore, the whole
action collapses to the ground as one without jurisdiction. Even on
facts, by interim orders made, the action substantially quashed. The
interim orders dated 6.8.92 as modified by order dated 27.8.92 are
confirmed. This appeal deserves to be allowed to the extent
indicated above. The disputed questions of title are left out from
reconsideration. The respondents are directed to restore possession
of the land in question on which the factory was standing,
wherefrom the obnoxious material was taken out by the police. The
police shall handover possession to the appellant within a week and
report compliance to the Registrar (Judl.) of this Court. The
impugned order as passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside
and the appeal to the extent indicated above.”
28.
The assertion of the petitioner on this count appears to be valid
inasmuch as the State respondent has not been able to produce any relevant or
specific notification empowering the respondent No. 3 to take charge of the
said proceedings. However, it is noticed that the respondent No. 3 had
initiated the said proceedings under Section 133 Cr.P.C in Executive
Proceeding No. 2 of 2022 and has passed the initial order dated 08.12.2022
directing the petitioner to remove the said nuisance and to file an action taken
report within 15 days thereof, apparently on the basis of evidence collected in
this regard, but as to how the evidence was collected was not made known.
29.
In such a situation, this Court is of the considered view that the
respondent No. 3 is not legally empowered to conduct the said proceedings
under Section 133 and the entire proceedings is vitiated as was held at para 10
of the Apollo Missionary Mart case.
30.
However, the conduct of the petitioner in taking part in the
proceedings by firstly, trying to rectify the situation, by making necessary
repairs and corrections to the said drain in question and the filing of the action
taking report from time to time, would only cause one to assume that the
petitioner has joined issue with the respondents and has submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate.
31.
The petitioner has corrected his stance in the matter by contending
that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any point of time in the
proceedings and in this connection, has referred to a number of authorities,
some of the relevant authorities would include the case of Harshad Chiman
Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr.: (2005) 7 SCC 791 herein at para 30
and 32 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that:
“30… The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several
categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local
jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over
the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions
are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the
earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement
of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is
not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a
subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to a subject-matter, however, is
totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has
no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any
limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take
up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no
jurisdiction is a nullity.
32. …neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer
jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. It is
well settled and needs no authority that “where a court takes upon
itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision
amounts to nothing.…A decree passed by a court without
jurisdiction is a coram non judice.”
33.
In the case of Pandurang & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra: (1986) 4
SCC 436 at para 4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
“4. When a matter required to be decided by a Division Bench of the
High Court is decided by a learned Single Judge, the judgment
would be a nullity, the matter having been heard by a Court which
had no competence to hear the matter, it being a matter of total lack
of jurisdiction. The accused was entitled to be heard by at least two
learned Judges constituting a Division Bench and had a right to
claim a verdict as regards his guilt or innocence at the hands of the
two learned Judges. This right cannot be taken away except by
amending the rules. So long as the rules are in operation it would
be arbitrary and discriminatory to deny him this right regardless of
whether it is done by reason of negligence or otherwise.
Deliberately, it cannot be done. Negligence can neither be invoked
as an alibi, nor can cue the infirmity or illegality, so as to rob the
accused of his right under the rules. What can be done only by at
least two learned Judges cannot be done by one learned Judge.
Even if the decision is right on merits, it is by a forum which is
lacking in competence with regard to the subject matter. Even a
„right‟ decision by a „wrong‟ forum is no decision. It is non-existent
in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. The judgment under appeal is
therefore no judgment in the eye of law. This Court in State of M.P.
v. Dewadas [(1982) 3 SCR 81] has taken a view which reinforces
our view. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order
passed by the learned Single Judge, and send the matter back to the
High Court for being placed before a Division Bench of the High
Court, which will afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to both
the sides and dispose it of in accordance with law, expeditiously.”
34.
Another aspect of the matter is the contention of the petitioner that
the bone of contention between the private parties, that is, the petitioner on
the one hand and the owner of M/s River Umtrew Service Station (Petrol
Pump) as regard the boundary wall separating their properties and the drain
which runs in between, therefore, the alleged complaint made by M/s River
Umtrew Service Station constitute a private dispute between two parties and
cannot be construed as the subject matter of private defence. This is evident
on perusal of the first effective order dated 08.12.2022 under the proceeding
in question, wherein the respondent No. 3 in the first paragraph itself has
observed as:
“Whereas, it has been made to appear to me that you, as Caretaker
of Old Bawri Sot- Mill (sic Sawmill), 13th Mile Tamulikuchi,
Byrnihat have failed to construct a proper drainage channel and
also failed to take necessary action in preventing the flow of
drainage water into the property of M/S River Umtrew Service
Station, 13th Mile Tamulikuchi, Byrnihat.”
35.
An interpretation of the abovementioned order would only make
one to draw a conclusion that the initial dispute is private in nature. In this
regard, the authority cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case
of Vasant Manga Nikumba (supra) at para 3 would be relevant to the facts
and situation of this case wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed
that:
“3…The object and public purpose behind Section 133 is to prevent
public nuisance that if the Magistrate fails to take immediate
recourse to Section 133 irreparable damage would be done to the
public. The exercise of the power should be one of judicious
discretions objectively exercised on pragmatic consideration of the
given facts and circumstances from evidence on record. The
proceedings under Section 133 is not intended to settle private
disputes or a substitute to settle civil disputes though the proceeding
under Section 133 is more in the nature of civil proceedings in a
summary nature.”
36.
In the case of Kachrulal Bhagirath Agarwal (supra), the proposition
as regard the issue of proceeding under Section 133 vis-à-vis settlement of
private disputes is similar to that as noticed in the case of Vasant Manga
Nikumba.
37.
Again, what is noticed in the proceeding under scrutiny herein is the
fact that the effective direction passed by the respondent No. 3 is to direct for
closure of all the business activities of the petitioners and his tenants, which
order was passed verbally. This, indeed, has no precedent in law and cannot
be countenance by this Court in any manner to legitimize the same. That the
petitioner has assailed the said action is therefore justified under the
circumstances.
38.
Another anomaly noticed is the fact that on the petitioner filing a
representation before the respondent No. 3 dated 04.04.2023 with a prayer to
rescind the said oral order whereby all activities of the petitioner’s tenants
was closed and further for grant of one month’s time to the petitioner to
complete the work towards prevention of any seepage of water, the said
respondent No. 3 without assigning any reasonable ground has simply
rejected the same by superscribing a one-word order “Rejected”. This is
nothing short but an act of arbitrariness and non-application of mind defying
all well accepted norms in this regard. This is the ultimate as far as passing
of a non-speaking order is concerned. To this extent, the learned AAG has
fairly and candidly conceded that this action on the part of the respondent
No. 3 cannot be defended.
39.
On an overall consideration of the issue before this Court, it can be
said that the entire proceeding under Section 133 embarked upon by the
respondent No. 3 was without jurisdiction, firstly, on the ground that the said
respondent No. 3 was not specifically empowered in this regard, secondly,
that the manner in which the verbal or oral order passed restraining the
petitioner and his tenants from carrying on with their business activities was
without any legal basis and thirdly, that the curt manner in which the
representation dated 05.04.2023 was dismissed reflected non-application of
mind.
40.
On careful analysis of the case of the parties, this Court is
convinced that the impugned proceedings under Section 133 Cr.P.C cannot
be sustained. The same is accordingly set aside and quashed.
41.
This petition is accordingly allowed and the interim order passed is
hereby made absolute.
42.
Before parting, it may be pointed out that if there is a genuine case
of public nuisance as regard the afflux into the said drain, it is open to any
member of the public affected by such nuisance, if at all, to initiate
proceedings in a proper manner.
43.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
07.06.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
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