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2016:SHC:125-DB
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Criminal Appeal Jurisdiction)
DATED : 17th AUGUST, 2016
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------D.B. : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl.A. No.02 of 2016
(Jail Appeal)
Appellant
Ram Kumar Basnett,
:
S/o Prem Lall Basnett,
Aged about 38 years,
R/o Lower Tinzering, Arithang Busty,
West Sikkim.
[Presently in Central Prison,
Rongyek, East Sikkim]
versus
Respondent
:
State of Sikkim
Appeal under Chapter XXIX of Section 374(2)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Sudesh Joshi, Legal Aid Counsel with Ms. Tengop Subba,
Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr. Karma Thinlay Namgyal, Additional Public Prosecutor with
Mr. S. K. Chettri and Mrs. Pollin Rai, Assistant Public Prosecutors
for the State.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
The Judgment and Order on Sentence dated 06-08-2013
convicting the Appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
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Crl.A. No.02 of 2016
Ram Kumar Basnett
(for
short
“IPC”),
and
vs.
sentencing
State of Sikkim
him
to
undergo
simple
imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five
thousand) only, with a default stipulation, in S.T. Case No.18 of 2011,
in the Court of the Learned Sessions Judge, South and West Sikkim at
Namchi, has been assailed in the instant Appeal.
2.
The Appellant’s grievance before this Court is that his
conviction is based solely on the uncorroborated statements of the
child witnesses, P.W.6 and P.W.7, by placing reliance on their
statements under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for
short “Cr.P.C.”) ignoring the fact that those statements had been
demolished in their cross-examination in the Court.
That in any
event the statement of a witness recorded under Section 164 of the
Cr.P.C. cannot be used as substantive evidence and is only for the
purpose of contradiction and corroboration.
To buttress this
argument, reliance was placed on George and Others vs. State of
Kerala and Another1 and R. Shaji vs. State of Kerala2. Emphasis was
also laid on the fact that P.W.6 and P.W.7 were child witnesses, but
their evidence was not closely scrutinised to rule out tutoring.
Reliance
was
placed
on
the
decision
of
Alagupandi
alias
Alagupandian vs. State of Tamil Nadu3; Radhey Shyam vs. State of
Rajasthan4 and State of Rajasthan vs. Chandgi Ram and Others5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
(1998) 4 SCC 605
(2013) 14 SCC 266
(2012) 10 SCC 451
(2014) 5 SCC 389
(2014) 14 SCC 596
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Referring to the unusual behaviour of P.W.5 inasmuch as he took
twenty-five minutes to reach the place of occurrence (for short “P.O.”)
after learning of the assault, it was put forth that this circumstance
has also not been given any consideration by the Learned Trial Court.
That, Exhibit 23, the FIR, has been lodged on hearsay. It was further
canvassed that chemical analysis of M.O.I, the weapon of offence,
could not link the weapon to the murder of the victim as no blood of
human origin was detected therein, the question of disintegration of
the blood being immaterial as the Analyst has made no such
observation.
Consequently, the recovery of M.O.I under Exhibit 12
the statement of the Appellant under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “the Evidence Act”), has no evidentiary
value. On the above counts reference was made to the decision in
Nirmal Kumar vs. State of U.P.6; Sk. Yusuf vs. State of West Bengal7
and State of M.P. vs. Kriparam8.
It is the further case of the
Appellant that the evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.7 nowhere reveals that
the Appellant was inside the house with the victim at the time of the
alleged incident. It was also urged that even assuming that the victim
did utter the words “Baba ley katyo” does not necessarily mean that
“your Father cut me” as translated, as P.W.6 and P.W.7 have not stated
that the victim had told them that their father had chopped her,
besides which the Prosecution failed to lead evidence to establish
6.
7.
8.
1993 Supp (1) SCC 510
(2011) 11 SCC 754
(2003) 12 SCC 675
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that P.W.6 and P.W.7 used to address their father as “Baba”. As the
evidence of the child witnesses P.W.6 and P.W.7 are uncorroborated,
mere recovery of M.O.I does not assist the Prosecution case,
consequently the Learned Trial Court has erred in convicting the
Appellant and the impugned Judgment and Order on Sentence be set
aside.
3.
Learned
Additional
Public
Prosecutor
per
contra
contended that the evidence of P.W.1 has to be read alongside the
evidence of P.Ws 5, 6 and 7 which establishes the hand of the
Appellant in the crime. Reliance was also placed on the evidence of
P.W.8 and P.W.9 witnesses to the disclosure statement of the
Appellant, which cogently established recovery of M.O.I.
That,
merely because blood was not detected on the ‘khukuri’, does not
absolve the Appellant of the heinous offence, since it is not disputed
that the CFSL, Kolkata, examined M.O.I after about one month of the
incident, on this count, reliance was placed on Mritunjoy Biswas vs.
Pranab alias Kuti Biswas and Another9. That obviously with the
passage of time the chemical composition of the blood would have
disintegrated but non-detection of human blood does not prove the
innocence of the Appellant, on this submission, reliance was placed
on Sunil Clifford Daniel vs. State of Punjab10. Apart from the
evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.7 who were at the spot, the Appellant’s
9. (2013) 12 SCC 796
10. (2012) 11 SCC 205
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statement in Exhibit 12 disclosing the place where M.O.I was
concealed by him is clearly admissible under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. On this point, L earned Additional Public Prosecutor
placed reliance on Praveen Kumar vs. State of Karnataka11 and
Nagaraj vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, Salem Town,
Tamil Nadu12. That, P.W.6 and P.W.7 have admitted that the
statement of the victim “Baba ley katyo” were heard by them and is,
therefore, a cogent dying declaration made by the victim when
conscious. To buttress his submission, reliance was placed on Atbir
vs. Government of NCT of Delhi13 and Parbin Ali and Another vs.
State of Assam14. At the same time, there was no reason for P.W.6
and P.W.7 to falsely implicate their father, while their evidence of his
involvement has remained consistent. Support on this aspect was
drawn from the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bishan Singh
and Others vs. The State of Punjab15.
That the Appellant’s
involvement in the offence is apparent from his absconsion from the
P.O. on 09-06-2011, after the incident and his arrest by the Police
only on 13-06-2011, after being traced by them. Vouching for the
veracity of Exhibit 23, it was submitted that the evidence of the
Investigating Officer reveals that the assault took place on 09-06-2011
and the FIR Exhibit 23 was lodged on 09-06-2011 itself, at around 2130
hours as reflected in Exhibit 24 after Lok Bahadur Basnett (P.W.16)
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(2003) 12 SCC 199
(2015) 4 SCC 739
(2010) 9 SCC 1 (Paras 17 and 22)
(2013) 2 SCC 81
(1974) 3 SCC 288
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learnt of the incident. It was also urged that although P.W.6 had been
declared hostile it is not necessary that his entire evidence is beyond
the scope of consideration, and if it is cogent and corroborated by
other evidence the statement of the hostile witness can still be a
ground for holding the accused guilty of the crime committed.
Hence, considering the grounds enumerated above, it was prayed
that the Appeal be dismissed.
4.
We have carefully considered the rival contentions raised
by Learned Counsel before this Court and have also minutely
perused the entire evidence and documents on record, including the
impugned Judgment and Order on Sentence. The question that arises
for consideration is, whether the Appellant had committed the
offence under Section 302 of the IPC or whether he was erroneously
convicted by the Learned Trial Court?
5.
In order to gauge the above, it is imperative to traverse
through the facts of the case.
Lok Bahadur Basnett (P.W.16), the
younger brother of the Appellant, lodged Exhibit 23, the FIR, before
the Gayzing Police Station on 09-06-2011 at around 2130 hours,
informing therein that, his elder brother (the Appellant), who had
been living at Lower Arithang, Khunduray, West Sikkim, along with
his wife and children, had fatally assaulted his wife on her neck with
a ‘khukuri’. Consequently, Gayzing Police Station Case No.13/2011
dated 09-06-2011 under Section 302 of the IPC was registered against
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the Appellant and taken up for investigation, which revealed that, on
the evening of 09-06-2011 the Appellant returned home at around
1300 hours with some grocery which later became the cause of a
heated altercation between the deceased and the Appellant.
The
enraged Appellant who was standing behind the victim assaulted her
with M.O.I on the back of her neck, on which she fell to the floor,
meanwhile the Appellant absconded from the P.O.
Saren Basnett
(P.W.6) and Sunil Basnett (P.W.7) the sons of the Appellant and the
deceased who were playing behind the house heard their mother’s
cry of pain “aiya” and rushed towards the house, and simultaneously
they saw, the Appellant running into the jungle. Their mother was
lying in the kitchen in a pool of blood oozing from her neck. On
enquiry by them, their mother informed them that the Appellant had
assaulted her with M.O.I and asked them to call Nar Bahadur Limboo
P.W.5 (their immediate neighbour). P.W.6 went to call P.W.5 who at
the time was milking his cow, duly informing him of the assault by
the Appellant on their mother. P.W.5 reached the P.O. after sometime
and informed the other neighbours while also directing P.W.6 and
P.W.7 to inform their uncle at Arithang, Tinzering Busty, about the
murder. During investigation Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of P.Ws
5, 6 and 7 were recorded, while M.O.I was later recovered from
Borong Busty, South Sikkim, on the disclosure statement (Exhibit 12)
of the Appellant made in presence of the witnesses P.W.8 and P.W.9
and seized by the Police. On the basis of the evidence so collected,
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Charge-Sheet was submitted against the Appellant under Section 302
IPC and the Learned Trial Court finding prima facie materials, framed
Charge accordingly. The Prosecution examined twenty-one witnesses
in support of their case, on closure of which the Appellant was duly
examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and on 06-08-2013 the
impugned Judgment and Order on Sentence was pronounced as
aforesaid.
6.
While delving into the argument of Learned Counsel for
the Appellant that the evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.7 requires close
scrutiny being child witnesses and that their evidence in Court failed
to support the Prosecution case, in Radhey Shyam vs. State of
Rajasthan4 (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court while referring to the
decision of Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak vs. State of Gujarat16
observed as follows;
“11. In Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak, this Court
considered the evidentiary value of the testimony of a
child witness and observed as under: (SCC pp.67-68,
para 7)
“7. … The decision on the question
whether the child witness has sufficient
intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge
who notices his manners, his apparent
possession or lack of intelligence, and the said
Judge may resort to any examination which will
tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as
well as his understanding of the obligation of an
oath. The decision of the trial court may,
however, be disturbed by the higher court if
from what is preserved in the records, it is clear
that his conclusion was erroneous. This
precaution is necessary because child witnesses
are amenable to tutoring and often live in a
world of make-believe. Though it is an
16. (2004) 1 SCC 64
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established principle that child witnesses are
dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and
liable to be influenced easily, shaken and
moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if
after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court
comes to the conclusion that there is an impress
of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of
accepting the evidence of a child witness.”
In the same Judgment, reference was also made to Panchhi and
Others vs. State of U.P.17 wherein it was also observed that –
“12. In Panchhi, after reiterating the same
principles, this Court observed that the evidence of a
child witness must be evaluated more carefully and
with greater circumspection because a child is
susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and,
thus, a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring. This
Court further observed that the courts have held that
the evidence of a child witness must find adequate
corroboration before it is relied upon. But, it is more a
rule of practical wisdom than of law. It is not
necessary to refer to other judgments cited by learned
counsel because they reiterate the same principles. The
conclusion which can be deduced from the relevant
pronouncements of this Court is that the evidence of a
child witness must be subjected to close scrutiny to
rule out the possibility of tutoring. It can be relied
upon if the court finds that the child witness has
sufficient intelligence and understanding of the
obligation of an oath. As a matter of caution, the court
must find adequate corroboration to the child witness'
evidence. If found reliable and truthful and
corroborated by other evidence on record, it can be
accepted without hesitation. We will scrutinise PW 2
Banwari's evidence in light of the above principles.”
7.
On the anvil of the observations supra it may be
remarked that P.W.6 and P.W.7 were found competent to depose by
the Learned Trial Court after they gave rational answers to questions
put to them in terms of Section 118 of the Evidence Act.
In view of
this circumstance, we may now carefully examine and analyse the
17. (1998) 7 SCC 177
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evidence of P.W.6 a child witness. According to him, “On 8th July,
2011, at around 5:30 in the evening when I was at home and playing with
my younger brother Sunil Basnett in the courtyard of our house, my father
(accused) and mother was (sic) inside the house, thereafter I donot know
what happened.” He was declared hostile by the Prosecution having
resiled from his Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement. On careful perusal of
his cross-examination, he has stated that “It is true that we were playing
outside our house on the relevant day as such I did not see nor do I know if
my father was in the kitchen with my mother.” Thus, although he did
not know whether his father was in the kitchen the fact that his father
was indeed inside the house was not demolished. It is not the case of
the Appellant that any other person had visited his house at the
relevant point of time or even thereafter, until P.W.5 was called to the
P.O. by P.W.6 and P.W.7 after the traumatic and heinous incident,
hence the “last seen theory” which is an important link in the chain of
circumstances that would point towards the guilt of the accused with
some certainty falls into place here. This theory requires the Courts to
shift the burden to the accused and the accused to offer a reasonable
explanation as to the cause of death of the deceased in terms of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It was held in Nizam and Another
vs. State of Rajasthan18 that –
“15. Elaborating the principle of "last seen alive"
in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram [(2006) 12 SCC 254], this
Court held as under: (SCC p. 265, para 23)
18. (2016) 1 SCC 550
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“23. It is not necessary to multiply with
authorities. The principle is well settled. The
provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act
itself are unambiguous and categorical in laying
down that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of a person, the burden of proving
that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last
seen with the deceased, he must offer an
explanation as to how and when he parted
company. He must furnish an explanation which
appears to the court to be probable and
satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to
have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an
explanation on the basis of facts within his
special knowledge, he fails to discharge the
burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the
Evidence Act. In a case resting on
circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to
offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of
the burden placed on him, that itself provides an
additional link in the chain of circumstances
proved against him. Section 106 does not shift
the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is
always upon the prosecution. It lays down the
rule that when the accused does not throw
any light
upon facts which are specially
within his knowledge and which could not
support any theory or hypothesis compatible
with his innocence, the court can consider his
failure to adduce any explanation, as an
additional link which completes the chain. The
principle has been succinctly stated in Naina
Mohamed, In re. [AIR 1960 Mad 218]”
The above judgment was relied upon and reiterated
in Kiriti Pal v. State of W.B. [(2015) 11 SCC 178]”
[emphasis supplied]
In the light of the above observation, it is evident that the
Appellant was in the house with the deceased and despite being
afforded an opportunity under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has not
explained where else he was at the time of the incident nor
extended any plausible explanation on the death of the victim,
thereby failing to discharge the burden cast upon him.
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8.
vs.
State of Sikkim
That having been said, when P.W.6 was declared hostile
and cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor, he was confronted with
his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., Exhibit 9, which was read
over and explained to him in the Nepali vernacular. It was enquired
from the child witness as to whether he had made such a statement to
the Magistrate, this was affirmed by the child. He has categorically
stated that “I was not tutored by anybody to depose in the manner that I
had done and recorded in my statement Exhibit 9.” According to him,
Exhibit 8, i.e., the questions put to him by the Magistrate and Exhibit
9 his statement, were prepared at Gayzing and read over to him and
explained by the Magistrate who had recorded the same statement.
The witness went on to state in his evidence before the Court that “On
the relevant incident of the evening there were no other persons except my
parents and us i.e. myself and my brother Sunil. I had also gone to
inform about the death of my mother to the old man Nar Bdr. Limboo but he
was not at home and I came back. Thereafter my brother Sunil went to the
house of Nar Bdr. Limboo and informed him about the incident. After about
five minutes the said Nar Bdr. Limboo came to our house.” The above
statements of the witness under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. have not
been demolished by the defence cross-examination. That apart, his
deposition clearly points to the incident of the evening and how he
went to inform P.W.5, but returned as P.W.5 was not at home,
following which P.W.7 went to inform P.W.5, resultant the evidence
of P.W.6 in the Court with regard to the incident has not been
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demolished whatsoever under cross-examination, save to the effect
that, though he had given his statement at Gayzing, he did not know
what he had stated. This obviously would stem from the fact that the
statement was made by him on 20-06-2011 and his evidence was
recorded on 25-07-2012. The evidence of P.W.7 read conjointly with
the evidence of P.W.6, corroborates the fact that P.W.6 first went to
call P.W.5 followed by P.W.7.
9.
Now, the question that would arise is why would P.W.6
and P.W.7 have gone to the house of P.W.5. At this point, it would be
beneficial to extract the evidence of P.W.7;
“…………………………………………..
I know the accused present in the dock as he is my
father.
On 09.07.2011, in the evening I was playing with
my elder brother Saren Basnett in our field. My mother was
inside the house. Suddenly, we heard my mother crying
‘Aiya’ (expression of pain) we entered inside the house. We
saw our mother bleeding profusely from the neck. My
mother told “Baba ley katyo’ (your father cut me). She also
told us “Bajay lai bolai day’” (call the old man). Bajay lives
below our house. First my brother Saren Basnett went to
call Bajay but he did not come so I went and told Bajay about
the incident and called him to our house. He came after some
time. The said bajay got scared to see the condition of my
mother and went out to call Falaiza Saila. He came back and
sent me and my brother to our paternal uncle Lok Bdr.
Basnett where we told the entire thing to our paternal
grandfather Prem Lall Basnett and paternal uncle Lok Bdr.
Basnett. In connection with this case I made my statement
at Gyalshing Thana. Exhibit 10 consisting of three pages is
a document prepared at Gyalshing Thana wherein Exhibit
10(a), 10(b) and 10(c) are my signatures. Exhibit 11
consisting of two pages is another document prepared at
Gyalshing Thana wherein Exhibit 11(a) and 11(b) are my
signatures.”
As per P.W.7, the victim told him and P.W.6 that “Baba ley
katyo’ (Father cut me).” She also told them “Bajay lai bolai day” (call the
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old man).” On carefully walking through the cross-examination of this
witness, not a single line of the above statements have been
demolished by cross-examination, neither was the witness confronted
with Exhibit 10 or Exhibit 11 in Court, to controvert his evidence in
chief or for that matter the statements made by him under Section 164
of the Cr.P.C. It is also apparent from the records that Exhibit 9,
Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. statement of the P.W.6 was read over to him
in the Court room and he admitted to having made the statements. It
goes without saying that evidence under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. is
not substantive evidence, but can be relied upon for the purposes of
corroborating statements made by the witnesses before the Magistrate
or to contradict the same, as the Defence at that time will have had no
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The statements of P.W.6
and P.W.7 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. stand duly corroborated.
10.
It is no one’s case that either P.W.6 or P.W.7 witnessed
the incident but P.W.7 has deposed that when he heard his mother
crying ‘aiya’, he along with P.W.6 entered the house and found their
mother in the condition already described by him hereinabove. One
cannot even begin to imagine the trauma the child went through on
seeing his mother in that state, nevertheless, despite the condition of
the victim, P.W.6 and later P.W.7 after calling P.W.5 also went to
inform P.W.1 of the incident. The fact of arrival of P.W.6 and P.W.7 in
the house of P.W.5 was not controverted in the cross-examination of
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P.W.5 who deposed that “It is not a fact that neither of the sons had not
come to my house. …….. It is not a fact that the son of the accused did not
tell me that his father (accused) cut his mother.” Thus, the evidence of
P.W.5 clearly supports the evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.7 firstly with
regard to their having gone to his house, and thereafter to the effect
that their father had cut the victim. The evidence of P.W.5 that he
informed Tek Bahadur Chettri (P.W.19) and Ranbir Limboo (P.W.12)
is duly corroborated by the said witnesses. P.W.1 has stated that
P.W.6 and P.W.7 had come to his residence and P.W.6 told him “Aama
ta chutti bhayo”. Roughly translated from the Nepali vernacular into
English, it would mean that, “mother has been done away with”.
Although in cross-examination, he has denied that his grandson told
him that the Appellant had cut and killed their mother, the fact
remains that P.Ws. 6 and 7 had indeed gone to P.W.1 to inform him of
the incident at the instance of P.W.5.
11.
While dealing with the question of hostile witness, we
may refer to Govindaraju alias Govinda vs. State by Sriramapuram
Police Station and Another19, wherein it was held that–
“36. It is also not always necessary that
wherever the witness turned hostile, the prosecution
case must fail. Firstly, the part of the statement of such
hostile witnesses that supports the case of the
prosecution can always be taken into consideration.
Secondly, where the sole witness is an eyewitness who
can give a graphic account of the events which he had
witnessed, with some precision cogently and if such a
statement is corroborated by other evidence,
19. (2012) 4 SCC 722
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documentary or otherwise, then such statement in face
of the hostile witness can still be a ground for holding
the accused guilty of the crime that was committed.
The court has to act with greater caution and accept
such evidence with greater degree of care in order to
ensure that justice alone is done. The evidence so
considered should unequivocally point towards the
guilt of the accused.”
In light of the above decision, it is clear that the evidence of
P.W.6 despite being declared hostile, points to the fact of the offence,
as already discussed hereinabove having remained undemolished. It
may also be pointed out here that the evidence of the Prosecution
Witnesses corroborate each other and there is no lacunae to make the
Prosecution story improbable.
12.
Coming to the argument that the Prosecution has failed
to establish that M.O.I is the weapon of offence, for which reliance
was placed by the Appellant on the evidence of P.W.14 Sujit Kr.
Mallick, Junior Scientific Officer (Biology) of CFSL, Kolkata, his
evidence reveals that he examined M.O.I, the ‘khukuri’ forwarded to
him by the
SP,
CID,
PHQ,
Gangtok, in connection with the
instant matter but that the blood found therein was not of human
origin. The first fact that is established by the evidence of this witness
is that, M.O.I contained blood, we cannot help but agree with the
submission of the Prosecution that over time there is bound to be
disintegration of the chemical composition of the blood as evidently
the seizure of M.O.I was made on 14-06-2011, vide Seizure Memo
Exhibit 15, while analysis was carried out on 29-09-2011 and the
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incident occurred on 09-06-2011. Exhibit 21 has been carefully
perused by this Court, in which the Expert has opined that Blood was
detected on M.O.I. He has deposed that the blood was not of human
origin, although this statement finds no place in Exhibit 21, thus it is
nebulous as to on what basis the Expert, has opined that the blood
was not of human origin.
It would be worthwhile perusing the
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in R. Shaji vs. State of Kerala2
(supra) on this count where it held as follows;
“30. It has been argued by the learned counsel
for the appellant, that as the blood group of the
bloodstains found on the chopper could not be
ascertained, the recovery of the said chopper cannot be
relied upon.
31.
A failure by the serologist to detect the
origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum does
not mean that the blood stuck on the axe could not have been
human blood at all. Sometimes it is possible, either
because the stain is insufficient in itself, or due to
hematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that
a serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood in
question. However, in such a case, unless the doubt is
of a reasonable dimension, which a judicially
conscientious mind may entertain with some
objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused in
this regard. Once the recovery is made in pursuance of
a disclosure statement made by the accused, the
matching or non-matching of blood group(s) loses
significance. (Vide Prabhu Babaji Navle v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 51], Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v.
State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 74], State of Rajasthan v. Teja
Ram [(1999) 3 SCC 507], Gura Singh v. State of
Rajasthan [AIR 2001 SC 330], John Pandian v. State [(2010) 14
SCC 129] and Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab [(2012)
11 SCC 205].
32. In view of the above, the Court finds that it
is not possible to accept the submission that in the
absence of a report regarding the origin of the blood,
the accused cannot be convicted, for it is only because
of the lapse of time that the blood could not be
classified successfully. Therefore, no advantage can be
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Ram Kumar Basnett
vs.
State of Sikkim
conferred upon the accused to enable him to claim any
benefit, and the report of disintegration of blood, etc.
cannot be termed as a missing link, on the basis of
which the chain of circumstances may be presumed to
be broken.”
In Sunil Clifford Daniel vs. State of Punjab10 (supra) it was
observed as hereunder;
“42. A similar issue arose for consideration by
this Court in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 2001 SC
330], wherein the Court, relying upon earlier judgments
of this Court, particularly in Prabhu Babaji Navle v. State
of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 51], Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v.
State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 74] and Teja Ram (SCC p. 514,
para 25) observed that a failure by the serologist to detect
the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum,
does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe would not have
been human blood at all. Sometimes it is possible, either
because the stain is too insufficient, or due to
haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that
a serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood.
However, in such a case, unless the doubt is of a
reasonable dimension, which a judicially conscientious
mind may entertain, with some objectivity, no benefit
can be claimed by the accused, in this regard.”
[emphasis supplied]
13.
The above observations holds good for the purposes of
the instant case for the reasons already discussed. The question of
human blood not being found on M.O.I could also be attributed to the
fact that it was concealed by the Appellant on 09-06-2011 whereas
recovery was made on 14-06-2011. It is not the Appellant’s case that
M.O.I was in its scabbard. Concomitant to the above finding is the
seizure of M.O.I on the basis of the statement of the Appellant,
Exhibit 12, recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, in the
presence of witnesses, Bikash Pradhan (P.W.8) and Rudra Bahadur
Chettri (P.W.9). The Appellant has clearly stated therein that he had
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Ram Kumar Basnett
vs.
State of Sikkim
concealed the ‘khukuri’ near a Monastery in Borong, South Sikkim,
below the road. P.W.8 has admitted that the Appellant made the
statement as recorded in Exhibit 12 in his presence as well as that of
P.W.9, before the Police and their signatures were duly affixed
therein, his evidence withstood the gruelling cross-examination.
P.W.9 has corroborated the evidence of P.W.8 and this witness has
also not buckled under cross-examination, thereby establishing
recovery of M.O.I.
14.
The point canvassed by Learned Additional Public
Prosecutor is that it cannot be denied that the statement made by the
mother “Baba lay katyo” was a dying declaration as provided under
Section 32 of the Evidence Act and has to be extended due
consideration.
Resisting this argument Learned Counsel for the
Appellant contended that, the Prosecution has led no evidence to
establish that “Baba” meant the Appellant.
Pausing here for a
moment, it would be pertinent to point that it is common knowledge
that, one parent while referring to their spouse in a conversation with
their children would address them as “Baba” (father) and “Ama”
(mother) and not as “my husband” or “my wife”. Clearly what the
victim meant when she said “Baba” was that it was the “Father” of
P.W.6 and P.W.7. The presence of the father in the house as already
discussed has been established the Appellant having failed to prove
otherwise under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case,
although the conviction is not based solely on the dying declaration
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Ram Kumar Basnett
vs.
State of Sikkim
of the victim, but despite comprising of only words it is indeed
entitled to great weight. In Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi13
(supra) the parameters of considering a dying declaration was laid
down as follows;
“21. The same view has been reiterated by a
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
Panneerselvam v. State of T.N. [(2008) 17 SCC 190] and also
the principles governing the dying declaration as
summed up in Paniben v. State of Gujarat [(1992) 2 SCC
474].
22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly
shows that:
..............................................................................
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not
contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be
rejected.
(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be
discarded.
.............................................................................”
15.
Based on the said parameters, it is clear that merely
because the statement is a brief, it is not to be discarded.
Dr. Ong
Tshering Lepcha who conducted the post-mortem examination of the
victim and was examined as P.W.20 in his cross-examination has
nowhere stated that, the victim was not in a condition to utter the
three final words before her life was snuffed out. He has stated that
post-mortem was conducted on 10-06-2011 and the following injuries
were found on examination;
“Ante-mortem injuries:1. ......................................................
2. Chop wound (13 x 5 x 3.8 cms.) placed below the
occipital protuberance. It extends horizontally
across the neck with clean cut margin and beveling
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Ram Kumar Basnett
vs.
State of Sikkim
present over the upper border. The left end of the
wound is placed 5 cm. and right end of the would
(sic) is 4 cm. above the hair line. The wound
involves the skin, muscle, bone, artery, veins, nerves
and the spinal cord.
3. Vertebral artery is incised and the vessel is clean
cut.
4. There is fracture of first cervical spine with
complete resection of the odontoid process.
.............................................................................
The approximate time since death was around
12 to 18 hours and the cause of death to the best of my
knowledge and belief was due to incised/chop wound
of the neck involving the major vessels and spinal cord
as a result of homicidal chop wound. .........................”
The injuries were in the back of her neck thereby ruling out the
possibility that her vocal chords were damaged.
Hence, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary there is no reason to
disbelieve the evidence that she had uttered the words.
16.
The matter being based entirely on circumstantial
evidence, consequently motive assumes an important role in the
matter. It is settled Law that in cases of circumstantial evidence, the
facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused and the chain of evidence must be so complete
and unbroken to clinchingly point to his guilt.
In this context, we
may refer to the evidence of Birendra Chettri (P.W.2), Ram Kumar
Chettri (P.W.3), Narendra Basnett (P.W.4), Lok Bahadur Basnett
(P.W.16) which reveal that the Appellant and the deceased had
acrimonious relations on account of physical assaults by the
Appellant on the deceased. They have also identified Exhibit 1 as an
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Ram Kumar Basnett
vs.
State of Sikkim
‘Akarnama’ submitted at the Tashiding O.P. after one such assault and
subsequent amicable settlement between them. Dr. Karma Duryth
Bhutia (P.W.17) had examined the victim on 08-05-2011 at 1330 hrs.,
having been forwarded by the Tashiding O.P. with an alleged history
of having been assaulted by her husband and found simple injuries on
her person. H/C Hangu Tshering Lepcha (P.W.13) vouched for the
fact that the victim had lodged a Complaint at the Tashiding O.P.
accusing the Appellant of physically assaulting her and threatening
her with dire consequences.
The tragic fatal assault is evidently on
outcome of the simmering differences.
17.
The evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.7 indubitably point to the
guilt of the Appellant since nothing good would be gained by them by
falsely implicating their father, had he not been there at the time of the
incident. In Bishan Singh and Others vs. The State of Punjab15 (supra)
relied on by Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it has been held at
Paragraph 16, inter alia, as follows;
“16. .................... Normally a close relative of
the deceased would be most reluctant to spare the real
assailants and falsely mention the names of other
persons as those responsible for causing injuries to the
deceased. ............................”
In the case at hand, records are devoid of any acrimony
between the Appellant and his sons.
18.
One more circumstance that works against the Appellant
is his disappearance from the P.O. after the incident and his arrest
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Ram Kumar Basnett
only on 13-06-2011.
vs.
State of Sikkim
It is, of course, established Law that merely
because a person has absconded from the P.O., it cannot be held that
he was guilty, but the surrounding circumstances have also to be
carefully considered. In the above backdrop, it may be considered
that the Appellant found by the Police on 13-06-2016 after they
launched a search for him, followed by disclosure statement, Exhibit
12 pursuant to which M.O.I was recovered.
19.
It is also a settled principle of Law that a child witness
can be a competent witness provided that the statement of such
witnesses is reliable, cogent, truthful and corroborated by other
Prosecution evidence. The evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.7 have been
unwavering in light of the foregoing discussions.
20.
In conclusion, having carefully considered the entire
evidence on record and to the fact that the evidence of P.W.6 and
P.W.7 was duly corroborated by the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.5 and
by the evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.9 with regard to the recovery of
M.O.I, it goes without saying that there is clinching and unbroken
chain of evidence against the Appellant which fully supports the
Prosecution case.
21.
In consideration of the entire facts and circumstances and
the discussions hereinabove, the impugned Judgment and Order on
Sentence passed by the Learned Sessions Judge warrants no
interference by this Court.
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Ram Kumar Basnett
State of Sikkim
22.
Lacking in merit, the Appeal stands dismissed.
23.
No order as to costs.
24.
Copy of this Judgment be sent to the Learned Trial Court.
25.
Records of the Court below be remitted forthwith.
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
17-08-2016
Approved for reporting : Yes
Internet : Yes
ds
vs.
( Satish Kumar Agnihotri )
Acting Chief Justice
17-08-2016
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