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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.684 of 2025
======================================================
Ram Babu Verma S/o Rajeshwar Prasad Verma, R/o Vill- Ahiyapur, P.S.Bikram, Dist.- Patna (Bihar).
... ... Petitioner/s
1.
Versus
The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna.
2.
The Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna.
3.
District Magistrate, Patna.
4.
Additional District Magistrate, Patna.
5.
Sub Divisional Officer, Danapur, Patna (Bihar).
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s
For the Respondent/s
:
:
Mr. Atul Dayal, Advocate
Mr. Dheerjati Kumar Prasad, G.P-14
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DR. ANSHUMAN
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 22-06-2026
Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and
learned counsel for the State.
2. The petitioner has filed writ petition with the
following reliefs:That this writ application is
being filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking
the issuance of an appropriate writ/Writs,
order/orders, direction/directions to set aside
the order passed by the District Magistrate,
Patna dated 07.10.2007, which imposed the
punishment of reduction in rank and stoppage
of increments. The said order was
subsequently confirmed and the petitioner's
appeal was dismissed by the Divisional
Commissioner, Patna vide order dated
29.03.2011.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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that the petitioner was working as a Clerk in the office of the
Supply Officer, Patna. During the Three-tier Panchayat
Elections, 2001, he was entrusted with the additional
responsibility of being in charge of issuance of fuel supply
coupons for light vehicles. It is alleged that he misused the fuel
coupons by forging the signatures of his superior officers and
attempted to defalcate an amount of Rs. 45,677/-. In this
connection, an FIR was instituted as Gandhi Maidan P.S. Case
No. 144 of 2001 dated 04.06.2001 under Sections 467, 468,
471, 409 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
4. Learned counsel further submits that, apart
from the criminal prosecution, a departmental proceeding was
also initiated against the petitioner and a 'Prapatra-Ka' was
issued vide Memo No. 2302 dated 03.11.2001. The petitioner
submitted his show-cause reply on 11.09.2002, whereafter his
suspension was revoked vide Memo No. 595 dated 12.04.2005.
Subsequently, the District Magistrate, Patna concluded the
departmental proceeding bearing Record No. 31-7/2001 and,
vide order dated 07.10.2007, imposed two punishments upon
the petitioner, namely: (i) reduction to the basic pay and
disqualification from future promotion; and (ii) denial of salary
for the period of suspension except the subsistence allowance
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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already paid. The said punishment was communicated through
Memo No. 31-7/2001/4014 dated 29.10.2007.
5. It is further submitted that the criminal trial
culminated in the acquittal of the petitioner by the learned
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patna, vide judgment dated
11.05.2010 passed in G.R. No. 1655 of 2001/Trial No. 895 of
2010. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred Service Appeal No. 77
of 2008 before the Divisional Commissioner, Patna. However,
without considering the effect of the acquittal or the grounds
urged by the petitioner, the appeal was dismissed vide order
dated 29.03.2011, as contained in Annexure P/3 to the writ
petition.
6. Learned counsel further submits that, in the
meantime, the petitioner had filed CWJC No. 19832 of 2012
challenging
the
decision
of
the
District
Establishment/Promotion Committee dated 22.09.2012. The
said writ petition was disposed of by a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court vide judgment dated 20.08.2024. It is only thereafter
that the present writ petition has been filed challenging the
order of punishment dated 07.10.2007 passed by the District
Magistrate, Patna as well as the appellate order dated
29.03.2011 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna.
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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7. In support of his submissions, learned counsel
for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat
Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679, and
G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in (2006) 5
SCC 446. It is contended that where a delinquent employee is
acquitted in a criminal case arising out of the same set of facts
and evidence, such acquittal ought to be given due
consideration while examining the validity of the disciplinary
action. It is submitted that, in the present case, the departmental
proceeding and the criminal prosecution emanated from the
very same allegations and were founded upon identical facts.
Therefore, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case
ought to have been duly considered by the appellate authority.
Since the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments has not
been taken into account, the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs
prayed for. Accordingly, it is prayed that the orders passed by
the District Magistrate and the Divisional Commissioner be set
aside and all consequential benefits be granted to the petitioner.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
State
raises
a
preliminary
objection
with
regard
to
maintainability on the ground of gross delay and laches. It is
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submitted that the order of punishment was passed by the
disciplinary authority on 07.10.2007 after holding five charges
to have been proved against the petitioner. The said order was
affirmed by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna vide appellate
order dated 29.03.2011. However, the petitioner approached
this Court only in the year 2024/2025, after an inordinate delay
of about fourteen years. It is, therefore, contended that the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
9. It is further submitted that the explanation
offered by the petitioner, namely, that he could not approach
this Court earlier due to the pendency of CWJC No. 19832 of
2012, is wholly misconceived. The said writ petition pertained
to the decision of the District Establishment/Promotion
Committee regarding promotion, whereas the present writ
petition challenges the order of punishment passed in the
disciplinary proceeding and the appellate order affirming the
same. Thus, both causes of action are entirely distinct and
independent.
10. In support of the aforesaid contention,
learned counsel for the State has relied upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration & Ors. v.
Kaushilya Thakur & Anr., reported in (2012) 5 SCC 412,
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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particularly paragraphs 10 and 11, wherein it has been held that
an unexplained delay of several years in approaching the writ
court is fatal and cannot be ignored.
11. Further reliance has been placed on State
Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, reported
in (2011) 4 SCC 584, particularly paragraph 10, wherein it has
been held that a subsequent acquittal by a criminal court does
not invalidate a disciplinary proceeding that has already
attained finality, nor does it affect the findings of guilt or the
punishment imposed therein.
12. Learned counsel has also relied upon the
judgments rendered in Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2011) 9 SCC 94, and
Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. M. Mani,
(2018) 1 SCC 285, in support of the same proposition.
13. It is lastly submitted that a perusal of the
judgment of acquittal itself would show that the petitioner was
not honourably acquitted on merits. Rather, he was acquitted
because the prosecution failed to produce its witnesses and
consequently failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable
doubt. Such an acquittal, according to the learned State counsel,
does not entitle the petitioner to seek interference with the
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disciplinary proceedings.
14. Having considered the rival submissions and
upon perusal of the materials available on record, it transpires
that the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment
against the petitioner on 07.10.2007, which was affirmed by the
appellate authority on 29.03.2011. The present writ petition has
been instituted only in December, 2024 (numbered in January,
2025), after an unexplained delay of nearly fourteen years.
15. This Court also feels it necessary to deal
with the judgement relied upon by the leaned counsel for the
petitioner in Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs Bharat Gold Mines
Ltd. And Another (supra) paragraph 34 and 35 whereof is
reproduced as under :“34. There is yet another
reason for discarding the whole of the case
of the respondents. As pointed out earlier,
the criminal case as also the departmental
proceedings were based on identical set of
facts, namely, “the raid conducted at the
appellant's residence and recovery of
incriminating articles therefrom”. The
findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a
copy of which has been placed before us,
indicate that the charges framed against
the appellant were sought to be proved by
police officers and panch witnesses, who
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had raided the house of the appellant and
had effected recovery. They were the only
witnesses examined by the enquiry officer
and the enquiry officer, relying upon their
statements, came to the conclusion that the
charges were established against the
appellant.
The
same
witnesses
were
examined in the criminal case but the
Court, on a consideration of the entire
evidence, came to the conclusion that no
search was conducted nor was any
recovery made from the residence of the
appellant.
The
whole
case
of
the
prosecution was thrown out and the
appellant was acquitted. In this situation,
therefore, where the appellant is acquitted
by a judicial pronouncement with the
finding that the “raid and recovery” at the
residence of the appellant were not proved,
it would be unjust, unfair and rather
oppressive to allow the findings recorded
at the ex parte departmental proceedings
to stand.
35. Since the facts and the
evidence in both the proceedings, namely,
the departmental proceedings and the
criminal case were the same without there
being
any
iota
of
difference,
the
distinction, which is usually drawn as
between the departmental proceedings and
the criminal case on the basis of approach
and burden of proof, would not be
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applicable to the instant case.”
16. The another judgement relied upon by the
learned cousnel for the petitioner in the case of G.M. Tank
Versus State of Gujarat and Others (supra) whose paragraph
30 and 31 is relevant which is reproduced as under :“30. The judgments relied on
by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents are distinguishable on facts and
on law. In this case, the departmental
proceedings and the criminal case are based
on identical and similar set of facts and the
charge in a departmental case against the
appellant and the charge before the criminal
court are one and the same. It is true that the
nature
of
charge
in
the
departmental
proceedings and in the criminal case is grave.
The nature of the case launched against the
appellant on the basis of evidence and material
collected against him during enquiry and
investigation and as reflected in the chargesheet, factors mentioned are one and the same.
In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses
and circumstances are one and the same. In the
present case, criminal and departmental
proceedings have already noticed or granted
on the same set of facts, namely, raid
conducted
at
the
appellant's
recovery
of
articles
residence,
therefrom.
The
Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other
departmental witnesses were the only witnesses
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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examined by the enquiry officer who by relying
upon their statement came to the conclusion
that the charges were established against the
appellant. The same witnesses were examined
in the criminal case and the criminal court on
the examination came to the conclusion that
the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged
against the appellant beyond any reasonable
doubt and acquitted the appellant by its
judicial pronouncement with the finding that
the charge has not been proved. It is also to be
noticed that the judicial pronouncement was
made after a regular trial and on hot contest.
Under these circumstances, it would be unjust
and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the
findings
recorded
in
the
departmental
proceedings to stand.
31. In our opinion, such facts
and evidence in the departmental as well as
criminal proceedings were the same without
there being any iota of difference, the appellant
should succeed. The distinction which is
usually proved between the departmental and
criminal proceedings on the basis of the
approach and burden of proof would not be
applicable in the instant case. Though the
finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was
found to be valid by the courts below, when
there was an honourable acquittal of the
employee
during
the
pendency
of
the
proceedings challenging the dismissal, the
same requires to be taken note of and the
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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decision in Paul Anthony case [(1999) 3 SCC
679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] will apply. We,
therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the
appellant deserves to be allowed.”
17. On the question of delay and laches,
paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Delhi Administration & Ors. v. Kaushilya Thakur &
Anr. (supra) relied upon by the State are reproduced hereunder:
“10. We have heard Shri H.P. Raval,
learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri
Rishikesh, learned counsel for Respondent 1 and
perused the record. In our view, the impugned order
[Delhi Admn. v. Ranjodh Kumar, LPA No. 25 of
2004, order dated 22-9-2010 (Del)] as also the one
passed by the learned Single Judge [ WP (C) No.
4450 of 1993, order dated 13-3-2003 (Del)] are
liable to be set aside because while granting relief to
the husband of Respondent 1, the learned Single
Judge overlooked the fact that the writ petition had
been filed after almost 4 years of the rejection of an
application for allotment of 1000 sq yd plot made by
Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ
petitioner made further representations could not be
made a ground for ignoring the delay of more than 3
years,
more
so
because
in
the
subsequent
communication the authorities concerned had
merely indicated that the decision contained in the
first letter would stand.
11. It is trite to say that in exercise
of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution,
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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the High Court cannot entertain belated claims
unless the petitioner offers tangible explanation
(State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 :
(1964) 6 SCR 261] ).”
18. The further judgment relied upon by the
State in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya (supra), particularly paragraph 10 thereof, is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“10. The fact that the criminal court
subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him
the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a
completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor
affect the validity of the finding of guilt or
consequential punishment. The standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings being different
from the standard of proof required in departmental
enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead
to different results in the two proceedings, that is,
finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an
acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal
proceedings. This is more so when the departmental
proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in
point of time, when compared to the criminal
proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will
have no effect on previously concluded domestic
enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the
enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary
authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot
after several years, challenge the decision on the
ground that subsequently, the criminal court has
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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acquitted him.”
19. Another judgement referred is Samar
Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (supra)
by the State whose paragraph 7 is relevant which is reproduced
as under :
“7. Acquittal
in
the
criminal case shall have no bearing or
relevance to the facts of the departmental
proceedings as the standard of proof in
both the cases are totally different. In a
criminal case, the prosecution has to prove
the criminal case beyond all reasonable
doubt
whereas
in
a
departmental
proceedings, the department has to prove
only preponderance of probabilities. In the
present case, we find that the department
has been able to prove the case on the
standard
of
preponderance
of
probabilities. Therefore, the submissions of
the counsel appearing for the appellant
are found to be without any merit.
20. Another judgement referred is Management
of Bharat Heavy Eletricals Limited Vs. M. Mani (supra) by
the State whose pragraph 33 is relevant which is reproduced as
under :“33. In
the
case
on
hand,
the
appellant employer had conducted the departmental
enquiry in accordance with law independently of the
criminal case wherein the enquiry officer, on the basis of
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the appreciation of evidence brought on record in the
enquiry proceedings, came to a conclusion that a charge
of theft against the delinquent employees was proved.
This finding was based on preponderance of probabilities
and
could
be
recorded
by
the
enquiry
officer
notwithstanding the order of criminal court acquitting
the respondents.”
21. Upon perusal of the aforesaid judgmentS and
upon consideration of the factual matrix of the present case, it
transpires to this Court that the scope of criminal jurisprudence
and service jurisprudence are distinct. The standard of proof
required in a criminal trial is “proof beyond all reasonable
doubt”, whereas in departmental proceedings the charge is
required to be established only on the touchstone of the
“preponderance of probabilities”.
In the present case, a perusal of the judgment
passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate clearly reveals that the
petitioner has not been honourably acquitted on merits. Rather,
the learned Judicial Magistrate has categorically observed as
under: “After considering the aforesaid
facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charges in
absence of evidence beyond all reasonable
doubts. Therefore, the accused persons was found
and held not guilty, and he is entitled to acquittal.
Accordingly, accused person is acquitted of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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charges punishable u/s 467, 468, 471, 409, 120B
of the IPC.”
22. Upon perusal of the aforesaid judgment of
acquittal, it appears that the petitioner has not been honourably
acquitted on merits. Rather, the benefit of doubt has been
extended to him on account of the prosecution's failure to
produce its witnesses and consequently to establish the charges
beyond reasonable doubt. Such an acquittal cannot be equated
with a clean or honourable acquittal.
23. It is well settled that the standard of proof in
a criminal trial is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, whereas in
a departmental proceeding the charges are required to be
established only on the touchstone of the preponderance of
probabilities. It is equally settled that a subsequent acquittal in a
criminal case does not ipso facto render a concluded
disciplinary proceeding invalid or vitiate the findings recorded
therein. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for
the State clearly reiterate this settled proposition of law.
24. Apart from the aforesaid, this writ petition
suffers from gross delay and laches. The order of punishment
was passed on 07.10.2007 and the appellate order was passed on
29.03.2011, whereas the present writ petition has been instituted
only in December, 2024 (numbered in January, 2025), after an
Patna High Court CWJC No.684 of 2025 dt.22-06-2026
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unexplained delay of about fourteen years. The explanation
offered by the petitioner does not satisfactorily account for such
inordinate delay.
25. In view of the aforesaid facts and the settled
legal proposition, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the
impugned orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the
appellate authority.
26. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands
dismissed.
(Dr. Anshuman, J)
Ashwini/Manshi
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE
Uploading Date
Transmission Date
NA
24/06/2026
NA
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