Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE
CRR 5090 of 2025
Rakesh Kumar Singh
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners
:
Mr. Rajdeep Majumder, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Mouyukh Mukherjee
Ms. Sagnika Banerjee
For the State
:
Mr. Debasish Roy, Ld. APP
Mr. Rudradipta Nandy, APP
Mr. Aniket Mitra
Heard On
:
18.02.2026
Judgment on
:
11.03.2026
Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.
1.
Petitioners herein have challenged the continuance of the proceeding
and also
prays for setting aside of the order dated 20th November, 2025
passed by the learned Special Executive Magistrate, South Division Kolkata,
in connection with M/SEM Case no. 737 of 2025 under section 129
Bharatiya Nagarik Surakhsha Sanhita , 2023 (in short BNSS).
2.
Brief background of the case is that Watgonj Police Station submitted
a report before the aforesaid Executive Magistrate against the petitioner
alleging that the petitioner is a habitual offender involved in various
offences, including kidnapping and extortion and police therefore have
prayed for initiation of proceeding under section 129 of BNSS, contending
that such preventive action is necessary in order to maintain public peace
and tranquillity. On the basis of such prayer, Magistrate issued a
production warrant on 11.09.2025 under section 132 of BNSS, for securing
the appearance of the petitioner on 22.09.2025 and for enabling him to
furnish his reply to the show cause notice, issued in the said preventive
proceeding, since the petitioner was in custody at the relevant point of time
in connection with another case. On being produced the petitioner prayed
for supply of the case details and all relevant documents pertaining to the
present proceeding.
3.
It is alleged that learned Magistrate without conducting any enquiry to
verify and to ascertain the truth of the information so received, against the
petitioner directed the petitioner to furnish bond of Rs. 5,000/- each along
with four sureties. The petitioner executed the required bond with sureties.
4.
Thereafter on 31.10.2025, the police officer filed a petition before the
said Executive Magistrate, Port Division, Kolkata reporting that the
petitioner has been arrested again in connection with Kasba P.S. Case no.
499 of 2025 dated 27.10.2025. After getting such intimation, the learned
Court below upon the prayer of the Investigating Officer issued show cause
notice to the petitioner, as to why the bond executed by him shall not be
cancelled.
The petitioner gave reply to the show cause notice and also
expressed his desire about contesting the allegation of violation of bond
conditions
5.
However, learned Court below taking note of the fact that the
petitioner had already been implicated in Kosba P.S. case no. 499 of 2025
dated 27.10.2025 and he has been remanded in judicial custody, in
connection with the said case, proceeded to cancel the interim bond earlier
furnished by the petitioner in terms of order dated 20.11.2025 and had
taken him in custody in connection with the instant case by the aforesaid
impugned order.
6.
Being aggrieved by the impugned proceeding, Mr. Majumder learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that section 135 (3) of
the BNSS permits the court for asking of an interim good behaviour bond
only after the commencement and before the completion of an enquiry,
which is clear and unambiguous from the language of the section and it
does not confer unfettered discretion upon the Executive Magistrate to
mechanically direct execution of a bond at the very threshold. However in
the present case vide order dated 25.09.2025, the court below directed the
execution of an interim good behaviour bond, without commencing any
enquiry and therefore the condition precedent for invoking section 135 is
completely absent and he also referred that the guideline to be followed in
this context has been laid down by this High Court in the case of Rajesh
Pratap Tanti and others Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., (CRR 3465
of 2019).
7.
He further argued that section 135(2) of BNSS mandates that the
enquiry under this provision shall be conducted in the manner prescribed
for the trial of summons cases. However, it is evident from the record that
the interim bond was directed to be executed just two days prior to the
commencement of the puja vacation
and such timing, coupled with the
absence of any emergent circumstance, reflects undue haste and nonapplication of mind. In fact the petitioner was not in custody in any other
case at that relevant point of time nor was there any material to suggest
imminent danger, thereby rulling out any extra ordinary urgency. He further
submits that Preventive jurisdiction cannot be exercised as a matter of
convenience or administrative expediency, particularly when it results
deprivation of one’s personal liberty. Section 135(3) of BNSS clearly
mandates that an interim bond may be directed, only if immediate measures
are necessary. The absence of such recorded satisfaction renders the order
arbitrary and ultra vires as preventive jurisdiction cannot be exercised on
vague apprehension or speculative assumption.
8.
He argued since in the instant case no enquiry has been conducted
and therefore no final order under section 136 has been passed and the
bond executed by the petitioner was not a final bond under section 136 of
the BNSS but it’s a bond filed under section 129, therefore, the impugned
detention order dated 20.11.2025 passed by the court below is wholly
without authority of law as it suffers from patent illegality, procedural
impropriety and non-application of mind.
9.
It is further argued on behalf of the petitioner that the sequence of
events leading to the illegal detention of the petitioner is also apparent from
the fact that immediately upon reopening the court after puja vacation, the
petitioner was once again taken into custody on 27.10.2025 and on
03.11.2025 he was directed to file reply to the show cause notice, in
response of which petitioner duly appeared and also filed a maintainability
petition challenging the entire proceeding and also the legality of the
proposed cancellation of the interim bond but despite such objections being
raised at the earliest available opportunity, the court below failed to address
the same in accordance with law.
10.
He further argued that going against the statutory procedure, the
court below only after taking the petitioner into custody proceeded to direct
summoning of witness under section 135 (3) BNSS. Such a course of action
is wholly impermissible in law as the power to summon witnesses and
conduct enquiry under section 135, can be exercised only during the
pendency of the enquiry and not at the stage when the petitioner has
already been detained. The statute does not contemplate detention first and
enquiry thereafter. Therefore, the magistrate has acted in patent violation of
the mandate of section 135 BNSS and the principles of natural justice.
11.
He further submits that the petitioner is affiliated with a political
party and for which he has been deliberately singled out and has been
falsely implicated in successive criminal proceedings and as such the order
dated 20th November, 2025 passed by the learned Magistrate is liable to be
quashed.
12.
Mr. Debasish Roy learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State
argued that the instant proceeding arises out of a preventive action lawfully
initiated under section 129 of the BNSS against the present petitioner who
is a habitual offender with long standing criminal antecedent and conviction
involving serious and repeated offences. On 28.08.2025 the concerned
Executive Magistrate upon perusal of the petition was pleased to allow the
prayer of the Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Watgunj PS to conduct an
inquiry against the present petitioner for drawing up a proceeding under
section 129 of the BNSS and on 11.09.2025, the Executive Magistrate, Port
Division, upon perusal of the petition and report received from enquiry
officer, deemed it fit and proper to ask the petitioner to file a show cause as
mandated under section 129 and 130 of the BNSS and therefore at this
stage learned Magistrate had already started enquiry and for which he asked
the petitioner to file show cause. The order to file show cause as to why he
should not be ordered to execute a bond is interlocutory in nature and
subsequent orders were passed during or after conclusion of an enquiry,
taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the
order of show cause was passed during the conclusion of enquiry taking into
account the facts and circumstances of the case. On 25.09.2025 necessary
copies of the material documents were supplied to the petitioner through his
Learned Advocate and the substance of the information was read over and
explained to the petitioner and he was again asked to comply with the order
dated 18.09.2025 regarding the order of show cause notice under section
130 of the BNSS, as to why he should not be asked to execute a bond of
good behaviour under chapter IX of the BNSS.
13.
On verbal representation and on request of the learned advocate for
the petitioner the amount of bond of sureties was fixed at Rs. 5,000/- each.
The petitioner filed the said bond and the petitioner was released by the
court upon furnishing the bond and enquiry under section 135 of the BNSS
commenced at once. On 31.10.2025, the enquiry officer informed the Court
below that the petitioner has been arrested in connection with Kasba P.S.
Case and therefore the enquiry officer prayed for issuing production warrant
and the Executive Magistrate directed the enquiry officer to submit a
detailed report fixing 06.11.2025 as next date. On 04.11.2025, due to
change of jurisdiction the matter was transferred to the Special Executive
Magistrate, South Divisions where the Special Executive Magistrate
independently applied his mind and continued with the proceedings. On
10.11.2025 learned Advocate for the petitioner prayed for obtaining copies
of the relevant documents related with the proceedings by filing a petition.
Considering the report and the documents which discloses that the
petitioner has violated the conditions of bond for good behaviour furnished
by him on 25.09.2025 a further show cause notice under section 139 of the
BNSS was served upon the petitioner as to why
(i)
Interim bond executed by him should not be cancelled
(ii)
Action under section 141 of the BNSS should not be taken
against him for breach of bond and will not be taken into
custody until completion of enquiry.
14.
On the basis of the prayer made by petitioner’s counsel the next date
was fixed on 17.11.2025 for submission of the show cause notice, when the
petitioner was prayed for time and as such 24.11.2025 was fixed for
submissions of the show cause notice. In reply to the said show cause
notice, he stated that his lawyer has submitted before the court to contest
the matter but the court pressurized and misguided them by asking for
furnishing bond first and then the court will conduct hearing. Mr, Roy in
this context submits that by the order dated 25.09.2025, the petitioner was
asked to comply with the order dated 18.09.2025 and on the representation
and request, learned advocate for the petitioner, the amount of bond and
sureties have been fixed at Rs. 5,000/- each and therefore the question of
submission of forceful bond does not arise. Moreover the order about
furnishing bond was never challenged before any court. It is at latter stage
when he violated the condition of bond and was subsequently arrested in
different case, he has come out with the contention that the bond was bad
and forceful bond.
15.
Mr. Roy further argued that the ratio laid down in the judgment, of
Madhu Lamaye & Anr. Vs. Ved Murti & Ors., reported in (1970) 3 SCC
739 as relied by the petitioner is factually distinguishable with the instant
proceeding in view of the fact that from the order dated 11.09.2025 and the
subsequent orders dated 18.09.2025 and 25.09.2025 , it clearly reveals that
the Magistrate has already commenced inquiry and on repeated occasion,
Learned Magistrate directed the petitioner to show cause as to why he
should not be ordered to execute a bond and it is only on the basis of the
petition and submissions made by the lawyer, the bond amount was fixed
and the bond was taken by the Magistrate. It is the petitioner and learned
advocate who voluntarily submitted and executed the bond and now after
violation of the bond, which he executed himself, he has taken a different
plea that the bond was forcefully taken.
16.
He further argued that standard form of trials are not mandated in
preventive
proceedings,
when
the
object
is
preventive
rather
than
punishment. In the present case the proceeding was lawfully initiated under
section 129 of the BNSS, interim measures was imposed under section 135
(1) and subsequent action was also taken strictly within the statutory limits.
The petitioner was subjected to a preventive mechanism end to averting
breach of peace, not arbitrary detention or punitive incarceration. The
restraint imposed is proportionate, targeted and justified by the petitioner’s
conduct, reflecting a continuing threat to public order. The challenge based
on Article 21 of the Constitution of India is therefore wholly misconceived.
The
preventive
reasonableness
measures
and
met
disclosed
the
no
test
of
legality,
constitutional
fairness
infirmity
and
warranting
interference. The record reflects that the petitioner all along duly
represented through his advocate on the relevant dates and was afforded
regular liberty of hearing and at no stage, did he raise any contemporaneous
objection regarding lack of notice or denial of liberty. He was clearly
informed on repeated occasion that continuation of such liberty was
contingent upon compliance. Therefore cancellation of interim bond and
taking preventive measure were neither mechanical nor predetermined. They
were necessitated by the petitioner’s subsequent conduct, revealing
continuing involvement during subsistence of the bond.
17.
Mr. Roy further contended that petitioner’s contention that the
proceeding has been vitiated because the Executive Magistrate also held a
police function is legally untenable. Preventive jurisdiction is not invalidated
due to prior or parallel designation, so long as the authority acts within the
statutory limits and in a quasi judicial capacity. The record clearly
demonstrate due application of mind, grant of hearing, and reasoned
response. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising
from the alleged dual role. The challenge is not founded on denial of liberty
or procedural illegality, but on satisfaction within the lawful consequence
and his own subsequent conduct. Therefore, the plea lacks merit and
warrants no interference and therefore he prayed for dismissal of the instant
application.
Decision
18.
First let me quote the relevant portion of the impugned order which
runs as follows:“Hence order
(i) The Interim Bond, dated 25.09.2025 executed by the OP member Rakesh
Kumar Singh U/S 135 (3) BNSS, hereby stand cancelled.
(ii) The OP member has been taken into custody in this case and to be sent
him to the correctional Home in C/W this case until completion of the inquiry
u/s 129BNSS.
(iii) The Superintendent of Presidency Correctional Home, Alipore is directed
to detain the OP member Rakesh Kumar Sing(54 yrs), S/o-Shyamjit Sing of
12A, Orphanguange Road, P.S. Alipore, Kolkata-700023, under this order at
Presidency Correctional Home, Alipore and produce him before this court time
to time as and when asked for.
In this context, the court intends to conclude the inquiry as initiated against
him u/s 130 BNSS and orders to summon witnesses number 1 & 2 on the
next date, i.e., on 24.11.2025.
To 24.11.2025 for production of OP member from the Presidency Correctional
Home, Alipore by way of issuing production warrant and examination of
witnesses.”
19.
From the aforesaid order it is clear that the bond which was executed
by the petitioner on 25.09.2025 was under section 135(3) of the BNSS and
not under section 136. However the court below has taken him into custody
cancelling said bond invoking jurisdiction under section 141 (1) (b) & (c) and
the court thereafter issued summon to witness no. 1 & 2 for examination.
20.
Before going to further details let me reproduce section 129, 130, 135
(3) and 141 (1) (a) (b).
“Section 129.
Security for good behaviour from habitual offenders.
When an Executive Magistrate receives information that there is within his
local jurisdiction a person who-
(a) is by habit a robber, house-breaker, thief, or forger; or
(b) is by habit a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to have been
stolen; or
(c) habitually protects or harbours thieves, or aids in the concealment or
disposal of stolen property; or
(d) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, the
offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating or mischief, or any
offence punishable under Chapter X of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, or
under section 178, section 179, section 180 or section 181 of that Sanhita; or
(e) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of,
offences, involving a breach of the peace; or
(f) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of-(i)
any offence under one or more of the following Acts, namely:-(a) the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940);
(b) the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946);
(c) the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19
of 1952);
(d) the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955);
(e) the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (22 of 1955);
(f) the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962);
(g) the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006); or
(ii) any offence punishable under any other law providing for the prevention of
hoarding or profiteering or of adulteration of food or drugs or of corruption;
org) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without
security hazardous to the community,
such Magistrate may, in the manner hereinafter provided, require such person
to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bail bond, for his
good behaviour for such period, not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate
thinks fit.
130.Order to be made.
When a Magistrate acting under section 126, section 127, section 128 or
section 129, deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under
such section, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of
the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for
which it is to be in force and the number of sureties, after considering the
sufficiency and fitness of sureties.
135. Inquiry as to truth of information.
After the commencement, and before the completion, of the inquiry under subsection (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are
necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the
public tranquillity or the commission of any offence or for the public safety,
may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the person in respect of
whom the order under section 130 has been made to execute a bond or bail
bond, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until the
conclusion of the inquiry, and may detain him in custody until such bond or
bail bond is executed or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is concluded:
141.Imprisonment in default of security.
(a) If any person ordered to give security under section 125 or section 136
does not give such security on or before the date on which the period for
which such security is to be given commences, he shall, except in the case
next hereinafter mentioned, be committed to prison, or, if he is already in
prison, be detained in prison until such period expires or until within such
period he gives the security to the Court or Magistrate who made the order
requiring it;
(b) if any person after having executed a bond or bail bond for keeping the
peace in pursuance of an order of a Magistrate under section 136, is proved,
to the satisfaction of such Magistrate or his successor-in-office, to have
committed breach of the bond or bail bond, such Magistrate or successor-inoffice may, after recording the grounds of such proof, order that the person be
arrested and detained in prison until the expiry of the period of the bond or
bail bond and such order shall be without prejudice to any other punishment
or forfeiture to which the said person may be liable in accordance with law.
21.
Now after going through the bond executed by the petitioner it
appears that it was executed in Form no. 14 which is a bond for good
behaviour interms of section 129 and the period is ‘until the completion of the
enquiry in the matter’ and therefore it is undoubtedly an interim bond and it
was furnished by the petitioner within the time, by which he was asked to
execute. It further appears from the order dated 10th November, 2025 that
the petitioner was directed to file show cause;
(i)
Why the interim bond executed by him should not be cancelled and
(ii)
Action under section 141 BNSS should not be taken against him
for breach of bond and be taken into custody and send to
correctional home in connection with the case, until the completion
of enquiry.
22.
Therefore, the question that needs to be adjudicated herein is whether
learned Magistrate was justified in taking the petitioner in custody after
cancelling interim bond for good behaviour, invoking his jurisdiction under
section 141 of BNSS. On perusal of section 141(b), it is clear that if any
person after having executed a bond for keeping the peace in pursuance of
an order of Magistrate under section 136 ‘is proved’ to the satisfaction of
such magistrate to have committed breach of the bond, then the Magistrate
after recording the grounds of proof, order that the person be detained in
prison until the expiry of the bond. In the instant case Court below has
clearly observed in the impugned order dated 20.11.2025 that the petitioner
had executed interim bond under section 135 (3) BNSS, pending inquiry
under section 129. However, in one part of the same impugned order, court
held that the petitioner herein has committed breach of interim bond as per
section 139 of BNSS, which apparently shows that court below has confused
the purport of bond under section 135(3) and bond under section 139 of
BNSS.
23.
It is needless to say that contents of bond under section 139 relates to
order to give security under section 136 and the provision of interim bond is
guided only under section 135 (3) of the BNSS. In the instant case there
appears to be no allegation that petitioner has not furnished bond and
therefore section 141 (1) (a) has got no application. Now in order to invoke
jurisdiction under section 141 (1) (b) bond or bail bond for keeping the peace
in pursuance of an order passed under section 136 which reads as follows:“136. Order to give security.
If, upon such inquiry, it is proved that it is necessary for keeping the peace or
maintaining good behaviour, as the case may be, that the person in respect of
whom the inquiry is made should execute a bond or bail bond, the Magistrate
shall make an order accordingly:
Provided that-(a) no person shall be ordered to give security of a nature
different from, or of an amount larger than, or for a period longer than, that
specified in the order made under section 130;(b) the amount of every bond or
bail bond shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case and
shall not be excessive;(c) when the person in respect of whom the inquiry is
made is a child, the bond shall be executed only by his sureties.”
24.
Therefore section 136 clearly mandates with the words “if upon such
enquiry it is proved that it is necessary for keeping the peace or maintaining
good behaviour………” which signifies that first of all an inquiry is required
to be made and secondly upon such inquiry it is proved that furnishing of
bond is necessary. However on perusal of the record, it would reflect that
there was no compliance of section 136 BNSS. It is palpably clear that the
order of executing interim bond as directed
to the petitioner vide order
dated 25.09.2025 acting under section 129 BNSS and not under section 136
BNSS, and therefore it is not understandable, how the court below had
taken the petitioner in custody under section 141 of the BNSS. It is also
worthy to be mentioned that the petitioner was in judicial custody in
another case when production warrant was issued by learned Magistrate to
produce the petitioner under section 129 BNSS. Under Chapter IX of the
statute said bond was made to be executed by the petitioner when it was
based on the apprehension of breach of peace by the petitioner. However in
the instant case at that stage learned magistrate did not cause any enquiry
after taking evidence to ascertain whether the report so submitted by the
police officer is true or not.
25.
Application of section 141 arises in the case, where the petitioner has
violated the terms of bond under section 136 of the BNSS. On the contrary
section 135 (3) BNSS permits taking of an interim good behaviour bond only
after the commencement and before the completion of an enquiry, which is
very much clear and unambiguous from the statutory language and it does
not
confer
unfettered
discretion
upon
the
Executive
Magistrate
to
mechanically direct to furnish interim bond. Section 135(2) BNSS mandates
that the inquiry under this provisions shall be conducted in the manner
prescribed for the trial of summons cases.
26.
Admittedly in the instant case the bond for good behaviour was
interim bond which is guided by section 135 (3) of the BNSS, which
circumscribes the power of learned Executive Magistrate by providing that
an interim bond may be directed only if immediate measures are necessary
to prevent a breach of peace or disturbance to public tranquillity. Such
requirement is not an empty formality but learned magistrate must record
objective
satisfaction
supported
by
cogent
material,
demonstrating
immediate and proximate danger. In the instant case the impugned order is
conspicuously silent on the nature of the alleged threat and the imminence
of breach of peace or any factual foundation necessitating immediate
preventive action.
Learned counsel for the State submit that the order
clearly demonstrates that the petitioner voluntarily executed the bond and
therefore the question of stating urgency in the order does not arise, though
such argument has been negated by the petitioner stating that the petitioner
was compelled to execute the bond.
27.
Be that as it may, it is to be mentioned herein that violation of an
interim good behaviour bond cannot be related with section 141 (1) (b) or (c)
which mandates that jurisdiction under that provision can be invoked where
bond executed under section 136 is proved to the satisfaction of the
Magistrate to have committed breach of bond and furthermore after
recording grounds of such proof, detention order can be passed under the
circumstances, what is expressly provided by statute.
28.
In Gopal Acharya Vs. State of Kerala reported in 1980 (sup) SCC
649 it was held that preventive sections privative of freedom, it incautiously
proved by indolent judicial processes, may do deeper injury. To call a man
dangerous is itself dangerous, to call a man desperate is to affix a desperate
adjective to stigmatise a person as hazardous to the community is itself a
judicial
hazard,
unless
compulsive
testimony
carrying
credence
is
abundantly available. The power to demand an interim bond is incidental to
a pending
enquiry and not a standalone power. If the enquiry does not
disclose situation to take immediate measure, any order for interim bond or
detention for violation of the bond is not in accordance with the statute.
29.
However I am not agreeable with the submission made on behalf of
the petitioner that the enquiry has not yet been started, when the petitioner
was asked for production of interim bond, since it is clear from the order
dated 11.09.2025 that the petitioner was directed to file show cause and
thereafter when the petitioner was produced from custody on 25.09.2025,
the substance of the information was read over and explained to the OP
member/petitioner herein, which amounts to recording of plea in a
summons procedure case as mandated under section 135 (2) of the BNSS.
30.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State argued that
subsequent orders dated 20.11.2025 records that the petitioners detention
is under section 141(3) BNSS. Needless to say that power to take steps
under section 141 emanates in connection with an order passed under
section 125 or 136 BNSS. Section 125 BNSS deals with an order for
furnishing security upon conviction. The provision under section 141 read
with section 125 BNSS applies where a person has been convicted of an
offence and the court upon such conviction directs the person to execute a
bond for keeping the peace or for good behaviour. Admittedly in the present
case, the petitioner has not been convicted and therefore section 125 has
got no application in the present case. Section 136 contemplates the passing
of a final order after completion of an enquiry as to the truth of information
under section 135 BNSS. It is only when upon conclusion of such enquiry,
the Magistrate records a conclusive finding that the allegations are proved
and that an order directing the person to give security for good behaviour
can be lawfully passed. The heading ‘order to give security’ in section 136
BNSS clearly refers to a final and reasoned direction founded upon evidence
adduced during the enquiry. In the present case admittedly no final order
under section 136 BNSS has been passed. The bond directed to be executed
by the petitioner was not a final bond under section 136 BNSS but merely a
bond stated to be taken under section 129 BNSS, which is only an initiating
and preventing provision and therefore there exists no valid order to give
security within the meaning of section 136 of the BNSS. Since neither
section 125 BNSS nor section 136 has been validly invoked against the
petitioner, essential jurisdictional requirement for application of section 141
BNSS is entirely lacking.
31.
Furthermore Sub-section (2) of Section 141 has reference only to the
case where default is made in filing security. If the security is given, the
section does not apply and no reference to the court of sessions is necessary
even though the term of security exceeds one year. When reference under
this section is pending in the court of the sessions judge, the petitioner can
offer security to the magistrate, when they are able to procure it. Moreover
when a magistrate passes an order for furnishing security for a period
exceeding one year and default is made, imprisonment for default cannot be
awarded by the Magistrate. All that he is empowered to do is to detain the
accused, pending the order of the sessions judge under the said provision.
The section gives power to the sessions judge to deal with the case on the
merits and to pass such orders as the circumstances of the case may
require.
32.
On the other hand section 129 of the BNSS empowers an Executive
Magistrate to require a person to execute a bond for good behaviour on the
basis of information laid before him. The magistrate forms and opinion that
such persons is a habitual offender or is otherwise likely to commit offences
affecting public order or peace. Object of section 129 is not to contemplate
punishment but merely enables Magistrate to initiate proceeding to prevent
anticipated breach of law by calling upon the person concerned to show
cause why he should not be bound to maintain good behaviour. At this
stage the Magistrate only forms a prima facie satisfaction based on
information received and no adjudication on guilt or habituality has been
undertaken.
33.
In short section 135 BNSS lays down the procedure to be followed
after proceeding under section 129 BNSS are initiated. Sub-section (1) of
section 135 mandates that the magistrate shall hold an enquiry into the
truth of information and Sub-Section (2) provides that such enquiry shall be
conducted in the manner of a trial in summons cases including recording of
evidence. Sub-Section (3) permits the Magistrates during the pendency of
such enquiry to direct the person to execute an interim bond subject to the
conditions prescribed therein and it ensures procedural safeguards by
requiring a full fledged enquiry before any final adverse order is passed.
Section 136 BNSS contemplates the culmination of proceedings under
section 129 and 135 BNSS, empowering the Magistrate to pass a final order,
directing execution of the bond for good behaviour, if the allegations are
proved or to discharge person and to drop the proceeding, if the information
is found to be unsubstantiated.
34.
In order to invoke jurisdiction under section 141, the apprehension
which alone justifies initiation of proceeding under section
129 BNSS is
required to be established through evidence in the inquiry. Until such
evidence is laid, tested and evaluated in the manner of a summons trial, the
apprehension remains a mere allegation and cannot attain the status of a
proven fact and inquiry under section 135 BNSS necessarily requires the
Magistrate to examine whether the information laid before him is true. Mere
referring to past cases or police allegations cannot amount to an inquiry
which entails evaluation of evidence, examination of witness and application
of judicial reasoning.
35.
In Madhu Limaye & Anr. Vs. Ved Murti & Ors. reported in (1970) 3
SCC 739 a Five Judges Bench of Apex Court observed as follows:“11. It will be noticed that before the Magistrate took action to call for an
interim bond, he did not make any efforts to enquire into the truth of the
information as is required by Section 117(3) of the Code. He only saw the police
report and was satisfied from it, without even questioning the Sub-Inspector.
He did question him with regard to Narender Shastri who is described in the
Order as OP No. 3 but not others. It is also to be noticed that the case was fixed
on the following day for statements of Madhu Limaye and Ram Adhar Giri and
there is no mention that any witnesses were to be present. In fact even on the
next day the Magistrate was not going to try the case but only take statements
from the petitioners……..”
36.
It is evident from the impugned order dated 20.11.2025 that the
interim good behaviour bond of the petitioner was cancelled and the
petitioner was taken into custody. At the relevant point of time no evidence
have been recorded, no witness have been examined and no satisfaction had
been arrived at, nor attained the status of a proven fact in accordance with
law prior to curtailment of the petitioners liberty. The learned Executive
Magistrate only after taking the petitioner into custody proceeded to direct
summoning of witnesses under section 135 BNSS. Such course of action is
wholly impermissible in law.
37.
Learned Court below while passed the order has relied upon
Devadassan Vs. 2nd Class Executive Magistrate Ramanatha puram and
Ors., reported in
(2022) 13 SCC 166 but the fact of the said case is
distinguishable with the circumstances of the present case as said judgment
was rendered in a factual context where
a full-fledged enquiry was
conducted, evidence was considered and upon conclusion of such an
enquiry the competent magistrate had formed a conclusive opinion that the
person concerned was a habitual offender likely to breach the peace. It was
in such circumstances that a final bond was directed to be executed which
was upheld by the Apex Court. The present case stands on a different
footing in view of the fact that the record and order sheets demonstrates
that the statutory inquiry contemplated under section 135 BNSS has not
been concluded. Mere reference to past cases may not be sufficient for the
said purpose and an enquiry under the BNSS requires the Magistrate to
examine the truth of the information received by recording evidence and
applying judicial mind to determine whether the apprehension alleged has
been substantiated.
38.
I am not agreeable with the argument advanced by learned Public
Prosecutor that if the perpetrator can be taken into custody for violation of
terms of final bond furnished in terms of section 136 BNS, then he can also
be taken into custody for violation of interim bond furnished in terms of see
135(3). Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye Vs. Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
reported in (1970) 3 SCC 746, while dealt with section 107 of Cr.P.C. which
deals with “security for keeping the peace in other cases” has exhaustively
dealt with the issue and paragraph 35 may be quoted in this context
“35. We have seen the provisions of Section 107. That section says that action
is to be taken ‘in the manner hereinafter provided’ and this clearly indicates
that it is not open to a Magistrate in such a case to depart from the procedure to
any substantial extent. This is very salutary because the liberty of the person is
involved and the law is rightly solicitous, that this liberty should only be
curtailed according to its own procedure and not according to the whim of the
Magistrate concerned. It behoves us, therefore, to emphasise the safeguards
built into the procedure because from there will arise the consideration of the
reasonableness of the restrictions in the interest of public order or in the
interest of the general public.”
39.
It also needs to be mentioned that the contents of the bond executed
by the petitioner in terms of section 129 of BNSS are governed by the
prescribed Form no.14, which has been annexed to the petition and a bare
perusal of the same it appears that the consequence of violation of the
interim bond is limited to the forfeiture of the bond amount stipulated
therein and no penal consequence and or provisions or detention or
imprisonment is envisaged under the said bond. The bond also does not
contemplate either expressly or impliedly that the petitioner may be taken
into custody merely on the allegation of violation of the interim bond.
40.
Therefore, the impugned order which pertains to taking into custody
of the petitioner is hereby set aside.
41.
CRR 5090 of 2025 thus stands disposed of. However this order will
not prevent the court below to ask the petitioner for submission of fresh
bond during pendency of enquiry if emergent situation demands for
furnishing such bond interms of 135 (3) BNSS, and from forfeiting the
amount of interim bond already furnished by the petitioner.
42.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied
to the parties, on priority basis on compliance of all usual formalities.
(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review