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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA No. 17 of 2024
Rajesh Das,
Son of Late Rebati Mohan Das,
Resident of Netaji Palli, PO & PS-Belonia,
District-South Tripura, Pin-799155.
...... Appellant(s)
VERSUS
1. Society for Tripura Medical College
& Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Memorial Teaching Hospital,
Represented by its Member Secretary, Hapania,
PO-Agartala ONGC, PS-Amtali,
District-West Tripura, Pin-799014.
2. The Chairman (Appellate Authority),
Society for Tripura Medical College
& Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Memorial Teaching
Hospital, Hapania, PO-Agartala ONGC,
PS-Amtali, District-West Tripura, Pin-799014.
3. The Chief Executive Officer (Disciplinary Authority),
Society for Tripura Medical College & Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar Memorial Teaching Hospital, Hapania,
PO-Agartala ONGC, PS-Amtali, District-West Tripura,
Pin-799014.
4. Sri Narayan Debbarma (Inquiring Authority),
General Manager (H/R), Society for Tripura
Medical College & Dr. B.R/ Ambedkar Memorial
Teaching Hospital, Hapania, PO-Agartala ONGC,
PS-Amtali, District-West Tripura, Pin-799014.
...... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. P Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. K Nath, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. SS Dey, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. D Bhattacharjee, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. A Saha, Advocate.
Ms. A Chakraborty, Advocate.
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.D. PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
19/03/2024
Heard Mr. P Roy Baman, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. K
Nath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant as well as Mr. SS
Dey, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Ms A Chakraborty, learned counsel and
Mr. D Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. A Saha, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1, 2 & 3.
2.
The learned writ court by the impugned order dated 12th February,
2024 set aside the order of dismissal of the petitioner dated 28th April, 2023
and directed the respondent employer to start the proceeding from the stage of
evidence, as it was of the view that the petitioner had been dismissed from the
service on the basis of the statements he made in his written statement.
3.
Before us the appellant is aggrieved as there is no direction for
reinstatement pending fresh departmental enquiry from the stage of evidence.
4.
On the part of the appellant, learned senior counsel, Mr. P Roy
Barman, submits that as per Articles of Charges No. I, II & III as per
Memorandum dated 30th December, 2020, the petitioner was charged with
criticizing the respondent-Society through his social media accounts i.e.
Twitter handle relentlessly and had also indulged in indiscipline to disturb
normal functioning of the Society. He was alleged to be involved in activities
which were detrimental to the interest of the Society by posting offensive posts
on his social media account criticizing the functioning the society though being
an employee of the Society. He was also alleged to have left his work place
during working hours without permission of his Controlling Authority and as
such, was liable for indisciplined behaviour.
5.
Earlier, writ petitioner had approached this court in WP(C)
No.700/2021, being aggrieved by the issuance of the memorandum of the
charges. The learned writ court vide order dated 10th January, 2022 directed the
Disciplinary Authority to take a fresh look in the objections raised by the
petitioner by way of his representation dated 26th August, 2021. If it was found
that the FaceBook post, which is the source of Disciplinary Proceeding, has in
any way, directly or indirectly criticized the appointment of the respondent
No.3, the principle of fairness would warrant removal of respondent No.3. Else
he should be allowed to continue as the Inquiry Officer. Pursuant thereto, the
Inquiry Officer was changed vide Order dated 21st January, 2022.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the
petitioner denied having any Twitter handle ID to post such comments and
refuted the charges under Article ‘I’ as baseless but without properly adducing
the offending posts as evidence in the Disciplinary Proceeding, the Inquiry
Officer proceeded to hold him guilty. His written statement of defence is at
Annexure-12 at page 88. He has also referred to the rebuttal of his defence
statement reflected in the inquiry report as contained in the second show cause
notice vide memorandum dated 21st March, 2023 (Annexure-13) wherein the
inquiry officer has categorically stated that the AO was denying uploading of
any FB or Twitter postings concerning the internal affairs of TMC as charged
by the Disciplinary Authority.
7.
It is submitted that the petitioner had also taken a plea of Right to
Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
of India to criticize the follies of the management. As such, the learned Writ
Court found that the impugned order of dismissal was passed only on the basis
of his defence statement. However, the learned Writ Court while setting aside
the order of dismissal did not issue any direction for consequential relief, i.e.
reinstatement in service pending departmental inquiry.
8.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on
para 31 of the Constitution Bench judgment rendered by the Apex court in the
case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. vs. B. Karunakar &
Ors. reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727. He submits that in such a case when the
dismissal has been set aside on account of violation of principles of natural
justice in conduct of Disciplinary Inquiry the proper course for any court or
tribunal is to direct restatement of the delinquent during the period of
departmental enquiry though the question of back wages etc. would arise only
on conclusion of the fresh inquiry. As such, the impugned order may be
interfered to that extent.
9.
Learned senior counsel for the respondents, Mr. SS Dey submits
that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted in a proper manner after due
opportunity to the petitioner to submit his defence statement and after service
of the inquiry report along with the second show cause notice whereby the
punishment of termination from service was proposed. As such, the learned
Writ Court was not right in setting aside the penalty of dismissal from service
and directing fresh inquiry to restart the proceedings from the stage of
evidence.
10.
He has also countenanced the plea of reinstatement pending
Departmental inquiry raised by the appellant. He has also referred to the same
decision of the Apex court in the case of B Karunakar (supra). He submits
that para 31 of the report which contains the opinion of the three judges
comprising the majority do not specifically convey that reinstatement is
automatic. If the observations of the Apex court at para 31 are looked into in
detail, the order of punishment in this case has not been set aside on non-
service of inquiry report, as was the case therein. The order of termination had
been set aside to restart the disciplinary inquiry from the stage of evidence, as
according to the learned Writ Court, the punishment was based only on the
defence statement of the delinquent, which finding is not correct.
11.
We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties and taken note of the relevant materials placed on record as referred to
hereinabove. We have also taken note of the decisions cited by both the parties
in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. vs. B. Karunakar
& Ors. reported in (1993) 4 SCC 72, para 31 thereof.
12.
In the present case, the order of termination has been set aside by
the learned Writ Court being persuaded by the plea that the findings of the
inquiry officer suffered from violation of principles of natural justice as the
Presenting Officer had not established the charges by adducing evidence of
such offending social media posts alleged to have been posted by the
delinquent employee. Instead, though the delinquent employee had denied that
he had no Twitter handle ID and that the posts were not from his mobile either
but the Inquiry Officer proceeded to hold the charges established. As such, the
penalty imposed upon the petitioner was only on the basis of his defence
statement.
13.
The petitioner, however, is aggrieved by the impugned order only
to the extent that despite setting aside of the order of dismissal the learned Writ
Court did not direct reinstatement pending departmental inquiry. Though
reliance had been placed on para 31 of the Constitution Bench judgment of the
Apex Court on such plea but on a reading of the said judgment and as has been
considered and interpreted in subsequent decisions of the Apex Court, we are
of the view that the plea of the petitioner for automatic reinstatement upon
setting aside of the dismissal order is not tenable. This view finds further
support from the subsequent decisions rendered by the Apex Court such as
Union of India Vs. YS Sadhu, Ex-Inspector reported in (2008) 12 SCC 30
(para 3&7), Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. Vs. A.
Masilamani reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 (Para 16 & 17) and State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Rajit Singh, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 254 (para 12-14)
wherein the Apex Court after noticing the Constitution Bench decision in the
case of B Karunakar (supra) had occasion to hold that once the court sets
aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the inquiry was not properly
conducted, the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case
concerned to the Disciplinary Authority for it to conduct inquiry from the point
that it stood vitiated and conclude the same. As such, we are unable to accept
the plea raised by the writ petitioner/appellant that the learned Writ Court
ought to have directed his reinstatement after setting aside the order of
dismissal.
14.
However, we find that while directing the respondent-Disciplinary
Authority to restart the proceedings from the stage of evidence, the learned
Writ Court has not stipulated that it should be concluded in a time bound
manner. In such circumstances, we direct that the Disciplinary Proceedings be
concluded within a reasonable time, preferably within three months from the
date of receipt of copy of this order, also for the reason that the petitioner is out
of service. However, it is also indicated that in case the petitioner does not cooperate in the proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority would be free to
conclude it, in accordance with law, within the time frame.
15.
The
instant
appeal
is
disposed
of
with
the
aforesaid
modification(s) in the impugned order. Pending application(s), if any, also
stand disposed of.
(S.D. PURKAYASTHA), J
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH), CJ
signed by SATABDI DUTTA
SATABDI DUTTA Digitally
Date: 2024.03.21 16:25:17 +05'30'
Satabdi
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