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KHOIROM KHOIROM
BIPINCHAN BIPINCHANDRA
SINGH
2025.10.16
DRA SINGH Date:
18:34:21 +05'30'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Serial No. 3
W.P.(CRL.) No. 17 of 2025
Raj Pangeijam @ Naoboi, aged about 39 years, S/o Shri P.
Ramananda Singh, resident of Sagolband Salam Leikai,
P.O. & P.S. Imphal, District Imphal West, Manipur –
795001.
… Petitioner
- Versus –
1.
Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India, (Department
of Internal Security), Room No. 113, North Block,
New Delhi – 110001.
2.
The State of Manipur through the Chief Secretary,
Government of Manipur, Secretariat South Block,
P.O. & P.S. Imphal, District Imphal West, Manipur
– 795001.
3.
The
Commissioner
(Home), Government of
Manipur, Secretariat South Block, P.O. & P.S.
Imphal, District Imphal West, Manipur – 795 001.
4.
The District Magistrate, Imphal West District,
Government of Manipur, Lamphelpat, P.O. & P.S.
Lamphel, Imphal West District, Manipur
–
795001.
… Respondents
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B E F O R E
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. BIMOL SINGH
O R D E R
16.10.2025
[1]
[M. Sundar, CJ]
Captioned writ petition has been filed with a prayer seeking
issue of a writ of habeas corpus.
[2]
Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar, learned senior counsel instructed by Raj
Pangeijam @ Naoboi for petitioner; Ms. Pamchui Shimray, learned counsel
for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Th. Vashum, learned Public Prosecutor for
respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 are before this Court.
[3]
This Court, with the consent of all the learned counsel, took
up the main writ petition and heard out the same. Factual matrix of the
case in a nutshell is that 4th respondent (District Magistrate, Imphal West,
Government of Manipur, Lamphelpat) made a preventive order dated
07.07.2025 under the ‘National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980)’ (‘NSA’ for
the sake brevity); that this preventive detention order made by 4th
respondent shall be referred to as ‘impugned preventive detention order’
and the 4th respondent shall be referred to as ‘detaining authority’ for the
sake of convenience; that writ petitioner/detenu was arrested on
09.06.2025 pursuant to FIR No. 211(6)2025 dated 09.06.2025 on the file
of Lamphel Police Station, Imphal West District; that while the detenu
remained incarcerated (post arrest) the impugned preventive order was
made by detaining authority; that the detenu was initially remanded to
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police custody on 10.06.2025 and thereafter, remanded to judicial custody
on 17.06.2025; that thereafter, first bail petition of the detenu was rejected
by Ld. Trial Court Judge on 17.05.2025 and second bail petition was not
pressed by the detenu on 12.08.2025; that no bail petition is pending; that
the impugned preventive detention order of the detaining authority is being
assailed primarily on the ground that the detaining authority has not
recorded subjective satisfaction qua imminent possibility of detenu being
enlarged on bail either in the impugned preventive detention order or in the
ground supporting the same.
[4]
Elaborating on the afore-mentioned lone point on which the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner predicated his campaign against
the impugned preventive detention order, reliance was placed on N. Meera
Rani Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reported in (1989) 4 SCC
418. Adverting to the Meera Rani principle, it was contended that when
a preventive detention order is clamped on a detenu while he remains
incarcerated it is imperative that the detaining authority records subjective
satisfaction of imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail and
detaining authority not doing so is fatal to preventive detention order.
[5]
Responding to afore-mentioned argument, Mr. Th. Vashu,
learned Public Prosecutor for State initially submitted that Meera Rani is
distinguishable on facts. To noted, a Division Bench of this Court to which
one of us (Justice A. Bimol Singh) was a party, in Shri Lisham
Premamanda Singh @ Tony @ Brajamohan Vs. District Magistrate
& 3 Ors. vide order dated 06.08.2025 in W.P.(Crl.) No. 7 of 2025 has
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followed Meera Rani, dislodged a preventive detention order and this
order was also placed before us.
[6]
It is further to be noted that learned State counsel initially
contended that Lisham Premananda is also distinguishable on facts and
this has been captured by this Court in the proceedings made in the
previous listing on 06.10.2025. However, today, learned State counsel
changed the burden of song in the legal drill fairly submitted that Meera
Rani and Lisham Premamanda Singh are not distinguishable on facts
and learned State counsel reverted to his earlier submission made on
03.10.2025 (submission that imminent possibility of being enlarged on bail
thought not mentioned in the impugned preventive detention order has
been set out in the grounds of detention) and placed reliance on Baby
Devassy Chully Vs. Union of India reported in 2013 (4) SCC 531. To
be noted, it has been urged by learned State counsel that though there is
no mention about subjective satisfaction qua imminent possibility of detentu
being enlarged on bail in the impugned preventive detention order, there is
mention about the same in the ground of detention. In support of this
contention, the learned State counsel drew out attention to Point No. 4 in
the ground of detention dated 09.07.2025 and the same reads as follows:
‘4.
Necessity for Preventive Detention
Ordinary criminal proceedings (bailable offences) are
inadequate to restrain your activities, as:
-
There is imminent risk of you repeating such acts if
released.
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-
Your actions directly endanger public tranquility
and impede state security efforts.’
In the aforesaid Point No. 4, learned State counsel placed
reliance on second bullet point which says – ‘There is imminent risk of you
repeating such acts if released.’ In this regard, learned State counsel placed
reliance on Baby Devassy
case for the proposition that if a particular
point even if not mentioned in the preventive detention order will be good
enough, if mentioned in the ground of detention order. This Court is of the
considered view that there can be no quarrel on this proposition but, the
point here is, afore-referred second bullet point in main Point No. 4 in the
grounds of detention dated 09.07.2025 does not talk about imminent
possibility of detenu being released on bail, it only talks about imminent risk
of the detenu repeating the acts if released.
[7]
Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in writing that the
contention of the learned State counsel that there is mention about
subjective satisfaction of imminent possibility of detenu being released on
bail in the ground of detentions is incorrect and unacceptable as there is
only a mention about imminent possibility of repeating alleged acts if
released. To be noted, in this regard, we deem it is appropriate to write
that the impugned preventive detention order is predicated on a sole FIR,
the details of which have been captured supra. We also hasten to write that
law is clear that a preventive detention order can be clamped even on the
basis of a single case or single FIR but in the case on hand, that it is single
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FIR buttresses and amplifies the point that subjective satisfaction qua
imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail has not been recorded
either in the impugned preventive detention order or in the grounds of
detention. As already alluded to supra, the first bail petition of the detenu
was rejected on 17.06.2025 and the second bail petition was not pressed
on 12.08.2025. As of today, no bail petition is pending. We are conscious
that the second bail petition was filed on 23.06.2025 and therefore, the
same was pending on the date of impugned preventive detention order
dated 07.07.2025 (to be noted, it was not pressed only on 12.08.2025). To
be further noted, it was fixed for hearing on 08.08.2025. Notwithstanding
this, there is no recording of subjective satisfaction that there is imminent
possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail.
Reverting to Meera Rani, the same was rendered by a 3
(three) Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, restating declaration of
law made in Rameshwar Shaw Vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan
reported in AIR 1964 SC 334. We are referring to Rameshwar Shaw
as ‘declaration of law’ rather than ratio; as Rameshwar Shaw was
rendered by a Constitution Bench. In Rameshwar Shaw, the Constitution
Bench has made it clear that while there is no bar in clamping a preventive
detention order on a detenue who is already incarcerated, in such cases, it
is imperative that the detaining authority records subjective satisfaction that
there is imminent possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail and not
recording such subjective satisfaction is fatal to preventive detention order.
There can be no quarrel that such recording though subjection is justifiable
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to the extent of examining if such satisfaction is based on cogent material.
In any event this scenario does not arise in the case on hand as there is no
recording of subjective satisfaction qua imminent possibility of being
enlarged on bail. In Rameshwar Shaw, it was also made it clear that
subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of
preventive detention but, the decision must depend on detaining authority
being satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of detenu being
enlarged on bail. As already alluded to supra, another order of Division
Bench of this Court dated 06.08.2025 in Lisham Premananda in W.P.(Crl)
No. 7 of 2025 followed Meera Rani.
[8]
Another Division Bench to which one of us (Chief Justice M.
Sundar) was a party, in Md. Sirajuddin Khan Vs. State of Manipur & 3
Ors. being order dated 09.10.2025 in W.P.(Crl) No. 12 of 2025 followed
Meera Rani and Rameshwar Shaw and set aside the preventive
detention order.
[9]
This Court is informed that both in Lisham Premananda and
Md. Sirajuddin Khan, State has complied with the order of this Court
and released the detenus. In Sirajuddin Khan, the factum that the
detenu was released has been captured by this Court in another subsequent
case viz., Konjengbam Akash @ Pari Vs. District Magistrate, Thoubal
District & 2 Ors. vide order dated 14.10.2025 in W.P.(Crl) No. 22 of 2025.
[10]
Before we conclude, we deem it appropriate to write that
Paragraph Nos. 10 & 11 of Md. Sirajuddin Khan case are relevant qua
discussion dispositive reasoning set out supra and the same read as follows:
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‘[10]
As regards subjective satisfaction qua a
preventive detention order clamped on a detenu who is
already incarcerated, the lead case is N. Meera Rani
reported in (1989) 4 SCC 418. N. Meera Rani is also a
case where a preventive detention order was made under
‘National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980)’ which shall
hereinafter be referred to as ‘NSA’ for the sake of brevity.
The detenu’s wife assailed the impugned preventive
detention order in the High Court unsuccessfully and
carried the matter to Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of a
petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India along
with a separate writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. In this N. Meera Rani case, which
was rendered by a 3 (three) Judges Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court, declaration of law in Rameshwar Shaw
reported in AIR 1964 SC 334 was restated and it was made
clear that while there is no bar in clamping a preventive
detention order on a detenue who is already incarcerated,
in such cases, it is imperative that the detaining authority
records subjective satisfaction that there is imminent
possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail. It was held
that subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not
invalidate an order of preventive detention but, the
decision must depend on detaining authority being satisfied
on cogent materials that there is likelihood of detenu’s
release and in view of these antecedent activities which is
proximate in point preventive detention order is necessary
to prevent detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities. In
the case on hand, while there is no bail application at all
i.e. when the writ petitioner has not moved a bail petition
at all, the detaining authority has proceeded on the basis
that a bail petition submitted by the detenu is pending and
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on that factual basis, come to the conclusion i.e. recorded
subjective satisfaction that there is imminent possibility of
detenu being enlarged on bail. Law is well settled that
subjective satisfaction though subjective is justiciable but
under limited circumstances. One such circumstance is N.
Meera Rani principle which restates declaration of law
made by Rameshwar Shaw about which there is allusion
elsewhere supra in this order.
[11]
The above means that the impugned detention
order deserves to be dislodged on the point that the
subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority
qua imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail
is wholly bad as it is based on an incorrect fact.’
[11]
Ergo, sequitur is, captioned writ petition is allowed. The
impugned preventive detention order dated 07.07.2025, approval order
dated 13.07.2025 and confirmation order dated 06.02.2025 are set aside.
The detenu, Shri Raj Pangeijam @ Naoboi, aged about 39 years, S/o
Shri P. Ramananda Singh, resident of Sagolband Salam Leikai, P.O.
& P.S. Imphal, District Imphal West, Manipur is directed to be set at
liberty forthwith, if not required in connection with other case or cases.
There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
CHIEF JUSTICE
Bipin
P.S. I:
P.S. II:
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