The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
11. The present writ appeal is beyond time by 109 days delay and the counsel for the appellant could not satisfy this Court for condoning the delay, hence, we reluctant to allow the application for condonation delay, but thereafter, the appellant’s counsel would submit that, the present writ appeal be dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty to the appellant to avail remedy before the appropriate forum, if any available to her.
12. In view of the above, this Court is constrained to hold that, no case for condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant writ appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty to the appellant to avail remedy before the appropriate forum, if any available to her. Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved Sd/(Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:CGHC:2130-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 3 of 2026
Ragini Dandekar W/o Late Ashwani Kumar Dandekar Aged About 37 Years
(Now 39 Years), R/o Village Dhabadih, Tahsil Bhatapara, District
Balodabazar-Bhathapara (C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Secretary, Department Of School Education,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur
(C.G.)
2 - District Education Officer Balodabazar District Balodabazar-Bhathapara
(C.G.)
3 - Principal Government Boys School Simga, District BalodabazarBhathapara (C.G.)
4 - Branch Manager State Bank Of India Main Branch, Office At Kewada Badi
Bus Stand, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant
:
Mr. Raghvendra Pradhan, Advocate
For Respondents/State
:
Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Deputy
Advocate General
For Respondent No.4
:
Mr. P.R. Patankar, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Digitally signed
by VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date:
2026.01.15
10:55:33 +0530
14/01/2026
1.
Heard Mr. Raghvendra Pradhan, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant as well as Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned Deputy
Advocate General, appearing for respondents/State and Mr. P.R.
Patankar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 on I.A.
No. 1, which is an application for condonation of delay of 109 days in
preferring the instant appeal.
2.
The appellant has filed this writ appeal against an order dated
24.06.2025, passed by learned Single Judge, in WPC No. 4932 of
2023 (Ragini Dandekar v. State of Chhattisgarh and others), by which
the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the
writ petitioner.
3.
On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the
appellant as to why he has approached this Court against the
impugned order dated 24.06.2025, after an inordinate delay of 109
days, he has not offered any plausible explanation or any cogent
reason for delay in filing the writ appeal.
4.
Learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents submit that
the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no
cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches
application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the appeal is not
liable to be entertained.
5.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the
instant writ appeal.
6.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is
whether the delay of about 109 days in preferring the present writ
appeal deserves to be condoned or not.
7.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary” 2024 INSC 932, while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as
follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented
in
the
Court
beyond
limitation,
the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the
Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy
Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this
Court that even though limitation may harshly affect
the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its
rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was
also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra
v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held
as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC
81]
while
rejecting
an
application
for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient
cause”
which
means
an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found
to be negligent, or for want of bona fide
on
his
part
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate
delay
by
imposing
any
condition whatsoever. The application is
to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning
the
delay
putting
without
any
any
justification,
condition
whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation
of
the
statutory
provisions
and
it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake
in
dismissing
the
delay
condonation
application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone
the
delay
has
to
be
exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances
of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient
cause'
cannot
be
liberally
interpreted,
if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is
attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J)
was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should
not be excused as a matter of generosity and
rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant
passage of the same is profitably extracted
below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going
to look into the merits of the matter as
long as we are not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for
condonation
of
such
a
long
and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is
a private party or a State or Union of
India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court
long
after
the
lapse
of
the
time
prescribed under the relevant provisions
of the law, then he cannot turn around
and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are
in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.
However, till date the respondent has not
been able to reap the fruits of his decree.
It would be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and 158
days and once again ask the respondent
to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not.
From the tenor of the approach of the
appellants, it appears that they want to
fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation.
Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be nondeliberate
delay
and
in
such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations.
While
considering
the
plea
for
condonation of delay, the court must not
start with the merits of the main matter.
The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered
by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question
of limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’
hanging over the head of the respondent
for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of
the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned
order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was
exercising
its
supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this
Court, it has been said that delay should
not
be
excused
as
a
matter
of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice
is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to
prove that they were reasonably diligent
in prosecuting the matter and this vital
test for condoning the delay is not
satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the opinion
that the High Court correctly refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by
observing that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible reason
was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are
inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the
delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to
callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery. Though
the Government adopts systematic approach in
handling
the
legal
issues
and
preferring
the
petitions/applications/ appeals well within the time,
due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue
loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein, enormous
delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the
second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the
officials functioning under the State, though valuable
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct
the State to streamline the machinery touching the
legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility
on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s),
who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses,
etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be followed
by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we
must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is a plea for
condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private
litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained
right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is
a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of limitation is
90 days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What events occurred
after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence.
The court is required to consider what came in the
way of the party that it was unable to file it between
the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing
an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising before
the limitation expired it was not possible to file the
appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising
after the expiry of limitation can constitute such
sufficient
cause.
There
may
be
events
or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation
which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire without
the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause
arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh
Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981
SC 733).”
8.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case,
in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the
discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and
only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.”
The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves,
do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of
advancing substantial justice.
9.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of
109 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate. The
explanation offered by the appellant, i.e. financial constraints, lack of
legal guidance, and ignorance of the remedy, though invoking
sympathy, cannot be treated as “sufficient cause” in the eye of law. It is
now well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law by themselves do not
constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the
valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of
limitation be lightly taken away.
10.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to
ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has
expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence
and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances
which prevented timely action. In the present case, the appellant has
not been able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of
limitation which disabled her from approaching this Court. On the
contrary, the record reveals that she remained inactive for a long
period and sought to revive her claim only after consulting legal aid
services. Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and
unexplained for a substantial period.
11.
The present writ appeal is beyond time by 109 days delay and the
counsel for the appellant could not satisfy this Court for condoning the
delay, hence, we reluctant to allow the application for condonation
delay, but thereafter, the appellant’s counsel would submit that, the
present writ appeal be dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty to the
appellant to avail remedy before the appropriate forum, if any available
to her.
12.
In view of the above, this Court is constrained to hold that, no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant writ
appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, dismissed as
withdrawn with the liberty to the appellant to avail remedy before the
appropriate forum, if any available to her.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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