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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Case: OWP No. 1599/2013 c/w
OWP No. 61/2014
Reserved on 06.08.2026.
Pronounced on 08.09.2026.
Uploaded on: 08.09.2026
Full Judgment is pronounced
R.G. Buildwell Engineers Ltd.
Valeecha Engineering Ltd
.....Appellant/Petitioner(s)
Through :- Mr. Z.A.Shah, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. A. Hanan, Advocate
Mr. Nisar Ahmad, Advocate.
v/s
Union of India and others
Union of India and others
.....Respondent(s)
Through :- Mr. T.M.Shamsi, DSGI with
Ms. Rehana Qayoom Advocate
Mr. Alla Ud Din Ganaie, AAG
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE (ACTING)
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
CHIEF JUSTICE (A)
1.
The petitioners, through the medium of these two writ petitions,
(OWP No.1599/2013 and OWP No.61/2014), essentially seek a
declaration that (i) the Building and Other Construction Workers
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996; (ii)
the Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996;
and (iii) the Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess
Rules, 1998, along with all Rules, Notifications and other instruments
issued thereunder, are ultra vires the Constitution of India and,
consequently, liable to be struck down.
2.
The matters were initially listed before a learned Single
Judge of this Court. However, in view of the order/circular dated
28.05.2020 passed by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice, whereby matters
involving the constitutional validity of any Act, statutory Rule,
Regulation or Notification are directed to be listed before a Division
Bench, these matters have accordingly been placed before us.
3.
For a better appreciation of the claim of the petitioners and
for arriving at a just decision in the controversy raised in these petitions,
it is necessary to take note of the factual antecedents leading to the filing
of these petitions.
4.
The case set up by the petitioners, as projected in these writ
petitions, is that all of them are holding subsisting contracts with the
J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency, respondent No.4 herein.
Parliament enacted, in the year 1996, two legislations, namely, (i) the
Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment
and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (for short, “BOCW Act”); and (ii)
the Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996
(for short, “the Cess Act”). The Central Government, in exercise of the
powers conferred under the BOCW Act, framed the Building and Other
Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of
Service) Central Rules, 1998. Likewise, the Central Government framed
the Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Rules, 1998
under the Cess Act. So far as the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir
is concerned, it is stated that the State Government, in exercise of the
powers conferred by the BOCW Act, framed, for the first time, the
Jammu and Kashmir Building and Other Construction Workers
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2006 vide
SRO 232 dated 17.07.2006. Thereafter, the State Government, vide SRO
274 dated 31.07.2007, constituted the Jammu and Kashmir Building and
Other Construction Workers Welfare Board [“Board”]. The members of
the Board were nominated by the Government vide SRO 439 dated
01.12.2010. The State Government also issued a Circular dated
11.03.2011 in this regard.
5.
According to the petitioners, after issuance of the aforesaid
Notifications/Circulars, respondent No.4 started deducting cess at the
rate of one per cent from the bills of the petitioners. The said action was
communicated by the Chief Executive Officer, J&K Economic
Reconstruction Agency, to the Principal Secretary to Government,
Planning and Development Department, vide communication dated
12.06.2013. The petitioners objected to the proposed deductions by
submitting separate communications. Notwithstanding such objections,
the respondents persist in their decision to deduct one per cent of the
amount of the bills of the petitioners towards cess.It is further pleaded
that one of the petitioners had approached the Court of the Principal
District Judge, Srinagar, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 by filing an application. The said application,
however, came to be dismissed by the learned Principal District Judge,
Srinagar, vide order dated 26.08.2013.
6.
The petitioners claim to be the contractors engaged in the
execution of various construction works, most of which have been
awarded by respondent No. 4. namely, J&K Economic Reconstruction
Agency. It is their case that the contracts in question had been awarded
prior to the issuance of SRO 439 dated 01.12.2010 and were already
under execution, some of them being at the stage of completion.
However, from the year 2012, cess at the rate of one per cent of the
value of their bills was levied and deducted under the Cess Act, 1996.
The petitioners apprehend that such cess may also be demanded in
respect of payments already made. They further contend that, presently,
one per cent of the amount payable under their running bills is being
deducted at source towards cess.
7.
The petitioners challenge the constitutional validity of the
impugned legislations, inter alia, on the ground that Parliament lacked
legislative competence to legislate these laws in respect of the erstwhile
State of Jammu and Kashmir. The first question, according to them, is
whether the levy under the Cess Act is in the nature of a tax or fee. They
contend that the nature and character of a levy must be determined with
reference to the purpose for which it is imposed. Section 3 provides for
levy and collection of cess at the prescribed rate, including deduction at
source and deposit in the Welfare Fund. Since the levy is compulsory
and involves deduction of one per cent from the amount payable to
them, it is, according to the petitioners, a tax and not a fee, particularly
as no corresponding service is rendered to them.
8.
The second question is with regard to identification of
relevant legislative Entry under which Parliament could enact the
impugned statutes for Jammu and Kashmir. The petitioners submit that
the relevant Entries could be Entry 49 of List II, Entries 23 and 24 of
List III, or residuary Entry 97 of List I. They contend that the
impugned legislations do not fall within Entries 49 of List II or 23 and
24 of List III; moreover, List II did not apply to Jammu and Kashmir and
the Concurrent List is applied only with modifications. Their case is that
the impugned legislation falls under Entry 97 of List I.
09.
Having regard to Article 370 (now abrogated w.e.f.
05.08.2019) and the constitutional scheme governing application of the
Constitution of India to Jammu and Kashmir as then existed, the
petitioners contend that Entry 97 of List I was not extended in its
original form to the State. It was applied with modifications notified by
the President under Article 370. They refer to the Constitution
(Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Amendment Orders of 1963, 1965,
1969, 1972 and 1985, by which Entry 97 was omitted, substituted or
modified. In its modified form, Entry 97 dealt principally with
prevention of activities affecting sovereignty, territorial integrity,
terrorism and specified taxes on foreign travel, air travel and postal
articles, as reproduced in the petition.
10.
`On the strength of Article 248 and the modified Entry 97
as applicable to Jammu and Kashmir, the petitioners contend that
Parliament lacked power to extend the impugned legislation to the State.
Its application was therefore void ab initio for want of legislative
competence. Consequently, the compulsory levy of one per cent on their
bills was without authority of law, without jurisdiction, illegal and void.
11.
The petitioners challenge the constitutional validity of the
impugned statutes, rules, orders and circulars, on the following grounds:
(i) Entry 97 of List I, as applicable elsewhere in India, covers
matters not enumerated in Lists II and III, including taxes not
mentioned therein. Parliament may therefore impose a tax
under its residuary power only where the subject does not fall
within List II. Where List II and Entry 97 compete, the State
List Entry must receive a broad interpretation.
(ii) The Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare
Cess Act, 1996 is complementary to the Building and Other
Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and
Conditions of Service) Act, 1996. Section 3 of the Cess Act
provides for levy and collection of cess at a rate between one
and two per cent of the cost of construction incurred by an
employer and permits collection by deduction at source. The
proceeds are to be paid to the Board after permissible
collection expenses.The petitioners contend that the levy is
imposed for the purposes of the BOCW Act and is collected
from every “employer”. Under Section 2(1)(i) of the BOCW
Act, a contractor is treated as an “employer” where the
construction work is carried out through or by a contractor. It
is on this basis that one per cent is deducted from the
petitioners‟ bills.They further submit that the levy is essentially
imposed on the cost of construction incurred by the
employer and that the taxable event is the activity of
construction. Since “building or other construction work”
includes construction, alteration, repair, maintenance and
demolition, the levy is, in substance, a compulsory levy on
expenditure incurred on construction. According to the
petitioners, Parliament has no power to impose such a levy in
Jammu and Kashmir, particularly when taxation of buildings
and constructions falls within the State legislative field (which
did not apply to Jammu and Kashmir).
(iii) The petitioners further contend that the one per cent levy
is ultimately utilised for giving effect to the welfare measures
envisaged in the BOCW Act, and the proceeds are transferred
to the Board under Section 3(3) of the Cess Act. Even if the
levy is treated as a fee, no corresponding service is provided to
the petitioners, therefore, such levy cannot be collected from
employers working in Jammu and Kashmir under the
impugned Parliamentary legislation. Thus, whether the levy is
treated as a tax or a fee, Parliament may have the power to
enact the legislation under Entry 97 of List I, but it lacked the
power to extend it to Jammu and Kashmir.
(iv) The petitioners clarify that they do not challenge
Parliament‟s power to enact the impugned legislation in
respect of its subject matter, which, according to them, falls
under Entry 97 of List I. Their challenge is only to its
application to Jammu and Kashmir. Since Entry 97 was
applicable to the State in a modified form, Parliament lacked
legislative competence to impose the compulsory deduction.
Therefore, whether the levy is treated as a tax or a fee, the
legislation, insofar as it applies to Jammu and Kashmir, is void
and cannot be sustained.
(v) The petitioners contend that there is no Entry in List I
empowering Parliament to enact the impugned legislation
except its residuary power. Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed a
special constitutional position and greater constitutional
autonomy than other States. According to the petitioners, the
impugned legislation takes away that constitutional autonomy
and adversely affects the basic features of the State
Constitution, autonomy being one of them.
They further contend that even a laudable object or an attempt
to implement the Directive Principles cannot save legislation
enacted by a legislature lacking legislative competence.
Consequently, the Rules framed and the orders and circulars
issued by the State Government under the impugned statutes
are also unsustainable if the parent statutes themselves are
unconstitutional in their application to Jammu and Kashmir.
(viii) Although the impugned legislations were enacted in
1996, the necessary machinery for their implementation was
not created in Jammu and Kashmir until recently. According
to the petitioners, the legislations therefore could not
effectively operate in the State until the Board was constituted
and its members nominated. The petitioners had entered into
their contracts before the creation of the Board. At the time of
obtaining the contracts, they were neither informed nor aware
that one per cent of the cost of construction would
subsequently be deducted from their bills.
They further submit that several contracts executed after 1996
had already been finalised and completed, and the parties had
been discharged from their contractual obligations, without
any deduction having been made. The subsequent deduction
therefore comes as a surprise and has caused prejudice to the
petitioners. Had they known about the liability, they would
have taken the proposed deduction into account while
submitting their bids. The petitioners, therefore, contend that
the burden should be borne by the authorities which allotted
the contracts and cannot be transferred to them either in law or
otherwise.
(ix) Some of the petitioners had filed petitions under Section 9
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which were dismissed
by the Principal District Judge, Srinagar, vide order dated
26.08.2013. Since the present proceedings challenge the
constitutional validity of the impugned statutes, the petitioners
contend that such a challenge can be made only before the
High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.
(x) According to the petitioners, the direct effect of the
impugned legislation is the compulsory deduction of one per
cent from their bills without lawful legislative authority. Since
the legislation under which the deduction is being made is
unconstitutional in its application to Jammu and Kashmir, the
consequential deduction from the petitioners‟ bills is also
unconstitutional.
12.
Upon notice, the respondents have appeared through their
counsel and filed objections to this writ petition. It is contended that the
subject under reference falls under Entries 23 and 24 read with Entry 47
of the Concurrent List and not under Entry 97 of List I of the
Constitution of India. It is submitted that, in view of the J&K
Constitution (Application) Order, 1954, the Concurrent List has been
duly made applicable to the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir and,
therefore, the Acts under reference, as well as the competence and
jurisdiction of Parliament to levy the cess, are well within the
competence of the legislature, and the authorities of the State are duly
competent to levy the same. It is no more res integra that cess has been
held to be a fee and not a tax. It is submitted that the Building and Other
Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of
Service) Act, 1996 and the Building and Other Construction Workers
Welfare Cess Act, 1996 have been validly legislated by the Parliament
of India and duly made applicable to the erstwhile State of Jammu and
Kashmir through the medium of the J&K Constitution (Application)
Order, 1954, as amended from time to time.
13.
It is further submitted that the levy of cess is squarely
referable to and falls within the Concurrent List, with special reference
to Entries 21 to 23 read with Entry 47. Entry 97 does not deal with levy
of cess or tax, therefore, the question of its applicability to the given
facts of the case has no relevance.That apart, the petitioners, having
executed contract agreements with respondent No.4, have undertaken to
pay the cess and, in the event of any dispute, the mechanism envisaged
is by way of arbitration. Reference in this regard can be made to Clause
20.6d of the agreements.
14.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the
Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996, and
the rules and notifications issued thereunder are unconstitutional insofar
as they were made applicable to the erstwhile State of Jammu and
Kashmir. It is contended that one per cent cess is in the nature of a tax
and not a fee, as it is compulsorily levied without any corresponding
service to the petitioners. It is further submitted that Parliament lacked
legislative competence to extend the impugned legislation to Jammu and
Kashmir, as the relevant Entry 97 of List I stood modified under Article
370 of the Constitution. It is also contended that their contracts were
executed before the constitution of the Welfare Board and, therefore, the
subsequent deduction of one per cent cess from their bills is illegal.
15.
Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the
impugned legislation is valid and falls within Entries 23 and 24 of the
Concurrent List, read with Entry 47, and not under Entry 97 of List I. It
is submitted that the Concurrent List had been validly extended to the
erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir by the J&K Constitution
(Application) Order, 1954, and, therefore, Parliament was competent to
enact and apply the impugned legislation. It is further submitted that the
cess is in the nature of a fee and not a tax and is utilized for the welfare
of building and other construction workers. The respondents have also
relied upon the arbitration clause contained in the contracts for
resolution of disputes relating to the deduction of cess.
16.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record, the following questions arise for determination:1.
Whether levy imposed under Cess Act is a tax or a fee?
2. Whether the Parliament had the Legislative competence
to enact and apply the BOCW Act and the Cess Act to the
erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir in view of provisions
of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and limited
application of provisions of Constitution?
3. Whether the question no. 2 supra is no longer res-integra
in view of law laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dewan
Chand Builders case upholding the view of High Court of
Delhi that the Cess Act was referable to Entry 97 of List I of
Seventh Schedule?
Question no. 1: Whether levy imposed under Cess Act is a tax
or a fee?
18.
The first question that arises for consideration is whether the levy
imposed under the Cess Act is a tax or a fee. This question is no longer
res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Dewan Chand Builders &
Contractors v. Union of India, (2012) 1 SCC 101, while considering
the same Cess Act and the challenge to its constitutional validity has
examined its object and scheme and held that the levy imposed under the
Act is a fee and not a tax. In the said case, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
observed that the amount collected as cess is not part of the general
revenue of the Government. It is collected for the specific purpose of
augmenting the Welfare Fund and is to be utilized for the welfare of
building and other construction workers. The Court, therefore, found a
sufficient connection between the levy and the purpose for which it is
collected and upheld the levy as a „fee‟.
19.
The plea of the petitioners that no service is rendered to
them personally and, therefore, the levy cannot be treated as a fee,
cannot be accepted. It is not necessary that the benefit of the levy must
go directly to the person from whom it is collected. It is sufficient if
there is a reasonable connection between the class of persons from
whom the levy is collected and the welfare activity for which the amount
is utilized. The BOCW Act is a welfare legislation intended to protect
the interests of workers engaged in building and construction activities.
The cess collected under the Cess Act is meant for the welfare of such
workers. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Dewan Chand Builders &
Contractors,(supra) has already found the necessary connection
between the levy and the object of the legislation. This Court is,
therefore, bound by the said declaration of law.Once the levy is held to
be a fee and not a tax, the very basis of challenge of the petitioners based
on Entry 49 of List II, relating to taxes on lands and buildings, no longer
survives.
20.
Question no. 2. Whether the Parliament had the Legislative
competence to enact and apply the BOCW Act and the Cess
Act to the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir in view of
provisions of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and the
limited application of provisions of the Constitution?
21.
The next question that arises for consideration is whether the
Parliament had the legislative competence to enact and apply the BOCW
Act and the Cess Act to the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir in
view of the provisions of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and the
limited application of other provisions of the Constitution of India to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir.
22.
Article 370 of the Constitution of India, as it existed till 5th
August 2019, contained temporary provisions with respect to the then
State of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 370, inter alia, provided that the
power of Parliament to make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir
would be limited to those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent
List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, were
declared by the President to correspond to the matters specified in the
Instrument of Accession as the matters with respect to which the
Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State and also such other
matters in the said Lists as the President, with the concurrence of the
Government of the State, may by order specify. This was so specifically
provided in clause (1) of Article 370 of the Constitution of India.It is in
the exercise of this power conferred by clause (1) of Article 370, the
President, with the concurrence of the Government of Jammu and
Kashmir, promulgated the Constitution (Application to Jammu and
Kashmir) Order, 1954 ["1954 Order"]. By virtue of the 1954 Order,
various provisions of the Constitution of India, as amended from time to
time, came to be extended/applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir
with certain exceptions and modifications. This position continued to
exist till the President issued a declaration in the exercise of power
conferred by clause (3) read with clause (1) of Article 370 of the
Constitution, providing that all clauses of Article 370 shall cease to be
operative except the following, which reads as under:
"370. All provisions of this Constitution, as amended
from time to time, without any modifications or
exceptions, shall apply to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir notwithstanding anything contrary contained in
article 152 or article 308 or any other article of this
Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of
Jammu and Kashmir or any law, document, judgement,
ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation, notification,
custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of
India, or any other instrument, treaty or agreement as
envisaged under article 363 or otherwise."
23.
It is equally pertinent to note that prior to issuance of C.O.
273 dated 06.08.2019, the President of India, in the exercise of power
conferred by clause (1) of Article 370, had issued the Constitution
(Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, superseding the 1954
Order, as amended from time to time. This was done by the President in
terms of C.O. 272 dated 05.08.2019.The case in hand, however, pertains
to an era prior to 05.08.2019 and, therefore, has to be dealt with in the
light of constitutional position vis-à-vis the then State of Jammu and
Kashmir as it existed prior to 05.08.2019. The legislative relations
between the Union and the States are enumerated in Chapter I of Part XI
of the Constitution of India.
24.
Article 245 of the Constitution was extended to and
applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as it is, without any
exceptions and modifications, and the same reads as under:
"245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the
Legislatures of States.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament
may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of
India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the
whole or any part of the State.
(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be
invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial
operation."
25.
Article 246 of the Constitution, which deals with the
subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of
States, applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with exceptions and
modifications. Article 246 of the Constitution of India reads thus:
“Article 246. Subject-matter of laws made
Parliament and by the Legislatures of States
by
(1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3),
Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect
to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh
Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "Union
List").
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and,
subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have
power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the "Concurrent List").
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any
State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or
any part thereof with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the "State List").
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any
matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a
State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter
enumerated in the State List.”
26.
In terms of the 1954 Order, the provisions of Article 246
would apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the following
modifications:
“In Article 246, for the words, brackets and figures “clauses
(2) and (3)” occurring in clause (1), the word, brackets and
figure “clause (2)‟ shall be substituted, and the words,
brackets and figure “notwithstanding anything in clause
(3)”, occurring in clause (2), and the whole of clauses (3)
and (4), shall be omitted.”
27.
It is, thus, evident that, in terms of clause (1) of Article 246,
as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Parliament had
exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule (the Union List), subject,
of course, to clause (1), and the Legislature of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir had the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III of the Seventh Schedule (the Concurrent List).
Clauses (3) and (4), as noted above, stood omitted in relation to the then
State of Jammu and Kashmir. There was, thus, no State List in relation
to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
28.
The most important Article, i.e. Article 248, which reserved
residuary powers of legislation in Parliament, was applicable in relation
to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with exceptions and modifications.
The Parliament was conferred exclusive power to make laws with
respect to specified fields in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Article 248 of the Constitution, as was made applicable to the State of
Jammu and Kashmir in terms of the 1954 Order, reads thus:
248. Residuary powers of legislation
(1) Subject to Article 246-A, Parliament has exclusive
power to make any law with respect to any matter not
enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List.
(2) Such power shall include the power of making any law
imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.
29.
From a reading of Article 248, it is abundantly clear that the
residuary powers of legislation only in respect of matters enumerated in
Article 248, as was made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
were reserved in Parliament. The rest of the residuary power remained
with the State. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution enumerates the
matters in the Union List. Entry 97, which applied to the rest of India
except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, is a residuary entry and reads
thus:
"Entry 97. Any other matter not enumerated in List II or
List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those
Lists."
30.
However, in this application to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, Entry 97 reproduced above was substituted in the following
manner:
".(a) prevention of activities in involving terrorist acts
directed towards overawing the Government as by law
established or striking terror in the people or any section of
the people or alienating any section of the people or
adversely affecting the harmony amongst different sections
of the people;
(aa) prevention of other activities directed towards
disclaiming, questioning, or disrupting the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a
part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the
territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the
Indian National Flag, the Indian Anthem and this
Constitution; and
(b) taxes on (i) foreign travel by seal or air;(ii) inland air
travel; (iii) postal articles, including money orders,
phonograms and telegrams.
Explanation.— In this Entry, the term "terrorist act" has
the same meaning as in the explanation to Article 248 of the
Constitution.
31.
Needless to state that the State List in the Seventh Schedule
was omitted in relation to its application to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. This was the constitutional position in relation to the State of
Jammu and Kashmir.
32.
Keeping the aforesaid discussion of the constitutional
position vis-à-vis the then State of Jammu and Kashmir in the
background, we now proceed to examine the challenge made by the
petitioners to the twin legislations, the BOCW Act and the Cess Act,
insofar as their application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir is
concerned.
33.
Mr. Z.A. Shah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioners, did not seriously pursue the challenge to the BOCW Act and
fairly conceded that the Act is one which is traceable to Entries 23 and
24 of the Concurrent List. He, however, restricted his challenge to the
Cess Act on the ground that the said legislation was enacted by
Parliament in the exercise of its residuary powers of legislation and is
clearly traceable to Entry 97 of the Union List.
34.
Question no. 3. Whether the question no. 2 supra is no
longer res-integra in view of law laid by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dewan Chand Builders case
upholding the view of High Court of Delhi that the Cess
Act was referable to Entry 97 of List I of Seventh
Schedule ?
35.
The argument of Mr. Shah is that Entry 97, as it was
applicable in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, only conferred
a limited power of legislation in relation to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. Entry 97, as was applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
clearly restricted the exercise of residuary powers of legislation in
respect of enumerated matters, whereas the rest of the residuary powers
of legislation remained with the State of Jammu and Kashmir.To
buttress his submission, he placed strong reliance upon a judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Dewan Chand Builders (supra) and
vociferously contended that the Supreme Court, having held the source
of legislation, i.e. the Cess Act, to be Entry 97 of the Union List as is
applicable to the rest of India, there remains hardly any scope for
discussion with regard to the legislative competence of Parliament to
enact such law for the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
36.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
argument of Mr. Shah. We have no manner of doubt that Article 248 of
the Constitution of India and Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule,
as was made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of
the 1954 Order, did not confer upon Parliament legislative competence
to legislate the Cess Act for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. If this is
the simple position emerging from a reading of the relevant provisions
of the Constitution as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the
issue raised will remain no longer res integra. However, when we look
to the Cess Act in its entirety and, particularly, its pith and substance, we
clearly find that the Cess Act is a legislation which can be traced to
Entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List and, therefore, can be very well
saved from being declared ultra vires.
37.
Mr. Shah would submit that, in view of the law laid down
by the Supreme Court in Dewan Chand Builders (supra), this question
is not open to debate, discussion or decision. The Cess Act shall be
deemed to be an Act of Parliament enacted under Entry 97 of the Union
List to the extent it was not applicable to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. He would urge this Court not to venture into discussion as to
whether the Cess Act could be traced to Entries 23 or 24 of the
Concurrent List. We are afraid we cannot agree with the learned senior
counsel for the reasons which we will give hereinafter.
38.
We are conscious that Hon‟ble Supreme Court has, in
Dewan Chand Builders case confirmed the view of High Court of Delhi
that the Cess Act is referable to residuary Entry 97 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule, yet for the reasons given hereinafter, we are of the
view that the question as to whether vires of the Cess Act like BOCW
Act can be saved by tracing it to Entry 23 and 24 of List III of Seventh
Schedule is still open to determination at the instance of the then State
of Jammu and Kashmir (now a Union Territory).
39.
The vires of the Cess Act were called in question by the
Builders Association of India and others before the High Court of Delhi.
The cases were clubbed together under the lead case of Builders
Association of India and others v. Union of India and others and
disposed of by the High Court of Delhi vide its judgment dated
28.02.2007. The constitutional validity of the Cess Act was challenged
by the petitioners therein primarily on the ground that the levy of cess
under the Act was, in essence and in effect, a tax on land and buildings
and, therefore, the subject matter of the legislation was fully covered by
Entry 49 in List II (State List), which pertains to "taxes on land and
buildings". It was, thus, argued before the Delhi High Court that the
enactment of the legislation, i.e. the Cess Act, was in the exclusive
legislative domain of the State and, therefore, Parliament lacked
legislative competence to enact the Cess Act providing for imposition of
tax on land and buildings. In the counter-affidavit filed, the Union of
India took a specific stand that the BOCW Act as well as the Cess Act
were enacted for the welfare of building and other construction workers
and, as such, they were clearly traceable to Entries 23 and 24 of List III.
It was, however, in the alternative pleaded by the Union of India that if
one were to accept that there was no specific entry in the Concurrent List
concerning a tax or cess corresponding to Entries 23 and 24 thereof, the
impugned statutes could be justified with reference to the residuary
Entry 97 of the Union List.
40.
It seems that during the course of arguments, the learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India somehow
did not pursue the line of his argument expressed in the counter-affidavit
to the extent that the Cess Act was enacted with reference to Entries 23
and 24 in the Concurrent List. He somehow confined his submissions to
Entry 97 of List I. It is in this background that the High Court of Delhi
considered only the following question:
“whether the levy of cess under the Cess Act is a tax on
land and buildings or a fee not traceable to any of the
Entries in Lists II and III and, therefore, is an enactment
referable to Entry 97 of List I.
41.
In view of the reluctance of the Additional Solicitor General
to pursue his argument that the Cess Act was enacted with reference to
Entries 23 and 24, the High Court of Delhi did not venture into
examining the pith and substance of the Cess Act and to render its
opinion as to whether it was traceable to Entries 23 and 24 of the
Concurrent List. The discussion was limited to determining as to
whether the levy imposed under the Cess Act was in the nature of a tax
or a fee. After a long debate, with reference to the case law on the
subject, the High Court of Delhi held the levy under the Cess Act to be a
fee and not a tax on land and buildings traceable to Entry 49 of List II.
The High Court, thus, accepted the argument of the Additional Solicitor
General that the cess leviable under the Cess Act was not a tax but a fee
and, therefore, referable to Entry 97 of the Union List. The conclusion
drawn by the High Court of Delhi is contained in paragraph 33 of the
judgment, which reads as under:
"33. It is accordingly held that the petitioners have failed to
show that the subject matter of the Cess Act falls under any
entry in List II or List III. Therefore, the subject matter of
the Cess Act is within the legislative competence of
Parliament with reference to Entry 97 of List I. This part of
the discussion is concluded by negativing the challenge by
the petitioners to the validity of the Cess Act on the ground
of lack of legislative competence."
42.
The matter was taken to the Supreme Court by the
contractors in Dewan Builders case (supra). The appeal before the
Supreme Court was by the contractors who were still contending that the
levy of cess envisaged under the Cess Act was a tax on land and
buildings and, therefore, referable to Entry 49 of List II. They challenged
the judgment of the High Court of Delhi to the extent it held the levy as
a fee not referable to any of the Entries in List II or List III and,
therefore, could be said to have been enacted under Entry 97 of List I
(residuary powers of legislation).Since the constitutional validity of the
Cess Act had been upheld by the High Court of Delhi and, therefore, the
Union of India had no occasion to contend before the Supreme Court
that the Cess Act could have been enacted by reference to Entries 23 and
24 of the Concurrent List. The issue, thus, was never debated either
before the High Court of Delhi in Builders Association of India’s case
(supra) or before the Supreme Court in Dewan Chand Builders’s case.
43.
We have carefully gone through the judgments of the High
Court of Delhi in Builders Association of India and others case
(supra) as well as the Supreme Court in Dewan Chand Builders’s case
and we are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid judgments do not
come in the way of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to urge and argue
that the Cess Act is traceable and referable to Entries 23 and 24 of the
Concurrent List and, therefore, was within the legislative competence of
Parliament, notwithstanding that Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the
Union List were made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir
with exceptions and modifications. We, therefore, do not agree with the
contention of Mr. Shah that the issue raised by the State of Jammu and
Kashmir to sustain the constitutional validity of the Cess Act by bringing
it within the purview of Entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List is no
more open to debate and discussion in view of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Dewan Chand Builders’ case (supra).
44.
Having said that, the issue that now calls for determination
is whether the Cess Act is a revenue-collection legislation or legislation
aimed at providing for the welfare of labour, including conditions of
work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation,
etc. With a view to finding out the pith and substance of the legislation,
we need to look at the Cess Act in its entirety.
45.
In the year 1996, Parliament enacted the BOCW Act, 1996,
with an aim to regulate the employment and conditions of service of
building and other construction workers and to provide for their safety,
health and welfare measures and for other matters connected therewith
or incidental thereto. The BOCW Act, inter alia, envisages the
constitution of Building and Other Construction Workers‟ Welfare
Boards. Section 18 of the BOCW Act dealt with the constitution of State
Welfare Boards. Section 24 prescribes constitution of a fund by the
Board to be called the Building and Other Construction Workers‟
Welfare Fund. In the same year, the Parliament came up with the
Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996,
which was enacted to provide for levy and collection of cess on the cost
of construction incurred by the employers with a view to augmenting the
resources of Building and Other Construction Workers‟ Welfare Boards
constituted under the BOCW Act.
46.
From the Preamble of the Cess Act, it is quite evident that
the Cess Act, 1996, is aimed at augmenting the resources of the
Workers‟ Welfare Boards constituted under the BOCW Act and,
therefore, must be seen to be an Act supplementing and complementing
the aims and objects sought to be achieved by the BOCW Act. Viewed
thus, the Cess Act must be considered and treated to be an extension and
integral part of the BOCW Act.The Cess Act does provide for levy and
collection of cess but clearly provides in Section 3 that the purpose of
collection of levy and cess is for giving effect to the BOCW Act. The
predominant object and purpose of the Cess Act is to garner finances and
augment the resources for the Workers‟ Welfare Boards constituted
under the BOCW Act.
47.
It is true that the Cess Act lays down an elaborate procedure
for collection of cess from the employer/contractor, as the case may be,
but the fact remains that the Cess Act has been enacted with a
predominant purpose of augmenting the resources for the Workers‟
Welfare Boards so that the Boards are in a position to discharge their
duties effectively under the BOCW Act. It is beyond any pale of
discussion that the BOCW Act is legislation for the welfare of labour
and, therefore, referable to Entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List.The
Cess Act, being an enactment for augmenting the resources of the
Workers‟ Welfare Boards constituted under the BOCW Act, cannot be
said to be merely a revenue-collection legislation. Viewed thus, the Cess
Act can very well be said to be an extension of the BOCW Act and
enacted with the sole object of taking care of the social security and
welfare of labour, including the conditions of work, provident fund,
workmen's compensation, invalidity and old-age pensions and maternity
benefits, etc. The legislation, in its pith and substance, is a labour
welfare legislation and cannot be termed as merely a revenue-collection
legislation.
48.
Since the issue was not debated either before the High
Court of Delhi in Builders Association of India case or before the
Supreme Court in Dewan Chand case, as such, the Courts had no
occasion to look at the enactment from this angle. The vires of the
legislation was saved by holding that it was enacted in reference to Entry
97 of List I and this was so held by the Supreme Court by negativing the
contention of the contractors that the levy of cess under the Cess Act
was a tax on land and buildings referable to Entry 49 of the State List
and, therefore, beyond the legislative competence of Parliament. The
State of Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed a different constitutional status at
the relevant point of time. Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the Union
List was not applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as it is, but
was applicable with exceptions and modifications, which we have
detailed hereinabove, in terms of the 1954 Order. The Parliament did not
have legislative competence to enact laws in relation to the State of
Jammu and Kashmir by tracing its legislative competence to Article 248
read with Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, which was
applicable in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with certain
modifications and exceptions. The State of Jammu and Kashmir had,
thus, no occasion to put forth its point of view. The concession by the
Additional Solicitor General of India to the extent of not pressing his
argument that the Cess Act was referable to Entries 23 and 24 of List III
was during the course of arguments and, notwithstanding the fact that
the Union of India in its counter-affidavit had clearly taken the stand that
the Cess Act was referable to Entries 23 and 24 of List III. It had only
pleaded in the alternative that if the Act was not covered under Entries
23 and 24, it could be saved by reference to the residuary Entry 97 of
List I of the Seventh Schedule.
49.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion
that Parliament had the legislative competence in terms of Article 246
read with Entries 23 and 24 of List III of the Seventh Schedule and,
therefore, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Cess Act is
meritless and must fail.
50.
The last question that begs determination in this case is
whether, in the absence of constitution of the J&K Building and Other
Construction Workers‟ Welfare Board under the BOCW Act, the
provisions of the Cess Act could have been implemented in the then
State of Jammu and Kashmir.Reliance in this regard is placed by Mr.
Shah on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prakash Atlanta (JV)
v. National Highways Authority of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC
1998, in which it was held by the Supreme Court, though in a different
context, that the constitution of Welfare Boards was sine qua non for
giving effect to the BOCW Act and the Cess Act and the cess in
connection therewith could not have been levied or collected before the
constitution of such Welfare Boards. It was also held that the contractors
could not have factored the cess component into their bid prices prior to
a mechanism being put in place for its collection, as that would have led
to unjust and unlawful enrichment on their part.
51.
The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 50 of
the judgment in Prakash Atlanta’s case (supra) are relevant and are,
therefore, set out below:
“50. Having given our earnest consideration to all aspects
of the matter, we find that the ultimate obligation to bear the
statutory levy of the subject cess would lie with the
„employer‟, under Section 3(2) of the Cess Act. „Employer‟
in relation to an establishment is defined by Section
2(1)(i) of the BOCW Act to mean the „owner‟ thereof but
includes the „contractor‟, if the building or construction
work is carried on by or through such contractor or by
employment of workers provided by such contractor. This
being one aspect of the matter, the crucial issue, insofar as
„contractors‟ are concerned, is whether they could have
factored in the levy of such cess in their bid prices at the
time they submitted their bids when such a levy was not
even in existence then. This question would arise,
irrespective of whether the contracts made a mention of the
BOCW Act and the Cess Act. The answer is simple - the
contractors could not have factored such cess component
into their bid prices prior to a mechanism being put in place
for its collection, as that would have led to unjust and
unlawful enrichment on their part. In consequence, the
question would arise as to when the liability to pay the
subject cess commences. The observations in para 12 of A.
Prabhakara Reddy (supra) are of guidance. This Court held
therein that after the Cess Act and the Rules came into
effect and the Welfare Board was constituted, with the
notification specifying the rate of cess to be levied upon the
cost of construction incurred by the employer already in
place, the authorities were duty-bound to collect the cess by
raising demands in respect of the ongoing construction
works and it was not necessary to wait till such building and
construction workers were registered under Section 12 of
the BOCW Act or till welfare measures were provided to
them. Therefore, the constitution of Welfare Boards is the
sine qua non for giving effect to the BOCW Act and the
Cess Act and the cess in connection therewith could not
have been levied or collected before the constitution of such
Welfare Boards”.
52.
In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the J&K Building and
Other Construction Workers‟ Welfare Board was constituted vide SRO
274 of 2007 dated 31.07.2007 and, therefore, a proper mechanism was
put in place for collection of cess from the employer, i.e.
owners/contractors, to be appropriated by the Board.
53.
It is true that prior to 31.07.2007, the Cess Act and the
Rules framed thereunder were not capable of being given effect to and,
therefore, the petitioners could not have factored the cess into their
bidding price. However, w.e.f. 1st August 2007, the petitioners became
liable to pay the cess at the prescribed rate under the Cess Act and the
Rules framed thereunder, irrespective of whether they had factored the
payment of cess into their bidding price or not.All the works executed by
the petitioners, having been allotted to them pursuant to NITs issued
after 31st July 2007, will attract the levy of cess.
54.
For the foregoing reasons and the discussion made
hereinabove, we dispose of both the petitions by holding as under:
(i) The Parliament had the legislative competence to enact
the BOCW Act and the Cess Act in relation to the then State
of Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore, both the Acts are
intra vires the Constitution.
(ii) The petitioners in both the petitions are liable to pay the
cess envisaged under the Cess Act at the prescribed rate in
respect of all the contracts executed by them pursuant to the
NITs issued after 31.07.2007, i.e. the date when the J&K
Building and Other Construction Workers‟ Welfare Board
was for the first time constituted to give effect to the
provisions of the BOCW Act and the Cess Act.
(iii) The Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare
Cess Rules, 1998, framed under the Cess Act, 1996, are also
held constitutionally valid. The cess amount payable by the
petitioners in terms of this judgment at the prescribed rate
shall be recoverable from the petitioners along with interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date it was due till it is
actually recovered.
(MOHD. YOUSUF WANI)
JUDGE
(SANJEEV KUMAR)
CHIEF JUSTICE (A)
JAMMU
08.09/2026
SANJEEV
Whether the order is speaking: Yes
Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No
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