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[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17624/2025
Professor Ramesh Chandra S/o Shri Sunder Lal, Aged about 68
years, R/o Vice Chancellor House, Maharaja Surajmal Brij
University,
Chak
Sakitara,
Kumher,
District
Bharatpur
(Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
The
Chancellor,
Maharaja
Suraj
Mal
Brij
University,
Bharatpur, Address Governor House, Civil Lines, Jaipur
(Rajasthan).
2.
State of Rajasthan, through Chief Secretary, Government
of Rajasthan, Government Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj).
----Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Major R.P. Singh Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Ashish Poonia
Advocate, Ms. Aanchal S. Rathore
Advocate, Ms. Rituraj Kaur Bhullar
Advocate & Mr. Prashant Chandra
Advocate.
For Respondents
:
Mr. Rajendra Prasad Senior Advocate
(Advocate General) assisted by Mr.
Tanmay Goyal Advocate, Mr.
Sheetanshu Sharma Advocate, Ms.
Harshita Thakral Advocate & Ms.
Dhriti Laddha Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments
::
11.02.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved ::
Whether the full judgment or only
11.02.2026
the operative part is pronounced
::
Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement
::
17.02.2026
1.
Petitioner has filed the present writ petition with
following prayers :
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may kindly be pleased to direct:
(i) to declare the Sub Section (1) of Section 11A, MSBU Act,
2012 unconstitutional being vague, ambiguous, arbitrary,
and conferring un-canalized power to the Chancellor to
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remove a Vice-Chancellor in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India;
(ii) to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated
11.11.2025 (Annexure-23) terminating the petitioner and
directing the Respondents to allow the Petitioner to function
on the post of Vice Chancellor, Maharaja Surajmal Brij
University, Bharatpur with all consequential benefits
(iii) also to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated
28.03.2025 (Annexure-1) suspending the petitioner and
direct the Respondents to allow the Petitioner to function on
the post of Vice Chancellor, Maharaja Surajmal Brij
University, Bharatpur with all consequential benefits, and
(iv) to pass any other appropriate order, direction in favor of
the humble Petitioner in the interest of justice and in the
circumstances of the present case.”
2.
Since vires of Section 11-A (1) of the Maharaja
Surajmal Brij University Act, 2012 (hereinafter to be referred as
'the MSBU Act, 2012') was also questioned by the petitioner,
therefore, the writ petition was listed before the Division Bench of
this court on 16.12.2025. However, during hearing before the
Division Bench, the petitioner did not press his challenge to vires
of Section 11-A (1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, therefore, the Division
Bench passed following order:
“Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner upon instructions
submits that the challenge made in the present petition is
vires to Section 11-A (1) of the Maharaja Surajmal Brij
University Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as MSBU Act
2012) is not pressed.
Considering that the order which is under challenge is to be
examined by the Single Bench of this Court.
The petition is therefore ordered to be listed before the
Single Bench on 08.01.2026.”
3.
Consequently, the matter was listed before the Single
Bench for consideration of the challenge to the suspension order
dated 28.03.2025 and the subsequent termination order dated
11.11.2025 passed by the Chancellor of the University. The
petitioner further prayed for reinstatement with consequential
benefits.
4.
It has been contended by the petitioner in memo of
writ petition that he was a distinguished biomedical scientist and
academic
administrator.
After
following
the
procedure
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contemplated in Section 11 of the MSBU Act, 2012, on the basis of
recommendation
of
selection
committee
followed
by
the
consultation with the State Government, he was appointed as
Vice-Chancellor of Maharaja Surajmal Brij University, Bharatpur (in
short “MSBU”) on 08.03.2023 issued by the Chancellor for a term
of three years. During his tenure, acting upon State directives to
verify credentials of affiliated colleges, petitioner constituted
committees to inspect and review the status of certain colleges,
including Shri Ganga Saran Women’s College and S.N. College,
Halena. The inspection and subsequent high-level committee
reports found serious deficiencies in infrastructure and compliance
and recommended for withholding or cancelling affiliation in
accordance with the MSBU Act, 2012 and the MSBU (Affiliation of
Colleges) Rules, 2015. Acting thereon, the University initiated deaffiliation proceedings.
5.
Subsequently,
representatives
of
the
complaints
concerned
were
colleges
made
to
the
by
Hon’ble
Governor/Chancellor. On 01.01.2025, the matter was referred to
the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, who constituted a twomember committee, one member of which was alleged to have a
conflict of interest. The petitioner objected to the constitution and
jurisdiction of the said committee. Thereafter, on 07.03.2025, a
four-member committee was constituted by the Chancellor under
Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 to inquire into complaints
against the petitioner.
6.
On
28.03.2025,
the
petitioner
was
placed
under
suspension by order of the Chancellor under Section 11A(1) of the
MSBU Act, 2012 in consultation with the State Government. The
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petitioner contended that no show cause notice or opportunity of
hearing, as mandated by the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the
MSBU Act, 2012, was granted prior to suspension. He further
alleged that no review of suspension was undertaken and even
salary and emoluments of the petitioner during the suspension
period were not released in terms of Section 11A(2) of the MSBU
Act, 2012.
7.
It is further contended by the petitioner that one
enquiry report dated 11.06.2025 containing 87 pages was
subsequently supplied to the petitioner, directing him to file his
representation/ reply within a period of three days, however, on
his request the time was further extended to 10 days. Thereafter,
the petitioner filed detailed reply/ representation against the
enquiry report raising objections with regard to procedure as well
as explaining each and every point of the enquiry report. While
the matter was pending and after the petitioner had filed a writ
petition on 10.11.2025 challenging his suspension, he was served
with order dated 11.11.2025, thereby removing him from the
office of vice-chancellor.
8.
The petitioner has challenged both suspension order
dated 28.03.2025 and removal order dated 11.11.2025 on the
grounds of violation of statutory procedure, breach of principles of
natural justice, non-speaking order, suffering from malafides and
colourable
exercise
of
power
and
the
petitioner
pleaded
infringement of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
9.
In order to oppose the writ petition, the respondents
filed reply to the writ petition categorically denying all the
allegations and it was stated that the petitioner was appointed as
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Vice Chancellor on 08.03.2023. Upon receipt of several complaints
alleging serious financial irregularities and abuse of office, a
preliminary
enquiry
Commissioner,
was
Bharatpur,
conducted
who
by
submitted
the
a
Divisional
report
dated
05.03.2025 finding prima facie substance in the allegations.
Consequently, the petitioner was placed under suspension on
28.03.2025 under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 after
consultation with the State Government.
10.
Thereafter, a four-member committee constituted under
Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 conducted a detailed enquiry
and submitted its report dated 11.06.2025, holding prima facie
proved allegations relating to non-compliance with statutory
provisions,
misuse
of
university
funds,
irregular
payments,
overpayment to contractual employees, disobedience of State
Government directions, favouritism in allocation of work, and
violation of the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement
Rules, 2013. Copy of enquiry report was furnished to the
petitioner and he was also afforded opportunity of personal
hearing. His written reply as well as oral submissions were duly
considered. The reply/ representation was further again sent for
comments
to
the
concerned
Divisional
Commissioner,
who
reiterated his findings in report dated 19.09.2025. While following
the process, after consultation with the State Government, the
Chancellor, in exercise of powers under Section 11A(1) of the
MSBU Act, 2012, passed order dated 11.11.2025 removing the
petitioner from the post of Vice Chancellor. It is submitted that the
removal order was passed strictly in accordance with statutory
provisions and after full compliance with principles of natural
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justice. The suspension order consequently ceased to operate
being merged in the removal order.
11.
The respondents in their reply denied the allegations
that the removal was summary, arbitrary, non-speaking, or
actuated by malice. It is contended that adequate opportunity of
hearing was granted, the statutory procedure was followed, and
the decision was based on material available on record. The
petitioner’s claim for salary beyond subsistence allowance during
suspension is stated to be untenable.
12.
the
Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
petitioner
vehemently
contended
that
the
impugned
termination order is ex facie illegal, arbitrary and violative of
statutory safeguards embodied under Section 11A of the MSBU
Act, 2012. It was emphasised by the learned Senior Counsel that
that the present writ petition raises issues of grave constitutional
and statutory importance touching upon the autonomy of a
statutory University, the limits of the Chancellor’s supervisory
jurisdiction, the mandatory safeguards embodied under Section
11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, and the inviolable principles of natural
justice flowing from Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioner has not
merely sought reinstatement for a short residual tenure; rather, in
addition to that he insisted upon restoration of institutional
propriety and exposed vindication of the rule of law.
13.
While reiterating the content of writ petition learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioner is an internationally
acclaimed biomedical scientist, educationist, and institution builder
of high repute. His pioneering contributions in anticancer drug
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discovery, authorship of over 400 research publications, guidance
of more than 100 doctoral scholars, and receipt of distinguished
international honours such as the J. William Fulbright Scholarship
and the Rockefeller Biotechnology Career Award reflect his
academic stature. He has served as Founder Director of the
Institute of Nano Medical Sciences at the University of Delhi, ViceChancellor of Bundelkhand University, Member of the Planning
Commission (U.P.), President of the Indian Chemical Society and
Non-Official Director of a Government of India enterprise. These
credentials demonstrate that the impugned action is institutionally
disproportionate and legally untenable when tested on the
touchstone of fairness and legality.
14.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in the
instant case although no definite charges against the petitioner
were ever framed or served upon him, copies of alleged “several
complaints” were not supplied to him, no statements of the
witnesses were recorded, nor was he given reasonable opportunity
of hearing; yet the impugned removal order dated 11.11.2025
nevertheless records a finding that the charges imposed upon the
petitioner stood proved. Thus,
the entire exercise is vitiated for
gross violation of principles of natural justice.
15.
Learned Senior Counsel asserted that Section 11A of
the MSBU Act, 2012, which forms the basis of the impugned
action, provides a carefully structured mechanism for removal of a
Vice-Chancellor. The provision mandates that removal can be
ordered only after making detailed inquiry, and no order shall be
made unless the Vice-Chancellor has been given a “reasonable
opportunity” of defence. The second proviso to Section 11A(1) of
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the MSBU Act, 2012 uses explicitly clear language that “no order
shall be made unless…” which makes it essentially mandatory in
nature
and
admits
no
deviation
or
dilution.
The
alleged
opportunity given to the petitioner before removal was nothing but
an eye-wash or empty ritual, hence, the action taken by the
Chancellor stands vitiated for non-compliance with a statutory
safeguard. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon judgments of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Khem Chand vs. Union
of India & Others, AIR 1958 SC 300, Pepsu Road Transport
Corporation vs. Lachhman Dass Gupta & Another, (2001) 9
SCC 523, Oryx Fisheries Private Limited vs. Union of India
& Others, (2010) 13 SCC 427, Union of India & Others vs.
Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78, Anil Gilurker vs.
Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Another, (2011)
14 SCC 379, Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society &
Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515, Committee of Management,
Kisan Degree College vs. Shambhu Saran Pandey & Others
(1995) 1 SCC 404, State of U.P. vs. Shatrughan Lal &
Another (1998) 6 SCC 651, Dewan Singh vs. State of
Haryana & Another (1976) 3 SCC 638 and Dr. Umrao Singh
Choudhary vs. State of M.P. & Another (1994) 4 SCC 328 in
order to emphasise that the expression “reasonable opportunity”
has quite wide amplitude and it cannot be construed in a narrow
sense
either
as
an
illusionary
formality
or
a
mechanical
compliance. When the statutory provision makes it mandatory to
provide reasonable opportunity before taking any punitive action
against the incumbent, then it should be meaningful
and
purposeful exercise by framing definite charges, supplying relied
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upon documents/ material, as well as the opportunity to put
forward defence and evidence to prove his innocence.
16.
Learned Senior Counsel categorically argued that the
illegality is further compounded by the fact that the Divisional
Commissioner ostensibly initiated as an inquiry under Section 9(2)
of the MSBU Act, 2012 and such provision of the MSBU Act, 2012
empowers the Chancellor to order an inquiry into the affairs of the
University; however, it was impermissibly converted into a
disciplinary proceeding against the Vice-Chancellor under Section
11A of the MSBU Act, 2012. Learned Senior Counsel firmly stated
that Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 is supervisory, University
centric and general in nature; it does not contemplate personal
disciplinary action against an Vice-Chancellor. The transformation
of a general administrative inquiry into a disciplinary proceeding
for removal, without following the procedural safeguards of
Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, amounts to a colourable
exercise of power and circumvention of mandatory statutory
requirements.
17.
Learned Senior Counsel highlighted that the factual
background demonstrates that the petitioner was acting strictly
within his statutory authority in matters of affiliation and deaffiliation under the MSBU (Affiliation of Colleges) Rules, 2015,
pursuant to directives issued by the Government of Rajasthan to
verify credentials of affiliated colleges, the petitioner constituted
expert committees comprising distinguished academicians. Their
reports revealed serious infrastructural and academic deficiencies
in certain colleges, including Shri Ganga Saran Women’s College
and S.N. College, Halaina. Acting upon these reports and in
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conformity with statutory provisions, the University issued show
cause notices and recommended withdrawal of affiliation. These
actions were grounded in academic standards and regulatory
compliance.
18.
Learned Senior Counsel further added that instead of
addressing these deficiencies through the University’s statutory
framework,
the
Office
of
the
Chancellor,
by
letter
dated
01.01.2025, directed the Divisional Commissioner to inquire into
the de-affiliation decisions. The Divisional Commissioner has no
statutory role under the MSBU Act in matters of affiliation. The
subsequent constitution of a two-member committee by the
Divisional Commissioner, including Shri Hemant Mahawar, an
individual allegedly connected with the concerned college, has
further vitiated the process. The petitioner had already objected to
this appointment citing conflict of interest. Even a reasonable
apprehension of bias renders the proceedings void, therefore,
carrying on enquiry of such nature against the petitioner was
against fundamental principles of fairness.
19.
Learned
Senior
Counsel
reiterated
that
the
four-
member committee constituted on 07.03.2025 for enquiry under
Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 did not conduct any
independent audit or inspection as mandated. The records would
reveal, that the committee members never personally visited the
University, and the report was effectively prepared by an
interested officer. Even otherwise, the findings and conclusions of
the enquiry report do not lead to any logical conclusions, as each
conclusion ends with the observation that recovery of certain
amounts under a particular head is expected from the concerned
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officials. Thus such findings of the Enquiry Committee cannot be
read against the petitioner so as to make it as foundation so as to
take the harshest action of removal of the petitioner.
20.
While referring the provisions of Section 11A(2) of the
MSBU Act, 2012, it was submitted by learned Senior Counsel that
the statutory violation was aggravated by the non-payment of
salary and emoluments during suspension, whereas Section
11A(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 unequivocally mandates that during
suspension the Vice-Chancellor shall continue to receive the
emoluments to which he was otherwise entitled. Despite repeated
representations, the petitioner’s salary has been withheld. Learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the chronology of events further
indicate malafide intent, which makes the entire decision making
process a nullity and non-est.
21.
Learned
Senior
Counsel
emphasised
that
the
Committee headed by the Divisional Commissioner was supposed
to confine its enquiry in relation to de-affiliation proceedings
initiated by the University in respect of its two affiliated colleges,
however, the Committee enlarged the scope of enquiry and has
touched altogether different arena, which was manifestly beyond
the scope of enquiry. Hence, on the basis of such enquiry report,
as per principles of legal fairness and transparency, no action
ought to have been taken against the petitioner.
22.
While pressing the above submissions, learned Senior
Counsel further argued that the action impugned herein further
undermine the autonomy of the University, which is a statutory
body
created
independence.
with
academic,
Executive
administrative
interference
through
and
financial
officers
not
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contemplated under the Act erodes institutional independence and
sets a dangerous precedent for higher education governance. The
Vice-Chancellor, acting under statutory rules to enforce academic
standards, cannot be penalised merely because such enforcement
affects private interests.
23.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the enquiry report, while drawing adverse conclusions against
the petitioner, ultimately rests its findings on broad observations
that he failed to maintain financial discipline and control, and did
not ensure timely conduct of the University’s regular activities. It
is contended that such conclusions are not only generalized but
also overlook the prevailing administrative circumstances under
which the petitioner was functioning.
24.
It was argued that during the relevant period, the
crucial statutory posts of Registrar and Financial Controller
remained vacant. These positions are entrusted with primary
responsibility
for
maintaining
financial
propriety,
supervising
accounts, ensuring compliance with statutory and regulatory
norms, and overseeing day-to-day administrative functioning.
Despite repeated communications and reminders addressed to the
State Government for filling up these key posts, no appointments
were made. Consequently, the institutional mechanism necessary
for financial oversight and procedural compliance was itself
deficient.
25.
of
Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in the absence
duly
appointed
officers
entrusted
with
financial
and
administrative control, the burden cannot be singularly fastened
upon the Vice-Chancellor. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held
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personally liable for alleged procedural lapses or administrative
delays which were occasioned by systemic deficiencies beyond his
control. At best, such circumstances may reflect institutional
constraints
rather
than
individual
misconduct
or
deliberate
omission.
26.
It was further submitted that the impugned removal
order dated 11.11.2025 has no reference of justifications and
explanations submitted in the reply/representation submitted
against enquiry report dated 11.06.2025, thus not only the
principles of natural justice have been flagrantly violated, but it
also makes it clear that the impugned order is wholly nonspeaking and unreasoned. A non-speaking order affecting civil
consequences is per se arbitrary, whimsical and lacks any
transparency in the impugned action.
27.
Learned Senior Counsel also urged that in a similar
matter, namely Dr. Balraj Singh vs. Chancellor, Sri Karan
Narendra Agriculture University, Through its Secretary and
Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Raj 5229, Co-ordinate Bench of this
High Court while interpreting the pari materia provision of Sri
Karan Narendra Agriculture University, Jobner Act, 2013 has
observed that the enquiry under Section 9 was for visitation and
inspector power of the Chancellor and cannot be used to punish
the Vice-Chancellor. It has been held that the although provisions
of the Act authorises the Chancellor to remove vice Chancellor but
it is expected of the Chancellor to act in accordance with rider
placed under law. Every action has to be in conformity with the
principles of natural justice particularly when specifically provided
under the law. If the Chancellor intended to initiate any enquiry,
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then obviously he cannot act as if he is a controlling administrative
office of the Vice-Chancellor.
28.
Learned Senior Counsel also heavily relied upon the
interim order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court at principal Seat Jodhpur in Dr. Arun Kumar vs
State of Rajasthan & Others (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No.
16709/2025) and submitted that the said order, though not
binding, carries persuasive value and reflects the reasoning
adopted by the Coordinate Bench while interpreting analogous
issue
arising
from
pari
materia
provisions
of
the
Swamy
Keshwanand Rajasthan Agriculture University Bikaner Act, 1987.
Learned Counsel submitted that while passing interim order dated
16.10.2025 the Coordinate Bench has observed that the enquiries
contemplated under Section 9 and Section 19-A (having similar
provision as of Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 applicable in
the present case) of the Act of 1987 are governing different fields.
Enquiry under Section 9 is University centric and not individual
centric, hence, cannot be made basis to remove the Vice
Chancellor. As per learned Senior Counsel in the above interim
order, the Coordinate Bench also observed that the procedure for
removing the Vice Chancellor is almost identical to disciplinary
proceedings, which must have been followed by the Enquiry
officer. By rendering the proceedings and order of removal prima
facie against the principles of natural justice, the Co-ordinate
Bench had stayed the operation of removal of the Vice Chancellor.
29.
In conclusion, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that
the process of selection and appointment of a Vice-Chancellor is
rigorous and distinct from an ordinary appointment. It involves a
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comprehensive
evaluation
of
the
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candidate’s
efficiency,
competence, integrity, academic credentials and administrative
acumen at multiple levels by an expert body. Therefore, once a
person is duly appointed as Vice-Chancellor, he cannot be
removed prior to completion of his tenure in a casual or slipshod
manner. Such removal must be founded on cogent and substantial
reasons, strictly in accordance with the governing statutory
provisions, sufficient to form a lawful and reasoned opinion
regarding his lack of fitness or suitability to continue in office.
However, in the present case, the impugned termination dated
11.11.2025, passed in a casual manner, is apparently ultra vires
the MSBU Act, 2012 violative of mandatory procedural safeguards,
vitiated by bias and conflict of interest, reflective of colourable
exercise of power, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21, as
well as destructive of University autonomy. According to learned
Senior Counsel, the petitioner had merely enforced statutory
standards regarding affiliation and was victimised at the behest of
certain colleges. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be
quashed with direction for reinstatement and consequential
benefits.
30.
Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for the
respondents submitted that the impugned actions are fully
supported by statutory authority and were taken in the larger
interest of the University and its students. It was contended that
Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 confers wide discretion
upon the Chancellor to act either on the report of the State
Government or “otherwise” if it appears that the Vice-Chancellor
has committed willful omission, abuse of powers or acted in a
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manner detrimental to the University. The present writ petition is
wholly misconceived, not maintainable either in law or on facts,
and deserves outright dismissal.
31.
Learned
Advocate
General
further
submitted
that
Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 clearly delineates the
circumstances under which the Chancellor may remove a ViceChancellor, namely where he willfully omits or refuses to carry out
the provisions of the Act, abuses the powers vested in him, or
where his continuance is detrimental to the interest of the
University. The provision also mandates consultation with the
State Government and an inquiry prior to removal. The petitioner
has failed to demonstrate how the impugned order of removal is
either arbitrary or against the provisions of the Act.
32.
Learned Advocate General contended that the petitioner
was appointed as Vice-Chancellor by His Excellency the Governor
of Rajasthan and Chancellor under Sections 11(3) and 11(7) of
the MSBU Act, 2012 for a tenure of three years or until attaining
the age of seventy years. However, during his tenure, several
complaints were received alleging serious financial irregularities,
abuse of power, irregular payments, overpayment to contractual
employees, disobedience of State Government directives, violation
of University statutes and causing financial loss to the University
by contravening the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement
Rules, 2013. Considering the gravity of these allegations, a
preliminary inquiry was entrusted to the Divisional Commissioner,
Bharatpur, who submitted a report dated 05.03.2025 finding prima
facie substance in the allegations. In view of the preliminary
findings, and in contemplation of a detailed inquiry, the Chancellor,
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in consultation with the State Government and in exercise of
powers under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, placed the
petitioner under suspension vide order dated 28.03.2025. The
suspension was thus neither mechanical nor arbitrary, but a
conscious decision taken after prima facie satisfaction based on
material on record.
33.
Learned Advocate General submitted that in exercise of
powers under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012, a four-member
committee headed by the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur was
constituted on 07.03.2025 to conduct a detailed inquiry into the
affairs of the University in light of the complaints received. The
committee conducted a comprehensive inquiry and submitted its
report on 11.06.2025.
34.
Learned Advocate General drew indulgence of this court
over the report dated 11.06.2025 and further submitted that the
report, on a cumulative reading of its findings, prima facie reflects
serious deficiencies in the petitioner’s efficiency, integrity, and
administrative capacity to continue to hold the office of ViceChancellor. The instances recorded therein indicate lapses in
adherence to statutory provisions and established procedures,
irregular exercise of administrative and financial powers, and
failure to ensure institutional discipline and regulatory compliance.
Such findings not only raise concerns regarding procedural
impropriety but also cast doubt on the petitioner’s ability to
discharge the high responsibilities attached to the post with the
requisite transparency, accountability, and integrity. In that view
of the matter, the conclusions drawn in the report suggest that the
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petitioner’s continuance in office would not be conducive to the
effective and lawful administration of the University.
35.
After receipt of the inquiry report, the petitioner was
furnished with a copy of the report and was granted a personal
hearing vide communication dated 10.07.2025. He submitted a
detailed written reply on 15.07.2025, which was duly considered.
He was also afforded personal hearing on 17.07.2025. Thereafter,
his reply was forwarded to the Divisional Commissioner for further
examination. Upon reconsideration, the Divisional Commissioner
submitted a further report dated 19.09.2025 reaffirming that the
serious allegations stood prima facie established. Thus, the
principles of natural justice were meticulously complied with at
every stage. The petitioner was not condemned unheard; rather,
he was afforded ample and sufficient opportunities to defend
himself.
36.
Upon consideration of both inquiry reports and after
due consultation with the State Government, as evident from
communication dated 03.11.2025, the Chancellor, in exercise of
statutory powers under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012,
passed the order dated 11.11.2025 removing the petitioner from
the post of Vice-Chancellor. The order was passed on the basis of
substantive
material
and
after
compliance
with
statutory
procedure. It cannot be termed as arbitrary, non-speaking, or
passed in haste. The suspension order had been passed in March
2025, and the removal order came only after a detailed inquiry
process extending over several months.
37.
Learned Advocate General emphatically refuted the
allegations of bias and improper constitution of the inquiry
(19 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
committee.
Learned
AG
clarified
[CW-17624/2025]
that
the
committee
was
constituted by order of the Chancellor under statutory authority.
No material has been placed on record by the petitioner to
substantiate
allegations
of
biasness.
Hence,
bald
and
unsubstantiated allegations cannot invalidate a statutory inquiry
conducted by senior administrative officers.
38.
Learned Advocate General further submitted that after
the removal order dated 11.11.2025, the suspension order dated
28.03.2025 ceased to have independent existence. Therefore,
challenge to the suspension order has become infructuous. In any
event, suspension pending inquiry is expressly authorized under
the first proviso to Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, and the
petitioner cannot claim immunity from such statutory action.
39.
With
regard
to
salary
and
emoluments,
it
was
submitted by the learned Advocate General that during suspension
the petitioner was entitled only to subsistence allowance in
accordance with applicable rules. In light of the serious financial
irregularities found against him, his claim for full salary and
benefits is wholly untenable.
40.
Learned Advocate General categorically denied that
there was any malice in law or fact, or any colourable exercise of
power. The action taken was in discharge of statutory duty to
protect the interest and integrity of the University. The dignity of
the office of Vice-Chancellor cannot be used as a shield against
accountability. When serious irregularities affecting public funds
and institutional governance are found, the Chancellor is not only
empowered but duty-bound to act in the larger interest of the
University.
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
41.
(20 of 37)
[CW-17624/2025]
It was argued that credible complaints were received
from affiliated colleges alleging arbitrary and non-transparent deaffiliation processes and accordingly an inquiry was initiated. The
Divisional Commissioner submitted a detailed report running into
87 pages documenting irregularities in the petitioner’s functioning,
including deviation from UGC norms and non-consideration of
representations.
42.
It was further submitted that the writ jurisdiction ought
not to be invoked to interfere in matters of university governance
unless there is manifest illegality. Reliance was placed upon State
of U.P. & Others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh &
Others, (1989) 2 SCC 505 to submit that judicial review is
concerned with decision-making process and not the merits of the
decision itself.
43.
Learned Advocate General submitted that the office of
the Vice-Chancellor stands on an entirely different footing from
that of an ordinary employee of the University. The ViceChancellor is the principal executive and academic authority of the
institution, occupying a statutory office created by the Act itself.
His appointment, tenure, powers, and removal are governed
specifically by the provisions of the parent statute and not by the
general service or disciplinary rules applicable to subordinate
officers and staff of the University. Therefore, that the petitioner
cannot invoke the protection of disciplinary rules framed for
regular employees, as such rules do not govern the process of
removal of the Vice-Chancellor.
44.
Learned
Advocate
General
further
submitted
that
Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 was consciously inserted by
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
(21 of 37)
[CW-17624/2025]
the legislature by way of an amendment to provide a distinct and
self-contained mechanism for suspension and removal of the ViceChancellor. The provision commences with a non obstante clause,
thereby giving it overriding effect over any other inconsistent
provisions of the Act or rules. Therefore, in the light of specific
legislative design, the elaborate procedure contemplated for
departmental enquiries against other employees is not attracted in
the case of action taken under Section 11-A of the MSBU Act,
2012. The field is wholly occupied by the special procedure
prescribed therein.
45.
The learned Advocate General further argued that the
scope of Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 is wide and
purposive. Action thereunder is not confined merely to instances
of proven misconduct involving positive wrongful acts. The
provision expressly encompasses situations where the ViceChancellor “wilfully omits or refuses” to carry out the provisions of
the Act or abuses the powers vested in him. Thus, culpable
inaction, deliberate omission, failure to implement statutory
mandates, or dereliction of duty would equally attract the
jurisdiction of the Chancellor under Section 11-A of the MSBU Act,
2012.
46.
It was emphasised by learned Advocate General that
the legislative intent is to ensure that the highest executive
authority of the University remains accountable not only for acts
of commission but also for acts of omission which undermine
statutory
compliance,
institutional
discipline,
or
the
larger
interests of the University. Hence, once material is available
demonstrating either abuse of power or failure to discharge
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
(22 of 37)
[CW-17624/2025]
statutory obligations, the competent authority is empowered to
form an opinion and take appropriate action in accordance with
Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012.
47.
Learned
Advocate
General
submitted
that
the
expression “reasonable opportunity” employed in Section 11-A of
the MSBU Act, 2012 cannot be expanded or interpreted in a
manner that defeats the legislative scheme of the provision. It is
contended that the concept of reasonable opportunity is inherently
contextual and its applicability varies with the nature of the
statutory framework governing it, and the object sought to be
achieved. There can be no straightjacket formula or universal
procedural template applicable to all situations.
48.
Learned Advocate General indicated that Section 11-A
of the MSBU Act, 2012 is a special provision dealing exclusively
with the removal of a Vice-Chancellor. The provision itself
delineates the extent of procedural safeguard by stipulating that
no order shall be passed unless the Vice-Chancellor is afforded a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed
action. The statute, however, does not contemplate or mandate a
full-fledged departmental enquiry akin to those conducted under
service rules applicable to regular employees, such as framing of
formal charges, recording of oral evidence, cross-examination of
witnesses, or adherence to technical rules of evidence. Learned
Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgments delivered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Mohinder Singh Gill
& Another vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi &
Others (1978) 1 SCC 405, P.D. Agrawal vs. State Bank of
(23 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
India & Others, 2006 (8) SCC 776 and Charan Lal Sahu vs.
Union of India, 1990 (1) SCC 613.
49.
In response to the plea of vacancies of Registrar and
Financial Controller raised by learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, it was submitted by learned Advocate General that the
existence of vacancies in certain posts cannot operate as a shield
against lapses in governance, particularly when the statute vests
supervisory and controlling powers in the Vice-Chancellor. It was
argued that the Vice-Chancellor, being the principal executive and
administrative
authority
of
the
University,
is
ultimately
accountable for ensuring that the affairs of the institution are
conducted in accordance with the Act, the Statutes, and the
applicable financial rules. The administrative exigencies, including
vacant positions, are not uncommon in public institutions. In such
circumstances, it is incumbent upon the head of the institution to
make appropriate interim arrangements, delegate responsibilities
in accordance with law, or take corrective measures to prevent
financial irregularities and administrative lapses. It was also
submitted that the allegations in the enquiry report are not
confined to mere technical lapses attributable to administrative
vacuum, but relate to specific instances of irregular exercise of
authority, non-compliance with statutory provisions, and decisions
taken in deviation of prescribed procedures. Such actions also fall
squarely within the domain of the Vice-Chancellor’s own decisionmaking authority and cannot be attributed solely to the absence of
subordinate officers.
50.
Learned Advocate General seriously objected that the
reliance placed by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner over
(24 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
the judgment passed by learned Single Judge in the case of Dr.
Balraj Singh (supra) is totally misplaced as the above judgment
was further challenged by the Chancellor and the University before
the Division Bench of this Court by way of filing D. B. Civil
Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1284/2025 (Chancellor, Sri Karan
Narendra Agriculturre University & Another vs Dr. Balraj
Singh & Another). As during the pendency of the appeal, the
concerned petitioner Dr. Balraj Singh had already completed his
tenure, therefore, after recording the submissions of the Advocate
General on behalf of the appellants that the Single Judge had
wrongly interpreted the provisions of the Sri Karan Narendra
Agriculture University, Jobner Act of 2013, vide judgment dated
30.10.2025, the appeals were disposed of by the Division Bench
leaving the question raised as open to be examined in appropriate
case and that the order passed by the learned Single Judge shall
not be treated as precedents in any other case.
51.
Similarly,
in
relation
to
the
interim
order
dated
16.10.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in the case of Dr.
Arun Kumar (supra) relied upon by learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner, it was objected by learned Advocate
General that firstly, an interim order does not carry any
precedential value, nor even guiding force and secondly, he
pointed out that the order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the
learned Single Judge was put to challenge by the respective
Universities and the State Government by way of filing D.B.
Special Appeals (Writ) no. 1621/2025, 1564/2025 and 1620/2025.
In the above Appeals, vide order dated 01.12.2025, it was
observed by the Division Bench of this Court that learned Single
(25 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
Judge has granted final relief at the interim stage, hence, by
staying the directions given by the learned Single Judge in para 15
of the order, the Division Bench of this Court has requested the
learned Single Judge to decide the main petition expeditiously.
However, the writ petition filed by Dr. Arun Kumar is still pending
before the learned Single Judge and no final judgment has been
delivered so far.
Hence, interim order dated 16.10.2025, in the
aforesaid circumstances, has lost all its persuasive or guiding
force, if any.
52.
In view of foregoing detailed submissions, learned
Advocate General prayed for dismissing the writ petition filed by
the petitioner.
53.
Having heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner and learned Advocate General for the respondents at
length and perused the pleadings and material placed on record,
this Court proceeds to examine the issue arising in the present
writ petition, which fundamentally is that as to whether the
termination order dated 11.11.2025 suffers from arbitrariness,
violation
of
principles
of
natural
justice
or
statutory
non-
compliance under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 or not ?
54.
As the controversy in the present writ petition revolves
around Section 11 of the MSBU Act, 2012, it would be appropriate
to reproduce the same as under:
"Removal of Vice-Chancellor.- (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Act, if at any time on the report of
the State Government or otherwise, in the opinion of the
Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor wilfully omits or refuses to
carry out the provisions of this Act or abuses the powers
vested in him, or if otherwise appears to the Chancellor that
the continuance of the Vice-Chancellor in office is
detrimental to the interest of the University, the Chancellor
may, in consultation with the State Government, after
making such inquiry as he deems proper by order, remove
the Vice-Chancellor:
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
(26 of 37)
[CW-17624/2025]
Provided that the Chancellor may, in consultation with the
State Government, at any time before making such order,
place the Vice-Chancellor under suspension, pending
enquiry:
Provided further that no order shall be made by the
Chancellor unless the Vice-Chancellor has been given a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action
proposed to be taken against him.
(2) During the pendency or in contemplation, of any inquiry
referred to in sub-section (1) the Chancellor may, in
consultation with the State Government, order that till
further order(a) such Vice-Chancellor shall refrain from performing the
functions of the office of the Vice-Chancellor, but shall
continue to get the emoluments to which he was otherwise
entitled:
(b) the functions of the office of the Vice-Chancellor shall be
performed by the person specified in the order."
55.
After analysing the scheme of the Act of 2012, it can be
observed that the Vice-Chancellor is not an ordinary employee of
the University. He is a statutory functionary occupying the highest
executive office under the MSBU Act, 2012. His appointment,
powers, duties, and removal are governed exclusively by the
MSBU Act, 2012. Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, introduced
by legislative amendment, provides a distinct and self-contained
mechanism for suspension and removal.
56.
Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 empowers the
Chancellor, in consultation with the State Government and after
making such inquiry as deemed proper, to remove the ViceChancellor if:
(a) he willfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of the
MSBU Act, 2012;
(b) he abuses the powers vested in him; or
(c) his continuance in office is otherwise detrimental to the
interest of the University.
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
57.
(27 of 37)
[CW-17624/2025]
The aforesaid provision begins with a non obstante
clause and contains its own procedural safeguard requiring
“reasonable opportunity” before removal. The legislative intent is
thus clear that action against a Vice-Chancellor is to be governed
by this special provision and not by general service rules
applicable to other employees.
58.
The first proviso to Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act,
2012 expressly authorises the Chancellor to place the ViceChancellor under suspension pending inquiry. The suspension
order dated 28.03.2025 was preceded by a preliminary inquiry
report
dated
05.03.2025
submitted
by
the
Divisional
Commissioner, Bharatpur, finding prima facie substance in the
allegations of financial irregularities and administrative lapses.
Suspension, at that stage, was not punitive, but preventive in
nature. It is well settled that suspension pending inquiry does not
require any opportunity of hearing. The material on record
discloses that the Chancellor acted upon relevant material and in
consultation with the State Government. No mala fides or
extraneous consideration have been substantiated. Further, after
issuance of the removal order dated 11.11.2025, the suspension
order merged into the final order and ceased to have independent
existence. Accordingly, the challenge to suspension has become
academic.
59.
The main thrust of arguments of behalf of the petitioner
relates to alleged violation of principles of natural justice in the
process culminating in removal. The record, however, reflects that
a four-member inquiry committee under Section 9(2) of the MSBU
Act, 2012 was constituted on 07.03.2025. After examining the
(28 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
record, the committee submitted a detailed report on 11.06.2025
recording prima facie findings against the petitioner. Thereafter,
the petitioner was supplied with the report alongwith a letter/
notice requiring him to file reply/ representation against the
enquiry report while expressing in explicit terms that an action
under
Section
11A
of
the
MSBU
Act,
was
under
contemplation. Admittedly time was granted to the petitioner to
submit a reply/ representation against the enquiry report and on
demand of the petitioner, reasonable and sufficient extension was
also granted. It is also not disputed that the petitioner availed the
opportunity
and
submitted
a
comprehensive
written
representation on 15.07.2025. He was also afforded personal
hearing on 17.07.2025. His reply was reconsidered, and a further
report after considering the reply of the petitioner was submitted
on 19.09.2025, which also reaffirmed the findings given in earlier
report. After conducting such exercise, consultation with the State
Government was made on 03.11.2025; and only thereafter was
the removal order dated 11.11.2025 issued. The above sequence
demonstrates that notice, opportunity to submit explanation, and
personal hearing were admittedly given to the petitioner prior to
passing of removal order. Thus, the requirement of Section 11A(1)
of the MSBU Act, 2012 stood complied with. The petitioner has not
demonstrated any specific prejudice occasioned by the procedure
adopted.
60.
Another limb of such contention of the petitioner is that
the expression “reasonable opportunity” under Section 11A of the
MSBU Act, 2012 mandates a detailed departmental inquiry with
formal charges, oral evidence, and cross-examination. In the light
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
(29 of 37)
[CW-17624/2025]
of unambiguous language of the provision and the legislative
intent, this Court is unable to accept such submission. The
expression of “reasonable opportunity” is contextual. It cannot be
equated mechanically with the elaborate disciplinary procedures
applicable to civil servants under Article 311 of the Constitution of
India or the relevant service rules. Section 11A of the MSBU Act,
2012 does not prescribe framing of formal charges, examination of
witnesses, or adherence to technical rules of evidence. It requires
that the Vice-Chancellor be given an opportunity to show cause
against the proposed action.
61.
In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Another
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“57. We may not be taken to say that situational
modifications to notice and hearing are altogether
impermissible. They are, as the learned Addl. SolicitorGeneral rightly stressed. The glory of the law is not that
sweeping rules are laid down but that it tailors principles to
practical needs, doctors remedies to suit the patient,
promotes, not freezes, life's processes, if we may mix
metaphors. Tucker, LJ drove home this point when he
observed in the Duke of Norfolk case:
"There are no words which are of universal application
to every kind of inquiry The requirements of natural
justice must depend on the circumstances of the case,
the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the
tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt
with, and so forth.
........."
62.
In the case of P.D. Agrawal (supra), Hon’ble Apex
Court observed as under:
"39. ……………. To the principle/doctrine of audi alteram
partem, a clear distinction has been laid down between the
cases where there was no hearing at all and the cases where
there was mere technical infringement of the principle. The
Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard
to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied
in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case. It is no unruly horse. It cannot be
put in a straitjacket formula. (See Viveka Nand Sethi v.
Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 337 and State of
U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi (2001) 6 SCC 667. See also Mohd.
Sartaj v. State of U.P. (2006) 2 SCC 315.)."
(30 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
63.
[CW-17624/2025]
Similarly, in the case of Charan Lal Sahu (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down following guidelines:
“109................. It was held that the phrase 'natural
justice' is not capable of static and precise definition. It
could not be imprisoned in the strait-jacket of a cast-iron
formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules.
Hence, it was not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue
of such rules. This Court reiterated that audi alteram partem
is a highly effective rule devised by the courts to ensure that
a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is
calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse
of power. The rules of natural justice can operate only in
areas not covered by any law validly made. The general
principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform
application seems to be that where a statute does not in
terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a
post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the
original order on merits then such a statute would be
construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the
pre-decisional stage. If the statute conferring the power is
silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to
the person affected the administrative decision after postdecisional hearing was good.
110. The principles of natural justice have been examined
by this Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3
SCC 398, It was reiterated, that the principles of natural
justice are not the creation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Article 14 is not the begetter of the principles of natural
justice but their constitutional guardian. The principles of
natural justice consist, inter alia, of the requirement that no
man should be condemned unheard. If, however, a
legislation or a statute expressly or by necessary implication
excludes the application of any particular principle of natural
justice then it requires close scrutiny by the court.”
64.
The judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner in the cases of Khem Chand
(supra), Pepsu Road Transport Corporation (supra), Union
of India & Others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar (supra), Anil
Gilurker (supra), Anant R. Kulkarni (supra), Committee of
Management, Kisan Degree College (supra), State of U.P.
vs.
Shatrughan Lal
(supra)
pertain
& Another (supra), Dewan Singh
largely
to
disciplinary
proceedings
against
employees under service jurisprudence and Article 311 of the
Constitution of India. The present case concerns removal of a
statutory office-holder under a special provision containing its own
(31 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
procedure, hence, the above judgments relied upon by the
petitioner are distinguishable on account of distinct facts and
altogether
different
statutory
scheme.
Importing
the
entire
framework of departmental inquiry into Section 11A of the MSBU
Act, 2012 would defeat legislative intent. In the case of Oryx
Fisheries Private Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
was dealing with a matter related to cancellation of registration
certificate and found that the show cause notice was premeditated
in nature and did not fulfil the parameters of fairness. As such, the
facts and issue involved in the said case were quite different from
the present case. As regards judgment of Dr. Umrao Singh
Choudhary (supra) is concerned, in that case the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice can be
excluded either by express statutory provision or by necessary
statutory implication. There cannot be any quarrel with such
principle of law, however, when in the instance case, where
Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 prescribes for reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action and
such opportunity was apparently granted and availed by the
petitioner, the above judgment also does not extend any help to
the petitioner.
65.
Even
otherwise,
the
expression
“reasonable
opportunity” occurring in the proviso to Section 11A of the MSBU
Act, 2012, which mandates affording such opportunity before
removal of the Vice-Chancellor, cannot be read in isolation or
construed in a rigid or mechanical manner. The said proviso has to
be harmoniously interpreted with the substantive part of Section
11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, which empowers the competent
(32 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
authority to act “as it deems proper.” The legislative intent,
therefore, is to confer a degree of discretion upon the authority
concerned in determining the nature and extent of opportunity
required to be afforded in the facts of a given case. Consequently,
the requirement of “reasonable opportunity” does not, in all
circumstances, necessarily entail the holding of a full-fledged
disciplinary
statutory
enquiry
of
disciplinary
the
rules
nature
contemplated
applicable
to
under
employees
of
the
the
University for acts of misconduct. While such an enquiry may be
warranted against other employees of the University in cases
involving
allegations
adjudication,
the
of
Statute
misconduct
requiring
evidentiary
does
mandate
a
not
detailed
departmental enquiry as an invariable prerequisite for removal
under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012. What is essential is
that the Vice-Chancellor is made aware of the material against
him and is afforded a fair and reasonable chance to respond
thereto, in a manner consistent with the principles of natural
justice and proportionate to the nature of the action proposed.
66.
Argument raised on behalf of the petitioner that an
inquiry under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 only confines to
visitation power, and could not form basis for action under Section
11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 is also misconceived for the obvious
reason that Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 permits action “on
the report of the State Government or otherwise.” The expression
“otherwise” is of wide amplitude and authorizes the Chancellor to
act upon any credible material forming basis of satisfaction. The
inquiry conducted under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 was
a fact-finding exercise into the affairs of the University. If such
(33 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
inquiry revealed material indicating abuse of powers or wilful
omission by the Vice-Chancellor, there is no statutory prohibition
against acting upon it under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012.
Even otherwise, record would reveal that while issuing notice
dated 04.07.2025 alongwith enquiry report dated 11.06.2025 to
the petitioner, it was made clear that on the basis of enquiry
report action under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 would be
under contemplation, hence, the petitioner was required to submit
his reply/ representation accordingly. Hence, the assumption of
the petitioner is totally unfounded and baseless. No provision has
been shown on behalf of the petitioner, which restricts the source
of material for forming opinion under Section 11A of the MSBU
Act, 2012.
67.
This court finds that it is evident from the record that
the inquiry report records instances of: (i) Irregular payments and
overpayment to contractual employees; (ii)Violation of Rajasthan
Transparency in Public Procurement Rules, 2013; (iii) Noncompliance with statutory provisions and governmental directions;
and
(iv)
Administrative
irregularities
affecting
institutional
governance. This Court cannot sit as an appellate forum over
factual
findings.
Judicial
review
under
Article
of
the
Constitution of India is concerned with the decision-making
process and not with reappreciation of evidence. Unless findings
are perverse, based on no material, or vitiated by mala fides, the
Court does not substitute its view. However, the petitioner has
utterly failed to show any manifest illegality and perversity.
68.
Needless to observe that the office of the Vice-
Chancellor stands on a distinct footing and cannot be equated with
(34 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
that of an ordinary employee of the University. The ViceChancellor occupies the highest academic and administrative
position in the University and is entrusted with wide-ranging
statutory, financial, and supervisory powers. Consequently, the
standards of discipline, integrity, transparency, and administrative
efficiency expected from a Vice-Chancellor are necessarily of a
much higher degree. Mere distinction or eminence in the academic
field, by itself, does not suffice to meet the requirements of the
office, as the role involves complex administrative responsibilities,
policy
implementation,
and
governance
of
the
institution.
Academic excellence and administrative competence operate in
different domains, and the latter assumes particular significance in
the functioning of a University. Therefore, a Vice-Chancellor is
required to satisfy more stringent and exacting parameters for
holding the post, commensurate with the trust reposed in the
office and the overarching objective of maintaining institutional
integrity and effective governance.
69.
This court does not find any merit in the petitioner’s
explanation resting upon vacant posts of Registrar and Financial
Controller, which cannot absolve him of ultimate supervisory
responsibility.
As
the
principal
executive
authority,
he
is
accountable for ensuring statutory compliance. Administrative
vacancies cannot justify irregular exercise of power or financial
deviation.
70.
Although allegations of bias have been raised, yet they
are in general terms without substantive material. It is settled
preposition of law that mere assertion of conflict of interest is
insufficient to invalidate proceedings conducted by a statutory
(35 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:7274]
[CW-17624/2025]
committee headed by a senior administrative officer. No cogent
evidence
of
personal
animus
or
malice
in
fact
has
been
demonstrated. The chronology of events reveals that the inquiry
process extended over several months and was not actuated by
haste.
71.
Petitioner has also alleged that the impugned order
dated 11.11.2025 was non-speaking and unreasoned. In this
regard it would be sufficient to observe that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the removal order dated 11.11.2025
must be read in conjunction with the inquiry reports and the entire
record preceding it. Where an order is based upon detailed reports
forming part of the record and known to the affected person, the
order cannot be termed arbitrary merely because it is concise. The
decision is supported by reasons reflected in the inquiry material.
72.
Learned Senior Counsel placed heavy reliance over
judgment of coordinate bench in the case of Dr. Balraj Singh
(supra) as well as an interim order passed in the writ petition of
Dr. Arun Kumar (supra). For the reasons assigned by learned
Advocate General and accordingly recorded here-in-above, it is
abundantly clear that in the case of Dr. Balraj Singh (supra), it
has been expressly held by the Division Bench not to operate as
precedent and question has been left open to be decided in an
appropriate case. Similarly, the interim order passed in the case of
Dr. Arun Kumar (supra) does not carry precedential value and
has also been diluted by the Division Bench. Therefore, reliance
upon them does not advance the petitioner’s case.
73.
It has also been vehemently argued by learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned orders are
(36 of 37)
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adversely affecting the autonomy assigned to the University by
the Statute. Needless to mention that autonomy of a University
does not imply absence of accountability. The MSBU Act, 2012
itself vests supervisory powers in the Chancellor. Action taken in
accordance with statutory mandate cannot be termed interference
with autonomy.
74.
As held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State
of U.P. & Others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh &
Others (supra), judicial review is concerned with legality of
process, not with merits of decision. The scope of judicial review in
such matters is limited to examining whether the authority had
jurisdiction,
whether
the
procedure
prescribed
by
law
was
followed, whether principles of natural justice were observed, and
whether the decision is vitiated by arbitrariness or perversity. In
the present case, this court finds that Jurisdiction to pass
impugned order existed with the Chancellor under Section 11A of
the MSBU Act, 2012 and therefore, undisputedly order has been
passed by the competent authority; as required consultation with
the State Government was also undertaken. That apart, prior to
passing of order a fact finding Inquiry was also conducted and
after receiving findings of the Enquiry committee, opportunity to
file reply/ representation against such finding was also granted to
the petitioner followed by personal hearing. Thereafter, after
forming opinion with regard to exercise of power, which is based
on material on record, order dated 11.11.2025 was passed after
consideration of the inquiry reports and the petitioner’s responses.
The sufficiency of evidence or correctness of conclusions lies
outside the limited scope of judicial review. The record further
(37 of 37)
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reveals that the Chancellor considered detailed findings indicating
procedural
irregularities
in
de-affiliation
decisions,
non-
consideration of representations, and deviation from prescribed
norms. Thus, this court does not find any procedural illegality,
perversity, or mala fide in the entire decision making process.
75.
On an overall consideration of the statutory scheme and
the material on record, this Court is satisfied that the suspension
order dated 28.03.2025 was within statutory competence; the
removal order dated 11.11.2025 was passed after due inquiry and
compliance with principles of natural justice; and the allegations of
bias,
mala
fides
and
colourable
exercise
of
power
are
unsubstantiated. Hence, no case for interference under Article 226
of the Constitution of India is made out. The writ petition filed by
the petitioner is, accordingly, dismissed.
76.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI /
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