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Serial No. 02
Supp. List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C). No. 38 of 2020
Date of Judgment: 02.05.2023
Professor Jeffreyson Wahlang
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Judge.
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. P.K.Tiwari, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S.P.Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. H.Abraham, GA for R 1 & 3.
Mr. K.Paul, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S.Chanda, Adv. for R 2 & 4.
Mr. H.L.Shangreiso, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. E.Wanniang, Adv. for R 5.
i)
ii)
:
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner who was
appointed as an Assistant Professor against a government sanctioned post,
while on probation was relieved of his duties, as after review of his
probation period by the Governing Body, his services were not
confirmed. The dispensation of the services of the petitioner it has been
alleged, was because he had been found participating in demonstrations,
which however has been resisted by the respondents, who maintain that
the decision to relieve the service of the petitioner was termination
simpliciter and not a stigmatic one, as it was based on an overall
assessment of his service.
2.
The petitioner then made a representation before the respondent
No.3 on 01-07-2019 seeking redressal of his grievances which was
followed by other detailed representations on 10-10-2019 and 22-10-2019
on the same issue. As the matter remained unresolved, the petitioner is
before this Court assailing the impugned communication dated 28-062019, whereby he has been relieved of his duties.
3.
Mr. P.K.Tiwari, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr.
S.P.Sharma, learned counsel submits that the impugned communication
dated 28-06-2019, issued by the respondent No.4, stating that the
petitioner’s period of probation was reviewed by the Governing Body and
decision arrived that the petitioner be relieved from his duties, is violative
of Rule 7 of the Assam Aided College Employees Rules, 1960
(hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1960) which were applicable on the
same being adopted by the Government of Meghalaya. It is further
submitted that the Governing Body, lacked jurisdiction to take such
decisions as its composition is also contrary to rules, and the discharge of
the petitioner under Rule 8 (a) of the Rules is to be read in harmony with
Rule 7, wherein discharge of the petitioner cannot be treated to be one
made at the end of the period of probation. It has also been contended that
the decision is also violative of Rule 23(10) of the Meghalaya Deficit
Aided Colleges Management Rules, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as Rules
of 2013) which provides that the Governing Body is to adhere to all
procedures prescribed under the relevant Employee Rules, in the matter
of dismissal of any incumbent holding a post under the Deficit Funding
System.
4.
The learned Senior counsel has further submitted that the act
attributed to the petitioner in the letter of the respondent No.4, and in the
letter of the respondent No. 2 (Principal) to the respondent No.3, is not a
misconduct within the meaning of the Rules regarding conduct and
discipline of the employees of Aided Educational Institution, contained in
the Rules of 1960 most specifically Rule 2, 5 and 6 read with Rule 38 of
the Rules of 2013. It has been strongly contended that when the
appointment of the petitioner had the approval of the Government, the
termination of the same, could only be with the approval of the
Government. Learned Senior counsel has referred to the Annexures
contained in the affidavit-in-opposition to substantiate this point,
especially letter dated 03-07-2019, and the Minutes of the meeting dated
04-07-2019, wherein the respondents, had directed that the petitioner to
be given a show cause, and that he be allowed to continue on probation
for one more year.
5.
Learned Senior counsel concludes his arguments by submitting that
the respondent No. 4, a body which is subordinate to the final authority of
the Government, could not have dispensed with the services of the
petitioner without due approval, and the impugned letter of termination is
unsustainable in law, being punitive in nature, and made in violation of
the principles of natural justice, and the Rules holding the field and as
such, is liable to be interfered with by this Court.
6.
Mr. K.Paul, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. S.Chanda,
learned counsel on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 4, has at the outset
raised questions on the maintainability of the writ petition, and has drawn
the attention of the Court to the averments made in the writ petition itself,
wherein the petitioner has stated that the appeal/representation filed by
him ought to have been allowed, instead of being kept pending. He
submits that the appeal, was preferred on 10-10-2019 and the instant writ
petition was filed on 04-02-2020, before any decision had been arrived at
by the respondent No. 1 and 3. The appeal, he submits which was filed by
the petitioner under Rule 12 (ii) of the 1960 Rules, which is the cause of
action according to the writ petitioner, for filing of the instant writ
petition, having not yet been decided, the writ petition is therefore
premature.
7.
It has been also submitted that the fact that no decision has been
taken cannot be disputed inasmuch as, the State respondents had
requested for documents to show case the evaluation process, notices or
any memorandum issued to the writ petitioner to enable them to consider
the matter, and no decision has been forthcoming till date. With regard to
the power of confirmation or non-confirmation of an employee in service,
the learned Senior counsel submits that as per Rule 23 (11) of the Rules
of 2013, the Governing Body is vested with the power of confirmation of
employees whose salaries are borne by the Government under the Deficit
Funding System of Aided Colleges, and as such, for non-confirmation of
the services of the petitioner, no approval is required from the State
respondents. Reference has also been made to the affidavit of the State
respondents, which he submits at para 5 it is averred that, appointments to
such posts are not done by the State Government and autonomy in this
regard is given to the Governing Body.
8.
On the point that the Governing Body has not been constituted as
per rules and therefore the impugned order was without jurisdiction, the
learned Senior counsel submits that there is no hard and fast rule that the
Principal has to be only the Secretary in the Governing Body, and has
referred to Rule 4 (vi) and (vii) of the Rules of 2013. He submits that the
petitioner’s service on probation being found unsatisfactory on an overall
assessment, the Governing Body was well within its rights as the
appointing authority to not confirm the services of the petitioner. The
learned Senior counsel has also reiterated the point that the college
exercises autonomy in such matters, where the post of the petitioner does
not fall under the Government, but is only aided by the Government with
the College Governing Body being the appointing authority.
9.
The learned Senior counsel then submits that Article 311, is not
applicable to probationers as long as the order of termination is not
stigmatic. The order of relieving the petitioner from his duties from the
post of Assistant Professor he submits, is an order simpliciter, which does
not even say termination from services. The question of regularization of
the petitioner he contends, is not permissible and apart from the writ
petition being premature, the prayer of the petitioner as contained in the
writ petition is untenable, apart from being directed against a private body
that does not come within the definition of Article 12 of the Constitution
of India. He therefore, submits the petition being without any merit is
liable to be dismissed.
10.
Mr. H. Abraham, learned GA on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 & 3
as per his affidavit, submits that approval was not accorded as no show
cause was issued and further that the period of probation being over two
years, the petitioner should have been subjected to continuous evaluation
processes in intervals, and if these processes found him wanting in his
performance, requisite advisories should have been issued to him. With
regard to non-disposal of the appeal, the learned GA has not made any
submissions.
11.
Mr. H.L.Shangreiso, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms.
E.Wanniang, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent No.5, which is
the Meghalaya College Teachers Association, St. Edmund’s Unit, has
submitted that the writ petitioner is not guilty of any misconduct nor had
violated any professional ethics, and that the respondent College was
expected to adhere to and follow the due process of law when it comes to
taking adverse action against any employee.
12.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The basic underlying
fact in the instant case, is that the petitioner was still under probation
when he was relieved of his duties by the respondent College, and as
such, the rights and conditions of service that accrue to a probationer has
to be examined against the action taken by the respondent College
together with the relevant Rules governing the situation.
13.
The impugned letter dated 28-06-2019 conveying the decision of
the Governing Body of the College taken on 26-06-2019, has simply
stated that in an overall assessment of the period of probation, it had been
unanimously decided, not to confirm the services of the petitioner as
Assistant Professor. An attempt had been made by the petitioner, to make
out a case, that the discharge as per Rule 8 (a) of the 1960 Rules, during
or at the end of the period of probation, should be read together with the
proviso to Rule 7, that reads that ‘end of probation’ should also include a
one year extension, thereby to mean that the period of probation has not
ended, does not seem to be tenable. For easy reference, Rule 7 and 8 of
the Rules 1960 are reproduced herein below:
“7. Probation – All persons appointed in aided
college shall be on probation for a period of two years
subject to the production of medical certificate as may
be prescribed:
Provided that in the event of unsatisfactory
work or conduct during the period of probation for
which written warning was given to a probationer, or
in the event of failure to pass examination or training
or test if so prescribed, the period may be extended by
another year.
8.
Discharge of a Probationer – A probationer
will be liable to discharge from the service –
(a)
If he/she fails to give satisfaction during
or at the end of the period of probation.
(b)
If on any information received relating to
his/her nationality, age, health, character
and
antecedents,
the
Appointing
Authority is satisfied that the probationer
is ineligible or otherwise unfit for holding
the appointment.”
A bare perusal of these two Rules read together cannot be said to
vest the writ petitioner with a right to automatic extension of the
probation period, inasmuch as, the proviso to Rule 7 is not mandatory
and the word ‘may’ is used. As such, in the absence of any extension, the
petitioner cannot be said to have not been discharged at the end of the
period of probation.
14.
The respondent College, is an Aided College under the deficit
funding system, and in this regard the Rules of 2013, has laid down the
manner of confirmation of employees whose salaries are borne by the
Government under this system, and provides that such employees were to
be confirmed by the Governing Body after a normal probation period of
two years. The relevant Rule i.e., Rule 23 (11) of the 2013 Rules is
reproduced herein below:
“23. The following particular duties are assigned to
the Governing Body.
(11) Employees whose salaries are borne from
Government under the deficit funding system under
Aided Colleges will be confirmed by the Governing
Body after a normal probation period of two years
subject to observing all formalities under prescribed
rules.”
15.
The writ petitioner by the operation of the above quoted Rule
therefore is subjected to confirmation by the Governing Body of the
College, and in view of this autonomy given by the Rules, the decision to
discharge or confirm the services of a probationer, would rest at the level
of the Governing Body itself.
16.
The services of the petitioner as noted earlier, were on probation
and as observed above, the confirmation of his services rest with the
Governing Body. The impugned order which was issued at the end of the
probation period, does not impute any misconduct and as such, the same
does not cast any stigma nor can be held to be punitive in nature, but is of
termination simpliciter. In such cases therefore, wherein the termination
of service has been made as per prevailing rules and on being assessed on
the overall performance, no opportunity need be given. Furthermore,
being a matter of purely subjective satisfaction, the impugned order will
therefore not be violative of Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution of
India. In this context, it would be beneficial to refer to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Registrar, High Court of Gujarat &
Anr. Vrs. C.G.Sharma
reported in (2005) 1 SCC 132, wherein at
paragraphs 43, 44 and 47 it has been held as follows:
“43. But the facts and circumstances in the case on
hand are entirely different and the administrative side
of the High Court and the Full Court were right in
taking the decision to terminate the services of the
respondent, rightly so, on the basis of the records
placed before them. We are also satisfied, after
perusing the confidential reports and other relevant
vigilance files, etc. that the respondent is not entitled
to continue as a judicial officer. The order of
termination is termination simpliciter and not punitive
in nature and, therefore, no opportunity needs to be
given to the respondent herein. Since the overall
performance of the respondent was found to be
unsatisfactory by the High Court during the period of
probation, it was decided by the High Court that the
services of the respondent during the period of
probation of the respondent be terminated because of
his unsuitability for the post. In this view of the matter,
order of termination simpliciter cannot be said to be
violative of Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the
Constitution. The law on the point is crystallized that
the probationer remains a probationer unless he has
been confirmed on the basis of the work evaluation.
Under the relevant Rules under which the respondent
was appointed as a Civil Judge, there is no provision
for automatic or deemed confirmation and/or deemed
appointment on regular establishment or post, and in
that view of the matter, the contentions of the
respondent that the respondent’s services were
deemed to have been continued on the expiry of the
probation period, are misconceived.
44. This Court, in the judgment in the case of
Wasim Beg v. State of U.P. while considering the
confirmation and its scope held as under:
“15. Whether an employee at the end of the
probationary period automatically gets
confirmation in the post or whether an order of
confirmation or any specific act on the part of
the employer confirming the employee is
necessary, will depend upon the provisions in
the relevant Service Rules relating to probation
and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of
authorities of this Court dealing with this
question. In those cases where the Rules
provide for a maximum period of probation
beyond which probation cannot be extended,
this Court has held that at the end of the
maximum probationary period there will be a
deemed confirmation of the employee unless
Rules provide to the contrary. This is the line of
cases starting with State of Punjab v. Dharam
Singh, M.K.Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank,
Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Coop. Sugar
Factories Federation, State of Gujarat v.
Akhilesh C. Bhargav.”
47. In our opinion, what is to be considered in such
matters is the examination of overall entries of the
officer concerned and not the entry here and there. It
may well be in some cases that in spite of satisfactory
performance still the authority may desire to not to
extend the probation of an employee in public interest,
as in the opinion of the said authority, the post has to
be manned by a more efficient and dynamic person.
There is no denying of the fact that in all
organisations there is a great deal of dead wood and,
more so in government and judicial departments,
which has to be replaced in public interest. Therefore,
as pointed out by many courts in India and by this
Court, it is purely a matter of subjective satisfaction of
the High Court. In such case, the record so considered
would naturally include the entries in the confidential
reports/character rolls/vigilance reports, both
favourable and adverse. There cannot be any
justification for interference by this Court in such
cases.”
17.
Another aspect of the matter, is with regard to the pendency of the
appeal filed by the writ petitioner under Rule 12 (ii) of Rules of 1960
before the respondent No. 3. The pleadings in the writ petition at paras 23
and 31 has in effect surrendered the recourse taken before the appellate
forum as provided by the rules, inasmuch as, the statements made therein
has also impugned the failure on the part of the said respondent to allow
the appeal and that the inaction by the respondent, as per the writ
petitioner has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. The instant writ
petition being on the same cause of action as the appeal, and considering
the rules applicable and the facts and circumstances of the case, the
petitioner having elected to resort to an application under Article 226,
inspite of the pendency of the appeal, it cannot be said that the instant
petition is premature.
18.
The other contentions raised by the petitioner, such as the
impugned decision being passed by a Governing Body which has not
been duly constituted and that the termination of services, not being as
per Rule 2, 5 and 6 of the Rules of 1960 read with Rule 38 of the Rules of
2013, do not deserve any detailed consideration by this Court, inasmuch
as, the show cause notice dated 10-06-2020, brought on record by an
additional affidavit filed by the petitioner, is not supported by any other
materials, apart from the fact that the same, is not in consonance or
provided in the Rules of 2013, especially on the point that the Principal of
the College should be the Secretary, whereas the Rules at Rule 4 (vi) and
(vii) speak otherwise, and allows the Principal to be nominated as Joint
Secretary or even Secretary. On the latter point raised, that the conduct of
the petitioner does not come within the conditions given in Rule 2, 5 and
6 of the Rules of 1960 under the heading ‘Rules regarding Conduct and
Discipline of the Employees of Aided Educational Institution’, read with
Rule 38 of the Rules of 2013 to constitute misconduct, an examination of
these Rules which are quoted hereafter, reveals that these provisions are
not attracted or applicable in the instant case.
“2. Conduct – No employee shall, except with the
previous sanction of the Director of Public Instruction
engage in any trade or accept any private employment
except private tuition subject to a maximum of two
hours a day:
Provided that an employee may undertake
honorary work of a social and charitable nature
subject to the condition that his normal duties do not
thereby suffer, but he/she shall not undertake and
shall discontinue such work if so directed by the
Managing Committee.
5.
No employee shall publish or cause to be
published, in his own name or anonymously or
contribute to the Press any matter which is likely to
lead to academic indiscipline or promote defiance of
authority.
6.
No employee shall offer himself as a candidate
for election to a Legislative Body or for holding office
of any political organization except in accordance
with provisions of Rule 7:
Provided that an employee may seek election as
an independent candidate of a panchayat with the
previous approval of the Managing Committee as the
case may be but he shall not be entitled to accept any
office thereunder except in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 7.
38. The Governing Body shall ensure that its
employees refrain from any agitation directed against
the Government and its agencies. The Governing Body
may deal with any indiscipline in the college and to
seek that the academic performance of the college is
not affected by any situation that may arise due to
strikes and non-cooperation movements.”
19.
Accordingly, in view of the discussions and observations as made
above, the impugned order suffers from no infirmity and the writ petition
stands dismissed.
20.
No orders as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
02.05.2023
“Samantha PS”
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