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24.08.2026
AD 29
Court No.12
(gc)
MAT 1986 of 2025
CAN 1 of 2025
CAN 2 of 2025
Principal Secretary, Department of
Urban Development and Municipal Affairs & Ors.
Vs.
Ananta Maji & Ors.
Mr. D.N. Ray, Ld. G.P.,
Mr. Guddu Singh
…for the Appellants.
Re: CAN 1 of 2025
1. The appeal arises out of an order dated September
15, 2020 passed in WP 15434(W) of 2015 along with
CPAN 1054 of 2016. The appeal is delayed by 1328
days. The other defects have been cured.
2. This is an application for condonation of delay of
1328 days in preferring the appeal. It is submitted
that the appeal was filed on November 17, 2025
after obtaining the records from the office of the
erstwhile
learned
Advocate
for
the
respondents who had suddenly expired.
State
On such
ground, the delay has been sought to be explained.
3. The learned Advocate for the appellants submits
that the order was passed during the Covid
Pandemic, i.e., on September 15, 2020. Thus,
benefit of the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court with
regard to the computation of limitation should be
available to the appellants. The appeal was filed on
November 17, 2025, that is, three years eight
months after the period of limitation started to run.
The benefit of the said order was given to the
appellants. The Stamp Reporter filed the report. It
indicates that the appeal was delayed by 1328 days
and should have been filed on March 30, 2022 i.e,
within 30 days from March 1, 2022.
4. Coming to the explanations for the delay, it is
averred that the certified copy of the impugned
judgment and order was obtained on April 13, 2021.
All relevant documents along with the certified copy
of the judgment and order were communicated by email dated May 25, 2021 to the then learned State
Advocate, for taking necessary action.
The Urban
Development
1,
department
on
June
forwarded the e-file and the proposal for the
engagement
of
a
learned
State
Advocate.
Thereafter, on June 7, 2021, the learned Legal
Remembrancer
engaged
the
erstwhile
learned
Government Pleader (since deceased) along with
learned Advocate, Mr. Sayan Sinha to prepare
appeal papers and defend the State in the appeal.
As the learned Government Pleader expired the
appeal had not been filed. Unfortunately, such
explanations do not appear to be convincing.
Equally unconvincing is the plea that the first
certified copy was lost.
5. Learned
erstwhile
Government
Pleader
expired
sometime in October 2022 and this date has been
omitted from the application. The period between
June
to
October
2022,
has
not
been
explained. For the period between October 2022 to
November 2025 also, there is no explanation. In
paragraph 10 of the application it has been casually
mentioned that the appellants again started their
journey to set the legal process in motion in the
year 2024. Disruption during the Covid Pandemic,
has been set up as a plea.
6. We observe that, all disruptions during Covid
Pandemic ended by February, 2022 and normalcy
was restored in courts.
7. The averments in Paragraphs 8 to 11 of the
connected application are inconsistent and there
are material contradictions. From the averments in
paragraph 12, it appears that only upon receipt of
an application under the Contempt of Courts Act,
another set of learned Advocates were engaged to
file an appeal and the e-file was sent to the office of
the learned Legal Remembrancer on September 25,
2025.
Ultimately, on October 13, 2025, the
erstwhile learned Additional Advocate General and a
junior along with him, were engaged to prefer the
appeal. The appeal was then filed on November 17,
2025.
8. Upon harmoniously reading the relevant paragraphs
of the application for condonation of delay, we find
huge gaps in the unexplained periods and timelines.
The delay extends to a couple of years. We do not
find that the appellants were prevented by sufficient
cause from filing the appeal.
9. We refer to the following decisions of the Hon’ble
Apex Court. Delay cannot be condoned as a matter
of course. In this case, the excuse has been the
untimely
demise
of
the
erstwhile
learned
Government Pleader. Not a single scrap of paper has
been annexed, demonstrating that he had been
engaged by the learned Legal Remembrancer.
10.
In the matter of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs v.
Karnataka Housing Board and ors, reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Apex
Court held as follows:“ 37. When one reads the phrase “within such
period” together with the expressions “after the
prescribed period” and “for not preferring the
appeal or making the application”, it becomes as
clear as a noon day, that the said phrase i.e.,
“within such period” includes both the original
period of limitation prescribed as-well as the
period of delay leading up to the actual filing of
the appeal or application, as the case may be.
There can be no question of construing “within
such period” as making a reference either to only
the original period of limitation or to only the
actual period of delay after the expiry of
limitation.
***
***
101. From the above discussion, it is clear
that the period which is being effectively
extended is only ancillary to the “sufficient cause”
that would have occasioned. Even the bare text of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it
abundantly clear that while “sufficient cause” has
to be shown for the duration covered by the
expression “within such period”, nowhere does
the provision allude that the “period” which
would be effectively extended by the court, in
exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be
the period for which “sufficient cause” is
demonstrated. Rather, the expression “may be
admitted after the prescribed period” clearly
indicates that it is only that period, which has
been subsumed after the expiry of limitation, as a
result of the “sufficient cause” persisting, which
would be effectively getting extended by way of
condonation. Thus, while the expression
“sufficient cause” and “within such period” are
itself inextricably linked together, both these
expressions have nothing to do with the manner
in which the court proceeds to condone the delay
i.e., the period which the court extends in
exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
102. If the contention is accepted that
“sufficient cause” has to be demonstrated only for
that length of the period that is required to be
extended, in order to admit the appeal or
application, as the case may be, then it would
result in “extension” being conflated with
“exclusion”. Although semantically both may
appear to be one and the same, and even the
end-result that would ensue if “extension” is read
as “exclusion” would in substance be the same,
as ultimately it would be that period after the
expiry of limitation till the actual filing that would
be extended or excluded to admit the appeal, yet
there is very fine but discernible difference
between the two, which if not appreciated, would
completely warp the mechanism of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, as envisaged by the
legislature.
103. If the court in condoning the delay in
exercise of its powers under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is construed as excluding that
period which was consumed after the expiry of
limitation, in order to bring it within the
“prescribed period of limitation”, for the limited
purpose of admitting the appeal or application,
as the case may be, then this would bring one
significant change in how sufficient cause is to be
demonstrated.
104. The net-effect of the aforesaid would be
that, a litigant for seeking condonation of delay,
would only be required to demonstrate that
“sufficient cause” only for that amount of period
which is necessary to be excluded so that it is
able to bring its appeal or application, as the case
may be, within the prescribed period of
limitation. For illustration, say, the prescribed
period of limitation was 90-days, and the actual
date of filing took additional 10-days. Now, in
such a scenario, if we read “extension” as
“exclusion”, then “sufficient cause” only has to be
shown for the 10-days so that, once it is
excluded, his filing would be deemed as if it was
filed on the 90th day.
105. Although the aforesaid, may not, on the
surface seem like a drastic consequence if
“extension” is read as “exclusion”, yet, it would
have an underlying effect which would be
contrary to the provision of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, which we shall now explain. If
“extension” is read as “exclusion” and a party is
required to demonstrate “sufficient cause” only
for that duration necessary to be excluded, for
the appeal or application, to once again fall
within the prescribed period of limitation, for it to
be
admitted,
then
the
entire
exercise
contemplated under Section 5, would in simple
terms involve showing “sufficient cause” such
that after the exclusion, the litigant is once again
put back into the “prescribed period of limitation”.
106. In
other
words,
if
the
above
interpretation is adopted then the litigant would
only have to show “sufficient cause” for that
period, which after excluding would at the very
least put him back into the outermost date on
which he could have filed the appeal or
application i.e., the last day on which the
limitation would have expired.
107. However, the power that the court
exercises in condoning the delay, is not for the
purpose of putting the litigant back into the
position he would have enjoyed during the
prescribed period of limitation. This is because,
during the prescribed period of limitation, the
litigant is entitled, as a matter of right, to file the
appeal or application, as the case may be, and
the courts cannot object or refuse to admit the
same.
108. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
does not say that, once “sufficient cause” is
established and the court is also satisfied about
the same, then the appeal or application, has to
be mandatorily be admitted. On the contrary, the
provision, by use of the word “may” lays
emphasis that even after the court is satisfied
about the existence of a “sufficient cause”, it has
the discretion to decide, whether to admit the
appeal or application, as the case may be, or not.
A
catena
of
decisions
of
this
Court
including Rewa Coal Fields (supra) hold that
“even after sufficient cause has been shown a
party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right … if sufficient cause
is shown then the court has to enquire whether in
its discretion it should condone the delay”.
109. If at all, what is contemplated under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is exclusion of the
period consumed after the expiry of limitation for
the filling of appeal or application, such that the
litigant is put into the same position, he enjoyed
on the last day of limitation, or any other day
within the prescribed limitation, then where is
the question of the courts still being able exercise
discretion for deciding to admit or not admit such
appeal or application.
110. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, also does
not speak that the discretion conferred to the
courts is limited only for determining if sufficient
cause exists or not, and where it has in its
discretion decided that such “sufficient cause”
existed, it has to then mandatorily condone the
delay. As succinctly put in Rewa Coal
Fields (supra), even “if sufficient cause is shown
then the court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay”.
111. The discretion that the courts have been
conferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
is two-fold, for determining if “sufficient cause”
existed and where the former is answered in the
affirmative, then whether the case is a fit one for
it to condone the delay, to admit the appeal or
application as the case may be. Which is why,
the legislature consciously used the word
“extension” rather than “exclusion” in marginal
note to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
112. To
say,
that
the
purpose
for
demonstrating “sufficient cause” is to exclude
only that extent of period which would once again
put the litigant back into the last day on which,
he could have filed the appeal or application,
would, in our opinion, gravely misconstrue the
entire mechanism of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. Thus, the expression “within such period” for
this reason also cannot be possibly construed to
mean the period from the last day of expiry of the
limitation, till the actual date of filing of appeal or
the application, as understood by Rewa Coal
Fields (supra). The phrase “extension” used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not a misnomer.
113. It is for this reason that the decisions of
this
Court
in Ajit
Singh
Thakur (supra)
and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) held that
“sufficient cause” for the delay in filing of an
appeal or application, as the case may be, has to
be established by some event or circumstance
that had arisen before the limitation expired and
that the party seeking condonation has to explain
the delay the entire continuum commencing from
the point at which the limitation period first
began to run, until the eventual filing of the
appeal or application, as the case may be.
114. We may, with a view to obviate any
confusion, clarify that the observations made by
this Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra),
particularly that “what events occurred after the
91st day till the last is of no consequence” should
not be construed devoid of its context. When this
Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) said that
events after the expiry of limitation till the date of
actual filing would be of no consequence, the
same was made in view of the well-established
rule that “sufficient cause must be establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired”. The aforesaid
observations of “what events occurred after the
91st day till the last is of no consequence”
in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) were made in
the peculiar facts of that case, where the
appellant had failed to assign any “sufficient
cause” occasioning during the period of
limitation, which rendered the events occurring
after the expiry of limitation as irrelevant.
115. However, as is manifest from the entire
discussion above, for the purpose of condonation
of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing
the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety
of the period from when the limitation began till
the actual date of filing. In other words, if the
period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is
filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation
has to be given for the entire 100-days.”
11.
We hold that the appellants have not been able
to show sufficient cause for condonation of the
delay.
12.
State is not a privileged litigant, and cannot
claim condonation as a matter of course.
13.
In the matter of Union of India and Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, (D) Through His
Lr, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it
very clear that we are not going to look into the
merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been made
out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India when
it comes to condoning the gross delay of more
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to
approach the court long after the lapse of the
time prescribed under the relevant provisions of
the law, then he cannot turn around and say
that no prejudice would be caused to either side
by the delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime in 1981.
We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.
However, till date the respondent has not been
able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be
a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of
12 years and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the appellants, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has
prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be
non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances
of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the
main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation
is
not
merely
a
technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are based
on the principles of sound public policy and
principles of equity. We should not keep the
‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of
the respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.
28. At this stage, we would like to quote few
observations made by the High Court in its
impugned order pointing towards lack of bona
fides on the part of the appellants. The
observations are as under:—
“9. A perusal of paragraph 4 extracted
hereinabove shows that on oath, solemn
statement is made that notice of Darkhast No. 16
of 2014 for execution of the decree issued by the
executing Court was received by the Department
on 25.02.2019. As against this, in paragraph 3 of
the additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made
by Rajendra Rajaram Pawar, it is stated that the
averments made in paragraph 4 as regards
service of Darkhast on 25.02.2019 is factually
incorrect. Notice of Darkhast No. 16 of 2014 was
received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. The
error in the application is out of inadvertence for
which he tendered unconditional apology. It is
further stated that inadvertent mistake on facts
as to knowledge of execution proceedings was
purely because of oversight in the light of
possibilities of issuance of possession warrant
by the executing court and requirement of
expeditious urgency of moving before this Court
to save the proceeding in litigation since 1981
which otherwise would have got frustrated. He
stated that the same is nothing beyond human
error.
xxxxxxxxx
12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are
bereft of any particulars and are totally vague. In
fact the solemn statement made in paragraph 4
that notice of Darkhast for execution of the decree
issued by the executing Court was received by
the Department on 25.02.2019, to put it mildly, is
incorrect statement. In view of paragraph 3 of the
additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by
Rajendra Rajaram Pawar, it is evident that notice
of Darkhast was received by the defendants on
18.03.2016. It is material to note that no
particulars are given as to when the Department
sought legal opinion. There is also no explanation
as to why Department did not instruct lawyer in
the High Court to apply for restoration of the
Petition and why the Department defended
execution proceedings. It is worthwhile to note
that execution proceedings were filed by the
respondents only because Writ Petition was
dismissed. If the Writ Petition was restored,
automatically the execution proceedings would
have been stayed by the executing Court. Instead
of adopting appropriate proceedings, the
defendants unnecessarily went on defending the
execution proceedings. In paragraph 4(b) though
it is stated that Department was regularly
following up with its panel lawyer till 2003, this
statement is also not substantiated by producing
any document. Even if I accept that the
Department was regularly following up with its
panel lawyer till 2003, there is no explanation
worth the name as to why the Department did
not follow up the matter between 2003 and 2006
when the Petition was dismissed in default. That
apart, equally, there is no explanation as to why
no follow up action was taken by the officers
between 2006 and 2016 when Department
acquired knowledge about dismissal of Writ
Petition on 18.03.2016.
13. It is no doubt true that while considering the
application for condonation of delay, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ has to be liberally
construed. It, however, does not mean that
without making any sufficient cause, the Court
will condone the delay regardless of the length of
the delay. In the present case, the delay is of 12
years and 158 days. A perusal of the application
as also the additional affidavit hardly indicates
any sufficient cause for condoning the
unpardonable delay of 12 years and 158 days.”
29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries
Limited v. Gujarat
Industrial
Development
Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459, this Court
rejected the application for condonation of delay
of 4 years in filing an application to set aside
an exparte decree on the ground that the
explanation offered for condonation of delay is
found to be not satisfied.
30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while
dismissing the application for condonation of
delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave
Petition, held that condonation of delay is not
an exception and it should not be used as an
anticipated
benefit
for
the
government
departments. In that case, this Court held that
unless the Department has reasonable and
acceptable reason for the delay and there
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept
the usual explanation that the file was kept
pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process cannot be accepted. In Para Nos.
25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court
dealt with the scope of ‘sufficient cause’ and
held as follows:
“25. We have already extracted the reasons as
mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr.
Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting
Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in
the said affidavit, the Department has itself
mentioned and is aware of the date of the
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media
India Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD 201] as 11-9-2009. Even
according to the deponent, their counsel had
applied for the certified copy of the said judgment
only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by
the Department on the very same day. There is
no explanation for not applying for the certified
copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or
at least within a reasonable time. The fact
remains that the certified copy was applied for
only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four
months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to
file better affidavit by placing adequate material,
neither the Department nor the person-in-charge
has filed any explanation for not applying the
certified copy within the prescribed period. The
other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we
have already extracted, clearly show that there
was delay at every stage and except mentioning
the dates of receipt of the file and the decision
taken, there is no explanation as to why such
delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by
the Department that the delay was due to
unavoidable
circumstances
and
genuine
difficulties, the fact remains that from day one
the Department or the person/persons concerned
have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the
matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this Court.
They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government or
a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack
of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities
that
unless
they
have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated
benefit
for
the
government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.”
31. In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by
LRs v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC
363,
this
Court
made
the
following
observations:
“20. In N. Balakrishnan, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] this
Court again reiterated the principle that : (SCC p.
127, para 11)
“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the rights of parties. They are meant to see that
[the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but
seek their remedy promptly.”
21 to 27………
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or
rationale, which could have impelled the High
Court to condone the delay after holding the
same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as
“liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”,
“substantial justice” cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation.
Especially, in cases where the court concludes
that there is no justification for the delay. In our
opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court
tends to show the absence of judicial balance
and restraint, which a Judge is required to
maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the
parties. We are rather pained to notice that in
this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere
intemperate language, the High Court resorted to
blatant sarcasms.
29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or
extravagant language in a judgment has been
repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a
number of cases. Whilst considering applications
for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited
and unbridled discretionary powers. All
discretionary powers, especially judicial powers,
have to be exercised within reasonable bounds,
known to the law. The discretion has to be
exercised in a systematic manner informed by
reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or
predilections cannot and should not form the
basis of exercising discretionary powers.”
32. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by
LRs. v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, this Court held as
follows:
“19. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of
Gujarat [(1981) 1 SCC 495 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 184]
this Court observed : (SCC p. 497, para 6)
“6. … it is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before limitation expired it was not possible to file
the appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can
constitute sufficient cause.”
(emphasis supplied)
This judgment squarely applies to the facts in
hand.
xxxxxxxxx
21. Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel relying
on
the
decision
of
this
Court
in N.
Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7
SCC 123] submitted that length of delay is no
matter and acceptability of explanation is the
only criterion. It was submitted that if the
explanation offered does not smack of mala fides
or it is not put forth as a part of dilatory tactics,
the court must show utmost consideration to the
suitor. The very said decision upon which
reliance has been placed holds that the law of
limitation fixes a lifespan for every legal remedy
for the redress of the legal injury suffered.
Unending period for launching the remedy may
lead to unending uncertainty and consequential
anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on
public policy. The decision does not lay down
that a lethargic litigant can leisurely choose his
own time in preferring appeal or application as
the case may be. On the other hand, in the said
judgment it is said that court should not forget
the opposite party altogether. It was observed :
(SCC p. 128, para 11)
“11. … It is enshrined in the maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of
the parties. They are meant to see that parties do
not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal
remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed
period of time.”
22. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962
SC 361] this Court held that : (AIR pp. 363-65)
“In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is
relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the
expiration of period of limitation prescribed for
making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of
the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding
between the parties and this legal right which
has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time
should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other
consideration which cannot be ignored is that if
sufficient cause of excusing delay is shown
discretion is given to the court to condone the
delay and admit the appeal. It is further
necessary to emphasise that even if the sufficient
cause has been shown a party is not entitled to
the condonation of delay in question as a matter
of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by
Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts
and it is at this stage the diligence of the party or
its bona fides may fall for consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. On the facts and in the circumstances, we
are of the opinion that the respondent beneficiary
was not diligent in availing the remedy of appeal.
The averments made in the application seeking
condonation of delay in filing appeals do not
show any acceptable cause much less sufficient
cause to exercise courts' discretion in its favour.”
33. In
the
case
of Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing
Committee
of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC
649,
this
Court
made
the
following
observations:
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation of
delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied
in proper perspective to the obtaining factsituation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount
and pivotal the technical considerations should
not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross
negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is
to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence
to strict proof should not affect public justice and
cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness
and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free
play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between
inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or
few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice
is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of
a party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It
is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance
of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go by in the
name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted
or the grounds urged in the application are
fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to
expose the other side unnecessarily to face such
a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one
gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion
which is founded on objective reasoning and not
on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an
entity representing a collective cause should be
given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in
a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that
the courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis
on merits is seminal to justice dispensation
system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on
the base of individual philosophy which is
basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid
down regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,
lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.”
14.
The State of West Bengal cannot take the plea
that the delay in filing the appeal was on account of
technical issues. Secondly, the explanation that the
documents were sent to a learned Advocate in
May/June 2021, who expired in October 2022,
without filing the appeal is not corroborated by any
contemporaneous documents. No communication
between the appellants and the said learned
Government Pleader has been annexed. This is an
unfortunate plea taken by the State of West Bengal
to justify the wastage of time in preferring the
appeal.
We find that only when the contempt
application was filed against the Chief Secretary,
the State and its machinery woke up and started
taking steps. Although, it has been explained that
the original certified copy obtained in 2021 was lost,
but a copy of the same has not been brought on
record
to
show
authenticity
of
such
claim.
Secondly, we find from the averments that all the
documents were sent to the learned Advocate by email, and not by way of hard copies.
15.
Under such circumstances, we are not inclined
to condone the delay.
16.
The learned Advocate for the appellants submits
that the Court should condone the delay upon
appreciation of the merits.
We find that this is a
case where the learned Single Judge was of the view
that the ratio of Secretary, State of Karnataka
Vs. Umadevi (3) & Ors. reported in (2006) 4 SCC
1 would not apply and His Lordship has given his
reasons.
17.
18 writ petitioners approached the writ court
challenging denial of their claim for regularization.
His Lordship found on facts that, on an earlier
occasion, 21 of casual workers (including the writ
petitioners) who worked at Kulti Municipality, since
merged with the Asansol Municipal Corporation,
had approached the writ court, challenging an order
of termination. The said order of termination was
set aside. Thereafter, the municipality regularized
the service of the said writ petitioners as permanent
employees, with effect from March 1, 1995 and
appointment letters were issued to each of them.
From time to time, they moved the writ petitions
claiming arrear salary. The learned Single Bench,
directed salary and allowance to be paid, which was
modified by the Division Bench directing the
municipality to invest the amount in a bank. The
writ court recorded that a sum of Rs.82,07,603/was deposited with the Bank of Baroda and was
earning an interest at the rate of 6.5% p.a.
Although arguments were advanced with regard to
the ratio laid down in Umadevi (supra), His
Lordship was of the view that the subsequent
decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court had clarified
the ratio of Umadevi (supra).
According to His
Lordship, the fact that the termination order had
been
set
aside
municipality
by
had
the
writ
granted
court
them
and
the
permanent
appointment, went a long way to demonstrate that
the
writ
petitioners
could
not
be
treated
as
employees of the municipality who had been
illegally appointed against unsanctioned posts. His
Lordship also held that the approval of the Director
of
Local
Bodies
was
not
required
as
the
appointment was made in 1995.
18.
Under such circumstances, His Lordship set
aside the order dated February 2, 2015 passed by
the Director of Local Bodies and directed the Chief
Secretary, Government of West Bengal to take a
decision himself or by an officer not below the rank
of Principal Secretary specially appointed by him for
this purpose, so that the order of His Lordship
could be implemented and requisite approvals and
financial
concurrences
from
the
appropriate
department, could also be granted.
19.
On the merits as well, we have underlined the
peculiar facts of the case and we are not inclined to
condone
the
delay
on
the
ground
that
the
appellants have a good chance of success in the
appeal. We are not persuaded by the submissions of
the learned Government Pleader that, the order
impugned does not have any legs to stand on.
20.
Accordingly, the application for condonation of
delay is dismissed.
21.
In view of dismissal of the application for
condonation of delay, the appeal and the connected
application also stand dismissed.
22.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
23.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if
applied for, be supplied to the parties on usual
undertaking.
(Shampa Sarkar, J.)
(Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)
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