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2026:HHC:47186
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
OMPs No.1521 & 1522 of 2025
in Civil Suit No.8 of 2025
Reserved on: 12.10.2026
Decided on 28.10.2026
Uploaded on : 28.10.2026
______________________________________________________
Premium Acres Infratech Pvt. Ltd.
....Plaintiff
Versus
Devi Lal Banga and another
.…Defendants
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the plaintiff:
Mr. Ajay Kumar, Senior Advocate, with
Mr. Atul Jhingan, Advocate.
For the defendants:
Mr. Arun Kumar Verma & Mr. Trigun
Singh Negi, Advocate, for defendant
No.1.
Mr. Bimal Gupta, Senior Advocate, with
Mr. Sant Ram Sharma, Advocate, for
defendant No.2.
____________________________________________________
Sushil Kukreja, Judge
This common order shall dispose of two applications,
i.e. OMPs No.1521 of 2025, filed by defendant No.1 & OMP
No.1522 of 2025, filed by defendant No.2, under Order 7, Rule 11
of CPC, read with Section 2 (C), Explanation A(a) and Section 6 of
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2026:HHC:47186
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (for short, ‘the Act of 2015) and
Section 151 of CPC, for rejection of plaint.
2.
Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for
recovery of Rs.6,36,71,580/- alongwith interest @ 12% per annum
from the date of filing of the suit till recovery of the decretal amount
under Section 26, Order VII, Rules 1 and 3 and Order 34, Rules 1 to
6 of CPC, by way of sale/foreclosure of the mortgaged property, I.,e.
2454 undivided shares, measuring 61 bighas and 7 biswas of
defendant No.1 in the land comprised in Khewat No.66/55, Khatauni
No.107/95, Khasra No.328/29, total measuring 164.04 bighas,
situated in Village Sainj, Pargan Bagurkhurd, Tehsil Kandaghat,
Hadbast No.416, District Solan, HP and if the sale proceeds of the
mortgaged/enumerated property are found short, the balance
decretal amount be ordered to be recovered from the defendants
under Order 34, Rule 6 of CPC.
3.
It has been averred in the plaint that the plaintiff-
company is engaged in the business of real estate development and
allied activities and defendant No.1 used to be its trusted associate
and employee. In the month of January, 2011, defendant No.1
approached the plaintiff-company, representing that he required
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funds to purchase land in Himachal Pradesh to set-up a housing
project, being an agriculturist of Himachal Pradesh and, therefore,
sought loan from the plaintiff-company and he was an agriculturist
and competent to buy land in Himachal Pradesh and he was willing
to pay reasonable market interest on the loan amount. He further
represented that he would get the lien/charge/encumbrance marked
in favour of the plaintiff-company and assured that he would
return/repay the loan after three years, once the housing project
takes off on the land to be purchased with the loan amount taken
from the plaintiff. It has been further averred in the plaint that
defendant No.2 assured and took responsibility to secure the loan
amount by creating equitable mortgage of the property by deposit of
title deeds with the company and by getting lien/charge and
encumbrance of mortgage of the plaintiff-company marked in the
revenue records after sale deed of the land is executed in favour of
defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 disclosed to the Directors of the
plaintiff-company that he had identified a suitable piece of land
measuring 61 bighas and 07 biswas
in Village
Sainj, Pargana
Bagurkhurd, Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan, HP. Vide resolution
dated 18.01.2011, passed by the BOD of the plaintiff-company,
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defendant No.2-Sanjay Jain was authorized to complete the
formalities for purchase of the land, who made payment to the tune
of Rs.48,80,125/- by way of multiple cheques from the account of
the
plaintiff,
which
were
issued
directly
in
the
name
of
sellers/authorized representatives. Defendant No.2 also took a cash
amounting to Rs.1,95,82,875/- from the cash-in-hand held by the
plaintiff, which was handed over/remitted to defendant No.1 for
purchase of the land. The aforesaid entire money was given to
defendant No.1 to purchase the above-mentioned land and
defendant No.2, who had taken the responsibility to get all relevant
documents executed and also getting the lien/charge marked in
favour of the plaintiff, in connivance with defendant No.1 did not get
the lien of the plaintiff-company marked on the land, measuirng
61.07 bighas, which was purchased vide two separate sale-deeds
bearing No.134/2012 and 140/2012, dated 24.05.2012 and
29.05.2012, respectively, registered in the name of defendant No.1.
4.
In the month of August, 2014, it was found that
defendant No.2 was involved in misappropriating, cheating and
playing fraud upon the Company as a Director, therefore, vide
resolution dated 07.08.2014 passed by the Company, Shri
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Parminder Singh Sehgal was authorized and empowered to initiate
legal action against the defendants and others. Thereafter, the
plaintiff-company
filed
an
application
before
the
Tehsildar,
Kandaghat to enter its encumbrance/lien/charge and entry of
encumbrance on the land purchased by defendant No.1 with the
money of the company. On receipt of the said notice, defendant
No.1 made a statement/declaration that the money was provided to
him by the plaintiff-company. Vide rapat No.178, dated 29.01.2015,
the
aforesaid
application
was
allowed
and
lien/charge
of
encumbrance was entered in the revenue records pertaining to the
land so purchased by defendant No.1 on 29.01.2015. Defendant
No.1 declared before the Income Tax Authorities that he had
received the funds from the plaintiff-company and the entire sale
consideration amount for purchase of land was a loan from the
plaintiff. The matter was subsequently referred by the Income Tax
Officer, Ward (2), Chandigarh to the concerned authorities under
the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. During
the proceedings before the Initiating Officer, under Prohibition of
Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, the competent authority
came to the conclusion that defendant No.1 was an agriculturist and
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had purchased the aforesaid land measuring 61.07 bighas for a
consideration of Rs.2,52,66,500/-, vide Sale Deed No.134/2012,
dated 24.05.2012. Defendant No.2 also admitted in his statement
during the aforesaid proceedings that the plaintiff-company had
made payment for purchase of the aforesaid land and in the final
order dated 05.09.2022, the Adjudicating Authority, under the
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, Delhi held
that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the subject sale
transaction as the said transaction had taken place prior to the year
2016. After passing of order dated 05.09.2022 by the concerned
Officer under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,
1988, defendant No.1 in connivance with defendant No.2 filed an
application on 30.06.2023 before the Naib Tehsildar, Kandaghat,
District Solan, for seeking deletion of the encumbrance, charge/lien
of the plaintiff-company from the revenue records with respect to the
share in the land comprised Khasra No.328/29, measuring 61.07
bighas in Mohan Sainj, Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan. The said
application was rejected by the Tehsildar Kandaghat on 16.12.2024.
After removal of defendant No.2 as Director of the plaintiff-company
in June, 2014, owing to misdeeds and acts of fraud and cheating
2026:HHC:47186
and embezzlement as also misappropriation of company funds, it
was found that he hand taken way the original sale deeds with him,
for which, FIR No.54, dated 23.02.2015 was also registered against
him. The plaintiff has been requesting defendant No.1 to return the
money advanced by him, but he had been evading on one false
pretext or the other. The plaintiff has now come to know that the
defendants had surreptitiously and clandestinely formed a Company
in the name and style of M/s Co-Living Apartments Pvt. Ltd., with its
registered office at Sector 28, Chandigarh and had also secretly
entered into an alleged Memorandum of Understanding for Joint
Venture (Agreement) on 12.03.2007, without the knowledge of the
plaintiff. It has also come to the notice of the plaintiff that the said
projected as having been promoted by defendant No.1 and he even
signed
an
alleged
Memorandum
of
Understanding
dated
08.11.2019 with the Government of Himachal Pradesh for
developing a housing project on the land so purchased in the name
of defendant No.1. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the
plaintiff-company filed the suit against the defendants for recovery
of Rs.6,36,71,580/- alongwith interest @ 12% per annum from the
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date of filing of the suit till recovery of the decretal amount by sale of
mortgaged property.
5.
By way of the instant applications (OMPs No.1521 &
1522 of 2025), both the applicants-defendants have made almost
common
averments.
It
has
been
averred
on
behalf
of
applicant/defendant No.2 that he was authorized to complete the
necessary formalities to buy lands at Kandaghat, from house at
Chandigarh and lands at Dera Bassi for the business interest of the
plaintiff-company, thus, the alleged transaction, if taken, would fall
within the purview of Section 2(C) and Explanation A(a) of the
Commercial Courts Act. This Court would not like to exercise the
jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit in view of Section
12A of the Act of 2015 . The subject matter of the suit squarely falls
within the definition of a ‘Commercial Dispute’ and the plaintiff has
filed the present suit as an ordinary suit, without taking recourse of
the provisions of Commercial Courts Act. Moreover, after
constitution of a Commercial Division/Court by the Hon’ble Chief
Justice, it is the Commercial Court/Division that shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to try all suits and applications relating to commercial
disputes of a specified value. Hence, the present suit having been
2026:HHC:47186
instituted before a forum not vested within the jurisdiction to try
commercial disputes, is barred by law and is liable to be rejected
under order VII, Rule 11(d) of CPC, read with Section 2(c) read with
Explanation A(a) and Section 6 of tthe Act of 2015. It has been
further averred that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by
limitation as the same was filed on 06.01.2025, whereas, as per the
plaint, the cause of action to recover the amount accrued in the
month of May, 2015, therefore, it should have been filed before
31.05.2018. Hence, it is prayed that the applications may be
allowed and in view of the provisions contained under Order VII,
Rule 11(d) of CPC, read with Section 2(c) read with Explanation
A(a) and Section 6 of tthe Act of 2015, the instant suit may be
ordered to be rejected with exemplary costs.
6.
In reply(ies) to these applications, it has been averred
that the limitation for recovery of money by sale of mortgaged/
charged property under Order 34, Rules 1 to 6 of CPC is 12 years
under Article 62 of the Limitation Act, hence, the suit is well within
time.
It is also averred that for the purpose of decision of
application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC, only averments made in
the plaint are required to be seen. It is a case of purely civil nature
2026:HHC:47186
covered by Order 34 of CPC, where the money has been secured
by creating charge/mortgage on immovable property and the
applicants/defendants are trying to give a totally erroneous, warped,
distorted and legally untenable interpretation to the fact of the case
that it is a commercial dispute. The subject matter of the present
suit is an ordinary civil dispute and by no stretch of imagination, it
cannot be termed as commercial dispute. Hence, it is prayed that
the applications be dismissed with costs.
7.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the defendants/
applicants contended that, the subject matter of the dispute
between the parties to the suit is a commercial dispute within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act as the transaction between
the parties is commercial in nature and all ingredients of Section
2(1)(c)(i) of the Act of 2015 have been satisfied
8.
Conversely, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
plaintiff-non-applicant contended that, the suit does not involve a
commercial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) the Act of
2015. According to him, the character of a suit is determined by the
substance of the plaint read as whole and the status of the parties
or the commercial setting in which the controversy has arisen.
9.
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It is settled law that the power conferred on Civil Courts to
reject plaint at the threshold is an extra-ordinary power and,
therefore,
required
to
be
exercised
with
great
care
and
circumspection. At this stage, it would be relevant to reproduce
Oder 7, Rule 11 of CPC, which reads as under:“11. Rejection of plaint- The plaint shall be rejected in the
following cases:(a)
where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b)
where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff,
on being required by the court to correct the valuation
within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
(c)
where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint
is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the
requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the
Court, fails to do so;
(d)
where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint
to be barred by any law;
(e)
where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f)
where the plaintiff fails comply with the provision of Rule
9.
Provided that the time fixed by the court for the
correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp papers shall not be extended unless the court, for
reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was
prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from
correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp
papers, as the case may be within the time fixed by the
court and that refusal to extend such time would cause
grave injustice to the plaintiff.”
10.
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Thus, under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC, plaint can be
rejected on the grounds that the suit is barred by law or it does not
disclose the cause of action or proper court fees has not been paid
even after order of the court or where it is not filed in duplicate or
where the plaintiff fails comply with the provision of Rule 9. It is well
settled that the Court, at the stage of considering an application
under Order 7 Rule, 11 of CPC has to examine only the plaint
averments, and the documents filed along with the suit. Other pleas
advanced by parties, including the pleadings in the written
statement, have no relevance in order to decide the present
application in hand. In Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association
Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I and another, (2004) 9 SCC 512, while
dealing with the law relating to rejection of plaint under Order VII,
Rule 11, CPC, the Supreme Court observed as follows:"139.Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or
not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or
does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself.
For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in
their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to
whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be
correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.
151.In ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of
action, the court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry
into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact………..
152.So long as the claim discloses some cause of
action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a
judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to
succeed is no ground for striking it out. The purported
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failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of action is
distinct from the absence of full particulars."
11.
In the case of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 2003 SC 759, it was held with reference to Order VII, Rule 11
of CPC that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for
deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint.
The trial Court can exercise the power at any stage of the suit
before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the
defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under Clauses (a) and (d) of
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the averments in the plaint are the
germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement
would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.
12.
In the case of Popat and Kotecha Property v. State
Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510, it was held as
under: "20…...The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits…….
****
****
****
*****
23.Rule 11 of Order VII lays down an independent
remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the
maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to
contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not
contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised,
and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a
written statement. Instead, the word “shall‟ is used clearly
implying thereby that it casts a duty on the Court to perform
2026:HHC:47186
its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by
any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11,
even without intervention of the defendant. In any event,
rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the
plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13."
13.
Thus, the real object of Order VII, Rule 11, CPC is to
keep out irresponsible lawsuits from the Courts and it provides for
an independent remedy for the defendant to challenge the
maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the
same on merits. The Supreme Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v.
Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137, held as under:“ 17.... The real object of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is
to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, Order
10 of the Code is a tool in the hands of the courts by resorting
to which and by a searching examination of the party, in case
the court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of
the process of the court, in the sense that it is a bogus and
irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11
of the Code can be exercised.
*** ***
***
***
20....Rule 11 of Order 7 lays down an independent
remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the
maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to
contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not
contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised,
and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a
written statement. Instead, the word ―shall‖ is used, clearly
implying thereby that it casts a duty on the court to perform
its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by
any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11,
even without intervention of the defendant. In any event,
rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the
plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13.”
14.
In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253,
the Supreme Court further held that the whole purpose of
2026:HHC:47186
conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a
litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should
not be permitted to waste the judicial time of the Court, in the
following words :“12. ... The whole purpose of conferment of such powers
is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound
to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time
of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The
sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head
unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary
civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a
plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action…...”
15.
Thus, on the conspectus of the settled position of law, it
is crystal clear that the power vested in the Court under Order VII,
Rule 11 of CPC is to curb abusive or fruitless litigation which is
bound to meet a dead fate. Order VII, Rule 11 CPC is a vital
procedural
safeguard
that
prevents the abuse of the
legal
process and ensures that only legitimate disputes consume
judicial
time.
While the rule acts as a gatekeeper preventing
frivolous litigation, courts also exercise caution to ensure that
genuine plaintiffs are not unjustly denied their right to seek
justice due to hyper-technicalities. The balance lies in a judicious
application of the rule, upholding the sanctity of court proceedings
while safeguarding access to justice.
16.
2026:HHC:47186
It is a settled position of law that all commercial disputes
do not come within the definition of the commercial disputes as
appearing in the Act of 2015. The Act of 2015 has defined
"commercial dispute" in Section 2(1)(c). It is only those commercial
disputes that have been defined in Section 2(1)(c) of the Act of 2015
which are required to be decided by the Commercial Courts. If a
Civil Suit is filed as a commercial suit when it does not qualify as a
"commercial dispute" under the Act of 2015, it undermines the
scope and object of the Act of 2015, as it essentially misuses the
specialized jurisdiction of commercial courts intended for swift
resolution of genuine commercial disputes, potentially delaying
other legitimate commercial cases. At this stage, it would be
relevant to reproduce Section 2(1)(c) (i) of the Commercial Disputes
Act which reads as under:“2(1)(c)(i) ordinary translations of merchants, bankers,
financiers and traders such as those relating to
mercantile documents, including enforcement and
interpretation of such documents.”
17.
Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act of 2015
specifies that,
commercial disputes means a dispute arising out of the ordinary
transactions of merchants, bankers, financiers and traders such as
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those relating to mercantile documents, including enforcement and
interpretation of such documents.
18.
Recently, in the case of
M/s. Levitate Mobile
Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Standard Chartered Bank Pvt.
Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 818, Delhi High Court had an occasion
to consider the scope and ambit of the Act of 2015 while rejecting
the application under Order XI, Rule 1(5), CPC. It observed as under:
“23. A comprehensive reading of the Statement of
Objects and Reasons, along with the insights from the Law
Commission’s 188th and 253rd Reports, provides significant
clarity on the rationale behind the enactment of the Act. The
Parliament’s intention was to overhaul the commercial
dispute resolution framework by distinguishing it from other
civil disputes, thereby achieving its core goal i.e., the
expeditious disposal of commercial disputes in India, keeping
in view the larger picture of preserving and boosting the
economy of the country. The aim and objective of the Act of
2015 clearly reflect the intent of the Parliament for speedy
disposal of high value commercial disputes while setting up
an independent mechanism for their early resolution.”
19.
In Kailash Devi Khanna & Ors vs D D Global Capital
Ltd & Ors., 2019 SCC Online Del 9954, the High Court of Delhi
emphasized that not all suits for monetary recovery qualify as
"commercial dispute" under the Act of 2015. The Court specifically
observed that for a claim to fall under Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act of
2015, it must pertain to "ordinary transactions of merchants,
bankers, financiers, and traders," involving mercantile documents
2026:HHC:47186
and their enforcement or interpretation. The Court further held that a
suit merely seeking recovery of money, without any connection to
mercantile transactions or documents, does not meet the criteria of
a "commercial dispute" and, therefore, cannot be filed as a
commercial suit. Filing a civil suit under the commercial courts'
jurisdiction, without meeting these requirements, amounts to a
misuse of the specialized forum meant for expeditious resolution of
genuine business disputes, ultimately hindering the adjudication of
legitimate commercial cases.
20.
Further, the High Court at Calcutta in Ladymoon
Towers (P) Ltd. v. Mahendra Investments Advisors (P) Ltd.
2021 SCC Online Cal 4240, clarified that a "commercial dispute"
involves transactions typically of merchants, financiers, and traders,
and emphasized that disputes should be assessed on the
substance of the case rather than procedural objections. Similarly,
in Rolta (P) Ltd. v. Varanium Cloud Ltd., 2024 SCC Online Bom.
the High Court at Bombay reiterated that a "commercial
dispute" under the Act of 2015 must relate to commercial
transactions and not personal loans or other non-commercial
engagements. In both these cases, the Courts ruled that disputes
2026:HHC:47186
arising from personal loans, even if advanced for business
purposes, do not qualify as "commercial dispute" under the
definition provided in Section 2(1)(c) of the Act of 2015.
21.
Thus on a plain reading of Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act of
coupled with the judicial pronouncements as discussed
above, it is crystal clear that only those ordinary transactions that
concern merchants, bankers, financiers and traders, and relate to
mercantile documents, would come under the purview of the
"commercial dispute". It would also be apposite to note that under
Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act of 2015, two essential ingredients must
exists simultaneously. The transactions in the suit must be ordinary
transaction of merchants, bankers, financiers and traders and that
there are mercantile documents with regard to such ordinary
transactions between such entities. The overall scheme of the Act of
2015 and the intent underlying therein indicate that both elements
must co-exist for a dispute to be termed as a "commercial dispute".
22.
At this juncture, it would be necessary to analyze the
meaning and significance of "mercantile documents" within the
framework of commercial disputes. The Act of 2015 does not define
"mercantile documents" as such, however, the plain meaning of
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"mercantile" pertains to matters related to trade and commerce. In
its ordinary usage, the term "mercantile document" refers to a
document associated with merchants, trade, or commercial
transactions.
23.
Since the Act of 2015 does not provide a specific
definition of the term "mercantile" , therefore reference can be made
to Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, which defines "mercantile" as
"an act relating to a merchant or trading and being commercial in
nature. This interpretation suggests that for a dispute to be
categorized as a "commercial dispute", the transaction should be
supported by a document that records, governs, or evidences trade,
commerce, or business activity. The absence of such a document
certainly raises doubts as to whether a dispute can be classified as
a "commercial dispute" under the provisions of the Act of 2015. A
dispute qualifies as a "commercial dispute" when it arises from
transactions involving merchants, bankers, financiers, or traders,
and relates to mercantile documents, including their enforcement
and interpretation.
24.
2026:HHC:47186
The word "document" is defined under Section 2(d) of
the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhinyam, 2023 (earlier "Indian Evidence
Act, 1872") which reads as under:“(d) "document" means any matter expressed or described
or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of
letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than
one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be
used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes
electronic and digital records.
25.
The presence of the word "mercantile" narrows down the
scope of the word "document" and thus, the mere presence of a
document evidencing the transaction is not enough unless the
document qualifies as a mercantile document in the sense
discussed above.
26.
In Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited Vs. K.S.
Infraspace LLP and another, 2020 (15) SCC 585, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the averments of the plaint would be
relevant for determination as to whether, the suit is required to be
tried by the Commercial Court under the Act of 2015 or not. It has
also held that, the provisions of the Act of 2015 are to be strictly
construed. Paras-13 and 14 of the judgment read as under:“13. The learned senior advocate for the appellant would
however, contend that a strict interpretation as in the case of
taxing statutes would not be appropriate in the instant case
where the issue relates to jurisdiction. In that regard, the
learned senior advocate has referred to the statement of
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objects and reasons with which the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 is enacted so as to provide speedy disposal of high
value commercial disputes so as to create the positive image
to the investors world about the independent and responsive
Indian Legal System. Hence, he contends that a purposive
interpretation be made. It is contended that a wider purport
and meaning is to be assigned while entertaining the suit and
considering the dispute to be a commercial dispute. Having
taken note of the submission we feel that the very purpose
for which the CC Act of 2015 has been enacted would be
defeated if every other suit merely because it is filed before
the Commercial Court is entertained. This is for the reason
that the suits which are not actually relating to commercial
dispute but being filed merely because of the high value and
with the intention of seeking early disposal would only clog
the system and block the way for the genuine commercial
disputes which may have to be entertained by the
Commercial Courts as intended by the law makers. In
commercial disputes as defined a special procedure is
provided for a class of litigation and a strict procedure will
have to be followed to entertain only that class of litigation in
that jurisdiction. If the same is strictly interpreted it is not as if
those excluded will be non-suited without any remedy. The
excluded class of litigation will in any event be entertained in
the ordinary Civil Courts wherein the remedy has always
existed.
14. In that view it is also necessary to carefully examine and
entertain only disputes which actually answers the definition
“commercial disputes” as provided under the Act. In the
instant case, as already taken note neither the agreement
between the parties refers to the nature of the immovable
property being exclusively used for trade or commerce as on
the date of the agreement nor is there any pleading to that
effect in the plaint. Further the very relief sought in the suit is
for execution of the Mortgage Deed which is in the nature of
specific performance of the terms of Memorandum of
Understanding without reference to nature of the use of the
immovable property in trade or commerce as on the date of
the suit. Therefore, if all these aspects are kept in view, we
are of the opinion that in the present facts the High Court was
justified in its conclusion arrived through the order dated
01.03.2019 impugned herein. The Commercial Court shall
therefore return the plaint indicating a date for its
presentation before the Court having jurisdiction.”
27.
2026:HHC:47186
On such principles as has been enunciated in various
judicial pronouncements referred to above, the question which
arises for consideration before this court is as to whether the subject
matter of the dispute between the parties to the suit involves a
commercial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the
Act and whether the transaction between the parties is commercial
in nature.
28.
As observed in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises case
(supra), the decision as to whether or not the suit involves a
commercial dispute within the meaning of the Act has to be arrived
at on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and on a strict
construction of the provisions of the Act. Thus, a bare reading of
the plaint in the instant case would disclose that the defendants
were well known to the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 used to be its
trusted associate and employee whereas defendant No.2 was
director of the plaintiff-company, with whom, defendant No.1 had
close association, which served a reason for the plaintiff to grant
loan to defendant No.1. In January, 2011, defendant No.1
approached the plaintiff-company and represented that he required
funds to purchase land in Himachal Pradesh to set up a housing
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project and thus sought loan from the plaintiff-company for the said
purpose. Further case of the plaintiff-company is that defendant
No.1 was willing to pay reasonable market interest on the loan
amount, which he would secure by mortgaging/encumbering the
land purchased by him with the loan amount and would get the
lien/charge/encumbrance marked in favour of the plaintiff-company
on the purchased land in the relevant revenue records and he
assured that he would return/repay the loan after three years once
the housing project of defendant No.1 took off on the land to be
purchased with the loan amount taken from the plaintiff-company.
Defendant No.2 assured and induced the Directors of the Company
to extend the loan to defendant No.1 on behalf of the plaintiffcompany and he also assured and took the responsibility to secure
the loan amount by creating equitable mortgage of the property by
deposit of title deeds with the Company and by getting lien/charge
and encumbrance of mortgage of the plaintiff-company marked in
the revenue records after sale deed of the land was executed in
favour of defendant No.1. However, defendant No.2 in connivance
with defendant No.1 did not deliberately get the lien of the plaintiffcompany marked on the land measuring 61.07 bighas which was
2026:HHC:47186
purchased vide two separate sale deeds and in August, 2014, it was
found by the plaintiff-Company that defendant No.2 was involved in
misappropriating, cheating and playing fraud upon the company as
a Director and was hand in glove with defendant No.1. When it
came to the notice of the plaintiff-company
that the defendants
were hand in glove in defrauding and cheating the company, it filed
an application before the Tehsildar Kandaghat, District Solan,
seeking to enter the plaintiff-company’s encumbrance/lien/charge
and entry of encumbrance on the land purchased by defendant
No.1 with the money of the plaintiff-company.
29.
Therefore, upon considering the aforesaid assertions
made in the plaint and on perusal of the material available on
record, it is seen that the suit has not been filed by the plaintiffcompany
raising any commercial dispute. Admittedly, present
transaction as per the case of the plaintiff is without execution of
any document, what to speak of a mercantile document. Plaintiff is
neither a banker nor a trader nor a merchant nor had any business
dealing with the defendants. Merely because loan amount was
payable with interest or that same was to be used by defendant
No.1 for the setting up of housing project would not make the
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transaction commercial particular in the absence of a mercantile
document as discussed above. It is simply a suit filed by the plaintiff
under Order 34, Rules 1 to 6 of CPC for recovery of the decretal
amount by way of sale/foreclosure of the mortgaged property.
As
discussed, defendant No.1 approached the plaintiff-company and
represented that he required funds to purchase land in Himachal
Pradesh to set up a housing project and thus, sought loan from the
plaintiff-company for the said purchase and thereafter defendant
No.2 made payment of amount of Rs.48,80,125/- by way of multiple
cheques from the account of the plaintiff-company which were
issued directly in the name of the sellers and their authorized
representatives. Apart from the cheques, defendant No.2 also took
a cash amount of Rs.1,95,82,875/- from the cash-in-hand held by
the plaintiff-company, which too was handed over/remitted to
defendant No.1 for purchase of the land. There is no mercantile
document involved in the present suit as per Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the
Commercial Disputes Act nor had the plaintiff acted in the capacity
of a financier. The defendants have failed to show that the plaintiff
company was commercially engaged in the activity of financing or
lending. A one-off personal loan does not fall within any of the
2026:HHC:47186
categories enumerated under Section 2(1)(c) of the Act of 2015,
merely because it carries interest. It is only the ordinary transactions
involving merchants, bankers, financiers, and traders such as those
relating to mercantile documents, which are covered under Section
2(1)(c)(i) of the Act of 2015,therefore, it cannot be said that the suit
involves commercial dispute.
30.
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that
the claim for recovery in the present suit does not qualify as a
"commercial dispute" under Section 2(1)(c) of the Act of 2015. The
plaintiff company is not a merchant, trader, banker or financier. It
had advanced a
loan to defendant No.1 on certain terms and
conditions, but such a loan, even if ultimately used for the purpose
of setting up of the housing project, does not inherently constitute a
"commercial dispute" within the meaning of the Act of 2015 as it
does not pertain to ordinary transactions involving merchants,
bankers, financiers, and traders such as those relating to mercantile
documents. Moreover, the loan was not advanced in the ordinary
course of business and has no relation to the trade, commerce, or
business of the plaintiff company
31.
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Consequently, in view of the above discussion, both the
applications are dismissed, being devoid of merit.
32.
Be it stated that the observations made hereinabove are
purely for the disposal of these applications and shall have no
bearing on the merits of the main suit.
October 28, 2026
(V.Himalvi)
( Sushil Kukreja )
Judge
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