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by SIDDHANT
2026:CGHC:8269
SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR
TAMRAKAR Date:
2026.02.17
10:52:46
+0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MAC No. 88 of 2024
•
Praveen Tiwari S/o Digri Tiwari Aged About 36 Years R/o Bhatthapara,
Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.) (Owner)
... Appellant
versus
1. Smt. Sunita Anant Wd/o Late Ramkumar Anant Aged About 44 Years R/o
Village Jagdishpur (Aghina) P.S. Bhatgaon, Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District
Surajpur (C.G.)
2. Naveen Kumar Anant S/o Late Ramkumar Anant Aged About 21 Years R/o
Village Jagdishpur (Aghina) P.S. Bhatgaon, Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District
Surajpur (C.G.)
3. Sudhanshu Anant S/o Late Ramkumar Anant Aged About 18 Years R/o
Village Jagdishpur (Aghina) P.S. Bhatgaon, Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District
Surajpur (C.G.)
4. Sampet W/o Ramdas Anant Aged About 69 Years R/o Village Jagdishpur
(Aghina) P.S. Bhatgaon, Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District Surajpur (C.G.)
5. Prashant Pandey S/o Shivnarayan Pandey Aged About 29 Years R/o
Village Salka (Aghina) P.S. Bhatgaon Tahsil Bhaiyathan Distt. Surajpur
(C.G.) (Driver Of Motorcycle)
6. Abhinav Pandey S/o Prashant Pandey Aged About 54 Years R/o Village
Salka (Aghina) P.S. Bhatgaon Tahsil Bhaiyathan Distt. Surajpur (C.G.)
(Owner Of Motorcycle)
7. I.C.I.C.I. General Insurance Company Ltd. Lombard General Insurance
Company Ltd. Branch Office, Ambikapur, District Sarguja (C.G.) (Insurer)
8. Narendra Singh S/o Govind Singh Aged About 36 Years Caste Gond,
Lanchi P.S. And Tahsil Surajpur Distt. Surajpur (C.G.) (Driver Of Tractor)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant/Owner
:
For Respondents No.2 to 4
For Respondents No.5 & 6
For Respondents No. 7
:
:
:
Mr. Ravi Singh, Advocate holding the brief of
Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Advocate
Mr. Pavas Sharma, Advocate
Mr. Gyan Prakash Shukla, Advocate
Mr. Palash Agrawal, Advocate holding the
brief of Mr. Shekhar Rao Saheb Amin,
Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
16.02.2026
1. Heard on I.A. No. 01/2023, an application for condonation of delay.
2. The owner of the vehicle has preferred this appeal challenging the liability
part assailing the judgment and award passed by the learned 1 st Additional
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Surajpur, District Surajpur passed in Claim
Case
No.
48/2019,
whereby
the
learned
Tribunal
has
granted
compensation to the tune of Rs. 10,82,500/- with interest at the rate of 8%
per annum on account of death of Ram Kumar and fastened liability with
the owner of the vehicle.
3. The owner of the vehicle has preferred this appeal with delay of 1274 days.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the award was passed
on 27.02.2020, and this appeal has been preferred on 24.11.2023. He
would submit that counsel engaged by the appellant herein failed to inform
the appellant about the judgment and award passed by the learned
Tribunal. He would submit that the appellant collected certified copy of the
award and other relevant documents on 08.11.2023, and thereafter,
preferred this appeal. He would pray to condone the delay.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would
oppose. They would submit that the appellant failed to explain sufficient
cause in the application for condonation of delay. They would contend that
the application (I.A. No. 01/2023) deserves to be rejected.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the application for
condonation of delay with utmost circumspection.
7. The award was passed on 27.02.2020, whereas this appeal has been
preferred on 24.11.2023. The appellant has taken a plea that he was not
aware of the award, though the appellant was duly represented by his
counsel before the learned Tribunal; therefore, this ground is not available
to the appellant. The appellant remained in state of slumber for period of 33
months from date of award and failed to explain delay properly.
8. Law as regards scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of
condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act is well settled by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments and some judgments are
as under :
(i) In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR
1962 SC 361, Hon. Supreme Court in para 7 has held as
under:“7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation
Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two
important
considerations.
The
first
consideration is that the expiration of the
period of limitation prescribed for making an
appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the
decree-holder to treat the decree as binding
between the parties. In other words, when
the period of limitation prescribed has
expired the decree-holder has obtained a
benefit under the law of limitation to treat the
decree as beyond challenge, and this legal
right which has accrued to the decree-holder
by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other consideration
which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient
cause for excusing delay is shown discretion
is given to the court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been
deliberately conferred on the court in order
that judicial power and discretion in that
behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice.”
(ii) Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K.
Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556,
has held in para 6 as under:“6. law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes
and the courts have no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds.”
(iii) As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of
limitation, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlilk
Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., Vs. Executive Engineer,
Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448
has held as under:
“26. Basically the laws of Limitation are
founded on public policy. In Halsbury’s
Laws
of
England,4th
Ed.,
Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the policy of the
Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.The courts have expressed at least
three different reasons supporting
the existence of statutes of
limitation, namely,
(i) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than
justice in them,
(ii) that a defendant might
have lost the evidence to
dispute the stated claim,
(iii) that persons with good
causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable
diligence.”
27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes
described as ‘statutes of peace’. An
unlimited and perpetual threat of
limitation
creates
insecurity
and
uncertainty; some kind of limitation is
essential for public order. This court in
Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa
Singh and others [(1973) 2 SCC 705]
has observed : (SCC p.712, para 18)
“18. The object of law of Limitation
is to prevent disturbance and
deprivation of what may have
been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what
may have been lost by a party’s
own inaction, negligence or
laches”.
28. In Motichand vs. Munshi [AIR 1970
SC 898], this court observed that this
principle is based on the maxim
“interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,
that is, the interest of the State requires
that there should be end to litigation but
at the same time law of Limitation are a
means to ensuring private justice
suppressing
fraud
and
perjury,
quickening diligence and preventing
oppression.
29. It needs no restatement at our
hands that the object for fixing time limit
for litigation is based on public policy
fixing a life span for legal remedy for the
purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics but avail their
legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his
jurisprudence states that the laws come
to the assistance of the vigilant and not
of the sleepy.
(iv) Hon. Supreme Court in a recent decision Maniben
Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:“24. What colour the expression
“sufficient cause” would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would
largely depend on bona fide nature of
the explanation. If the Court finds that
there has been no negligence on the
part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona
fides, then it may condone the delay. If,
on the other hand, the explanation
given by the applicant is found to be
concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause,
then it would be a legitimate exercise
of discretion not to condone the delay.”
9.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC
286, in para 26, summarized the judgments and the same is reproduced
herein-below:“26. On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law,as aforesaid, and the law
laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by
forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right
itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must
come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to
be construed differently, such as Section 3 has
to be construed in a strict sense whereas
Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice,
though
liberal
approach,
justice-oriented
approach or cause of substantial justice may be
kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation contained
in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion
to condone the delay if sufficient cause had
been explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established
for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others are
also entitled to the same benefit if the court is
not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay
in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for condoning
the delay and condoning the delay for the reason
that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts
to disregarding the statutory provision.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented
approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be
employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a
matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
11. Considering inordinate delay of 1274 days and the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not find any good ground to allow the
application for condonation of delay, accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2023 is
hereby rejected. Consequently, appeal also fails and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
$iddhant
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