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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 12.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on:22.01.2026
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ARB.P. 2001/2024
PRATEEK GOEL
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Sanyam Jain, Advocate.
versus
DHAKKSHINAMOORTHY NATARAJAN
Through:
.....Respondent
Ms. Upasna Bakshi, Mr. Satish
Kumar and Ms. Divya Bakshi,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present petition has been instituted under Section 11(6) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, whereby the Petitioner
seeks the appointment of an independent Sole Arbitrator for the
adjudication of disputes stated to have arisen between the parties in
relation to the Memorandum of Understanding dated 24.11.20202.
2.
It is the case of the Petitioner that a notice invoking arbitration
under Section 21 of the Act was duly issued on 11.03.2024; however,
despite receipt thereof, the Respondent failed to act in accordance with
the agreed procedure for appointment of an arbitrator, thereby
Act
MoU
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:34:32
ARB.P. 2001/2024
necessitating the present petition before this Court.
3.
Briefly stated, the Petitioner asserts that a sum of Rs.
25,00,000/- was advanced to the Respondent on 05.10.2020 for safe
custody. It is the Petitioner’s case that the Respondent, without
consent, utilised the said amount for his personal purposes.
4.
It is averred by the Petitioner that thereafter, on 24.11.2020, the
parties entered into a MoU at New Delhi, whereby the Respondent
acknowledged the utilisation of the amount and undertook to repay the
same on or before 01.02.2021. Along with the MoU, the Respondent
also executed a Promissory Note and an Acknowledgment Receipt of
the same date, and issued five cheques of Rs. 5,00,000/- each.
5.
According to the Petitioner, despite repeated demands, the
amount was not repaid and the cheques, when presented, were
dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. This led to the initiation of
proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, which are stated to be pending.
6.
It is averred by the Petitioner that the MoU contains an
arbitration clause (Clause 12) providing that disputes arising out of the
transaction between the parties shall be resolved by arbitration, with
the seat of arbitration being New Delhi.
7.
Invoking the said clause, the Petitioner issued a notice under
Section 21 of the Act dated 06.03.2024, dispatched on 11.03.2024.
The Respondent replied vide notice dated 28.03.2024, disputing the
claims and declining reference to arbitration.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
8.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner would
contend that the MoU dated 24.11.2020 contains a valid and binding
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BHATIA
15:34:32
ARB.P. 2001/2024
arbitration agreement governing the disputes between the parties. It
would be submitted that disputes have admittedly arisen in relation to
the said MoU and the underlying transaction, thereby giving rise to a
cause for the invocation of arbitration.
9.
Learned counsel would further submit that the arbitration clause
was duly invoked by issuance of a notice under Section 21 of the Act;
however, despite receipt of the said notice, the Respondent failed and
neglected to act in accordance with the procedure agreed between the
parties for the appointment of an arbitrator.
10.
It is further contended that in view of the settled position of law,
the clause providing for unilateral appointment of the sole arbitrator
by one party is no longer enforceable, and consequently, the Petitioner
was left with no alternative but to approach this Court under Section
11(6) of the Act for appointment of an independent and impartial Sole
Arbitrator.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
11.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would
contend that the present petition is not maintainable and that the
disputes sought to be referred to arbitration do not warrant the
appointment of an arbitrator by this Court. It would further be
submitted that the MoU was not executed with free consent and is
alleged to have been obtained under coercion and threat. Learned
counsel would contend that the Respondent has lodged a complaint in
this regard with the concerned police authorities, alleging that the
MoU was forcibly executed, and therefore, the said agreement,
including the arbitration clause contained therein, is not legally
binding upon the Respondent.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:34:32
ARB.P. 2001/2024
12.
Learned counsel for the Respondent would further contend that
the alleged transaction was a cash transaction and, therefore, no
proceedings can be invoked for the purpose of enforcing the same. It
would be submitted that there exists no valid or enforceable agreement
between the parties, and that this is further borne out from the fact that
the entire conspectus of facts relating to the alleged agreement is
stated to have transpired during the period affected by the COVID-19
pandemic.
13.
Learned counsel for the Respondent would further contend that
the cheques in question were neither voluntarily issued nor issued in
discharge of any legally enforceable debt or liability, and that the
criminal proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, are false and malicious.
14.
It would be further contended by the learned Counsel for the
Respondent that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
present petition. In support thereof, learned counsel for the
Respondent would submit that, as is evident from the contents of the
agreement itself, the performance thereof was required to take place at
Chennai, and consequently, the courts at Delhi would have no
jurisdiction to entertain the present proceedings.
ANALYSIS:
15.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and has carefully examined the pleadings as well as the documents
placed on record.
16.
This Court is mindful of the limited scope of judicial
interference at the stage of consideration of a petition under Section 11
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BHATIA
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ARB.P. 2001/2024
of the Act. The law governing the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act is now fairly well settled. A
Coordinate Bench of this Court, of late, in Pradhaan Air Express Pvt.
Ltd. v. Air Works India Engineering Pvt. Ltd.3, has elaborately
examined the contours of jurisdiction exercisable at the stage of
appointment of an arbitrator. After comprehensively analysing the
relevant precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Coordinate
Bench succinctly discussed and summarised the legal position, which
reads as under:“9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 &
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re has held that scope of inquiry at
the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent
of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no. 114 in the
case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. that observations made
in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., and adopted in NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd., that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facienon-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re :
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no. 114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd. reads as under:—
“114. In view of the observations made by this Court
in In Re : Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of
enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it
difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya
Drolia (supra) and adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that
the jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the
2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 2001/2024
issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11
extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re : Interplay (supra).”
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd., however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated such
as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim through
arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the limited
scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the interest
of the parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne
by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the other
parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent
and malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts
of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:—
“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 : 2024
INSC 532], frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which
the referral court should not decide at the stage of Section
11 as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent to
adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the
limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11
must not be misused by parties in order to force other
parties to the arbitration agreement to participate in a
time consuming and costly arbitration process. This is
possible in instances, including but not limited to, where
the claimant canvasses the adjudication of non-existent
and mala fide claims through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of judicial
interference of the referral courts with the interests of the
parties who might be constrained to participate in the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 2001/2024
arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct
that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party
which the Tribunal ultimately finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the
other party to the arbitration. Having said that, it is
clarified that the aforesaid is not to be construed as a
determination of the merits of the matter before us, which
the Arbitral Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to
determine.”
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11
proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to
the extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of the
referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act and
further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural safeguards
but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the arbitral process.
Any transgression beyond this limited judicial threshold would not
only contravene the legislative intent enshrined in Section 8 and
Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk undermining the sanctity
and efficiency of arbitration as a preferred mode of dispute
resolution. The referral Court must, therefore, exercise restraint and
refrain from venturing into the merits of the dispute or adjudicating
issues that fall squarely within the jurisdictional domain of the
arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen that the scope of enquiry at the
referral stage is conservative in nature. A similar view has also
been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay
Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.
At the outset, this court deems it appropriate to extract the
Arbitration Clause as envisaged under the MoU, which reads as
follows:
“12. That in case any dispute arose between the Parties, in relation
to the present MOA or the present transaction of Rs. 25,00,000/(Rs. Twenty Five Lakhs Only), the dispute shall be resolved by
way of an Arbitration to be conducted by a sole Arbitrator
appointed solely by the First Party. The Sole Arbitrator shall
conduct the Arbitration as per the norms laid down in The
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended upto date).
The seat of the Arbitrator shall be in New Delhi.
13. That the Courts at New Delhi shall have the Jurisdiction to
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 2001/2024
adjudicate the matter.”
(emphasis added)
18.
Learned counsel for the Respondent has contended that this
Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition, on
the premise that the performance of the MoU was to take place outside
Delhi. However, a bare perusal of the MoU leaves no manner of doubt
that the said objection is wholly misconceived. Clause 12 of the MoU
expressly stipulates that the seat of arbitration shall be New Delhi, and
Clause 13 further confers jurisdiction upon the courts at New Delhi to
adjudicate disputes arising therefrom. It is a settled principle of law
that once the seat of arbitration is designated, the courts exercising
jurisdiction over the seat alone retain supervisory jurisdiction over the
arbitral proceedings. In view thereof, this Court finds no merit in the
objection raised on behalf of the Respondent, and the same is
accordingly rejected.
19.
With respect to the contention as to whether the agreement itself
came to be entered into under coercion or whether the same is a
fabricated document, this Court is of the view that such issues are
essentially questions of fact, which the learned Arbitrator is competent
to examine and adjudicate upon.
20.
It is well settled that the remit of a Court exercising jurisdiction
under Section 11 of the Act is extremely circumscribed and confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. Undoubtedly, on a prima facie basis, an arbitration clause
exists in the agreement between the parties, and any contention
relating to the validity of the agreement or touching upon the merits of
the disputes would fall squarely within the domain of the learned
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:34:32
ARB.P. 2001/2024
Arbitrator to be decided in accordance with law.
21.
This Court is mindful of the fact that the Respondent has sought
to contend that the MoU was executed under coercion and that a
complaint in this regard has been lodged. However, a perusal of the
record reveals that no such complaint has been placed before this
Court. Save and except a bald assertion made in the reply notice, there
is no contemporaneous material or documentary evidence on record to
substantiate the allegation of coercion. Nonetheless, these issues can
be raised before the learned Arbitrator.
22.
In view of the fact that disputes have arisen between the parties
and there is an arbitration clause in the MoU, this Court is inclined to
appoint an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the
parties.
23.
As stated in the Petition, the disputed amount comes up to Rs.
25,00,0000/-.
24.
Accordingly,
Mr.
Kanwaljeet
Arora
(Mob.
No.+919910384733), who is empanelled with the Delhi International
Arbitration Centre (DIAC), is appointed as the sole Arbitrator.
25.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the DIAC
and would abide by its rules and regulations.
26.
The learned sole Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act within a week
of entering of reference.
27.
The learned sole Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees in
accordance with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise
be agreed to between the parties and the learned sole Arbitrator.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:34:32
ARB.P. 2001/2024
28.
The parties shall share the learned sole Arbitrator’s fee and
arbitral costs equally.
29.
All rights and contentions of the parties are kept open, to be
decided by the learned sole Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance
with law.
30.
Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
All rights and contentions of the parties in this regard are reserved.
31.
The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned Arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
32.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
application(s), is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
33.
No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 22, 2026/tk/kr
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:34:32
ARB.P. 2001/2024
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