The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. This petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner is directed to be released on bail, if not wanted in any other case, on the following conditions: i. That he shall not abscond or tamper with the evidence and witnesses; ii. That he shall appear before the court as and when required; iii. That he shall not leave the jurisdiction of India without prior permission of the court; and iv. That he shall furnish a personal bond of ₹ 50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand) only with two solvent sureties of like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
17. Petition disposed of. No costs. Judge Meghalaya
Full Judgment Text
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Serial No. 09
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 66 of 2022
Date of Decision: 14.12.2022
Shri. Prakash Sumer
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & 2 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S.K. Roy, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S. Sengupta, Addl. PP with
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, GA
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
ORDER (ORAL)
1.
This is an application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C with a
prayer to set aside and quash the order dated 19.10.2022 passed by the
learned Special Judge (NDPS) Shillong in bail application No. 211 (H) of
2022 in connection with Pynursla P.S. Case No. 17(04) of 2022 which was
subsequently registered as NDPS Case No. 8 of 2022.
2.
Heard Mr. S.K. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that the petitioner was arrested on the strength of an FIR dated
10.04.2022 lodged by COY Commander “A” COY 193 BN BSF on the
ground that a black plastic packet was found inside the car of the petitioner
containing suspected contraband items (tablets) weighing about 289.21
gms.
3.
Accordingly, on the basis of the said FIR the police registered a
criminal case being Pynursla P.S. Case No. 17(4) of 2022 under Section
21(b) and 22(b) NDPS Act following which the petitioner was arrested on
12.04.2022 and forwarded to police custody for 5(five) days and thereafter
is still under judicial custody till date.
4.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that
since the day of his remand on 12.04.2022 till date, the accused/petitioner
is still under judicial custody for more than 180 days.
5.
Since the Investigating Officer (I/O) has failed to file the charge
sheet within the stipulated 180 days as prescribed under Section 36 A (4)
of the NDPS Act, the accused/petitioner has preferred an application for
grant of default bail before the Trial Court on 10.10.2022. The learned
Trial Court vide order dated 19.10.2022 has rejected the same on the
ground that the charge sheet has already been filed on 29.09.2022 prior to
the preference of the said bail application.
6.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said order dated
19.10.2022 the petitioner has approached this Court with this instant
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C with a prayer that the impugned
order may be set aside and quashed and that the accused/petitioner may be
enlarged on bail in terms of the provisions of Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C read
with Section 36 A (4).
7.
The learned counsel has submitted that the learned Trial Court
has erred in law by passing the impugned order rejecting the default bail
application of the accused/petitioner only on the ground that the charge
sheet was said to have been filed before the court on 29.09.2022 when in
fact the charge sheet was placed before the court and cognizance of the
same was taken on 18.10.2022.
8.
Submitting that the facts borne from the records would reveal
that the charge sheet though dated 29.09.2022 which is presumed to be the
date when the I/O has prepared the same, the said charge sheet was
actually presented before the court only on 18.10.2022, beyond the
stipulated period of 180 days which as per the provision of Section 167
(2) Cr.P.C has resulted in an indefeasible right to the accused person to be
granted bail.
9.
Mr. S. Sengupta, learned Addl. PP on perusal of the records and
on noting the contents of the order dated 18.10.2022 has candidly admitted
that the date of filing of the said charge sheet before the court has to be
taken to be 18.10.2022 and as such, admittedly the same was filed after
the 180 days period is over. However, as to whether to grant default bail
to the accused/petitioner the learned Addl. PP has left it to the discretion
of this Court.
10.
Upon hearing the parties, admitted facts being duly noted, a look
at sub-Section (4) of Section 36 A, NDPS Act, 1985 would show that for
an offence punishable under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27 A or
for offences involving commercial quantity, that is, under Section 22(c)
of the said Act, the reference of 90 days in sub-Section (2) of Section 167
Cr.P.C shall be construed as reference to 180 days, which means that the
charge sheet may be filed within 180 days as regard the aforementioned
Sections. However, nothing is said about Section 22 (b). Therefore, it may
be assumed that as far as sub-Section (2) of Section 167 Cr.P.C is
concerned, the period within which the charge sheet should be filed is 90
days. Be that as it may, the facts of this case as indicated above, clearly
shows that the charge sheet was filed beyond the period of 180 days.
11.
In the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam: (2017) 15
SCC 67, a three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while
expounding the impact and purport of Section 167 Cr.P.C, particularly
sub-Section 2 of the same at para 16 and 17 has observed as follows:
“16. Generally speaking therefore, it could be said that the
legislative intent is and always has been to complete the
investigation into an offence within twenty-four hours, failing
which within 15 days (CrPC of 1898). The period of 15 days
was later extended to 60 days (CrPC of 1973) and eventually it
was extended to 90 days if the investigation was relatable to an
offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. In respect of
all other offences, the period of 60 days remained unchanged.
17. The significance of the period of 60 days or 90 days, as the
case may be, is that if the investigation is not completed within
that period then the accused (assuming he or she is in custody)
is entitled to “default bail” if no charge-sheet or challan is filed
on the 60th or 90th day, the accused applies for “default bail”
and is prepared to and does furnish bail for release. As can be
seen from the narration of facts, no charge-sheet or challan was
filed against the petitioner on the 60th day but was filed before
the conclusion of 90 days. Consequently, was the petitioner
entitled to “default bail” after 60 days? According to the
petitioner the answer is in the affirmative since he had not
committed an offence punishable with imprisonment for not less
than ten years, but according to the State he had committed an
offence punishable with imprisonment for ten years.”
12.
In the said judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court speaking on
the issue of ‘indefeasible right for default bail’ has reiterated that the
accused has acquired this right for being granted bail if, after the stipulated
period the charge sheet has not been filed, more so, if he has preferred an
application for bail indicating that he is prepared to furnish bail, if so
directed, has been moved before the court concerned.
13.
At para 80 of the said Rakesh Kumar Paul case, the Court has
referred to the case of Uday Mohanlal Acharya and has produced the
guidelines set therein which are accordingly done so here:
“80. In Uday Mohanlal Acharya case the Court culled out six
guidelines, which are as follows:
“(1) Under sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate
before whom an accused is produced while the police is
investigating into the offence can authorise detention of the
accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a
term not exceeding 15 days on the whole.
(2) Under the proviso to the aforesaid sub-section (2) of
Section 167, the Magistrate may authorise detention of the
accused otherwise than in the custody of police for a total
period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation
relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years,
and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other
offence.
(3) On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days,
as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour
of the accused for being released on bail on account of
default by the investigating agency in the completion of the
investigation within the period prescribed and the accused
is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and
furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate.
(4) When an application for bail is filed by an accused for
enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been
accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of
the investigating agency in completion of the investigation
within the specified period, the Magistrate/court must
dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the
accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or
60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by
the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part
of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to
frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate
of an accused being released on bail on account of the
default on the part of the investigating agency in
completing the investigation within the period
stipulated….”
14.
In view of the above, this Court is convinced that the petitioner
has acquired an indefeasible right to be granted default bail and the
impugned order has denied the said right and accordingly, the same is
hereby quashed.
15.
Even independently, this Court would have considered the
prayer of the petitioner for grant of default bail, which is done so herein.
16.
This petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner is directed
to be released on bail, if not wanted in any other case, on the following
conditions:
i.
That he shall not abscond or tamper with the evidence and
witnesses;
ii.
That he shall appear before the court as and when required;
iii.
That he shall not leave the jurisdiction of India without prior
permission of the court; and
iv.
That he shall furnish a personal bond of ₹ 50,000/- (rupees
fifty thousand) only with two solvent sureties of like amount
to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
17.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
14.12.2022
“Tiprilynti–PS”
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