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[2026:RJ-JP:4188]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous 3rd Bail Application No. 16907/2025
Pradeep Kumar @ Ankit S/o Jagpal Singh, R/o Krishana Nagar
Gali
No.
10,
Police
Station
Gangnahar,
Janpath
Roorkee,
Uttarakhand, At Present Gunner No. 15257477K, 881 Missile
Regiment Unit, Jodhpur. (Presently Confined At Central Jail,
Jaipur)
----Petitioner
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through PP
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. M.C. Jain, Adv. with
Mr. Ankit Jain, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Amit Punia, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN
Order
28/01/2026
1.
This third bail application under Section 483 BNSS has been
filed on behalf of the petitioner, who has been arrested in
connection with FIR No.02/2022 registered at Special Police
Station, District C.I.D Surakchha (Raj.) for offences punishable
under Sections 3 & 9 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923.
2.
The first and second bail applications filed on behalf of the
petitioner were dismissed on merits by the Co-ordinate Bench of
this
Court
vide
orders
dated
15.02.2023
and
19.03.2024,
respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by way of filing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.
16159/2024. Vide order dated 27.01.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court declined to grant bail and permitted the petitioner to
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withdraw the petition, while granting liberty to apply for bail
before the appropriate Court after completion of recording of precharge evidence. Pursuant thereto, a bail application was filed by
the petitioner before the learned trial Court, which came to be
dismissed on 13.11.2025. Hence, this third bail application has
been filed on behalf of the petitioner.
3.
It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
petitioner has falsely been implicated in this case. It is submitted
that the petitioner is in custody since 21.05.2022, and as such he
has already suffered incarceration of about three years and eight
months.
Counsel
submits
that
pre-charge
evidence
were
concluded on 24.04.2025 i.e., after more than two years and
eleven months of the arrest of the petitioner. Thereafter, charges
were framed against the petitioner under Sections 3 & 9 of the
Act, vide order dated 19.11.2025, after six months of conclusion
of pre-charge evidence. Counsel submits that over two months
have elapsed since the charges were framed, yet the prosecution
has
failed
to
examine
its
witnesses,
thereby
causing
an
unwarranted delay in the proceedings. In these circumstances, it
is urged that the fundamental right of the petitioner to a speedy
trial, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
stands seriously infringed. Learned counsel further submits that
the petitioner is facing trial before the Magistrate Court, where,
even in the event of conviction, the maximum sentence that may
be imposed would not exceed seven years, notwithstanding that
the offence alleged carries a maximum punishment of fourteen
years. It is further argued that a perusal of the complaint filed by
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the prosecution would reveal that no incriminating material has
been recovered from the mobile phone of the petitioner. Moreover,
the petitioner has not been supplied with the alleged material
which is stated to have been transmitted by him through
WhatsApp to a person in a neighbouring country. Learned counsel
submits that even if the allegations contained in the complaint are
accepted at its face value, the provisions of Section 3 of the
Official Secrets Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of
1923”) are not attracted, and at best, the case would fall within
the ambit of Section 5 of the Act of 1923. It is contended that in
the absence of any specific allegation that the petitioner acted
with a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State,
which is a sine qua non for invocation of Section 3 of the Act of
1923, the said provision is not applicable. Counsel further submits
that the delay in the trial is entirely attributable to the prosecution
and, in such circumstances, continued incarceration of the
petitioner
would
serve
no
useful
purpose.
The
petitioner
undertakes to abide by all the conditions that may be imposed by
this Court. Lastly, it is submitted that in view of the prolonged
incarceration of the petitioner and the absence of any likelihood of
the trial concluding in the near future, the petitioner deserves to
be enlarged on bail. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,
reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713.
4.
Per contra, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the
submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. It is submitted
that the offence alleged is of a serious nature and carries a
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maximum punishment of fourteen years under Section 3 of the
Act of 1923. It is further submitted that the question as to
whether the provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1923 are
attracted in the present case is a matter to be adjudicated during
trial and cannot be gone into at this stage. Learned State counsel
submits that sufficient incriminating material is available on record
to prima facie establish the involvement of the petitioner in the
alleged offence and, since the offence pertains to the safety and
security of the State, the present bail application deserves to be
dismissed. In support of his submission, learned State counsel has
placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of State versus Captain Jagjit Singh reported in AIR
1962 (SC) 253.
5.
I have considered the contentions.
6.
In light of the rival submissions of both the parties, I have
perused the material available on record. Perusal of the record
would reveal that petitioner is in custody since 21.05.2022 and
after recording the pre-charge evidence, charges were framed on
19.11.2025. Perusal of the record would further reveal that in this
case, complaint was filed on 21.05.2022, but since the prosecution
sanction was not submitted along with it, no proceedings took
place for the next five months except waiting for the sanction.
After
prosecution
sanction,
cognizance
was
taken
and
the
prosecution witnesses were summoned for pre-charge evidence
and
their
pre-charge
evidence
were
completed
only
on
24.04.2025. The trial Court took more than two years and eleven
months in completion of pre-charge evidence of the prosecution
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witnesses. Thereafter, the trial Court framed the charges on
19.11.2025, after a delay of more than six months from the
conclusion of the pre-charge evidence.
7.
Now, this Court would like to discuss delay in trial of accused
in custody and its effects. The personal liberty is a priceless
treasure for a human being. It is basically a natural right. No one
would like to lose his liberty. People from centuries have fought for
liberty, for absence of liberty causes sense of emptiness. The
sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society.
The
expression 'Personal Liberty' in Article 21 of the Constitution is of
the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to
constitute the personal liberty of a person and some of them have
been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given
additional protection under Article 19 of the Constitution. 'Personal
Liberty' under Article 21 of the Constitution primarily means
freedom from physical restraint of person by incarceration or
otherwise. The concept of "right to life and personal liberty"
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the "right
to live with dignity" and it does not mean mere animal like
existence of life. After the Hon’ble Supreme Court's decision
rendered in the case of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India,
AIR 1978 SC 597, Article 21 of the Constitution now protects the
right of life and personal liberty of citizen not only from the
executive action but from the legislative action also. A person can
be deprived of his life and personal liberty if two conditions are
complied with, first, there must be a law and secondly, there must
be a procedure prescribed by that law provided that the procedure
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is just, fair and reasonable. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in
catena of the judgments that prolonged incarceration without trial
is violative of rights of an accused and the Court should step in to
protect him and no provision can take away the power of
constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of
fundamental rights. Prolonged incarceration is a valid ground for
granting bail in the Indian judiciary system, particularly when
coupled with the anticipated length of the trial. The right to liberty
under Article 21 is a critical consideration, and Courts should
incline to grant bail to prevent undue hardship particularly when
prosecution is not showing promptness in producing witnesses.
However, the nature of the offence, potential risks associated with
releasing the accused, and the overall context of the case must be
carefully evaluated.
8.
In a case, Masroor v. State of U.P. reported in 2009
(14) SCC 286, Hon’ble Supreme Court beautified that there
should be a balancing approach between personal liberty of the
accused and interest of public and a case of prosecution. Again,
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a case Neeru Yadav vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2014(16) SCC 508 ardently
discussed the aspect of balancing two interests by observing that
"The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is
a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be
allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of
a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A
democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously
guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of
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an individual is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom
through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has
sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger
to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual
liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring
chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility
and accountability from the member, and it desires that the
citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social
norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in
the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an
individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in
disorderly
things
which
the
society
disapproves,
the
legal
consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the Court has a
duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an
order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the
established parameters of law."
9.
In the case of Jahir Hak vs State of Rajasthan : AIR
2022 (SC) 3047, indulgence of bail was extended to the accused
therein by the Hon'ble Apex Court by considering the following
observations made in the case of Union of India vs K.A. Najeeb
(2021) (3) SCC 713:“12. Even in the case of special legislations like the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
or
the
Narcotic
Drugs
and
Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”) which too have
somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this
Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)
[Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1999) 9 SCC
252 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1156], Babba v. State of
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[CRLMB-16907/2025]
Maharashtra [Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11
SCC 569 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 118] and Umarmia v.
State of Gujarat [Umarmia v. State of Gujarat, (2017)
2 SCC 731 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 114] enlarged the
accused on bail when they had been in jail for an
extended period of time with little possibility of early
completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh
conditions for bail in such special enactments, has thus
been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy
trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians.
19.
Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge
the respondent on bail is that Section 43- D(5) of the
UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of
the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS Act where the
competent court needs to be satisfied that prima facie
the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to
commit another offence while on bail; there is no such
precondition under UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of
the UAPA merely provides another possible ground for
the competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the
well-settled considerations like gravity of the offence,
possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the
witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by
abscission, etc.”
10.
In the case of Mehmood Mohammed Sayeed vs State of
Maharashtra reported in 2001 (7) SRJ 336, the Hon'ble Apex
Court while considering the fact that the trial may take long time,
disposed of the appeal of the appellant and released him on bail
with certain conditions. The same is reproduced hereinbelow for
the sake of ready-reference:"1. Leave granted. Though learned Counsel for the
State of Maharashtra opposed appellant to be released
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on ball we have taken note of the fact that appellant is
remaining in custody from 18-1- 2000 onwards. The
offences alleged against him include Sections 463, 467,
461, 419 read with Section 120 of the Indian Penal
Code. Investigation is completed and the charge-sheet
has been laid. What remains is only the trial. We do not
know how long the trial will take, particularly, seeing
the condition of the trial Courts in Maharashtra.
2. When learned Counsel for the State noticed that we
are disposed to release the appellant on ball he
alternatively pleaded that stringent conditions may be
imposed on him because of the allegations that he has
some links with the international terrorists gang. We,
therefore, impose the following conditions on him:
1.
He shall report to the Worli Police Station,
Mumbai on every Monday between 4.00 p.m. and
6.00
p.m.
until
further
orders:
and
2. If, he is to leave the limits of Mumbai City
Corporation he shall take permission from the trial
Court.
3. If he is prepared to abide the above conditions he
shall be released on bail on his executing a bond of
Rs.
lacs
with
two
solvent
sureties
to
the
satisfaction of the trial Court.
This appeal is disposed of accordingly."
11.
While it is true that Article 21 of the Constitution of India is
of great importance because it enshrines the fundamental right to
individual liberty but at the same time a balance has to be struck
between the right to individual liberty and the interest of the
Society. No right can be absolute and reasonable restrictions can
be placed on them. While it is true that one of the considerations
in deciding whether to grant bail to an accused or not is whether
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he has been in jail for a long time. The Court is also required to
take into account other relevant factors, including the broader
interest of society. In the present case, the record reveals that the
trial Court took more than two years and eleven months to
complete the pre-charge evidence. The charges were framed
against the petitioner on 19.11.2025, i.e., after a delay of more
than six months from the conclusion of the pre-charge evidence.
Further, more than two months have elapsed since the framing of
charges; however, the prosecution has failed to produce its
witnesses, resulting in an unwarranted delay in the proceedings.
The petitioner has been in custody since 21.05.2022, and given
the current pace of proceedings, there appears to be no likelihood
of the trial concluding in the near future. A person accused of a
criminal offence cannot be kept in confinement for an indefinite
period as an under trial prisoner. The right to a speedy trial is a
fundamental facet of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution. In such circumstances, the prosecution cannot
take shelter under the plea that the charges are serious in nature,
as the gravity of the offence alone cannot justify prolonged
incarceration without progress in trial.
12.
As far as the judgment cited by the learned State counsel in
Captain Jagjit Singh (supra) is concerned, the said decision is
clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed that the High Court had failed to consider the
relevant factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offence,
the character of the evidence, circumstances peculiar to the
accused, the reasonable possibility of the accused not being
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available for trial, and the fact that the accused therein was facing
trial before the Sessions Court for an offence punishable with a
maximum sentence of fourteen years. In contrast, in the present
case, the petitioner is facing trial before the Magistrate Court, and
he has already undergone incarceration for more than three years
and eight months, and even in the event of conviction, he cannot
be sentenced to more than seven years of imprisonment.
13.
Recently in the case of Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu VS State
of Chhattisgarh, Reported in (2025) 5 SCC 140, Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed as under:“12. We may, however, hasten to add that, that cannot
be an absolute proposition and some of the reasons
which may be relevant for rejection for regular bail
under Section 437(1)&(2) of the Code, may also be
relevant for rejection of application under sub-section
(6) of the said Section, in a given situation. We do not
subscribe to the theory that factors which are relevant
for rejection of regular bail, at the initial stage are not
at all relevant for rejection of application under subsection (6) of the said Section. Fact situations are so
large in numbers, that it may not be possible to
contemplate, enumerate, illustrate or incorporate here
the factors which would be relevant and which would
not
be
relevant
for
the
purpose
of
rejection
of
application under sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the
Code. But, it can certainly be said that grounds relevant
for considering application under sub-section (6) of
Section 437 of the Code and the grounds relevant for
considering
application
for
regular
bail
would
be
different to some extent.
13.
In our view, following factors would be relevant:
1. Whether the reasons for being unable to
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conclude trial within sixty days from the first date
fixed of taking evidence, are attributable to the
accused?
2. Whether there are any chances of the accused
tampering with evidence or causing prejudice to
the case of the prosecution in any other manner?
3. Whether there are any chances of abscondence
of the accused on being bailed out?
4. Whether accused was not in custody during the
whole of the said period?
If the answer to any one of the above referred fact
situations or similar fact situations is in affirmative then
that would work as a fetter on the right that accrues to
the accused under first part of sub-section (6) of
Section 437 of the Code.
14.
xxx
15.
xxx
16.
xxx
17.
This
Court
is
of
a
considered
view
that
applications under Section 437 (6) have to be given a
liberal approach and it would be a sound and judicious
exercise of discretion in favour of the accused by the
Court concerned more particularly where there is no
chance of tampering of evidence e.g. where the case
depends on documentary evidence which is already
collected; where there is no fault on part of the accused
in causing of delay; where there are no chances of any
abscondence by the accused; where there is little scope
for conclusion of trial in near future; where the period
for which accused has been in jail is substantial in
comparison to the sentence prescribed for the offence
for which he is tried. Normal parameters for deciding
bail application would also be relevant while deciding
application under Section 437(6) of the Code, but not
with that rigour as they might have been at the time of
application for regular bail.”
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14.
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[CRLMB-16907/2025]
In backdrop of the aforesaid factual and legal aspect, this
third bail application is accordingly allowed and it is directed that
accused-petitioner Pradeep Kumar @ Ankit S/o Jagpal Singh
shall be released on bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in
the sum of Rs.3,00,000/- together with two sureties in the sum of
Rs.1,50,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court
with the stipulation that he shall appear before that Court and any
Court to which the matter is transferred, on all subsequent dates
of hearing and as and when called upon to do so.
15.
It is made clear that the accused-petitioner shall not involve
in any other offence(s) during currency of the bail and he shall
mark his presence in first and third week of every month in the
concerned police station, till conclusion of the trial. He shall also
surrender his passport (if any) to the trial Court. It is further
directed that the petitioner shall share his mobile number (in use)
to the trial Court and investigating agency and shall keep his
mobile phone in active mode and may not switch it off for a longer
period intentionally.
16.
Concerned SHO shall enter attendance of the petitioner in
the Roznamcha. In case the petitioner fails to mark his presence
in the concerned police station, the concerned SHO is directed to
immediately report the matter to the concerned Court in this
regard.
17.
If any breach of these conditions is reported or come to the
notice of the Court, the same shall alone be a reason for the trial
Court to cancel the bail granted to him by this Court.
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18.
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[CRLMB-16907/2025]
Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the
concerned SHO for necessary compliance.
19.
The observations made hereinabove are only for decision of
the bail application and would not have any impact on the trial of
the case in any manner.
(ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J
Manoj Solanki /68
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