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CGHC010409292025
2026:CGHC:30778
NAFR
RAHUL
JHA
Digitally signed
by RAHUL JHA
Date: 2026.07.22
10:17:44 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 11528 of 2025
1 - Prabhanshu Pandey S/o Biranjan Pandey Aged About 37 Years R/o Village
And Post Basna, P.S. Bishrampur, Sub District- Bishrampur, Distt- Palamu
(Jharkhand), Pin Code 822124.
2 - Jhanak Lal Sahu S/o Shri Prem Lal Sahu Aged About 33 Years R/o Dev
Nagar, Jamul Ward No. 10, Near Prem Kirana Store, Jamul Cement Works,
Distt- Durg C.G., Pin Code 490024.
3 - Krishna Nand Dwivedi S/o Gore Lal Dwivedi Aged About 32 Years R/o
Village Jhakhrawal, Post Jhakhrawal, Tehsil- Devsar, Distt- Singrauli (Madhya
Pradesh), Pin Code 486881.
Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - N.M.D.C. Iron And Steel Plant Through The Managing Director N.M.D.C.
Iron And Steel Plant, Post Nagarnar (Bastar) Jagdalpur District Bastar C.G.
2 - National Mineral Development Corporation Limited, Through Its Chairman
Cum Managing Director, Khanij Bhavan, 10-3-311/a, Masab Tank District
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.
3 - General Manager, (H R) N M D C Limited, Iron And Steel Plant Post
Nagarnar (Bastar) Jagdalpur, District Bastar C.G.
4 - D G M (Per), (H R) N M D C Limited, Iron And Steel Plant Post Nagarnar
(Bastar) Jagdalpur, District Bastar C.G.
5 - Deputy Collector, District Bastar C.G.
6 - Labour Officer, District Bastar C.G.
Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners
: Mr. Himanshu Sharma, Advocate
For Respondents No.1 to 4
: Ms Naushina Ali, Sr. Advocate (through
VC) with Ms Poulami Das & Ms Ankita
Gourha, Advocate
For State
: Mr. S.D. Badgaiyabn, Govt. Advocate
(HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU)
Order on Board
20/07/2026
1.
The present writ petition has been filed calling in question the legality
and validity of the orders dated 29.08.2025 (ANNEXURE-P/1) issued by
respondent No.3, General Manager (HR), NMDC Limited, Iron and
Steel Plant, Nagarnar, District Bastar, whereby the contractual services
of the respective petitioners have been terminated. The petitioners have
also sought consequential relief of setting aside the impugned order and
their reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits.
2.
Facts of the case, according to the petitioners, are that they were initially
working with MECON Limited, Ranchi. Pursuant to appointment orders
dated 23.11.2024, they came to be appointed by NMDC Limited, Iron
and Steel Plant, Nagarnar, District Bastar, on contractual basis as
Executives (Grade ‘B’). It is the further case of the petitioners that while
they were discharging their duties, Respondent No.3 issued the
impugned order dated 29.08.2025 terminating their contractual
engagement. It is pleaded that the impugned order has been passed
without issuing any show cause notice or affording any opportunity of
hearing to the petitioners and is also contrary to Clause 17(ii)(a) of the
agreement governing their contractual engagement. It is further pleaded
that immediately after the issuance of the impugned order, the petitioners
submitted representations dated 01.09.2025 before the General Manager
(HR), NMDC Limited, and also before the Deputy Collector and the
Labour Officer, District Bastar, seeking reconsideration of the
termination order. However, no decision having been taken on the said
representations, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the
present writ petition.
3.
(a)
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned
order, though couched as an order terminating the contractual
engagement of the petitioners, is in reality punitive and stigmatic in
nature. It is argued that where the foundation of the order is allegations
of misconduct or circumstances casting a stigma upon the employee, the
employer is under a legal obligation to conduct a proper enquiry and
afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing before passing such an order.
It is contended that the respondents have failed to adhere not only to the
principles of natural justice but also to Clause 17(ii)(a) of the agreement
governing the petitioners' engagement pursuant to the order passed by
MECON Limited.
(b)
It is further submitted that the issue is no longer res integra in
view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swati
Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 2139, wherein it has been held that even in the case of
contractual employment, a stigmatic order of termination cannot be
sustained without holding a proper enquiry and affording due
opportunity to the employee concerned. Reliance has also been placed
upon the decisions in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. &
Others, (2000) 5 SCC 152, and Kaushal Chandrakar & Others v. State
of Chhattisgarh & Others, 2021 SCC OnLine Chh 2251, to contend that
the Court is empowered to lift the veil of an innocuously worded
termination order to ascertain its true nature and, if found to be punitive
or stigmatic, such an order cannot be sustained in the absence of
compliance with the principles of natural justice. On the aforesaid
grounds, it is prayed that the impugned orders dated 29.08.2025 deserve
to be quashed.
4.
(i)
Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents
No.1 to 4/NMDC opposes the writ petition and submits that the
petitioners were never regular employees of NMDC and their
engagement was purely contractual in nature. Initially, the petitioners
were engaged by MECON Limited, who has been given the contract of
Operation & Maintenance (O&M) by the NMDC Steel Plant (NSL) and
were subsequently the petitioners were engaged by NMDC Steel Limited
under a fresh contractual arrangement. It is submitted that the terms and
conditions of the engagement were specifically incorporated in the offer
letter dated 23.11.2024 as well as in the earlier agreement executed with
MECON Limited, both of which were duly accepted by the petitioners at
the time of joining.
(ii)
It
is
further
submitted
that
the
contractual
documents
unequivocally provide that the engagement was for a contractual tenure,
renewable only depending upon the requirement of the management and
the satisfactory performance of the employee. The terms of engagement
also specifically stipulate that the petitioners would not acquire any right
to claim regular or permanent employment merely by virtue of such
contractual engagement. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim any
vested right either to continue for the entire contractual period or till
attaining the age of 65 years.
(iii)
Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order dated
29.08.2025 has been passed strictly in accordance with Clause 17(ii)(a)
of the MECON Agreement read with Clauses 3.0 and 4.0 of the NSL
Offer Letter. In terms of the contractual stipulations, the respondents
were fully competent to terminate the contractual engagement by paying
one month's contract fee in lieu of notice, which has admittedly been
paid to the petitioners. It is argued that the termination is thus a
simpliciter termination in accordance with the contract and cannot be
termed arbitrary or illegal.
It is also contended that the allegation
regarding violation of the principles of natural justice is wholly
misconceived, as the petitioners' engagement being purely contractual,
the rights and obligations of the parties are governed exclusively by the
contractual terms voluntarily accepted by them. The respondents submit
that no departmental enquiry or prior opportunity of hearing was
required before exercising the contractual right of termination in terms of
the agreement.
(iv)
Lastly, learned counsel submits that the petitioners had also
executed willingness forms accepting the contractual employment on the
same terms and conditions as contained in the MECON Agreement.
Having accepted the contractual conditions without demur, the
petitioners are estopped from questioning the termination effected
strictly in accordance with those very terms. It is also submitted that the
present petition suffers from non joinder of necessary party, as the initial
employer of the petitioners i.e. MECON Limited has not been impleaded
as a party respondent. It is, therefore, submitted that the writ petition,
being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as
well as material available on record.
6.
The principal contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that though
the impugned order is couched in innocuous language, it is in reality
punitive and stigmatic in nature and, therefore, could not have been
passed without conducting an enquiry and affording an opportunity of
hearing. The aforesaid submission requires consideration.
7.
It is not in dispute that the petitioners were initially engaged by MECON
Limited on contractual basis under an agreement dated 23.11.2022.
Subsequently, the petitioners were placed under the NSL, as the
MECON Limited got the contract of O&M of NSL. Even the petitioners
voluntarily submitted willingness forms expressing their consent to
continue under NMDC Steel Limited on the same contractual fee and the
same terms and conditions as contained in the MECON agreement.
Consequent thereto, fresh engagement letters dated 23.11.2024 were
issued by NMDC Steel Limited, which were duly accepted by the
petitioners.
8.
The engagement letter specifically stipulates that the petitioners would
remain on contract initially for a period of three years; extension of such
engagement would depend upon the satisfactory performance of the
incumbent and the requirement of the management. It further expressly
declares that the contractual engagement would not confer any right to
claim regular or permanent employment. The petitioners accepted the
aforesaid conditions without any reservation. Even in the willingness
form it has categorically been admitted by the petitioner that “I
understand that I am liable to be terminated from the service of NSL
Limited forthwith without prejudice to any other legal and disciplinary
action as deemed fit by the management of NSL.”
9.
The impugned order dated 29.08.2025 has, therefore, to be examined in
the backdrop of the aforesaid contractual stipulations.
10.
A careful reading of the impugned order reveals that it merely states that
in exercise of powers under Clause 17(ii)(a) of the MECON Agreement
read with Paragraph 1.0 of the Engagement Letter, the contractual
engagement of the petitioners stands terminated with immediate effect
and that they shall be entitled to one month's contract fee in lieu of
notice. Beyond this, the order neither records any allegation nor assigns
any reason for bringing the contractual engagement to an end. The order
does not attribute any misconduct, negligence, indiscipline, inefficiency
or any other conduct which may cast a stigma upon the petitioners.
Thus, the submission that the order is stigmatic merely because it brings
the contractual engagement to an end cannot be accepted.
11.
The distinction between a termination simpliciter and a punitive
termination is well settled. A termination becomes punitive only where
the order itself contains allegations casting a stigma or where the
employer, after conducting an enquiry into allegations of misconduct,
terminates the employee on the basis of such findings, though the order
may appear innocuous on its face. In the present case, neither
contingency exists. Firstly, the impugned order is completely bereft of
any allegation against the petitioners and secondly, no material
whatsoever has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the
respondents had conducted any enquiry into any alleged misconduct or
that the termination was founded upon any adverse finding recorded
against the petitioners. Mere assertion in the writ petition that the order is
stigmatic, unsupported by any contemporaneous material, cannot
persuade this Court to lift the veil of an otherwise innocuous order.
12.
Consequently, the judgments relied upon by the petitioners do not
advance their case. The principle laid down in Swati Priyadarshini,
Chandra Prakash Shahi and Kaushal Chandrakar (Supra) would
apply only where the foundation of the order is misconduct or where the
order visits the employee with civil consequences by casting a stigma
upon his character or conduct. Since the impugned orders neither contain
any such allegation nor has the petitioners established any punitive
foundation behind the order, the ratio of the aforesaid decisions is clearly
distinguishable on facts.
13.
Once the impugned orders are held to be an order of termination
simpliciter, the inevitable consequence is that the rights of the parties
have to be tested on the touchstone of the contract governing their
relationship.
14.
The contractual documents accepted by the petitioners expressly
authorize the respondents to terminate the contractual engagement by
invoking Clause 17(ii)(a), subject to payment of one month's contract fee
in lieu of notice. The impugned order itself records compliance with the
said contractual requirement. The petitioners, having voluntarily
accepted the terms governing their engagement, cannot now seek to
avoid one of the essential conditions thereof merely because the
contractual power has been exercised against them.
15.
It is trite that a contractual employee has no indefeasible or vested right
to continue in service beyond the terms of the contract. In the absence of
arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of any statutory provision, the writ
Court would ordinarily refrain from interfering with an order passed
strictly in accordance with the contractual stipulations. In the present
case, neither arbitrariness nor mala fides nor violation of any statutory
provision has been established.
16.
This Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in the impugned order
warranting interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
17.
Consequently, the Writ Petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(BIBHU DATTA GURU)
JUDGE
Rahul
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