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2026:MLHC:189-DB
Serial No.01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A.No.14/2021
Reserved on:
12.03.2026
Pronouncement on:18.03.2026
Smti. Porthmi Bthuh, aged about 51 years, D/o (L) Shri Laldi
Lamurong, R/o Amsohrhong village, PS: Amlarem, West
Jaintia Hills Meghalaya.
Represented by her maternal uncle, Shri Kaldione Bthuh, S/o
(L) Jasper Shylla, R/o Jowai, Tredienlin, Jowai. ..... Appellant
Vs.
The State of Meghalaya, represented by the Chief Secretary,
Government of Meghalaya.
..... Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Revati Mohite Dere, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
: Mr. S.P. Mahanta, Sr.Adv with
Ms. L.D.N. Thangkhiew, Adv
Mr. D. Das, Adv
Mr. K. Deb, Adv
Ms. D. Ray, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. K. Khan, AAG with
Mr. S. Sengupta, Addl.PP
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Addl.PP
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
Yes
2026:MLHC:189-DB
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice)
By this appeal, the appellant has impugned the
judgment and order dated 31st August, 2021, passed in
Session Case No.13 of 2013 by the learned Additional Deputy
Commissioner (Judicial), West Jaintia Hills District, Jowai,
convicting and sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment
for both the offences under Sections 302 and 326 of the IPC
i.e. for causing the death of Kor (appellant’s husband) and for
causing grievous hurt to her daughter aged 2 years eight
months. The appellant was however acquitted of the offence
under Section 302 for allegedly causing the death of her son,
aged four years.
Brief facts are as under:
According to the prosecution, the incident took place on
28th March, 2003, at about 7:45 am. It is alleged that the
appellant, after a quarrel with her husband, assaulted him
with a dao and also her son, aged four years, as a result of
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which, both succumbed to the injuries. The appellant is also
alleged to have assaulted her minor daughter, aged about two
years and eight months, with a dao after which, the appellant
is stated to have inflicted injuries to herself, also with a dao.
2.
Pursuant to the said incident, PW8- the headman of
village Amlari lodged an FIR being P.S. Case No.9(03) of 2003
with the Jowai Police Station, alleging offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 326 of the IPC as against the
appellant. After investigation, police filed chargesheet in the
said case. Since the case was Session triable, the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions for trial. The court framed
charges against the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 326 of the IPC i.e. for causing the
death of her husband and son and for causing injuries to her
daughter. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the same and
claimed to be tried.
3.
The prosecution in support of its case, examined eight
witnesses:
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(1) Shri Nicholas Bora- PW1
(2) Smti. Brian Sama- PW2
(3) Dr. P. Syngkon (Doctor)- PW3
(4) Smti. Phibi Supoh- PW4
(5) Shri Hunmon Bthuh- PW5
(6) Dr. S. Rani (Doctor)- PW6
(7) Shri Birendra Ch. Marak (Investigating Officer)-PW7
(8) Shri Jarly Pohplet (Headman/Complainant)-PW8.
4.
The appellant claimed to be innocent. She did not
adduce any evidence in support of her case.
5.
After hearing the parties, the trial court convicted and
sentenced the appellant as stated aforesaid. Hence, this
appeal.
6.
Mr. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
submitted that the conviction of the appellant cannot be
sustained in the absence of any evidence to connect the
appellant with the crime. He submitted that the prosecution
case rests on circumstantial evidence and that the prosecution
had miserably failed to prove any of the circumstances so
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relied upon, by legal, cogent and admissible evidence. He
further submitted that the trial court despite observing in the
impugned judgment and order that there was no evidence qua
the appellant, convicted the appellant solely on the basis of a
confession allegedly made by the appellant. He further
submitted that the said confession relied upon by the trial
court suffers from several infirmities/illegalities, including
non-supply of the said confession and non-exhibiting of the
same during trial. Mr. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel relied
upon the following judgments, in support of his submission;
(i) Babubhai Udesinh Parmar v. State of Gujarat:
(2006) 12 SCC 268; (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 702; 2006 SCC
OnLine SC 1277 (paragraphs 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17,
18 & 19)
(ii) State of Punjab v. Harjagdev Singh: (2009) 16 SCC
91 (paragraphs 16 & 17);
(iii) Philip v. State of Karnataka: 1980 Cri LJ 171
(paragraphs 3, 8, 10 & 11);
(iv) Shivappa v. State of Karnataka: (1995) 2 SCC 76
(paragraphs 3 to 8);
(v) Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana: (2001) 7 SCC
148 (paragraphs 20 & 22);
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(vi) Dagdu & ors v. State of Maharashtra: (1997) 3
SCC 68 (paragraphs 49 to 52 and 98);
(vii) Kehar Singh v. Delhi State Administration:
(1998) 3 SCC 609 (paragraphs 117, 119, 121, 124);
(viii) Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab:
1957 SCC OnLine SC 1 (paragraph 10); and
(ix) State of Sikkim v. Suren Rai in Crl.A.No.17 of
2016.
7.
Mr.
submitted
Khan,
that
learned
no
Additional
interference
was
Advocate
General
warranted
in
the
impugned judgment and order, inasmuch as, the trial court
had rightly convicted the appellant after considering the
confession recorded under Section 164 CrPC of the appellant.
He submitted that the confession so recorded by the learned
Magistrate suffers from no infirmities, inasmuch as, the
learned Magistrate was satisfied that the confession of the
appellant was made spontaneously by her, which reflects its
voluntariness.
8.
Before we proceed to analyse the evidence qua the
appellant, it is pertinent to note that the prosecution case
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rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. The law relating to
circumstantial evidence is well settled and is no longer res
integra. The Apex Court in the landmark case of Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in
(1984) 4 SCC 116 laid down five golden principles to be
followed in a case based on circumstantial evidence;
“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established,
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to
say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
9.
Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, we now
proceed to deal with the facts in hand.
2026:MLHC:189-DB
10.
At the outset, we may note that the prosecution case
rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, i.e. mainly on a
confession allegedly made by the appellant under Section 164
CrPC. According to the prosecution, the said confession of the
appellant recorded under Section 164 CrPC by the learned
Magistrate, is true and voluntary and that the same is duly
corroborated by the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW5 and PW7 i.e.
with respect to the presence of the appellant at the spot with a
dao, soon after the incident.
11.
We may also note, that the fact, that Kor (appellant’s
husband) and Donmi Bthuh’s (appellant’s son) death was
homicidal, is not seriously disputed by the appellant. Nor, has
the appellant seriously disputed the injuries sustained by Miss
Lanosha Bthuh (appellant’s daughter). Thus, the question that
arises for consideration, is, whether the appellant is the
author of the same? and whether the prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that it is the appellant who caused
the deaths/injuries?
2026:MLHC:189-DB
12.
Before we proceed to discuss the confession allegedly
made by the appellant under Section 164 CrPC, it would be
necessary to discuss the evidence of the witnesses, as has
come on record.
13.
PW1 – Shri Nicholas Bora has in his evidence stated
that he knew the appellant, as the village where the appellant
was staying was adjacent to his village in Jaintia Hills. He has
deposed that he learnt of the incident when he had gone to a
shop situated near the appellant’s house, to buy tympew; that
he saw a crowd near the place which is used for washing
clothes; that when he went near the spot, he saw the body of a
person lying there i.e. of Kor (deceased); and that he did not
see the appellant there. The said witness although had further
deposed that he saw the brother of the appellant snatching the
dao from the appellant’s hand, has deposed that he did not
know who killed Kor.
2026:MLHC:189-DB
14.
PW2 – Smt. Brian Sama has stated that she knew the
deceased, as he was also a resident of her village; that on the
day of the incident, she was washing clothes at a public tap
near the house of the deceased; that when she was washing
the clothes, she suddenly heard the deceased screaming; that
when she looked, she saw the deceased coming out of his
house and collapsing just outside his house; that she saw the
appellant (wife of the deceased) coming out of the house
holding a dao in her hand and threatening with the dao. PW2
has further deposed that the neighbours gathered at the spot
soon after the incident, where the deceased had collapsed.
15.
PW4 – Smti. Phibi Supoh has in her evidence deposed
that the deceased was her elder brother and the appellant, her
sister-in-law and that from the said marriage, the couple had
two children, a son and a daughter. She has further deposed
that on the day of the incident, she was washing clothes at the
village tap near her brother’s house, where many other
villagers were also washing clothes; that she heard shouts and
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cries, that her brother had died, upon which she collapsed
and became unconscious; that on regaining consciousness,
she found herself at her residence and was told by her parents
that her brother had died. PW4 - Smti. Phibi Supoh has
further deposed that subsequently, the villagers told her that
her brother was murdered by the appellant; and that she and
her family had not lodged any FIR after the incident, as the
matter was compromised between them, and that it was the
village authority, i.e., the headman who lodged an FIR. In her
cross-examination, she deposed that she would not be in a
position to state whether any of the villagers had witnessed
the incident or not.
16.
PW5 – Shri Hunmon Bthuh has deposed that the
appellant is his elder sister and that the deceased was his
brother-in-law and that they stayed close to the appellant’s
house. PW5 - Shri Hunmon Bthuh has further deposed that
on the day of the incident, he heard screams coming from the
house of the appellant, pursuant to which he went to his
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sister’s house; that he saw the appellant coming out of the
house holding a dao and putting it on her neck cutting herself,
pursuant to which he ran towards his sister and snatched the
dao from her; that his sister (appellant) collapsed and that he
too received injuries on his hand, whilst snatching the said
dao. He has stated that he went home to apply medicine to his
wound and when he returned, he learnt that the appellant’s
son had died due to a neck injury and that the appellant’s
husband body was found near the village road outside the
house. He has further stated that the police had seized two
daos, however, he was unable to state whether they were the
same daos. In his cross-examination, he had stated that the
deceased had an affair with another woman and the entire
village was aware of it.
17.
The Investigating Officer Shri B.C. Marak was examined
as PW7. He has deposed that he received the information from
PW8 - Shri Jarly Pohplet about an incident that had taken
place in village Amlarem, pursuant to which, he went to the
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said village; that on reaching the village, he found a large
number of village people on the spot; that he found a dead
body lying on the footpath and one dead body of a minor child
inside the room; that he conducted an inquest and spot
panchnama and sent the bodies for postmortem examination
to Jowai Civil Hospital. He has further stated that he arrested
the appellant and conducted the investigation in the said case.
In his cross-examination, PW 7 has deposed that the daos i.e.,
exhibit-I and exhibit-II lying near the dead body were stained
with blood and that the seized articles were kept in a
Malkhana, however, were not sent to the FSL.
18.
Shri Jarly Pohplet was examined as PW8. He has stated
that at the relevant time, he was the headman of Amlari Model
village. He also stated that he along with the Secretary of the
village lodged an FIR on learning of an incident that had taken
place. The said FIR was exhibited as exhibit ‘6(1)’. In his crossexamination, he has admitted that he did not read the
contents of the FIR before putting his signature on the same.
2026:MLHC:189-DB
19.
Having perused the evidence of the witnesses as stated
aforesaid, it is apparent that none of the witnesses had last
seen the appellant with the deceased and children alone.
There is absolutely no evidence to show, what happened inside
the house and who all were there in the house. There is not a
whisper about the children being injured or seen lying at the
spot. Infact, even the learned Judge has in the impugned
judgment observed that there was no evidence to show what
happened inside the house and that there was nothing on
record, except the confession of the appellant recorded under
Section 164 CrPC. The learned Judge has further, while
convicting the appellant, observed that there was also no
evidence to show who had caused the injuries or who had
started the fight. The learned Judge only relying on the
statement under Section 164 CrPC allegedly made by the
appellant (though not exhibited) relied on the same while
convicting the appellant as stated aforesaid.
2026:MLHC:189-DB
20.
It is in this context, that it would be apposite to consider
the alleged confession of the appellant that was relied upon by
the learned Judge. From a perusal of the confession, it
appears that the appellant was arrested on 28th March, 2003
and was produced before the learned Magistrate on 29th
March,2003 at 2:30 pm from police lockup. A perusal of the
alleged confession recorded under Section 164 CrPC suffers
from several infirmities, making it impossible for us to place
implicit reliance on the same for the following reasons:
(i) that there is nothing to indicate from the confession
so recorded, that the appellant was given any time to reflect as
to whether she wanted to make the confession;
(ii) that there are blanks in columns 3 and 4, i.e., in
column 3, as to where the appellant/accused was kept, in
order to give her time, to reflect, before making the statement;
and in column 4, the Magistrate’s satisfaction that there was
no police officer in the place, from where the proceeding could
2026:MLHC:189-DB
be
heard.
Interestingly,
column
of
the
confession
categorically states as under:
“3. Magistrate shall not, except under circumstances which
render delay impossible, record the confession of an
accused person immediately the police bring him into
court. He shall be given at least three hours for reflection
during which period he shall not be in contact with any
police officer and shall not be permitted to hold converse
with any person.”
However, there is nothing in the said column to indicate
how much time was given to the appellant to reflect and where
the appellant was kept to enable her to make the said
reflection.
(iii) the endorsement at the end of the confession as
contemplated under Section 164(4) CrPC is absent;
(iv) the appellant was administered oath, contrary to the
provisions of law;
(v) the confession was admittedly not exhibited through
any witness; and
(vi) there is nothing on record in the proceeding, to show
whether the confession was opened and a copy of the said
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confession was handed over to the appellant. According to the
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the appellant was
not aware of the said confession allegedly made by her and
learnt of the same, only after the impugned judgment and
order of conviction and sentence was passed. Learned AAG
although disputes the same, is unable to show when the
confession was opened or given or exhibited through which
witness.
Learned AAG vehemently submitted that the confession
was true and voluntary, inasmuch as, the Magistrate had
recorded in the column of ‘reason to believe’ that “the said
confession was spontaneous”. Learned AAG also relied on
Section 80 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and the judgment of the
Apex Court in support thereof, in Madi Ganga v. State of
Orissa reported in (1981) 2 SCC 224. It may be noted that
reliance placed on the judgment in Madi Ganga (supra) is
misplaced, inasmuch as in the said case, the arguments
advanced by the appellant therein, was that the Court ought
2026:MLHC:189-DB
to have examined the learned Magistrate who recorded the
confession, as a witness. The said contention was rejected by
the Court, by placing reliance on Section 80 of the Evidence
Act. The Apex Court held that Section 80 of the Evidence Act
makes the examination of the Magistrate unnecessary. In the
said judgment, the Apex Court found the confession made by
the accused therein, true and voluntary, having been duly
recorded in accordance with law, while placing reliance on the
same. The same is not the case in the present case.
21.
As noted above, the alleged confession suffers from
several infirmities and as such, implicit reliance cannot be
placed on the same. It may also be noted that no question was
put to the appellant while recording her statement under
Section 313 CrPC vis-à-vis the alleged confession made by her.
22.
If the aforesaid confession is ignored and which will
have to be ignored for the reasons stated aforesaid, the other
evidence on record i.e., the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW4, PW5,
PW7 and PW8 is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that
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it is the appellant and the appellant alone who was
responsible for causing the death of her husband-Kor and the
child. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant
was alone with the deceased in the house and that there was
none present, apart from the appellant. From the alleged
confession relied upon by the learned AAG, it appears that the
incident took place in the presence of a non-tribal person.
However, admittedly, no investigation has been done in this
regard.
23.
Mr. Khan, learned AAG states that Section 106 of the
Evidence Act would come into play, having regard to the fact,
that the appellant ought to have offered some explanation with
respect to what happened in the house on the day of the
incident. He submits that the appellant had failed to discharge
her burden, thus, showing her complicity in the alleged crime.
This aforesaid submission of the learned AAG would have to
be rejected. It may be noted that Section 106 of the Evidence
Act would come into play only and only when the prosecution
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has connected the dots of the circumstances on which the
prosecution seeks to rely. It is well settled that the prosecution
has to prove its case on its own steam and cannot take
advantage of the weaknesses of the defence. Of course, false
defence, false explanation and non-explanation under Section
106 of the Evidence Act would be additional circumstances,
provided that the prosecution has been able to prove the chain
of circumstances by leading cogent, legal and admissible
evidence. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the
weakness of the defence. Section 106 cannot be invoked to
make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence
of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This
Section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the
prosecution has discharged the onus of proving all the
elements necessary to establish the offence.
2026:MLHC:189-DB
24.
The Apex Court in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar
reported in (2021) 10 SCC 725 has in paragraph 23 observed
as under:
“23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if
the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in
discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section
106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an
additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case
governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of
circumstances which is required to be established by the
prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused
to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the
Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not
complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict
the accused”.
25.
We in the facts, find that the prosecution has miserably
failed to prove its case i.e., the circumstances, against the
appellant, by leading cogent, legal and admissible evidence
and that the chain of evidence is far from complete.
26.
Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated
31st August, 2021 passed by the learned Additional Deputy
Commissioner (Judicial), West Jaintia Hills District, Jowai in
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Session Case No.13 of 2013 is quashed and set aside and the
appellant is acquitted of all the offences.
27.
The appellant be set at liberty forthwith, if not required
in any other case.
28.
The appeal is allowed and disposed of on the aforesaid
terms.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Revati Mohite Dere)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
18.03.2026
“Lam DR-PS”
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2026.03.18 17:08:30 IST
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