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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A. No.28 of 2025
Pinki Saha Roy (40 years),
D/O: Lt. Gopal Bihari Saha Roy,
W/O: Sri Raju Barman,
R/O: Buddhamandir, Opposite of Bazaar India Shopping Mall,
P.O: Ujan Abhoynagar, P.S: NCC,
Dist: West Tripura, Pin: 799005
---- Applicant(s)
For and on behalf of:
Shani Saha Roy (38 years),
S/O: Lt. Gopal Bihari Saha Roy,
R/O: P.O: Ujan Abhaynagar, Chakraborty para,
P.S: East Agartala,
Dist: West Tripua, Pin: 799005.
---- Accused Person
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s)
:
Mr. Samrat Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Adv,
Mr. Sreekanta Bal, Adv,
Mr. Ezekiel L. Darlong, Adv,
Mr. Riya Roy Chowdhury, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.,
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.,
Mr. Bibhal Nandi Majumder, Spl. P.P.,
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Spl. P.P.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
28/04/2025
This bail application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. is
filed for releasing the accused in custody namely Shani Saha Roy
in connection with Airport PS case No.37 of 2024 under Section
302/120(B) of IPC read with Section 27 of Arms Act and added
Section 201/34 of IPC.
Heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik
assisted by Learned Counsel, Mr. Ezekiel L Darlong and also heard
Learned Special P.P., Mr. Bibhal Nandi Majumder and Learned
Special P.P., Mr. Sankar Lodh appearing on behalf of the State-
respondents
along
with
Learned
P.P.,
Mr.
Raju
Datta
on
25.04.2025 fixing today for order.
On 25.04.2025, at the time of hearing, Learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik has drawn the attention of this Court
that this accused is lodging in custody on and from 09.05.2024
and this is the second bail application of the said accused before
the High Court. According to Learned Senior Counsel, in this case,
part charge-sheet has already been submitted by the IO with a
prayer for filing supplementary charge-sheet and referring the
charge-sheet, he drawn the attention of the Court that in this
case, on completion of investigation although IO has laid chargesheet against the accused Raju Barman, Shani Saha Roy under
Section 302/120(B)/201/34 of IPC and under Section 27 of Arms
Act and also against the accused persons Sandip Kar alias Akash,
Rakesh Barman under Section 302/120(B)/34 of IPC and Section
25/27 of IPC and against accused Pradyut Dhar Chowdhury,
Birchakra Ghosh, Miss Susmita Sarkar and Smt. Uma Sarkar
under Section 302/120B/34 of IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act and
prayed before the Court for holding custody trial of the said
accused persons. Learned Senior Counsel further drawn the
attention of the Court that in the charge-sheet, it is mentioned by
the IO that the investigation is continuing for the identification and
to establish the role and to complicity of other associates is
continuing. The further SFSL reports and other reports in support
of the evidence shall be submitted immediately on receipt of the
same in supplementary charge-sheet. So, it is clear that the IO is
going to file another supplementary charge-sheet against the
accused persons and by this time, the said accused shall be in
incarceration without any justified grounds and considering the
nature of involvement of the accused with the alleged crime,
Learned Senior Counsel urged for releasing the accused on bail in
any condition.
It was further submitted that although the IO in this
case prayed for holding custody trial of all the accused persons
but surprisingly by order dated 07.09.2024 passed in connection
with BA No.172 of 2024 and order dated 07.09.2024 in connection
with BA No.173 of 2024 accused Miss Susmita Sarkar and Smt.
Uma Sarkar granted bail by the Learned Sessions Judge, West
Tripura, Agartala as the prosecution did not oppose their bail
application. Thus, it appears that the conduct of the prosecution
itself is contradictory. It was further submitted by Learned Senior
Counsel that in the earlier bail application, the parity was prayed
for but at the time of hearing considering the period of detention
of the accused in custody, the accused urged for default bail as
such on the ground of parity, there was no proper argument on
his behalf. Learned Senior Counsel further referred statements of
said Susmita Sarkar and Smt. Uma Sarkar recorded by Learned
Magistrate under 64(5) of Cr.P.C and referring their statements,
he submitted that their involvement were more graver than the
involvement of the present accused in custody with the alleged
crime. So, on the ground of parity, Learned Senior Counsel urged
for releasing the accused on bail in any condition. Thereafter,
Learned Senior Counsel referring Annexure-5 i.e. prayer of IO for
adding Section 201/34 of IPC against this present accused,
submitted that the said offence is bailable in nature and the IO in
the charge-sheet could not place any materials against this
accused showing his further detention in custody. So, considering
the period of detention of the accused in the custody and also the
materials on record, he urged for release of the accused on bail.
Learned Senior Counsel also at the time of hearing further
referred the citation in Kashmira Singh case and referring the
same, he further drawn the attention of the Court that the present
accused deserves to be released on bail on the ground of parity.
On the other hand, Learned Special P.P., Mr. S. Lodh
appearing on behalf of the State-respondent along with Learned
Senior Counsel, Mr. B. N. Majumder drawn the attention of the
Court that although it was submitted by Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the accused in custody that on the last
date, he could not argue for releasing the accused on bail in parity
but factually he rests upon his submission on the ground of parity
and this Court after detailed hearing of argument of both the sides
rejected the bail application and at this stage, no new grounds
have been projected by the accused in custody in support of his
bail application and furthermore, this case was a sensational case
and since the rest two accused persons being women were
granted bail by the Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura in this
case but considering the involvement of the present accused with
the alleged crime there is no scope to enlarge him on bail.
Moreover, from the chain of circumstances, according to Learned
Special P.P., it is clear that just at the time of commission of
offence he was present to the PO and participated in the
commission of offence. So, if at this stage he is enlarged on bail
then there is every chance of hampering the trial of the case. So,
for proper adjudication of this case, Learned Special Public
Prosecutors strenuously opposed the bail application of the
present accused.
I have heard detailed argument of both the sides at
length. In the case at hand, this case was registered on the basis
of a Suo Moto complaint laid by one Mr. SI Srikanta Guha of
Airport PS on 01.05.2024 alleging inter alia that on 30.04.2024 at
around 2025 hours he received one telephonic information that a
person was shot at Salbagan Bazaar at Hatipara under Airport PS
and consequently upon the information he along with staffs
rushed to the spot and found one body lying by the side of road
with bullet wounds. Immediately with the help of local people the
body was shifted to ILS Hospital wherein the attending Doctors
declared him as dead. From the local inquiry, it came to his
knowledge that at about 2010 hours miscreants shot upon Durga
Prasanna Deb @ Viki while he was sitting in a vehicle bearing
No.TR-06-A-0745 and the same was parked at Salbagan Bazaar
Hati Para in front of one medicine shop of Shri Bikash Das of
Shalbagan BSF Para and immediately after receipt of bullet injury
he fell down on the road from the vehicle and the miscreants fled
away. After that, some kin relatives of the deceased arrived at
Hospital where he could know from them that one Raju Barman,
Rakesh Barman, Debabrata Barman, Biman Das, Pradyut Dhar
Chowdhury and some others made conspiracy and were involved
in the commission of murder of said Durga Prasanna Deb alias Viki
and on the basis of the Suo Moto complaint, Airport PS case No.37
of 2024 under Section 302/120(B) of IPC and Section 27 of Arms
Act was registered and in course of investigation this accused
person was arrested and produced before the Court under arrest
on 09.05.2024 and since then he is lodging in custody and after
completion of investigation, on 27.07.2024 the IO has laid chargesheet against the present accused along with others before the
Court to conduct trial of the case keeping the accused persons in
judicial custody for the interest of prosecution. But it is on record
that by this time, two women accused person were released on
bail as per order of Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura,
Agartala, as already stated. Since the IO laid charge-sheet within
time against all the accused persons so the question of default bail
does not arise.
In course of hearing of argument, Learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik in the earlier bail application relied
upon one citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar
Khanna vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence reported in 2018 SCC OnLine SC 757 wherein in
para Nos.10 and 11, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“10. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh(1952)1 SCC 275, this Court relied
upon the decision of the Privy Council in
Bhuboni Sahu v. R: 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 and
laid down as under:
8. Gurubachan's confession has played an
important part in implicating the appellant,
and the question at once arises, how far
and in what way the confession of an
accused person can be used against a coaccused? It is evident that it is not evidence
in the ordinary sense of the term because,
as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v.
R.
….. It does not indeed come within the
definition of" 'evidence' contained in
section 3 of the Evidence Act., It is not
required to be given on oath, nor in the
presence of the accused, and it cannot
be tested by crossexamination." Their
Lordships also point out that it is
"obviously
type.........
evidence
of
a
very
weak
It is a much weaker type of evidence
than the evidence of an approver, which
is not subject to any of those infirmities.
They stated in addition that such a
confession
cannot
be
made
the
foundation of a conviction and can only
be used in "support of other evidence."
In view of these remarks, it would be
pointless to cover the same ground, but
we feel it is necessary to expound this
further as misapprehension still exists.
The question is, in what way can it be
used in support of other evidence? Can it
be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be
used to corroborate an accomplice or, as
in the present case, a witness who,
though not an accomplice, is placed in
the same category regarding credibility
because the judge refuses to believe him
except in so far as he is corroborated ?
9. In our opinion, the matter was put
succinctly by Sir 'Lawrence Jenkins in
Emperor
v.
Lalit
Mohan
Chuckerbutty:ILR(1911)38 Cal 559 where
he said that such a confession can only be
used to "lend assurance to other evidence
against a coaccused "or, to put it in another
way, as Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami
Moopan in Re 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86
"the provision goes no further than this-where there is evidence against the coaccused sufficient, if believed, to support
his
conviction,
then
the
kind
of
confession de- scribed in section 30 may
be thrown into the scale as an additional
reason for believing that evidence."
10.Translating these observations into
concrete terms they come to this. The
proper way to approach a case of this kind
is, first, to marshal the evidence against the
accused excluding the confession altogether
from consideration and see whether, if it is
believed, a conviction could safely be based
on it. If it is capable of belief independently
of the confession, then of course it is not
necessary to call the confession in aid. But
cases may arise where the judge is not
prepared to act on the other evidence as it
stands even though, if believed, it would be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an
event the judge may call in aid the
confession and use it to lend assurance to
the other evidence and thus fortify himself
in believing what without the aid of the
confession he would not be prepared to
accept.”
11. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh
(supra) was approved by a Constitution Bench
of this Court in Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of
Bihar(1964) 6 SCR 623 wherein it was
observed:
“12. As we have already indicated, this
question has been considered on several
occasions by judicial decisions and it has
been consistently held that a confession
cannot be treated as evidence which is
substantive evidence against a co-accused
person. In dealing with a criminal case
where the prosecution relies upon the
confession of one accused person against
another
accused
person,
the
proper
approach to adopt is to consider the other
evidence against such an accused person,
and if the said evidence appears to be
satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold
that the said evidence may sustain the
charge framed against the said accused
person, the court turns to the confession
with a view to assure itself that the
conclusion which it is inclined to draw from
the other evidence is right. As was observed
by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit
Mohan Chuckerbutty: ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559
a confession can only be used to “lend
assurance to other evidence against a coaccused.” In re Periyaswami Moopan Reilly.
J., observed that the provision of Section 30
goes not further than this:
“where there is evidence against the
coaccused sufficient, if believed, to
support his conviction, then the kind of
confession described in Section 30 may
be thrown into the scale as an additional
reason for believing that evidence”
In Bhuboni Sahu v. R: (1949) SCC OnLine
PC 12 the Privy Council has expressed the
same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke
for the Board, observed that:
“a confession of a co-accused is
obviously evidence of a very weak type.
It does not indeed come within the
definition of “evidence” contained in
Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not
required to be given on oath, nor in the
presence of the accused, and it cannot
be tested by cross-examination. It is a
much weaker type of evidence than the
evidence of an approver, which is not
subject to any of those infirmities.
Section 30, however, provides that the
court may take the confession into
consideration and thereby, no doubt,
makes it evidence on which the court
may act; but the section does not say
that the confession is to amount to
proof. Clearly there must be other
evidence. The confession is only one
element in the consideration of all the
facts proved the case; it can be put into
the scale and weighed with the other
evidence”.
It would be noticed that as a result of the
provisions contained in Section 30, the
confession has no doubt to be regarded as
amounting to evidence in a general way,
because whatever is considered by the
court is evidence; circumstances which are
considered by the court as well as
probabilities do amount to evidence in that
generic sense. Thus, though confession may
be regarded as evidence in that generic
sense because of the provisions of Section
30, the fact remains that it is not evidence
as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The
result, therefore, is that in dealing with a
case against an accused person, the court
cannot start with the confession of a coaccused person; it must begin with other
evidence adduced by the prosecution and
after it has formed its opinion with regard
to the quality and effect of the said
evidence, then it is permissible to turn to
the confession in order to receive assurance
to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial
mind is about to reach on the said other
evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect
of the provisions contained in Section 30.
The same view has been expressed by this
Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh: (1952) 1 SCC 275 where the
decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni
Sahu case: (1949) SCC OnLine PC 12 case
has been cited with approval.”
Relying upon the aforesaid citation, Learned Senior
Counsel had drawn the attention of the Court that confession of
the co-accused is very weak piece of evidence. So, on the basis of
that, there is no scope to detain the accused in judicial custody.
Learned Special P.P. in course of hearing in the earlier
bail application relied upon few citations and drawn the attention
of the Court that considering the materials on record and nature of
evidence collected by the IO during investigation against this
accused and showing his direct participation in the crime at this
stage, there is no scope to release him on bail for fair trial of this
case.
Learned Special P.P. also relied upon the judgment of
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
Mahadev
Meena vs. Praveen
Rathore and another reported in (2021) 17 SCC 788 wherein
in para No.19, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“19. In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai
Hirabhai Makwana: (2021) 6 SCC 230, a two
judge Bench of this Court of which one of us
(Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part, has held
that the High Court while granting bail must
focus on the role of the accused in deciding the
aspect of parity. This Court observed: (SCC p.
246, para 26)
“26. … The High Court: Vishanbhai Hirabhai
Makwana v. State of Gujarat: (2020) SCC
OnLine Guj 2987, Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani
v. State of Gujarat, (2021) SCC OnLine Guj
784, Vanraj Karsha Akhiyani v. State of
Gujarat: (2021) SCC OnLine Guj 783,
Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat:
(2020) SCC OnLine Guj 2986, Khetabhai
Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat:
(2020) SCC OnLine Guj 2988, Siddhrajsinh
Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat:
(2020) SCC OnLine Guj 2985 has evidently
misunderstood the central aspect of what is
meant by parity. Parity while granting bail
must focus upon the role of the accused.
Merely observing that another accused who
was granted bail was armed with a similar
weapon is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for the grant of bail on the
basis of parity has been established. In
deciding the aspect of parity, the role
attached to the accused, their position in
relation to the incident and to the victims is
of utmost importance. The High Court has
proceeded on the basis of parity on a
simplistic assessment as noted above,
which again cannot pass muster under the
law.”
Thereafter, Learned Special P.P. also relied upon
another citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in
AIR 2023 SC (Supp) 1851 in Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of
India and Ors. wherein in para Nos.23 and 24, Hon’ble the Apex
Court further observed as under:
“23. It is also to be noted that as per the
scheme of Cr.P.C., an investigation of a
cognizable case commences with the recording
of an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. If a person
is arrested and the investigation of the case
cannot be completed within 24 hours, he has to
be produced before the magistrate to seek his
remand under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C.
during continued investigation. There is a
statutory time frame then prescribed for
remand of the accused for the purposes of
investigation, however, the same cannot
extend beyond 90 days, as provided under
Section 167(2)(a)(i) in cases where the
investigation relates to an offence punishable
with
death,
imprisonment
for
life
or
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10
years and 60 days, as provided under Section
167(2)(a)(ii), where the investigation relates
to any other offence. The relevant section
further provides that on expiry of the period of
90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, the
accused has a right to be released on default
bail in case he is prepared to and furnishes
bail.
24. This right of statutory bail, however, is
extinguished, if the charge sheet is filed within
the stipulated period. The question of resorting
to a supplementary chargesheet under Section
173(8) of the Cr.P.C. only arises after the main
chargesheet has been filed, and as such, a
supplementary chargesheet, wherein it is
explicitly stated that the investigation is still
pending, cannot under any circumstance, be
used to scuttle the right of default bail, for
then, the entire purpose of default bail is
defeated, and the filing of a chargesheet or a
supplementary chargesheet becomes a mere
formality, and a tool, to insue that the right of
default bail is scuttled.”
Thereafter, he also relied upon another citation in
Atulbhial Bithalbhai v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 2023
SC 2352 wherein in para No.12, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed
as under:
“12. Insofar as parity is concerned, we need
only reproduce the apt observations from
Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai
Makwana (Koli), (2021) 6 SCC 230: AIR (2021)
SC 2011, of which we take note:
“26….Parity while granting bail must focus
upon the role of the accused. Merely
observing that another accused who was
granted bail was armed with a similar
weapon is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for the grant of bail on the
basis of parity has been established. In
deciding the aspect of parity, the role
attached to the accused, their position in
relation to the incident and to the victims is
of utmost importance. The High Court has
proceeded on the basis of parity on a
simplistic assessment as noted above,
which again cannot pass muster under the
law.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, he relied upon another citation of Hon’ble the
Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Bishanbhai Hirabhai
Marwana (Koli) and Another reported in (2021) 6 SCC 230
wherein in para Nos.23 and 26, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed
as under:
“23. The first aspect of the case which stares in
the face is the singular absence in the
judgment of the High Court to the nature and
gravity of the crime. The incident which took
place on 9 May 2020 resulted in five homicidal
deaths. The nature of the offence is a
circumstance which has an important bearing
on the grant of bail. The orders of the High
Court are conspicuous in the absence of any
awareness or elaboration of the serious nature
of the offence. The perversity lies in the failure
of the High Court to consider an important
circumstance which has a bearing on whether
bail should be granted. In the two-judge Bench
decision of this Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay
v. Sudharshan Singh:(2002) 3 SCC 598 the
nature of the crime was recorded as “one of
the basic considerations” which has a bearing
on
the
grant
or
denial of
bail.
The
considerations which govern the grant of bail
were elucidated in the judgment of this Court
without attaching an exhaustive nature or
character to them. This emerges from the
following extract:
“4. Apart from the above, certain other
which may be attributed to be relevant
considerations may also be noticed at this
juncture, though however, the same are
only illustrative and not exhaustive, neither
there can be any. The considerations being:
(a) While granting bail the court has to
keep in mind not only the nature of the
accusations, but the severity of the
punishment, if the accusation entails a
conviction and the nature of evidence in
support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the
witnesses being tampered with or the
apprehension of there being a threat for the
complainant should also weigh with the
court in the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the
entire evidence establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt but there
ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the
charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always
be considered and it is only the element of
genuineness
that
shall
have
to
be
considered in the matter of grant of bail,
and in the event of there being some doubt
as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in
the normal course of events, the accused is
entitled to an order of bail.”
This Court further laid down the
standard for overturning an order
granting bail in the following terms:
(Ram Govind Upadhyay case: Ram
Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598
“3. Grant of bail though being a
discretionary order-- but, however, calls
for exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of
course. Order for bail bereft of any
cogent reason cannot be sustained.”
26. Another aspect of the case which needs
emphasis is the manner in which the High
Court has applied the principle of parity. By its
two orders both dated 21.12.2020: Prayinbhai
Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat:(2020) SCC
OnLine Guj 2986, Khetabhai Parbhatbhai
Makwana v. State of Gujarat: 2020 SCC OnLine
Guj 2988, the High Court granted bail to Pravin
Koli (A10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity
was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha
Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on
22-10-2020:Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v.
State of Gujarat(2020) SCC OnLine Guj 2985 on
the ground (as the High Court recorded) that
he was “assigned similar role of armed with
stick (sic)”. Again, bail was granted to Vanraj
Koli (A-16) on the ground that he was armed
with a wooden stick and on the ground that
Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh
(A-13) who were armed with sticks had been
granted bail. The High Court has evidently
misunderstood the central aspect of what is
meant by parity. Parity while granting bail
must focus upon the role of the accused.
Merely observing that another accused who
was granted bail was armed with a similar
weapon is not sufficient to determine whether
a case for the grant of bail on the basis of
parity has been established. In deciding the
aspect of parity, the role attached to the
accused, their position in relation to the
incident and to the victims is of utmost
importance. The High Court has proceeded on
the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment
as noted above, which again cannot pass
muster under the law.”
In Peng Yongxin v. State of West Bengal reported
in 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6424 wherein in para Nos.16, 17, 18
and 22, Hon’ble the Calcutta High Court observed as under:
“16. In passing the impugned order on 20th
September 2023 the judgment of Hon’ble Apex
Court of Ritu Chhabaria was placed; on the
observation of the fact that the Central
Government has preferred a review petition
against the judgment of Ritu Chhabaria, the
Learned Magistrate do not consider the prayer
of bail of the present petitioner.
17. On perusing the charge sheet/final report
along with the CD, it appears that during the
course of investigation the police have
collected several documents and materials; on
the basis of which the charge sheet has been
submitted against the present petitioner
stating the present petitioner to be a Chinese
citizen who tried to enter into the territory of
India with a fake Nepali passport. The Chinese
identity card of the petitioners was verified by
the investigating agency.
18. Supplementary charge sheet contained the
report the Director, Finger Print Bureau, Delhi
Police. After completion of investigation the
police have submitted charge sheet u/s
168/471 read with Section 14A/14B of
Foreigners Act. It is the submission of the
present petitioner that the Nepali passport
seized by the investigating agency is yet to be
verified. Thus, the charge sheet cannot be
termed as a complete charge sheet.
22. The instant Criminal Revision has been filed
by the petitioner against the impugned order
dated 16.09.2023 passed by the Learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate
Siliguri, wherein
the
Learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of
the offence on the basis of the charge sheet
submitted by the police and refused to grant
default bail. I find no illegality or irregularity in
the impugned order passed by the Learned
Magistrate.
The
Learned
Magistrate
has
correctly taken cognizance of the offence on
the strength of the charge sheet, and as the
charge sheet has been submitted has correctly
refused the prayer for default bail.
The proposition of law as referred by the
Learned Advocate for the petitioner in Ritu
Chhabaria and Thamisharasi are not applicable
in this case due to factual difference rather
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Judgebir Singh has
decided the issue which is squarely applicable
in this case.”
Thereafter, Learned Special P.P. also relied upon
another citation reported in AIR 2015 SC 1002 in Narendra
Kumar Amin v. C.B.I. and others, wherein in para Nos.3, 10
and 14, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“3. The appellant/accused was arrested on
4.4.2013 for an offence which had taken place
on 15.6.2004, which is popularly known as the
fake encounter death of Ishrat Jahan. The
offence alleged against the appellant was
punishable with life imprisonment or death and
what is popularly called Default Bail becomes
the indefeasible right on the expiry of 90 days
in the event of non-filing of police report by
then. On 3.7.2013 the first respondent viz. CBI
filed what they called the charge-sheet which
is alleged by the appellant as a misnomer
because it does not comply with the statutory
requirement of police report under Section
173(2) and 173(5) of Cr.P.C.
10. Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. enumerates the
information that must be detailed in the police
report forwarded to the Magistrate by the
Investigating Officer. This includes:
a) the names of the parties;
b) the nature of the information;
c) the names of the persons who appear
to
be
acquainted
with
the
circumstances of the case;
d) whether any offence appears to have
been committed and, if so, by whom;
e) whether the accused has been arrested;
f) whether he has been released on his
bond and if so, whether with or without
sureties;
g) Whether he has been forwarded in
custody under section 170.
14. With reference to the aforesaid rival legal
contentions we have examined the impugned
order to find out the correctness of the findings
and reasons recorded keeping in view the
statutory provisions under Section 173 (2) and
(5) read with Section 2(r) of Cr.P.C. and with
reference to the judgments on which both the
learned senior counsel placed reliance upon. In
our considered view, it is an undisputed fact
that the charge-sheet was filed on 3.7.2013
that is 90th day. Section 2 (r) of Cr.P.C. defines
the expression “police report” as a report
forwarded by a police officer to a magistrate
under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. the particulars
to be furnished in the police report which are
extracted as above are complied with in the
instant case. Therefore, filing of the police
report as required under Section 173(2) is
within 90 days in the instant case.”
And finally, he relied upon another citation of the
Supreme Court of India in Directorate of Enforcement vs.
Manpreet
Sing
Talwar
in
case
No.SLP(Crl.)/5724/2023
wherein in para No.1, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as
under:
“1. In continuation of the interim order of this
Court dated 1 May 2023, we clarify that the
order shall not preclude any trial court or, as
the case may be, High Court from considering
an application for the grant of default bail
under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 independent of and without
relying on the judgment dated 26 April 2023 in
Writ Petition (Criminal) No 60 of 2023.”
Referring those citations, Learned Special P.P. in the
earlier bail application prayed before the Court that the present
accused in custody does not come under the purview of parity and
urged for rejection of bail application.
I have also discussed the aforesaid citations in the
earlier bail application and also perused the same as reiterated by
the Learned Counsel of both the sides. After hearing both the
sides and also after perusal of the record of the Learned Trial
Court
below,
it
appears
that
earlier
the
IO
prayed
for
supplementary charge-sheet. Thereafter by this time the IO has
submitted supplementary charge-sheet in this case and the case is
now posted for accused copy and on the approach of Learned
Senior Counsel, Learned Trial Court has ordered for furnishing all
the relevant prosecution papers to the said accused.
However, considering the materials on record and the
statements of witnesses so far collected by IO during investigation
of this case, it appears that the presence of the accused in the
alleged PO and his participation cannot be ruled out. So, having
regard to the materials on record, at this stage, I find no scope to
consider the bail application of the accused in view of the
provision provided under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the
bail application filed on behalf of the accused stands rejected.
Send down the LCR along with a copy of this order.
Also, return back the Case Diary to IO through Learned
Special P.P. along with a copy of this order.
Since the rest six accused persons are lodging in
custody so the Learned Trial Court shall make all endeavour to
dispose of the case giving top priority keeping it in mind that the
accused persons are lodging in custody.
With this observation, this bail application stands
disposed of.
JUDGE
MOUMITA
DATTA
Deepshikha
MOUMITA DATTA
Date: 2025.04.28
17:03:29 -07'00'
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