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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
DATED: 13th NOVEMBER, 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No.20 of 2017
Petitioner
:
Shri Pawan Kumar Todi,
S/o Late Manik Chand Todi,
R/o 1, R. N. Mukherjee Road,
1st Floor, Room No.12,
P.S. Hare Street,
Kolkata 700 001.
versus
Respondent
:
Shri Ankit Sarda
S/o Shri Ravindra Kumar Sarda,
Sarda Emporium,
M. G. Marg, Gangtok,
East Sikkim,Pin – 737 101.
Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Sudesh Joshi, Mrs. Manita Pradhan and Mr. Sujan Sunwar,
Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Jorgay Namka, Ms. Panila Theengh and Ms. Tashi Doma
Sherpa, Advocates for the Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and
WP(C) No.21 of 2017
Petitioner
:
Shri Pawan Kumar Todi (HUF),
Represented by its karta
Shri Pawan Kumar Todi,
S/o Late Manik Chand Todi,
R/o 1, R. N. Mukherjee Road,
1st Floor, Room No.12,
P.S. Hare Street,
Kolkata -700 001.
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
versus
:
Respondent
Shri Ankit Sarda
S/o Shri Ravindra Kumar Sarda,
Sarda Emporium,
M. G. Marg, Gangtok,
East Sikkim,
Pin – 737 101.
Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Sudesh Joshi, Mrs. Manita Pradhan and Mr. Sujan Sunwar,
Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Jorgay Namka, Ms. Panila Theengh and Ms. Tashi Doma
Sherpa, Advocates for the Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
WP(C) No.20 of 2017 and WP(C) No.21 of 2017 filed
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, are being disposed of
by this common Judgment. They arise out of the impugned Orders
of the learned District Judge, East Sikkim at Gangtok, dated 05-122016, in Money Suit No.10 of 2015 [Mr. Ankit Sarda vs. Pawan
Kumar Todi and Order dated 05-12-2016 passed in Money Suit No.9
of
[Mr.
Ankit
Sarda
vs.
Pawan
Kumar
Todi
(HUF)],
respectively.
2.
The Petitioner‘s case, in WP(C) No.21 of 2017, is that,
he had filed a Suit for recovery of money against the Respondent,
before the Learned 7th Bench of the City Civil Court, at Kolkata, on
16-04-2015,
being
Money
Suit
No.220
of
2015.
The
facts
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
enumerated therein were that sometime in November 2012, the
Respondent had approached the Petitioner to be a franchisee of the
Petitioner‘s Company, in Siliguri, West Bengal. On the basis of the
agreed terms, the Respondent advanced some money to the
Petitioner, who in turn supplied some computers, servers and
peripherals worth Rs.9,75,000/- (Rupees nine lakhs and seventyfive thousand) only, to the Respondent at the Respondent‘s Siliguri
Office, which however closed down after a few months. Therefore,
the Petitioner sought recovery of Rs.1,03,026/- (Rupees one lakh,
three thousand and twenty six) only, being the difference in the
value of goods supplied and the advance made by the Respondent.
Instead, two and half months‘ later, the Respondent filed a Money
Suit against the Petitioner, being Money Suit No.09 of 2015, in the
Court of the Learned District Judge, East Sikkim, at Gangtok, on
06-07-2015 seeking recovery of a sum of Rs.10,11,044/- (Rupees
ten lakhs, eleven thousand and forty-four) only, from the Petitioner.
3.
In WP(C) No. 20 of 2017, it was averred that the supply
of computers and peripherals by the Petitioner to the Respondent
amounted to Rs.20,40,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs and forty
thousand) only, hence the Petitioner sought recovery of an amount
of Rs.94,200/- (Rupees ninety-four thousand and two hundred)
only, from the Respondent as the difference between the supplies
and the money advanced by the Respondent. The Respondent for
this part filed Money Suit No. 10/2015 in the Court of the learned
District Judge, East Sikkim, on 6-7-2015, seeking recovery of an
amount of Rs.22,74,914/- (Rupees twenty-two lakhs, seventy-four
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
thousand, nine-hundred and fourteen) only, from the Petitioner
herein alleging that he had advanced loan to the Petitioner.
4.
In both matters, the Petitioner filed an Application each
under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short
―CPC‖), on 04-11-2015 before the learned Court at Gangtok,
seeking stay of both the above proceedings, as according to him the
Civil Suits filed by him in Kolkata were prior in time to those filed by
the Respondent in Gangtok. That, the subject matters in the City
Civil Court, at Kolkata and the issues in the suits filed by the
Respondent before the Gangtok Court are directly and substantially
the same. That, the Learned Trial Court had directed the Petitioner
to furnish a certified copy of the Plaint filed by him in Kolkata and
fixed 05-12-2016 for orders. However, the required documents were
delayed, prompting the Court to reject the Petitioner‘s Applications,
inter alia, with the reasoning that if the parties in the instant case
and the case before the VIIth Bench of the City Civil Court, at
Kolkata were the same, it did not tantamount to the claim of the
parties being in respect of the same transaction. It is contended
herein that the provisions of Section 10 of the CPC are mandatory
and that if the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same
in the previous and latter suit, between the same parties, then the
later suit must be stayed. Learned Counsel garnered succour from
the decisions in National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences
v. C. Parameshwara1 and Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja
(2005) 2 SCC 256
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
Seth Hiralal2 .
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
Being thus aggrieved, the Petitioner is before this
Court.
5.
Rebutting the arguments of the Petitioner, Learned
Counsel for
the Respondent, contended
that merely
on the
allegation of the Petitioner that he has filed civil suits in the Court in
Kolkata, the proceedings in the Court at Gangtok cannot be stayed
as the Respondent is yet to receive the summons and to know the
cause of action. That, there have to be cogent grounds for such an
order which the learned Trial Court can issue after analysing the
material before it. That, the Petitioner was unable to furnish any
documents before the Learned Trial Court within the time stipulated
and should not now be heard to cry foul. Moreover, the amount
claimed by the Respondent, as the Plaintiffs in Money Suit No.09 of
2015, is Rs.10,11,044/- (Rupees ten lakhs, eleven thousand and
forty four), only, whereas the recovery sought by the Petitioner in
his Money Suit, is Rs.1,03,026/- (Rupees one lakh and three
thousand and twenty-six) only, and in Money Suit No. 10 of 2015, it
is Rs.22,74,914/- (Rupees twenty-two lakhs, seventy-four thousand,
nine
hundred
and
fourteen)
only,
as
against
the
claim
of
Rs.94,200/- (Rupees ninety-four thousand and two hundred) only,
of the Plaintiff. The disparity in the amounts would adequately
indicate that it does not pertain to the same transaction.
In order to buttress his submissions, strength was drawn from
the decisions in Indian Bank vs. Maharashtra State Co-operative
AIR 1962 SC 527
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
Marketing Federation Ltd.3, Aspi Jal and Anr. vs. Khushroo Rustom
Dadyburjor4, National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C.
Parameshwara5. It was further advanced that Orders of a Civil Court
are not amenable to a Writ Jurisdiction as clearly held in Radhey
Shyam and Another vs. Chhabi Nath and Others 6,
hence the instant
Petition deserves dismissal on this count alone. That, no illegality
arises in the Order of the Learned District Judge and hence, the
instant Petition be dismissed.
6.
Careful and anxious consideration has been given to the
submissions made at the Bar, the documents which Learned
Counsel have walked this Court through during the hearing have
also been carefully perused and considered, so also the citations
relied on and the impugned Order.
7.
Prior to embarking on a discussion on Section 10 of the
CPC, I deem it fit to address the argument of learned Counsel for
the Respondent, who while relying on the exposition in Radhey
Shyam (supra),
contended that orders of the Civil Court are not
amenable to Writ Jurisdiction. I am afraid reliance on this Judgment
is entirely misplaced for the reasons enumerated herein. In Umaji
Keshao Meshram and Others vs. Smt. Radhikabai and Another7, while
discussing the scope and ambit of Article 226 and Article 227 of the
AIR 1998 SC 1952
AIR 2003 SC 1712
AIR 2005 SC 242
AIR 2015 SC 3269
AIR 1986 SC 1272
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
Constitution of India, referring to the decision in Jagannath Ganbaji
Chikkale vs. Gulabrao Raghobaji Bobde8, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court
observed as follows;
“99. ....................................... Under Article
226 the High Courts have power to issue directions,
orders and writs to any person or authority including
any Government. Under Article 227 every High Court
has the power of superintendence over all courts and
tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. The power to issue writs is not
the same as the power of superintendence. By no
stretch of imagination can a writ in the nature of
habeas corpus or mandamus or quo warranto or
prohibition or certiorari be equated with the power of
superintendence. These are writs which are directed
against persons, authorities and the State. The power
of superintendence conferred upon every High Court by
Article 227 is a supervisory jurisdiction intended to
ensure that subordinate courts and tribunals act within
the limits of their authority and according to law (see
State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Veghela,
AIR. 1968 SC 1481, 1487, 1488 and Ahmedabad Mfg.
& Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Ramnand, (AIR 1972
SC 1598)). The orders, directions and writs under
Article 226 are not intended for this purpose and the
power of superintendence conferred upon the High
Courts by Article 227 is in addition to that conferred
upon the High Courts by Article 226. Though at the
first blush it may seem that a writ of certiorari or a writ
of
prohibition
partakes
of
the
nature
of
superintendence inasmuch as at times the end result is
the same, the nature of the power to issue these writs
is different from the supervisory or superintending
power under Article 227. The powers conferred by
Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and
operate in different fields. The fact that the same
result can at times be achieved by two different
processes does not mean that these processes are the
same.
(Emphasis supplied)
8.
On the same point of Law, in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram
Chander Rai and Others9, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, contrary to the
(1965) 67 Bom LR 609 : 1965 Mh LJ 426
(2003) 6 SCC 675
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
observation in Umaji Keshao Meshram, went on to observe at
Paragraph 25, that the distinction between Article 226 and Article
227 of the Constitution of India, stands almost ―obliterated‖ in
practice and allowed the Appeal setting aside the order of the High
Court
which
had
summarily
rejected
the
Appeal
with
the
observation that the petition was not maintainable under Article 226
of the Constitution as the appellant was seeking interim injunction
against private respondents. Following this, in Radhey Shyam
(supra), a three Judge Bench had to consider the correctness of the
Law laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) in pursuance of an order of a
two Judge Bench, that an order of a Civil Court was amenable to
Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Ruling to the
contrary, in Radhey Shyam (supra), it was held that the challenge to
judicial orders could lie by way of appeal or revision or under Article
227 of the Constitution but not by way of a Writ under Article 226
and Article 32 of the Constitution. It also discussed the Judgment
dated 06-12-1989 in Civil Appeal No. 815 of 1989 : Qamaruddin vs.
Rasul Baksh and Another which had been cited in the Allahabad
High Court Judgment in Ganga Saran vs. Civil Judge, Hapur, Ghaziabad
and Others
, which considered the issue of writ of certiorari and
mandamus against interim order of civil court and held;
―If the order of injunction is passed by a competent
court having jurisdiction in the matter, it is not
permissible for the High Court Under Article 226 of
the Constitution to quash the same by issuing a writ
of certiorari. In the instant case, the Learned Single
Judge of the High Court further failed to realise that a
writ of mandamus could not be issued in this case. A
writ of mandamus cannot be issued to a private
individual unless he is under a statutory duty to
AIR 1991 Allahabad 114
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
perform a public duty. The dispute involved in the
instant case was entirely between two private parties,
which could not be a subject-matter of writ of
mandamus Under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
Learned Single Judge ignored this basic principle of
writ jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. There was no occasion
or justification for issue of a writ of certiorari or
mandamus. The High Court committed serious error
of jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the
District Judge.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
9.
It was further observed as herein below;
“22. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed
in Para 25 of its judgment that distinction between
Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para
24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles
has been noted. In view thereof, observation that
scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not
correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in
Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though
despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction Under
Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure by Act 46 of 1999,
jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 227 remains
unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain
quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded.
Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several
decisions including Waryam Singh and Anr. v.
Amarnath and Anr.: AIR 1954 SC 215 : Ouseph Mathai
v. M. Abdul Khadir: 2002 (1) SCC 319, Shalini Shyam
Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil: 2010 (8) SCC 329
and Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal:
2013 (9) SCC 374.
.............................................................
23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders
of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari
under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the
view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus
does not lie against a private person not discharging
any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from
Article 226.
...................................................................
25. Accordingly,
referred as follows:
we
answer
the
question
―(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not
amenable to writ jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the
Constitution;
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
(ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from
jurisdiction from jurisdiction Under Article 226.
Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.‖ ”
Thus, it was for the reasons elucidated, supra that the
Judgment of Radhey Shyam (supra), held that judgments of Civil
Court are not amenable to Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. But a party can therefore approach this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction
and the Petitions have indeed correctly been filed under this
provision.
10.
I now proceed to address the issue at hand, for which
for the sake of convenience Section 10 of the CPC is reproduced
below.
“10. Stay of suit.—No Court shall proceed with
the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also
directly and substantially in issue in a previously
instituted suit between the same parties, or between
parties under whom they or any of them claim
litigating under the same title where such suit is
pending in the same or any other Court in India having
jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court
beyond the limits of India established or continued
by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction,
or before the Supreme Court.
Explanation.—The pendency of a suit in a foreign
Court does not preclude the Courts in India from trying
a suit founded on the same cause of action.”
11.
Both parties have referred to National Institute of Mental
Health (supra). The said Judgment lays down that the fundamental
test to attract Section 10 is, whether on a final decision being
reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res
judicata in the subsequent suit. That, Section 10 of the CPC applies
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
only in cases where the whole or the subject-matter in both the
suits is identical.
The key words in Section 10 are “the matter in
issue is also directly or substantially in issue in a previous instituted
suit”.
The words ‗directly‘ or ‗substantially‘ in issue are used in
contradiction to the words ‗instantly‘ or ‗collaterally‘ in issue.
Therefore, Section 10 would apply only after there is identity of the
matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of
the subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical.
12.
In Pukhraj D. Jain & Ors. Vs. G. Gopalakrishna11, relied on
by learned Counsel for the Respondent, while discussing the
parameters of Section 10, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court opined that it
is not for a litigant to dictate to the Court as to how the proceedings
should be conducted and that it is for the Court to decide what will
be the best course to be adopted for expeditious disposal of the
case. That, in a given case, the stay of proceedings of later suit may
be necessary in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and
harassments of parties. In Aspi Jal and Anr. (supra), the Plaintiffs and
defendants were identical in three civil suits filed thus;
(1) For eviction of the defendants on grounds of bona
fide occupation, (2) Suit between the same parties for
eviction on grounds of non user for civil orders before
institution of suits and (3) For eviction on grounds of
non user for a continuous period of not less than 6
months.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court held that many of the matters in
issue are common in the suits including the issue as to whether the
AIR 2004 SC 3504
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of possession of the suit premises
but for application of Section 10 of the CPC, the entire subject
matter of the two suits must be the same. That, the said provisions
will not apply where few of the matters in issue are common and will
apply only when the entire subject matter in controversy is the
same.
13.
In Manohar Lal Chopra (supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court held that where a party claims interference of the Court to
stop another action between the same parties, it lies upon him to
show to the Court that the multiplicity of actions is vexatious and
the whole burden of proof lies upon him. It was also held that the
provisions of the Section are clear, definite and mandatory. A Court
in which a subsequent suit has been filed is prohibited from
proceedings with the trial of a suit in certain specific circumstances.
14.
On
the
cornerstone
of
the
aforesaid
judicial
pronouncements, it would now be relevant for this Court to look into
whether the matter in issue filed by the Petitioner and the
Respondent
in
different
periods
of
time
are
―directly‖
and
―substantially‖ the same.
15.
Before proceeding on the aforestated point, we may
briefly surf through the provisions of Order VII Rule 14 of the CPC,
which are extracted below;
“14. Production of document on which plaintiff
sues or relies.—(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a
document or relies upon document in his possession or
power in support of his claim, he shall enter such
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when
the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same
time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be
filed with the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the
possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever
possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in
Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or
to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the
plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall
not, without the leave of the Court, be received in
evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
(4) ……………………………………………………………………”
Thus, this Rule makes it clear that when a suit is filed, the
Plaintiff is required to furnish the list of documents on which he
places reliance. It is not necessary that the documents are also to
be filed at this stage, a list of such documents will suffice.
The
documents which are relied on by the parties are to be produced at
the first hearing of the suit as required under Order XIII. It would
be apposite to produce the relevant provision of Order XIII Rule 1 of
the CPC.
“1. Original documents to be produced at or
before the settlement of issues.—(1) The parties or
their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement
of issues, all the documentary evidence in original
where the copies thereof have been filed along with
plaint or written statement.”
On
reading
hereinabove
the
and
understanding
specific
the
requirements
of
provisions
Law
extracted
pertaining
to
documents have been made out succinctly and require no further
elucidation.
16.
A meticulous examination of the documents on record
would reveal that, firstly no list accompanies the Plaint of the
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
Petitioner filed in Kolkata, nor were such documents pointed out by
the Counsel for the Petitioner to establish the similarity of the issues
involved in the suits at Kolkata and Gangtok. The suit filed by the
Petitioner is for recovery of a sum of Rs.94,200/- (Rupees ninetyfour thousand and two hundred) only, and Rs.1,03,026/- (Rupees
one lakh, three thousand and twenty-six) only. To the contrary, the
Money Suits of the Respondent before the Learned District Court, at
Gangtok, is for recovery of a sum of Rs.10,11,044/- (Rupees ten
lakhs, eleven thousand and forty-four) only, and Rs.22,74,914/(Rupees twenty-two lakhs, seventy-four thousand, nine-hundred
and fourteen) only. Thus, clearly there is a disparity in the amounts
and as correctly observed by the Learned Trial Court, it does not
mean that merely because the parties are the same the cause of
action too is identical. Consequently, had the Petitioner filed his list
of documents, it would have assisted the Courts to arrive at a
finding as to whether the issues were the same in the matters
before the aforementioned two Courts, directly and substantially,
this is not the case.
17.
Admittedly, Notice
has not
been received by the
Respondent in connection with the suits filed by the Petitioner in the
Court at Kolkata, to gauge the cause of action. In the absence of
formal intimation or knowledge of the filing of the suits, can we hold
the Suits of the Respondent to be harassive? In my considered
opinion the response would undoubtedly be in the negative. Having
said that, I reiterate that sans any document furnished for perusal
of the learned Trial Court in Gangtok, it is well nigh impossible to
WP(C) Nos.20 and 21 of 2017
Pawan Kumar Todi
vs. Shri Ankit Sarda
arrive at a finding as to whether the issues involved in the Money
Suits filed by the Respondent before the District Judge at Gangtok
and that filed by the Petitioner in the City Civil Court at Kolkata
involve issues directly and substantially identical.
18.
In conclusion therefore, I find no infirmity in the finding
and Order of the Learned District Judge, East Sikkim, at Gangtok,
which accordingly sustains.
19.
Petitions filed by the Petitioner under Article 227 stands
dismissed and disposed of.
20.
Records of the Learned Trial Court be remitted forthwith
along with a copy of this Judgment.
21.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
13.11.2017
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