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[2026:RJ-JP:10069]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16479/2023
Panchayat Samiti Jhotwara, Jaipur Through Development Officer,
Panchayat Samiti Jhotwara, Jaipur.
----Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
1.
Durga S/o Ruda,
2.
Devilal S/o Ruda,
3.
Kesarlal S/o Chhitar,
4.
Prakash S/o Chhitar,
5.
Omprakash S/o Chhitar,
6.
Ramchandra S/o Dhanna,
7.
Lala S/o Dhanna,
8.
Tota Ram S/o Hanuman,
9.
Kana Ram S/o Hanuman,
10.
Ramswaroop S/o Hanuman,
11.
Roopa S/o Birda – Deceased
11/1. Kalyan Sahai S/o Roop Narayan,
11/2. Damodar Lal S/o Roop Narayan,
11/3. Harinarayan S/o Roop Narayan,
All are resident of Village Achanchukya, Tehsil & District
Jaipur.
12.
Gram Panchayat Begus, Tehsil Jaipur District Jaipur
Through Sarpanch
----Respondents
13.
State Of Rajasthan, Through District Collector, Jaipur
District Jaipur.
----Proforma Respondent
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur, AAG
Mr. Ashutosh Udawat
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. R.B. Mathur, Sr. Adv. With
Mr. Dheeraj Kumar Palia
(2 of 10)
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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI
Order
09/03/2026
1.
The present writ petition has been filed against the order
dated 28.05.2014 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer
in Appeal No. Appeal/Decree/T.A./6941/2012/Jaipur. The said
order was passed in an appeal filed against the judgment dated
26.06.2008 passed by the learned Revenue Appellate Authority,
Jaipur in Appeal No.119/2004, which was dismissed solely on the
ground of delay.
2.
Learned counsel Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur, learned Additional
Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Udawat, Advocate,
appearing for the petitioners submits that a detailed justification
explaining the specific cause for the delay in filing the appeal
before the learned Board of Revenue was submitted. However, the
same has not been considered by the learned Board of Revenue in
the
right
perspective
and
without
considering
the
facts
enumerated in the application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, the appeal has been dismissed.
3.
Learned counsel further submits that it was only on account
of political reasons that the said delay occured and by not
condoning the same, loss to public exchequer and public interest
has been caused. Thus, the order dated 28.05.2014 deserves to
be set aside and the appeal filed by the petitioners before the
learned Board of Revenue against the order dated 26.06.2008 be
heard and decided on merits.
4.
Learned counsel Mr. R.B. Mathur, Senior Advocate, assisted
by Mr. Dheeraj Kumar Palia, Advocate, submits that not only the
(3 of 10)
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appeal was filed before the learned Board of Revenue with a delay
of 4 years and 50 days, but even the writ petition preferred before
this Court has been filed after a colossal delay of around 9 years
and no justification whatsoever has been submitted for the said
delay in the writ petition.
5.
Learned counsel further submits that the said conduct itself
demonstrates
the
lackadaisical
approach
adopted
by
the
petitioners and they cannot be permitted to take advantage of
their own wrong.
6.
Learned counsel further submits that the order dated
28.05.2014
duly
considers
the
justification
given
by
the
petitioners with respect to the delay, and a specific finding has
been recorded that the petitioners have miserably failed to justify
the delay in filing the appeal. Thus, the order dated 28.05.2014
has been passed strictly in accordance with law and the writ
petition deserved to be dismissed on ground of delay and laches
as well.
7.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
8.
Though the State can expect to be granted some latitude
with respect to the action or inaction of its officers, the said
inaction cannot travel beyond a particular point so as to defeat the
entire legal process. The law of limitation is founded on public
policy to ensure that litigation is initiated within a reasonable time
and stale claims are not revived at the whim of a negligent
litigant.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General & Ors. v.
Living Media India Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563,
has categorically held that government departments cannot claim
(4 of 10)
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a special privilege in matters of limitation and that bureaucratic
delays cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
Relevant paras of the judgment read as under:
“27.It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28.Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona
fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly
binds
everybody,
including
the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government
bodies,
their
agencies
and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception
and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
the government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few.”
10. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha &
Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School,
reported
in
SCC
OnLine
SC
191,
reiterated
that
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condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right and
the burden lies upon the applicant to establish sufficient cause for
the entire period of delay. The Court further observed that
stereotyped explanations reflecting merely procedural movement
of files cannot justify the exercise of judicial discretion under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Relevant paras of the judgment
read as under:
“ 17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India authoring the judgment for a
coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji
(supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with
an order of condonation of delay passed by the
relevant high court. However, it was observed that a
distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’
and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for
condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a
different approach has to be adopted while this Court
is considering an application for condonation of delay
in presentation of an appeal/application and when it
sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high
court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In
the case of the former, whether to condone or not
would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of discretion
in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has to
be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in
any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and
Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the
exasperation and consequent lament expressed by
none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in
course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of
Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay
and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not
acting with promptitude. This order was made within
six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We
can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety
hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned
senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November
16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite
some time in the past, this Court has been
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making observations as to the grave prejudice
caused to public interest by appeals brought on
behalf of the Government being lost on the
point of limitation. Such observations have
been made for over a few years in the past. But
there seems to be no conspicuous improvement
as is apparent in the present petition which is
filed in November 1993. The explanation for the
delay, had better be set out in petitioner's own
words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the
special leave petition drafted from the
drafting Advocate and sent the same
for approval to the Board on June 24,
1993 along with the case file. (h) The
Board returned the case file to the
Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993
who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that
draft SLP was not approved by the
Board. The Board after approving the
draft SLP sent this file to CAS on
October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a
judicially acceptable ground for condonation of
delay. After the earlier observations of this
Court made in several cases in the past, we
hoped that the matters might improve. There
seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which even
the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having
regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed,
in the case of the former the decisions to
present and prosecute appeals are not
individual but are institutional decisions
necessarily bogged down by the proverbial redtape. But there are limits to this also. Even with
all this latitude, the explanation offered for the
delay in this case merely serves to aggravate
the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in
protecting its common interests. The affidavit is
again one of the stereotyped affidavits making
it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue
does not seem to attach any importance to the
need for promptitude even where it affects its
own interest.
(7 of 10)
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[CW-16479/2023]
4. The application for condonation of delay is,
accordingly, dismissed. The special leave
petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by
time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders(supra), one after the other, leaves none in
doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to
lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid
down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra),
with much optimism that matters would improve.
Their Lordships, however, found no visible support for
such optimism and the Court's patience having been
tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point
beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant
even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High
Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that
its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High
Court, this Court has been approached by the State of
Odisha four months after expiry of the period of
limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the
Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the
latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear
opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the
State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame
excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set
up.”
11. Similarly, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka
Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court disapproved condonation of an
inordinate delay of 3966 days and observed that constitutional
courts
cannot
become
“surrogates
for
State
lethargy”,
emphasizing that the adequacy of explanation for the entire period
of delay is the decisive factor and not merely the length of delay.
Relevant paras of the judgment read as under:
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(8 of 10)
[CW-16479/2023]
“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned
order of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it
appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as
a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we
want to convey an emphatic message to all the High
Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous
and superficial grounds, until a proper case of
sufficient cause is made out, wherein the Statemachinery is able to establish that it acted with bona
fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure
is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But
courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts,
ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating
State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of
limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing
effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or
its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a
State-authority. They should not become surrogates
for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts
ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a
private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations
of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later
stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting
trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to
reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient
cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult
to the injury, more particularly in appeals under
Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is
already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
than the importance of judicial time, what worries us
is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate
and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations
deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold,
because, say if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation
of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens
the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is
our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent
from pillar to post to seek justice.
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(9 of 10)
[CW-16479/2023]
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts
to misuse the process of law.”
12.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joint Collector Ranga
Reddy District and Anr. Vs. D. Narsing Rao & Others,
reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 has categorically held as under:
“31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional
jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or
transactions were to remain forever open to challenge,
it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in
human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because,
even when there is no period of limitation prescribed
for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay,
may have led to creation of third-party rights, that
cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a
discretionary power especially when no cogent
explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is
said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in
cases where the orders sought to be revised are
fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a
reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply
describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will
not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for
otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself
be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests
such power in an authority.”
13.
In the present case, not only the appeal before the learned
Board of Revenue, Ajmer was filed with a delay of more than four
years, but even the writ petition challenging the order dated
28.05.2014 has been filed before this Court after a passage of
about 9 years. The memo of the writ petition fails to justify the
said delay, and no pleading whatsoever has been made, much less
any sufficient ground to justify the delay in filing of the present
writ petition.
14.
It is a trite principle of law that for seeking condonation of
delay, each day’s delay has to be explained, however, in the
present case no justification whatsoever has even been tendered
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(10 of 10)
[CW-16479/2023]
for the delay of 9 years in filing the present writ petition. Thus,
there is no occasion whatsoever for this Court to entertain the writ
petition, much less to interfere with the order dated 28.05.2014
passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer and accordingly,
the same is affirmed.
15.
Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed.
16.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
(ANUROOP SINGHI),J
VINAY MEENA /47
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