Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/16
GAHC010293312019
undefined
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/8870/2019
PABAN ALI @ PAWAN MAJEE
S/O LT. ABDUL KADER @ KADER MAJEE @ KALER ALI, R/O TIHU TOWN
WARD NO. 3, P.S. AND PO. TIHU, DIST. NALBARI, ASSAM, PIN-781371
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS.
REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME
AFFAIRS, SHASTRI BHAWAN TRILOK MARK, NEW DELHI-110001
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT
OF ASSAM
HOME DEPTT. DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006
3:THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY
NIRBACHAN BHAWAN
NEW DELHI-1
4:THE STATE OF CO-ORDINATOR
NATIONAL REGISTER OF CITIZENS (NRC)
ASSAM
BHANGAGARH
GUWAHATI-781005
5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
NALBARI
P.O. AND P.S. NALBARI
DIST. NALBARI
ASSAM
Page No.# 2/16
PIN-781335
6:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B)
NALBARI
P.O. AND P.S. NALBARI
DIST. NALBARI
ASSAM
PIN-78133
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. A HUSSAIN,
Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., SC, ECI,SC, NRC,SC, F.T
BEFORE
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE Pranjal Das
Advocate for the petitioner :
Shri A. Hussain
Advocates for the respondents :
Shri J. Payeng, SC- Home Deptt. & NRC,
Shri P. Sarma, GA, Assam;
Shri AI Ali, SC - ECI.
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 23.07.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 29.07.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the
judgment?
: NA
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced?
: Yes
Judgment & Order
(S.K. Medhi, J.)
The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked
by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting
to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 29.05.2018
Page No.# 3/16
passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.1, Nalbari in F.T. (Nal) Case No.
502/2010 (SP Reference No. 198/2007). By the impugned judgment, the
petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been
declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971.
2.
The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:
(i)
A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Nagaon
District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. (Nal)
Case No. 502/2010.
(ii)
As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that
the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written
statement on 02.05.2017 along with certain documents and adduced
evidence through 3 nos. of OPWs.
(iii)
The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances
and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as
opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him
and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to
be a foreign national post 25.03.1971.
3.
We have heard Shri A. Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have
also heard Shri J. Payeng, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC;
Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam and Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel,
Election Commission of India. We have also carefully examined the records
which were requisitioned vide an order dated 12.05.2020.
4.
Shri Hussain, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that
Page No.# 4/16
there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the
said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this
regard, he has referred to the evidence adduced through 3 nos. of OPWs
including himself as OPW1 and also the following documentary evidence:
(i) Ext-1 – Elector Photo Identity Card;
(ii) Ext-2 – Voter List of 1997;
(iii) Ext-3 – Voter List of 2016;
(iv) Ext-4 – Gaonburah Certificate;
(v) Ext-5 – High School Certificate;
(vi) Ext-6 – PRC;
(vii) Ext-7 – NRC;
(viii) Ext-8 – Tax Payment Certificate;
(ix) Ext-9 – Certificate from Tihu Town Committee;
(ix) Ext-10 – Another School Certificate from J.B. School;
(x) Ext-11 – Admission Register of Tihu Adarsa Nimna Buniadi Vidyalay.
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written
statement, all material disclosures were made. It is submitted that the petitioner
had attended a school where he got admitted on 21.09.1970 and in this
connection, he has proved the School Certificate dated 08.09.1986 as Ext.10.
Another School Certificate dated 25.08.1986 of Tihu Boys High School was
proved as Ext.5. Reliance has also been placed on a Certificate dated
06.05.2013 issued by the Gaonburah which was proved by the Gaonburah as
OPW3. The petitioner has also relied upon a Voters List of 1955 containing the
Page No.# 5/16
name of his father from which a link has been sought to be established.
Reliance has also been made on a Voters List of the 1997 containing the name
of the petitioner with the father’s name. A similar Voters List of the year 2016
has been relied upon containing his name. It is also submitted that the Tihu
Town Committee has issued a Certificate dated 21.07.2017 that the father of the
petitioner was paying house tax since the year 1966-67.
6.
The learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that in view of
the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have
been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires
interference.
7.
Per contra, Shri Payeng, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department
has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits
that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals)
Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner
or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the
proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely
upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act,
1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However,
in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is
also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would
be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee
has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only
thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in.
8.
The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written
statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation
Page No.# 6/16
of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case
lacks details and is totally vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the
petitioner and there are no details of the family members. The names of the
mother and siblings have not been stated in the written statement. In this
connection, he has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India
reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665:
“17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon
the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country.
In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to
give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his
parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of
birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)
(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the
personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State
authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if
necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a
person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but
almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points.
This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
9.
He has submitted that though a Voters List of 1955 containing the name of
the projected father was mentioned in the written statement, the same was not
exhibited. He has also highlighted that though it is projected that the petitioner
Page No.# 7/16
was born prior to 1971 in India, there is not even a single documentary
evidence in that regard. He has also submitted that the School Certificate Ext.10
was not trustworthy as the same was given on a blank piece of paper without
any letter head and the name of the school itself differs in the rubber stamp. He
has also submitted that though the same was proved by OPW2, the School
Register did not support issuance of such certificate and there was no counter
signature of the Deputy Inspector of Schools. He has also submitted that the
Certificate was issued belatedly without any explanation. In this regard, he has
relied upon a case of Hamida Begum Vs. Union of India [judgment dated
06.06.2018 passed in WP(C)/2294/2016] and the following observations
have been pressed into service:
“22. Ext.3 is a School Leaving/Transfer Certificate dated 28.08.2002 issued
by the Headmaster of Zarerbazar ME School, Karimganj certifying that
Hamida Begum was the daughter of late Md. Abdul Wahab and that she
had left the school on 31.12.1989 after passing Class-V examination. As
per admission register, her date of birth was 20.05.1978.
24. This certificate can be of no assistance to the petitioner for more than
one reason. Firstly, as per this certificate, petitioner had left the school on
31.12.1989. This certificate was issued 13 years thereafter on 28.09.2002.
Such belated issuance of the certificate would naturally raise legitimate
questions about the bona fides of the said certificate. That part, law on
this point is well-settled. School admission register is not a public record
within the meaning of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, it
is necessary that contents of the school admission register would have to
be proved.”
10.
He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum
Page No.# 8/16
vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain
observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which
read as follows:
“9.
On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and
opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari
jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts
reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned
opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from
illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on
evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal
refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not
been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the
face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
11.
He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rupajan Begum vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579, wherein
it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly,
the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents.
12.
The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ
petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated.
Page No.# 9/16
13.
The learned counsel for the rest of the respondents have supported the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of
its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the
decision-making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is
submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decisionmaking process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a
reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time
frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national
security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is
taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to
prove the citizenship through cogent, credible and acceptable evidence.
14.
The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials
placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been
carefully perused.
15.
With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of
the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a
proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts.
In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is
extracted hereinbelow“9.
Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any
question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction
given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not
Page No.# 10/16
a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that
such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class
or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such
person.”
16.
In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which
followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of
Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context
of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which are extracted hereinbelow“22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or
with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or
description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his
entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their
arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is
Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as
the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order
made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises
whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner
or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a
person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as
he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High
Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima
Page No.# 11/16
facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an
order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the
Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that
onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.”
17.
Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the
submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the
present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings
based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be
interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.
18.
Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after
discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ
of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in
Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No.
3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows:
“49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something
important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law
governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which
Page No.# 12/16
the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the
inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some
action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and
invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an
extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded
on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this
flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity
projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the
realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to
be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after
setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the
High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable
consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal
court of appeal which it is not.”
19.
In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and
apparently, has not met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to
Page No.# 13/16
disclose the following:
(i) his date of birth;
(ii) place of birth;
(iii) name of his parents;
(iv) their place of birth and citizenship.
20.
Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the
grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within
the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State.
21.
So far as the School Certificates are concerned, the Certificate dated
25.08.1986 of the Tihu Boys High School was not proved by the concerned
authorities and therefore, cannot be construed as admissible evidence. So far as
the School Certificate dated 08.09.1986 is concerned, the same appears to be
proved by the subsequent Headmaster, who as OPW2 had stated that it was
signed by the earlier Headmaster. However, the document suffers from certain
inherent defects which renders the entire document untrustworthy. Firstly, the
Certificate is on a blank piece of paper without any letter head. Secondly, the
Certificate which is written in Assamese language states the name of the school
as “Tihu Adarsh Nimna Bu. Bi.”. However, there is a rubber stamp beneath the
signature stating the name of the school in English language as “ Tihu J.B.
School”. Thirdly, while the Certificate states that the petitioner was admitted in
the School on 29.01.1970, the Certificate was issued after long 16 years which
also did not bear the counter signature of the Deputy Inspector of Schools.
There is also mismatch in the name of the petitioner; while the petitioner has
been named as Md. Paban Ali, Son of Md. Abdul Kader, from the other
Page No.# 14/16
materials, the name appears as Md. Paban Majee. We have also noticed that the
version of the petitioner in his cross-examination as OPW1 is that he read in the
Adarsh Nimna Buniyadi Vidyalay up to Class VI in 1970 which is clearly
inconsistent with the contents of the Certificate. This Court also finds force in
the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that this aspect was not
mentioned in the evidence in chief and only the School Certificate of 1970 was
inserted by hand and further that the School Register did not disclose issuance
of the certificate. Further, in his chief-examination, the petitioner had stated that
he was a student of Tihu Boys High School from 1970 to 1977 which is
inconsistent.
22.
So far as the Gaonburah Certificate is concerned, though the same was
proved by the Gaonburah as OPW3, the same would not be a conclusive proof
of the citizenship of the petitioner inasmuch as, the Certificate is only in
connection with the petitioner being a resident of the locality.
23.
So far as the Voters List of 1955 is concerned, the same is only a
photocopy and not admissible evidence. Further, the name of the projected
father has been stated to be Kadir Majih whereas in other documents, the name
of the father is Md. Abdul Kader. We are also of the view that when the
petitioner claims to have been born on 30.04.1965, the only requirement is to
prove the said fact of his birth on the said date in India which the petitioner has
failed to do. So far as the Voters List containing the name of the petitioner, the
first is of the year 1997 wherein the name has been stated to as Paban Ali with
father’s name as Abdul. As noted above, there are inconsistencies both in the
name of the petitioner as well as the name of his father. That apart, what is
intriguing is that the age of the petitioner is stated to be 28 years in the said
Voters List. There is no explanation as to why there are no Voters List of
Page No.# 15/16
previous years containing the name of the petitioner as it appears that the
petitioner had attained the age of voting in the year 1989.
24.
We have also noted that in the written statement, while the petitioner had
mentioned the name of his father and grandfather, there is no disclosure of the
other relevant and necessary facts like the name of his mother and the names
of his siblings. On the other hand, in the cross-examination, the petitioner as
OPW1 had stated that he has three brothers and one sister. It is trite law that
there cannot be inconsistency in the pleadings and the evidence and no
improvement can be made in the evidence.
25.
So far as the Certificate dated 21.07.2017 issued by the Tihu Town
Committee is concerned, this Court, upon verification with the records of the
learned Tribunal, find force in the contention of Shri Payeng, the learned
Standing Counsel that a different document was exhibited as Ext.9 which
pertains to the period 1975.
26.
We are of the view that the petitioner, as proceedee had failed to
discharge his burden to prove his citizenship.
27.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the impugned order dated 29.05.2018 passed by the learned Foreigners
Tribunal No.1, Nalbari in F.T. (Nal) Case No. 502/2010 (SP Reference No.
198/2007) does not call for any interference.
28.
The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed
earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by
the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law.
29.
The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith,
Page No.# 16/16
along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review