Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/13
GAHC010242242025
2026:GAU-AS:7233
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRP(IO)/445/2025
ON THE DEATH OF OMOR ALI HIS HEIRS AND REPRESENTATIVES BAHAR
ALI AND 5 ORS
S/O- LATE OMOR ALI, R/O- VILL.- KHUDRA POITARI, P.S. LAKHIPUR, P.O.
CHUNARI, DIST. GOALPARA, ASSAM, PIN- 783129.
2: SAHAR ALI
S/O- LATE OMOR ALI
R/O- VILL.- KHUDRA POITARI
P.S. LAKHIPUR
P.O. CHUNARI
DIST. GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN- 783129.
3: ABDUL AZIZ
S/O- LATE OMOR ALI
R/O- VILL.- KHUDRA POITARI
P.S. LAKHIPUR
P.O. CHUNARI
DIST. GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN- 783129.
4: ABDUL HANIF
S/O- LATE OMOR ALI
R/O- VILL.- KHUDRA POITARI
P.S. LAKHIPUR
P.O. CHUNARI
DIST. GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN- 783129.
5: MUSSTT OMELA KHATUN
D/O- LATE OMOR ALI
Page No.# 2/13
R/O- VILL.- KHUDRA POITARI
P.S. LAKHIPUR
P.O. CHUNARI
DIST. GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN- 783129.
6: MUSSTT HAJERA KHATUN
D/O- LATE OMOR ALI
R/O- VILL.- KHUDRA POITARI
P.S. LAKHIPUR
P.O. CHUNARI
DIST. GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN- 783129
VERSUS
INSAN ALI
S/O. HAZI MOINUDDIN, R/O.- VILL. JOYBHUM, P.S. LAKHIPUR, P.O.
JOYBHUM, DIST. GOALPARA, ASSAM, PIN- 783129.
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. A C SARMA, MR G BHARADWAJ,MR B DEORI
Advocate for the Respondent : MR. A RAHMAN, MR. A IKBAL,MR. A RAHMAN,MS S
SIDDIQUA,FOR CAVEATOR
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
ORDER
Date : 25.05.2026
Heard Mr. A.C. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. G. Bharadwaj,
learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. A. Ikbal, learned counsel for
the respondent.
2.
In this petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioners have challenged the orders dated 04.07.2022 and 13.10.2025,
Page No.# 3/13
passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Goalpara, in Title
Execution Case No. 4/2011.
3.
It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, dated 04.07.2022, the
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Goalpara (‘executing Court’, for
short) had directed to start the execution proceeding and vide impugned order,
dated 13.10.2025, it had dismissed the petition No. 269/2022, filed by the
petitioners under Section 47, read with Section 151 of the CPC.
4.
Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that the
decree holder/respondent herein, as plaintiff had instituted a suit, being Title
Suit No. 94/1979, against the judgment debtor/ petitioners herein, for
declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit land and for permanent
injunction, against the defendant Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, and thereafter, the suit
was decreed on 18.04.1984, but, the said decree was not executed for 27 years.
Mr. Sarma also submits that the judgment debtor and their predecessor, have
been in possession of the suit land since 1960 and the decree holder had no
possession of the suit land and therefore, the decree holder did not think of
executing the decree of injunction for a long time. Mr. Sarma further submits
that the judgment debtors due to their peaceful and continuous possession of
the suit land, filed a title suit bearing No. 24/2003, against the present decree
holder and accordingly, the said Title Suit No. 24/2003, was decreed vide
judgment and decree, dated 31.12.2004, and thereafter, the defendants
including the present decree holder filed an appeal, being Title Appeal No.
14/2005, before the Court of learned Civil Judge and the learned Civil Judge,
vide judgment and decree, dated 14.09.2005, had affirmed the decision of the
learned trial Court on all the issues except the issue of setting aside of the
judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 94/1979.
Page No.# 4/13
4.1. Mr. Sarma also submits that the effect of the judgment passed in Title Suit
No. 24/2003, and Title Appeal No. 14/2005, is that the judgment debtors of the
instant execution case, who have perfected the title in the suit land by adverse
possession and the decree along with the decree of permanent injunction,
making the instant decree of the decree holder a nullity, and as such inexecutable, and that there is a clear and categorical finding in the judgment
passed in Title Suit No. 24/2003 and Title Appeal No. 14/ 2005 that it is the
present judgments debtors who have been in continuous physical possession of
the suit land and therefore, the decree sought to be executed is in-executable
as per law and on such count, the title execution case is liable to be dismissed.
4.2. Mr. Sarma also submits that the report of the Nazir dated 18.12.2021,
submitted pursuant to an order of the court indicates that the present
judgments debtors, not the decree holder, are in physical possession of the suit
land and therefore, the present decree, dated 14.09.2005, is in-executable and
as such, the execution case is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Sarma further submits
that in Title Suit No. 24/2003, filed against the present decree holder, all the
issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff/judgment debtor and the issue
Nos. 6 and 7 bearing the question as to whether the decree passed in Title Suit
No. 94/1979, was obtained fraudulently and was liable to be set aside, were
decided in affirmative in favour of the present judgment debtor; and that that
the issues on the counter claim set up by the present decree holder were
decided in favour of the present judgment debtor and the counter claim set up
by the present decree holder in Title Suit No. 24/2003, was accordingly
dismissed. Mr. Sarma also submits that the suit land in Title Suit No. 24/2003 is
the same with that of the present execution case, and the measurement,
position and description of the land are also the same; and that since the last 27
Page No.# 5/13
years, the present decree holder could not show that the present judgment
debtor was dispossessed from the suit land and therefore, the right of the
present decree holder has been extinguished on the ground of adverse
possession over the suit land by the present judgment debtor, and as such, the
decree sought to be executed is a nullity and therefore, the learned executing
Court has no jurisdiction to execute the same.
4.3. In support of his submission, Mr. Sarma has referred to the following
decisions:
(i)
Hameed Joharan (Dead) and Ors. vs. Abdul Salam (Dead)
by LRs. and Ors., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 573.
(ii)
Kuldip Kaur vs. Satnam Singh, reported in (2018) 2 ICC
459.
(iii)
Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi, reported in
(2012) 4 SCC 307.
(iv)
Ishwar Sharan alias Ishwar Sharan Das (dead) and Anr.
vs. Bharat Kumar and Ors., in Civil Revision No. 49/2022.
4.4. Notably, in the case of Kanwar Singh Saini(supra) Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that in case there is a grievance of non-compliance with the terms of
the decree passed in the civil suit, the remedy available to the aggrieved person
is to approach the execution court under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC which provides
for elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and
can examine and cross-examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in
contempt which are summary in nature. It has also been held that execution of
an injunction decree is to be made in pursuance of Order 21 Rule 32 CPC as the
CPC provides a particular manner and mode of execution and therefore, no
other mode is permissible.
Page No.# 6/13
4.5.
In Hameed Joharan (Dead)(supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court and in
Kuldip Kaur(supra), Punjab and Haryana High Court respectively have dealt
with Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the case of Hameed Joharan
(supra), it has been held that Article 136 of the Act of 1963 prescribes a
twelve-year period certain and what is relevant for Article 136 is, as to when the
decree became enforceable and not when the decree became executable.
4.6. In the case of Ishwar Sharan alias Ishwar Sharan Das (dead)
(supra) Allahabad High Court has held that a single revision can lie against
several impugned orders, if the nature of the orders are same.
5.
On the other hand, Mr. Ikbal, learned counsel for the respondent, submits
that the land mentioned in Title Suit No. 24/2003, and the instant execution
proceeding are different, and that in respect of the execution of the decree,
passed in favour of the decree holder on 18.01.1984, the judgment debtor had
filed an objection petition on 04.02.2022, which was heard and decided on
04.07.2022, and accordingly, the said objection petition was rejected, and till
date, no revision petition was filed by the judgment debtor. But, on the same
subject matter, the petition No. 269/22, was filed on 06.08.2022, by the same
judgment debtors and hence the said petition is barred by the principle of resjudicata, under Section 11 of the CPC. Mr. Ikbal also submits that the decree
holder is being disturbed in his peaceful possession over the decretal land, and
therefore, he had filed a petition for execution of the decree, and there is no
limitation period for execution of a decree of permanent injunction. Mr. Ikbal
further submits that when the judgment debtor disturbed the peaceful
possession of the decretal land, the respondent herein had instituted the
execution proceeding, even though 27 years had elapsed in the meantime, and
that against the decision passed in Title Appeal No. 14/2005, the judgment
Page No.# 7/13
debtors did not file any appeal and that is the reason why on the confirmation
of the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 94/1979, the decree holder
is entitled to the benefit of permanent injunction, which cannot be challenged
by the judgment debtors in the execution proceeding. Mr. Iqbal referring to a
decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dagadabai v. Abbas, reported in
(2017) 13 SCC 705, also submits that - it is a settled principle of law of
adverse possession that a person, who claims title over the property on the
strength of adverse possession and thereby wants the Court to divest the true
owner of his ownership rights over such property, is required to prove his case
only against the true owner of the property and that it is equally well settled
that such person must necessarily first admit the ownership of the true owner
over the property to the knowledge of the true owner and secondly, the true
owner has to be made a party to the suit to enable the Court to decide the plea
of adverse possession between the two rival claimants. Mr. Ikbal also submits
that the plea of nullity of the decree is vague in nature, and under such
circumstances, he has contended to dismiss this petition.
5.1. In support of his submission, Mr. Ikbal has referred to the following
decisions:
(i)
Aainuddin Dewan vs. Haran Ali and Ors., reported in
(2000) 2 GLT 121.
(ii)
Bhudev Mallick alias Bhudeb Mallick and Anr. vs.
Ranajit Ghoshal and Ors., reported in 2025 0 Supreme(SC) 300.
(iii)
Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar and Ors., reported in
(2005) 1 SCC 787.
(iv)
Kalyani Swain and Ors. vs. Bijay Kumar Swain and Ors.,
in CMP No. 153 of 2024.
(v)
Dipali Biswas and Ors. vs. Nirmalendu Mukherjee and
Ors., reported in AIR 2021 SC 4756.
Page No.# 8/13
6.
Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, this
Court has carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on
record, and has also perused the impugned orders dated 04.07.2022 and
13.10.2025, and the decisions referred to by learned counsel for both the
parties.
7.
It appears that the learned executing Court, vide impugned order, dated
13.10.2025, had held that the execution proceeding is not barred by the law of
limitation in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the
limitation period of execution of decree by clarifying that an application for the
enforcement of execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not
be subject to period of limitation, and that Section 50 of the CPC deals with
execution of decrees of all kinds, including that of permanent injunction. The
learned executing Court further held that after filing of the execution
proceeding, the learned counsel for the judgment debtor had filed a written
objection with a prayer to dismiss the execution suit as the instant suit is not
executable under provisions of CPC, and that the objection filed by the
judgment debtor is not tenable.
7.1. While deciding the issue of res-judicata, the learned executing Court had
discussed the judgment of the this Court in Ashutosh Kundu vs. Laksheswar
Talukdar, reported in 2018 (2) GLT 900, and thereafter, applying the ratio
laid down in the said decision, in the title execution case, it had held that the
subject matter and the matter in issue in the objection petition. And in the
petition bearing No. 269/22, are directly and substantially the same, and
thereafter, dealing with the issue of nullity of the decree passed in Title Suit No.
94/1979, the learned executing Court had relied upon the judgment of this
Court in PN Pharma Marketing Service Pvt. Ltd. (M/S) and Another
Page No.# 9/13
vs. Nicholas Piramal India Limited (M/S), and held that the executing
Court cannot go beyond the decree and it has to execute the decree as it is.
Thereafter, relying upon a decision of Supreme Court in Rafique Bibi (D) By
L.Rs vs. Sayed Walledudin (D) BY L. Rs and Others, reported in AIR
2003 SC 3789, the learned executing Court had held that decree, not inexecutable as being without jurisdiction or a nullity, rather can be termed as
illegal decree on account of procedural irregularity and a plea not taken before
passing decree cannot be allowed to be raised during execution proceeding.
7.2. Further, relying upon another decision passed of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs. Raja Bhai Abdul Rehman and
Others, reported in (1970) 1 SCC 670, the learned executing Court has held
that objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding, if the
objection appears on the face of the record. But, where the objection as to
jurisdiction of the Court to pass decree does not appear on the face of the
record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial
or which would have been, but have not been raised, the executing Court will
have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree
even on the ground of absence. Thereafter, it had held that the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the objection as to the validity of the decree at that
stage as the same was not apparent on the face of the record and requires
examination of the questions raised and decided at the stage of trial, and that
since the plea of nullity of the decree was not taken during appeal, the Court
has no jurisdiction to declare the decree passed as nullity at that stage.
7.3. Further, the learned executing Court had held that though the plea of
continuous possession of the suit land was taken by the judgment debtor and
the decree holder had no possession over the suit land and therefore, the right
Page No.# 10/13
of the present decree holder is extinguished in virtue of adverse possession over
the suit land by the present judgment debtor, and thereafter, held that Section
144 is applicable to case of dispossession pending suit or where the decree is
varied or reversed in appeal and post decree dispossession in a decree for
permanent injunction needs to be redressed in an inquiry under Order 21 Rule
32 of the CPC after dispossession.
7.4. And based on the ratio laid down by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in
Kumapatri Mariymma, Krishna vs. Godavari Rup Kr. Krishna, reported
in AIR online 2024 AP 478, and that there is no time limit for an application
under Order 21 Rule 32 of the CPC. Thereafter, the learned executing Court had
held that since the present judgment debtor made fresh encroachment on the
disputed land, the decree holder came before the appropriate forum after 27
years and Article 136 of the Limitation Act prescribes no time period for filing of
any petition, and thereafter, it had rejected the petition.
8.
It is not in dispute that the decree in Title Suit No. 94/1979, was passed
about 27 years back and the Title Execution Case No. 4/2011, was instituted
after 27 years. Indisputably, no limitation period is prescribed under Article 136
of the Limitation Act for filing any petition for execution in respect of a decree
for permanent injunction.
9.
Though, Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that
the question of res-judicata does not arise, yet the said submission left this
Court unimpressed in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Y.B.
Patil vs. Y.L. Patil, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 66, wherein it has been
held that it is well settled that principles of res-judicata can be invoked not only
in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage
Page No.# 11/13
of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding
becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding .
Similar is the observation in the case of Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra) and in
the case of Kalyani Swain (supra).
10. Though Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has pointed
out that the earlier application was not filed under Section 47 of the CPC, but it
appears that though the Section is not the same, yet the contents of the
petition and the prayer being made are same and in that view of the matter and
also applying the ratio in the case of Y.B. Patil(supra), it can logically be
concluded that the principle of res-judicata is applicable in the given factual
scenario of the case in hand and the learned executing court had rightly applied
the same. This court has carefully gone through the decision referred by Mr.
Sarma, and finds that the ratio laid down in the said cases would not come into
his assistance for the reason discussed herein above.
11.
Thus, the submission of Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners is that by filing a subsequent suit, the right, title and interest of the
petitioners are perfected and also it is perfected by the adverse possession, left
this Court unimpressed in view of the fact that there is categorical finding of the
learned executing Court that the petitioners had dispossessed the decree holder,
subsequently, and the issue has to be addressed under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC.
12. This court has also gone through the other decisions referred by Mr. Iqbal,
learned counsel for the petitioner and finds that the same also strengthened his
submission. In the case of Aainuddin Dewan (supra) a co-ordinate bench of
this court had dealt with issue of injunction and restoration of possession. It has
been held para No.7 as under:-
Page No.# 12/13
“7. I am in respectful agreement with the decisions quoted
above. It is the duty and responsibility of the court to see
that an order of injunction passed by it is meticulously
implemented/followed, otherwise an order of injunction will
be a mere paper tiger without having the force to bite. That
is not the purpose for granting an order of injunction. An
order of injunction creates certain rights and liabilities
between the parties and that order of injunction must be
enforced by the court by passing necessary order. That is
also necessary to shorten the litigation inasmuch as if that
is not done, by executing a decree for perpetual injunction,
a person may be put in possession on a particular date and
on the next date, by using muscle power the Defendant may
again take back the possession of the land. It cannot be the
object or the purpose of law. In such a situation, a person
so dispossessed is not to go again for a fresh round of
litigation to establish his right, and to get the order for
recovery of possession. He can approach the court by filing
necessary application u/s 151 of CPC to obtain an order for
restoration of possession and the court in such a situation
can always give back/restore the possession.”
12.1. In the case of Dipali Biswas (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that a judgment debtor cannot be allowed to raise objections as to the method
of execution in installments. After having failed to raise the issue in four earlier
rounds of litigation, the appellants cannot be permitted to raise it in subsequent
stages. Thus, the proposition laid down in the aforesaid cases also strengthened
the submission of Mr. Ikbal.
13. In the result, having examined the impugned orders in the light of the
submissions of learned counsel for both the parties and the decisions referred
by them, and also in the given facts and circumstances, this Court finds no merit
in this petition and accordingly, the same stands dismissed, leaving the parties
Page No.# 13/13
to bear their own costs.
14. Interim order passed earlier, if any, stands vacated.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review