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Page No.# 1/23
GAHC010214212019
2026:GAU-AS:8387
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : RSA/79/2021
ON THE DEATH OF MD. NASIR KHAN HIS LEGAL HEIRS
REPRESENTED BY,
1.1: GULENA BEGUM
W/O LATE MD. NASIR KHAN
R/O VILLAGE- DIMOROGURI
KALIBARI PATH
NAGAON
MOUZA NIZSAHAR
DIST. NAGAON
ASSAM
1.2: AMZAD KHAN
S/O LATE MD. NASIR KHAN
R/O VILLAGE- DIMOROGURI
KALIBARI PATH
NAGAON
MOUZA NIZSAHAR
DIST. NAGAON
ASSAM
1.3: RASED KHAN
S/O LATE MD. NASIR KHAN
R/O VILLAGE- DIMOROGURI
KALIBARI PATH
NAGAON
MOUZA NIZSAHAR
DIST. NAGAON
ASSAM
1.4: BIKI KHAN
S/O LATE MD. NASIR KHAN
R/O VILLAGE- DIMOROGURI
KALIBARI PATH
Page No.# 2/23
NAGAON
MOUZA NIZSAHAR
DIST. NAGAON
ASSAM
1.5: NESIMA BEGUM
D/O LATE MD. NASIR KHAN
R/O VILLAGE- DIMOROGURI
KALIBARI PATH
NAGAON
MOUZA NIZSAHAR
DIST. NAGAON
ASSAM
1.6: RANI KHAN
D/O LATE MD. NASIR KHAN
R/O VILLAGE- DIMOROGURI
KALIBARI PATH
NAGAON
MOUZA NIZSAHAR
DIST. NAGAON
ASSA
VERSUS
MD. NURUL AMIN
S/O- LATE SIRAJUL HAQUE, R/O- VILL.- DIMOROGURI, KALIBARI PATH,
NAGAON, MOUZA- NIZSAHAR, DIST.- NAGAON, ASSAM.
Advocate for the appellants
:
Mr. M.U. Mahmud
Advocate for the respondent
:
Mr. M. Dutta, Sr. Adv.;
Mr. J. Mahanta
Date on which judgment is reserved
:
N/A
Date of pronouncement of judgment
:
12.06.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment?
:
N/A
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
:
Yes
Page No.# 3/23
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard
Mr. M. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. J. Mahanta, learned
counsel for the respondent.
2.
This appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, is directed against the
judgment dated 20.05.2019 and decree dated 01.06.2019, passed by the
learned Civil Judge, Nagaon, in Title Appeal No. 1/2018.
3.
It is to be noted here that vide judgment dated 20.05.2019 and decree
dated 01.06.2019, the learned Civil Judge, Nagaon (‘first appellate Court’, for
short) had reversed and set aside the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2017,
passed by the learned Munsiff No. 1, Nagaon (‘trial Court’, for short), in Title
Suit No. 138/2011.
4.
For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion, the status of the
parties hereinafter will be referred as indicated in the title suit before the
learned trial Court.
5.
The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, are briefly
stated as under:
“The defendant/appellant No. 1 herein (since deceased) was the owner
of the suit land, described in the schedule of the plaint and he had offered
to sell the said suit land belonging to him to the plaintiff/respondent
herein as he was in need of money. The plaintiff accepted the offer and
sale consideration was fixed at Rs.1,12,500/-. Thereafter, the defendant
Page No.# 4/23
executed a deed of agreement for sale (bainanama), bearing registration
No. 1762/2005, on 17.05.2005, in favour of the plaintiff and received a
sum of Rs.87,500/- from the plaintiff as earnest money. As per terms of
the said bainanama, the remaining amount of Rs. 25,000/- was to be paid
by the plaintiff within next three months and it was also agreed upon by
the parties that the defendant was to obtain sale permission and
thereafter, he was to execute a registered sale deed, on receipt of balance
consideration of Rs.25,000/-. However, the defendant did not obtain sale
permission as agreed upon till 31.12.2005, even though the plaintiff had
made several requests to him. The defendant, however, put the plaintiff in
possession of the suit land and he assured the plaintiff that he had no
reason to worry since he was in possession of the suit land. The plaintiff
was enquiring about the sale permission on several occasions from the
defendant. And on 01.09.2008, the plaintiff went to the defendant to
enquire about the sale permission. However, the defendant refused to sell
the suit land to the plaintiff.
Being aggrieved, the plaintiff had instituted Title Suit No. 138/2011,
seeking a decree for specific performance of the said bainanama i.e. deed
of agreement for sale, executed on 17.05.2005.
The defendant/appellant No. 1 herein (since deceased) had contested
the suit of the plaintiff/respondent herein, by filing written statement,
wherein he had taken a stand that he had not offered to sell the suit land
to the plaintiff and never entered into and executed the agreement for
sale and that he did not receive an amount of Rs.87,500/- as advance as
claimed. His further stand was that the suit property is a joint property of
the defendant and his siblings and he alone has no right to sell the same,
Page No.# 5/23
and that the agreement for sale is a manufactured and fraudulent
document, created by the plaintiff for unlawful gain, and on such count,
the same was liable to be dismissed.
Thereafter, the learned trial Court, upon pleading of the parties, had
framed the following issues:
1. Whether the suit is maintainable ?
2. Whether the defendant made contract to sale the land
mentioned in schedule (A) to the plaintiff and also
executed a deed of agreement for sale bearing
no.1762/05?
3. Whether
the
defendant
breached
the
conditions of the deed of agreement ?
4. Whether
the
plaintiff
is
relief/reliefs as sought for?
entitled
terms
and
to
any
5. To what other relief/reliefs the plaintiff is entitled
to?
Thereafter, the learned trial Court had examined as many as seven
witnesses of the plaintiff and one witness of the defendant and thereafter,
considering the evidence and documents adduced by both the parties,
decided the issues in favour of the plaintiff and partly decreed the suit on
contest with cost by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to a part decree
and he is not entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract.
However, he is entitled to the recovery of a sum Rs.87,500/- only from the
defendant, along with @ 6% interest per annum from the date of filing of
the suit till recovery with cost of the suit.
Being aggrieved, the plaintiff/respondent herein preferred an appeal,
being Title Appeal No. 1/2018, before the learned first appellate Court.
Page No.# 6/23
Thereafter, upon hearing learned counsel for both the parties and
considering the evidence adduced by them, the learned first appellate
Court had reversed and set aside the judgment and decree, dated
29.11.2017, passed by the learned trial Court and held that the
plaintiff/respondent herein is entitled to a decree as follows:
a)
A decree for specific performance of agreement for
sale (registered bainanama dt.17-05-05 bearing
registration No. 1762/05) in respect of the suit
schedule ‘A’ land;
b)
A decree declaring that the respondent (defendant)
is liable to execute a registered sale deed in
favour of the appellant (plaintiff) in pursuance of
agreement for sale dated 17-05-05 by obtaining sale
permission
immediately
on
receipt
of
balance
consideration amount of Rs. 25,000/- from the
appellant (plaintiff) on any day within next sixty
days;
c)
A decree that in the event of failure of the
respondent (defendant) to execute registered sale
deed in favour of the appellant (plaintiff) within
the aforesaid period of sixty days, the same (sale
deed) will be executed and registered by the Court
in favour of the appellant (plaintiff) on behalf of
the respondent (defendant), on deposit of balance
consideration amount of Rs. 25,000/- by the
appellant (plaintiff) in Court, within next 30 days,
as per provision of Rule 34 of Order 21 CPC.
d)
A decree for cost of the suit.
Them, being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, dated 20.05.2019
and decree dated 01.06.2019, so passed by the learned first appellate
Court, the defendant has preferred the present appeal before this Court,
Page No.# 7/23
which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:
(i)
Whether, the First Appellant court committed grave
errors of law and facts in not discussing and
deciding all the issues framed by Ld. Trial Court,
being the final court of facts though reiterated in
the appeal?
(ii) Whether, the defendant/appellant had the legal right
to execute a registered agreement for sale in
respect of land, measuring 2 katha 5 leecha,
covered by Dag No. 316/356/360, Patta No. 62 of
Dimoroguri Kissam, Mouza- Nizsahar, Dist- Nagaon,
Assam, when there are many other co-pattadars/
owners in the record of right/ zamabandi without
making them as parties?
(iii) Whether, the appellant/ defendant, who executed the
alleged agreement with the plaintiff/ respondent,
can be asked to register the sale deed in favor of
the respondent/ plaintiff, when the land does not
retain absolutely only in his own name and without
making the other legal heirs of Abdul Kader as
parties and also without determining his individual
shares over the suit land?
(iv) Whether, in absence of any findings by the Ld.
Courts below, regarding the genuiness of the
agreement for sale and signatures of the appellant
on Exhibit 1, i.e. Bainanama (Agreement for sale)
can direct the defendant/ appellant to execute the
sale deed in favour of respondent?”
6.
Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties,
this court has carefully gone through the memo of appeal, grounds mentioned
therein and also gone through the impugned judgment and decree so passed by
the learned first appellate Court as well as the judgment and decree of the
Page No.# 8/23
learned trial Court.
7.
The substantial question of law No. (i) concerned with Order 41 Rule
31 CPC, which reads as under:
“31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.—The judgment
of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state—
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied,
the relief to which the appellant is entitled,
and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and
dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”
8.
Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellants, has pointed out that in
the impugned judgment, dated 20.05.2019, the learned first appellate Court had
neither formulated any point for determination nor it had discussed the evidence
adduced by the parties in issue-wise, though mandated by the Order 41 Rule 31
CPC, and as such, the substantial question of law No. (i) is involved in this
appeal and the finding, so recorded by the learned first appellate Court, is liable
to be interfered with.
9.
The counter submission of Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent, is that though no point for determination was formulated by the
learned first appellate Court at the time of hearing of the title appeal, yet, it had
discussed the evidence in respect of all the issues and recorded findings
concerning all the issues and thus in substance, the requirement of Order 41
Rule 31 CPC has been complied with, and as such, the substantial question of
law No. (i), as formulated by this Court, is not at all involved in this appeal. In
support of his submission, Mr. Dutta has referred to a decision of Hon’ble
Page No.# 9/23
Supreme Court in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta vs. Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation, in Civil Appeal No. 16965-16957 of 2017.
10.
The submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, received due
consideration of this Court. And having carefully gone through the decision, so
referred by Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in the case of
Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta (supra), this Court finds sufficient force in his
submission. In the said case, considering its earlier decisions on the issue,
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“Thus,
even if the first appellate Court does not
separately frame the points for determination arising in
the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as
that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise
for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial
compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in
that regard is sufficient. In this regard, useful
reference may be made to G. Amalorpavam and others vs.
R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others, wherein this Court
held as under: ‘9. The question whether in a particular case there
has
been
substantial
compliance
with
the
provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has (2017) 2 SCC
415 (2006) 3 SCC 224 to be determined on the
nature of the judgment delivered in each case.
Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the
judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if
there has been substantial compliance with it and the
second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the
findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt
desirable that the appellate court should comply with all
the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is
possible to make out from the judgment that there is
Page No.# 10/23
substantial compliance with the said requirements and
that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be
sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the
entire evidence on record and discussed the same in
detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are
supported by reasons even though the point has not been
framed by the appellate court there is substantial
compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31
CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the
absence of a point of determination. Where there is an
honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court
to consider the controversy between the parties and there
is proper appraisement of the respective cases and
weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the
other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly
manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower
appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though
it does not contain the points for determination. The
object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the
appellate court to frame points for determination and to
cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of
the court on the rival contentions which arise for
determination and also to provide litigant parties
opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the
decision is founded with a view to enable them to know
the basis of the decision and if so considered
appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second
appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.”
11.
In the instant case, upon going through the impugned judgment and
decree, so passed by the learned first appellate Court, this Court finds that it is
a fact that the learned first appellate Court had not formulated any point for
determination in the impugned judgment and decree. However, it appears that
the learned first appellate Court had directed its discussion in respect of all the
Page No.# 11/23
issues and recorded findings to that effect. And in that view of the matter, the
requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC appears to be substantially complied with.
Thus, in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta (supra), the substantial question of law No.
(I), so formulated in this appeal, appears to be not flowing out of the impugned
judgment and decree, so passed by the learned first appellate Court, and
accordingly, the same stands answered.
12.
Moving forward to the substantial question of law Nos. (II) and (III), it
appears that both the questions are interconnected. The contention of Mr.
Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellants is that the defendant/appellant No.
1 herein (since deceased) had no land in his name and he has several brothers
and sisters and the land in question is ejmali. By referring to Ext. ‘Ka’ i.e. a copy
of jamabandi and also to the entries made therein, Mr. Mahmud submits that
from the total parcel of the land, several plots have been sold to different
persons, at different points of time and that it is the burden of the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant has sufficient land in his name and in his
possession to execute the agreement for sale. He further submits that the
plaintiff has not initiated any steps for partition of the suit land and under such
circumstances, the substantial question of law Nos. (ii) and (iii), both are
involved herein, and as such, he has contended to interfere with the finding so
recorded by the learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment and
decree.
12.1.
In support of his submission, Mr. Mahmud has referred to the following
decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court:
(i)
Balwinder Singh vs. National Fertilizers Limited and
Ors., reported in (2014) 13 SCC 277.
Page No.# 12/23
12.2.
(ii)
Sk. Golam Lalchand vs. Nandu Lal Shaw and Ors., reported
in 2024 INSC 676.
(iii)
Fateh Chand vs. Balkishan Dass, reported in 1963 AIR SC
1405.
Mr. Mahmud has also referred to a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in RFA No. 42/2019 (Sri Anil Brahma @ Anil Kumar Wary vs.
Smt. Sabita Saha and 2 Ors.) and submits that in the said case, this court
has directed to refund the earnest money to the plaintiff and the said decision is
binding upon this Court, in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and
Ors., reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680, and as such, Mr. Mahmud has
contended to pass similar order in the present case also, directing the defendant
to return the amount received as earnest money.
13.
Per contra, Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent,
submits that the substantial question of law Nos. (ii) and (III) are similar and
interconnected and as such, they can be dealt with together and that the
question of identifying the land and the question of partitioning of the suit land
does not arise herein this case as after execution of the bainanama, the
defendant had already handed over possession of the suit land to the plaintiff
and the plaintiff is in possession of the same, and that the dispute relates to
non-execution of the sale deed only. By referring to Section 44 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, Mr. Dutta submits that though the suit land was not
partitioned between the defendant and his siblings, yet in view of Section 44 of
the said Act, the defendant can transfer his share of the property without the
same being partitioned.
13.1.
Mr. Dutta has also pointed it out that there is a clear finding of fact by
Page No.# 13/23
the learned trial court in respect of handing over of possession of the suit land
to the plaintiff and the finding, so recorded by the learned trial Court, was not
challenged before the learned first appellate Court by the defendant, and the
learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment and decree, in
paragraph No. 18, recorded a finding to that effect that the trial Court had held
that the defendant did execute and register the agreement for sale in question
in favour of the plaintiff and did receive a sum of Rs.87,500/- from the plaintiff,
as earnest money and that the defendant had failed to prove his plea that the
agreement for sale in question was executed fraudulently and that the
respondent did not raise his grievance by filing any cross-objection in the said
appeal challenging the said finding of the learned trial Court in Issue No. 2 or
for that matter and did not challenge the decree so passed by the learned trial
Court asking the defendant to refund Rs.87,500/- to the plaintiff. He also
pointed it out that there is concurrent finding of fact in this regard by both the
learned courts below.
13.2.
Mr. Dutta also submits that the agreement for sale was executed by
the defendant in favour of the plaintiff by putting his signature over the same
and there is also concurrent finding of fact by both the learned Courts below in
respect of the same. By referring to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Aloka Bose vs. Parmatma Devi and Ors., reported in AIR 2009
SC 1527, he submits that though the signature of the plaintiff is not there in the
agreement for sale, yet it is not vital in view of the aforesaid decision and that
handing over of possession and payment of Rs.87,500/- is the testament of the
intention of the parties to sale the land, which has a bearing upon the suit.
13.3.
Mr. Dutta has also pointed out that the other siblings of the defendant
have not challenged the agreement for sale of 2 kathas 5 lechas of land in
Page No.# 14/23
favour of the plaintiff by the defendant and it is the defendant, who having
entered into the agreement and having received the amount, handed over the
possession to the plaintiff and later on refused to execute the sale deed. His
further submission is that though Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the
appellants, has relied upon a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
RFA No. 42/2019, yet the said case is factually different from the present case
and as such, the said decision would not come into the assistance of Mr.
Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellants.
13.5.
Mr. Dutta has further pointed out that the decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sk. Golam Lalchand (supra) so referred by Mr. Mahmud,
is also factually different from the case in hand and as such, the same would
also not help Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellants. And under the
given facts and circumstances, Mr. Dutta submits that none of the substantial
question of law Nos. (II) and (III) are involved in this appeal and as such, the
same are to be answered in negative.
13.6.
In support of his submission, Mr. Dutta has referred to the following
decisions:
(i)
Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and Ors., reported in (2005) 6
SCC 733.
(ii)
Md. Fakrul Islam Beg vs. Abul Gafur Borbhuiyan,
reported in 2023 0 Supreme(Gau) 1393.
(iii) Daulat Singh (D) Thr. LRs vs. State of Rajasthan,
reported in AIR 2021 SC 394.
14.
The submissions of learned counsel for both the parties are considered
in the light of the fact and circumstances on the record and also this Court has
Page No.# 15/23
carefully gone through the decisions referred by both the counsel and also gone
through the relevant provision of law.
14.1.
It is no more res-integra that co-owner of an immovable property is
legally competent to transfer his share of interest in view of Section 44 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The said Section reads as under:
“44. Transfer by one co-owner.—Where one of two or more co-
owners of immoveable property legally competent in that
behalf transfers his share of such property or any interest
therein, the transferee acquires as to such share or
interest, and so far as is necessary to give effect to the
transfer, the transferor’s right to joint possession or
other common or part enjoyment of the property, and to
enforce a partition of the same, but subject to the
conditions and liabilities affecting, at the date of the
transfer, the share or interest so transferred.
Where the transferee of a share of a dwelling-house
belonging to an undivided family is not a member of the
family, nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle
him to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of
the house.”
15.
It is not in dispute that the land in question is ejmali land and it has
not been partitioned between the siblings of the defendant. However, it appears
that the defendant, after execution of the agreement for sale, had handed over
the possession of the suit land in question to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is in
possession of the same, and as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs there is
concurrent finding of fact in respect of entering into the agreement for sale by
the plaintiff and the defendant and also regarding handing over of possession of
the land in question to the plaintiff, by the defendant. In paragraph No. 18 of
the impugned judgment and decree, the learned first appellate Court had
Page No.# 16/23
recorded a finding to that effect and the same has not been challenged.
Though, Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellants has disputed in
handing over the possession, yet the same left this Court unimpressed, as the
finding of the learned trial court in respect of handing over of possession of the
suit land to the plaintiff has not been challenged by filing cross-objection. And
the finding of the learned trial court is endorsed by the learned appellate court
also.
16.
In view of the provision of Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, there is no bar on the part of the defendant in selling his part of share to
the plaintiff and as such, the submission of Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the
appellants cannot be accepted.
17.
Further, it is well settled in plethora of decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court that in a case for specific performance of contract, there are only two
parties to the contract and only they are the necessary parties. Since the
siblings of the defendant are not party to the agreement, they cannot be
necessary party in the suit. Reference in this context can be made to a decision
of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi
(supra). Relevant
paragraphs, in the said decision, are extracted herein below:“7 In our view, a bare reading of this provision, namely,
second part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) CPC would
clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for
specific performance of a contract for sale are the
parties to the contract or if they are dead, their
legal representatives as also a person who had
purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In
equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes
rights and also regulates the liabilities of the
parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would
Page No.# 17/23
be affected if he had purchased with or without notice
of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to
the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary
party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests
are to be satisfied for determining the question who is
a necessary party. Tests are — (1) there must be a
right to some relief against such party in respect of
the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no
effective decree can be passed in the absence of such
party.
8. We may look to this problem from another angle. Section
19 of the Specific Relief Act provides relief against
parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent
title. Except as otherwise provided by Chapter II,
specific performance of a contract may be enforced
against:
“19. (a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title
arising subsequently to the contract, except a
transferee for value who has paid his money in
good faith and without notice of the original
contract;
(c) any person claiming under a title which, though
prior to the contract and known to the
plaintiff, might have been displaced by the
defendant;
(d) when a company has entered into a contract and
subsequently becomes amalgamated with another
company, the new company which arises out of
the amalgamation;
(e) when the promoters of a company have, before
its incorporation, entered into a contract for
the purpose of the company and such contract is
Page No.# 18/23
warranted by the terms of the incorporation,
the company:
Provided that the company has accepted the
contract and communicated such acceptance to
the other party to the contract.”
9. We have carefully considered sub-sections (a) to (e)
of Section 19 of the Act. From a careful examination of
the aforesaid provisions of clauses (a) to (e) of the
Specific Relief Act we are of the view that the persons
seeking addition in the suit for specific performance
of the contract for sale who were not claiming under
the vendor but they were claiming adverse to the title
of the vendor do not fall in any of the categories
enumerated in sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of
the Specific Relief Act.
10. That apart, from a plain reading of Section 19 of
the Act we are also of the view that this section is
exhaustive on the question as to who are the parties
against whom a contract for specific performance may be
enforced.
18. Over and above, the other co-owners i.e. the siblings of the defendant have
not challenged the authority of the defendant in selling his share of the ejmali
land. And it also appears that the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in RFA No. 42/2019, so referred by Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the
appellants, would not advance his argument in view of the fact that the present
case is factually distinguishable from the facts of the said RFA No. 42/2019,
and the clear finding of fact by the learned trial court in respect of handing over
possession of the land after execution of the agreement and receipt of sum of
Rs. 87,500/- has not been agitated in the first appeal by the defendant herein.
Page No.# 19/23
Further, it appears that the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sk. Golam Lalchand (supra), so referred by Mr. Mahmud, is also factually
distinguishable from the present case. In the said case the prayer was for
declaration of right, title and interest and permanent injunction. But, in the case
in hand, the prayer was for specific performance of the contract. And in the case
of Balwinder Singh(supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue
of deciding the second appeal without formulating any substantial question of
law. Since herein this case substantial question of law, as discussed herein
above, has been formulated at the time of admission of appeal, the ratio laid
down in the said case has no application to the case in hand.
19. Under the given factual and legal matrix, the substantial question of law
Nos. (ii) and (iii), cannot be said to be flows out of the impugned judgment and
decree, so passed by the learned first appellate Court. And accordingly, the
same stands answered.
20.
It is also to be noted here that in view of the concurrent finding fact
that the parties had entered into an agreement for sale and the defendant had
received a sum of Rs.87,500/-, from the plaintiff and thereafter, handed over the
possession of the suit land to the plaintiff, this Court is of the view that sitting in
second appeal, this Court is not entitled to re-appreciate the facts again.
Reference in this context can be made to the following decisions of Hon’ble
Supreme Court:(i) Thiagarajan and Ors. vs. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and
Ors., reported in (2004) 5 SCC 762.
(ii)
Commr., Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments vs. P.
Shanmugama and Ors. , reported in (2005) 9 SCC 232.
(iii) State of Kerala and Anr. vs. Mohd. Kunhi (Dead) by LRs.
Page No.# 20/23
And Ors., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 139.
(iv) Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by LRs., reported
in (2005) 10 SCC 553.
21.
Now, moving forward to the substantial question of law No. (IV), this
Court finds that the learned trial Court has framed one issue i.e. Issue No. 2 and
dealt with the same in para No. 6 and 7 and recorded its finding in para No.8 as
under:“8. But from the evidence tendered by the plaintiff side,
whether oral and documentary, in respect of the agreement
for sale in question it is safely established that the
defendant agreed to sale the Schedule –‘A’ land to the
plaintiff and received Rs. 87,500/-, as advance amount
from the consideration amount and thereby executed the
registered deed of agreement for sale the said land in
favour of the plaintiff. On the other hand the defendant
had failed to prove that said Bainanama was executed
fraudulently.”
21.1. It also appears from the impugned judgment and decree of the learned
first appellate court that it had dealt with the Issue No. 2 and the finding of the
learned trial court in para No. 16,17, 18 and 19. In para No. 16 it had held as
under:“16.
On close scrutiny of the impugned judgment what
transpires is that the core issue involved in the suit
was the Issue No.2 as has been reproduced above. The said
issue has been decided in favour of the plaintiff
(appellant) by the L.d. Court Below. It held that from
the evidences tendered by the plaintiff side in respect
of the agreement for sale it is safely established that
the defendant agreed to sell the suit schedule land to
the plaintiff and received Rs. 87,500/- from the
plaintiff as advance money and executed and registered
Page No.# 21/23
deed of agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff.
The Ld. Munsiff also held that the defendant has failed
to
prove
that
the
said
bainanama
was
executed
fraudulently.”
21.2. Then in para 17 it had discussed Rule 22 of Order 41 which provides for
filing of cross-objection. In para No. 18, it had held as under:“18.
It is pertinent to note that though it was the
pleaded case of the defendant (respondent) in the suit
that he never ever executed the agreement for sale in
question nor did he receive any money in advance as
alleged and that the agreement in question is a document
manufactured by the plaintiff (appellant) for making
unlawful gain yet when the trial court hold that the
defendant (respondent) did execute and register the
agreement for sale in question in favour of the plaintiff
(appellant) and did receive Rs.87,500/- from him
(plaintiff) as earnest money and further that the
defendant has failed to prove his plea that the agreement
for sale in question was executed fraudulently, the
respondent did not raise his grievance by filing any
cross-objection in the instant appeal disputing or
challenging the said finding of the Ld. Court Below in
Issue No.2 or for that matter did not challenge the
decree passed in part by the trial Court asking the
defendant (respondent) to refund Rs.87,500/- to the
plaintiff (appellant).”
21.3. Thereafter, in para No. 19 it had recorded a finding as under:“19. Situated so, it becomes evident that the defendant
(respondent) is not disputing the decision rendered by
the Ld. Court Below that he (respondent) did execute the
agreement for sale in question in respect of the suit
land and had also received Rs.87,500/- as advance from
the plaintiff (appellant).”
Page No.# 22/23
22.
Thus, from the aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that there is
absence of any findings by the Ld. Courts below, regarding the genuineness of
the agreement for sale and signatures of the appellant on Exhibit 1, i.e.
Bainanama (Agreement for sale), thereby giving raise to substantial question of
law No.(IV).
22.1.
Rather, it becomes apparent that both the learned courts below had
arrived at a concurrent finding of fact, in respect of the execution of agreement
for sale (bainanama) and the defendant has not challenged the finding of the
learned trial court in respect of the agreement and receipt of an advance sum of
Rs.87,500/- and handing over the possession of the suit land in question to the
plaintiff. It is, however, a fact that the agreement Exhibit – 1 bears no signature
of the plaintiff. But, in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Aloka Bose (supra), so referred by Mr. Dutta, learned counsel for the
respondent/plaintiff, absence of signature of the plaintiff in the agreement is not
vital. In addition, all these facts, such as execution of agreement for sale and
receiving of earnest money and handing over of possession of the land indicates
the intention to sale the land to the plaintiffs.
22.2. In that view of the matter, the substantial question of law No. (IV) also
appears to be not at all involved in this appeal and Mr. Dutta, learned Senior
Counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed this out during his argument, and
this Court finds sufficient force in the same, and as such, inclined to record
concurrence with the same.
23. This Court has also carefully gone through the other decisions referred by
Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent and finds that the ratio laid
down in the said cases also lends credence to his submissions. However, in
Page No.# 23/23
order to decide this appeal, detail discussion of the same is found to be not
necessary.
24. In the result, this Court finds that none of the substantial questions of law,
as formulated by this Court at the time of admission of the appeal, appears to
be flowing out of the impugned judgment and decree, so passed by the learned
first appellate Court, and accordingly, this appeal stands dismissed leaving the
parties to bear their own costs.
25.
Registry shall send back the records to the learned Courts below along
with a copy of this judgment and order.
JUDGE
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