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Sr. No.51
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
LPA 209/2026 in[WP(C) 1805/2026] CM(5913/2026)
…Petitioner(s)/appellant(s)
NUSRAT JAN AND ANOTHER
Through:
Mr. Mir Umar, Advocate
Vs.
...Respondent(s)
UNION TERRITORY OF J AND K (HOME)
AND OTHERS
Through:
Mr. Mohsin Qadri, Sr. AAG with
Ms. Maha Majeed, Assisting Counsel
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
ORDER
21.09.2026
1.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken this Court to the prayer
clauses of the writ petition bearing WP(C) No. 1805/2026 as well as the
present LPA which are reproduced as under:
WP(C) No. 1805/2026
a) Writ in the nature of mandamus be issued in favour of petitioners
and against the respondents directing upon the respondents not to
interfere (harass) with the life and matrimonial status of the
petitioners.
b) Writ in the nature of mandamus, commanding thereby the official
respondents
to
provide
sufficient
and
adequate
security/protection to the petitioners as envisaged in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court judgment in Lata Singh V/s State of UP and Ors.
LPA No. 209/206
a) Allow the present Letters Patent Appeal and set aside/quash the
impugned orders dated 29.07.2026, 03.08.2026, 07.08.2026,
12.08.2026 and 20.08.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in
WP(C) No.1805/2026 titled "Nusrat Jan and another v. Union
Territory of J&K and others", insofar
as
the
said
orders
impose restrictions upon the personal liberty, movement,
residence, association and decisional autonomny of the
appellants;
b) Hold and declare that appellant No.1, Nusrat Jan, having
attained the age of majority, is legally competent to make her own
decisions regarding her residence, movement, association and
choice of life partner, subject to law, and that her wishes cannot
be overridden merely on the basis of parental apprehension,
subjective disagreement or assessment of her prudence;
c) Quash/set aside all consequential directions requiring the
repeated production of appellant No.1 before the learned Single
Judge, police escort, police supervision, parental supervision or
restrictions upon her movement or residence, insofar as such
directions are inconsistent with her status as a major and
competent adult;
d) Direct the official respondents, particularly respondents No.2 to
5, to protect the life, liberty and physical safety of both appellants
and not to harass, threaten, forcibly separate, unlawfully detain
or otherwise interfere with their peaceful life and liberty, except
strictly in accordance with law;
e) Direct the respondents to ensure that no coercive action is taken
against the appellants merely on account of their having
voluntarily associated with each other or having solemnized
Nikkah, except where such action is independently warranted by
law and supported by legally sustainable material;
f) Direct the official respondents to ensure that appellant No.1 is
not subjected to any further physical or mental harassment,
coercion, intimidation or assault by respondent No.6 or any other
person acting at his instance, and to take appropriate measures
in accordance with law for protection of her life and liberty;
g) Direct the respondents to provide such necessary protection to
the appellants at their place of residence/choice as may be
required to safeguard their life and liberty from any threat or
harassment from private respondents or any other person;
h) Pass any other or further order(s) or direction(s) which this
Hon'ble Court may deem just, proper and expedient in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of
justice.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Annexure-IV, which
is the certificate issued by the Jammu and Kashmir State Board of School
Education, Class 10th Certificate, clearly reflects the date of birth of
petitioner No. 1 as 06.04.2008. Learned counsel submits that even this
Court, in its order dated 29.07.2026, had observed that petitioner No. 1 is a
major.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner makes a limited submission that
protection be granted to the petitioners, as they are adults and their wishes
are required to be respected in law. Learned counsel submits that, since
there is parental disagreement, the petitioners require protection for
exercising liberty to petitioner No. 1 to lead her life in accordance with her
own wishes.
4.
The father of petitioner No. 1 is also present in Court and was very
anxious regarding the future of his daughter, which, as a parent, is a
reasonable concern. He also made a submission that, if at all the girl wishes
to go with petitioner No. 2, proper Mahr ought to be paid to her.
5.
Mr. Mohsin Qadri, learned Senior AAG appearing along with Ms.
Maha Majid, learned Assisting Counsel, submits that Annexure-IV clearly
demonstrates that petitioner No. 1 is a major. He submits that, in the
interest of justice, her wishes have to be protected and that her liberty and
protection have become her right. He further submits that, if the wish of
petitioner No. 1 is required to be ascertained, the same can be done by this
Court itself.
6.
Upon this, petitioner No. 1 was called before the Court and was
asked in open Court as to what is her wish to which she confidently
submitted that she wants to go with petitioner No. 2. Petitioner No. 1 is
confident in her deposition and further submitted that protection be granted
to her so that she remains at liberty to exercise her voluntary will. She
further submitted that she tried to persuade her parents to allow her to
remain at liberty, but could not succeed.
7.
This Court is conscious of the constitutional obligations to be
discharged while maintaining the supremacy of the Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. This Court relies upon the judgment dated
15.09.2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at
Jodhpur in case titled “Leela and Another vs. State of Rajasthan and
Others”, S.B Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 5045/2021. The paragraphs 14 to 38
of the said judgment are reproduced here as under:
14. Learned Public Prosecutor relied upon the order dated
15.06.2021 passed by a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad
High Court in Smt. Geeta & Anr. Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
(Writ-C No.7542/2021), whereby the Hon'ble High Court has denied
the protection, while observing that the live-in relationship with an
already married person is illegal, and the Court, since is unable to
condone the illegality, therefore, the orders cannot be passed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees freedom of
life to all citizens, but such freedom has to be within the ambit of
law.
15. Learned Public Prosecutor has also referred to an order passed
by this Hon'ble Court in Rashika Khandal & Anr. Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.3023/2021
decided on 07.05.2021), wherein this Hon'ble Court at Jaipur Bench
has observed that a live-in relationship involving married and
unmarried persons is impermissible. The Hon'ble Court, while
passing the said order, has placed reliance upon a landmark
decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D. Velusamy Vs.
D. Patchaiammal, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 469, wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a couple must hold themselves out
to society being akin to spouses and must be of legal age to marry or
qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried,
and thus, this Hon'ble Court has dismissed the plea of the petitioners
in the said case for grant of protection to them.
16. The judgments rendered by the Hon'ble High Courts across the
country were also cited before this Court, which mostly chided the
illegal relationships and pertain to denial of the protection, owing to
fear of disruption in social fabric, but in some judgments (5 of 17)
protection was granted, as the courts did not wish to delve into the
issue of morality and immorality of such relationship, but stuck to
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Some of the recent judgments
whereby the protection was denied, are as follows:
(a) Simranjeet Kaur & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (CRWP7799-2021 (O&M) decided by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High
Court on 18.08.2021).
(b) Seema Devi & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Criminal
Misc. Petition No.4796/2021 decided by this Hon'ble Court at Jaipur
Bench on 16.08.2021).
(c) Smt. Maya Devi & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B.
Criminal Misc. Petition No.3314/2021 decided by this Hon'ble Court
at Jaipur Bench on 13.08.2021).
(d) Smt. Aneeta & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & ors. (Writ-C
No.14443/2021 decided by a Division Bench of the Hon'ble
Allahabad High Court on 29.07.2021).
(e) Smt. Surabhi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (Writ-C No.5455/2021
decided by a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court
on 21.06.2021).
(f) Gulza Kumari & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (CRWP
No.4199/2021 (O&M) decided by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana
High Court on 11.05.2021).
(g) Moyna Khatun & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (CRWP
No.2421/2021 decided by Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court on
10.03.2021).
(h) Daya Ram & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (Criminal Writ
Petition No.5212/2021 decided by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana
High Court on 10.06.2021).
17. After hearing learned counsel for the parties as well as carefully
examining the record of the case, alongwith the facts of the present
case, as well as the varied judgments being passed by the Hon'ble
High Courts across the country and the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
deems it prudent to address the present situation at length.
18. The issues before this Court for consideration are:
(i) whether the State ought to intervene in the personal
relationships of adult citizens;
(ii) as to what would prevail, in case there is a conflict
between law and morality; and
(iii) whether the State, having a duty of protecting its
citizens, is having any kind of restrictions, reservations or
exceptions.
19. Coming to the issue of intervention in personal relationship,
which includes question of privacy and autonomy of an individual in
a personal relationship, this Court takes note of the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar Vs.
Union of India (Writ Petition (Cri.) No.76 of 2016, decided on
06.09.2018), in which, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while enunciating
the principle of autonomy, succinctly laid down that any surrender of
one's autonomy to another must be willful, and their intimacy and
privacy is a matter of their choice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
the said judgment, further held that such autonomy inevitably forms
part of dignity of an individual. Relevant portion of the said
judgment reads as under:"64.. . . . . The right to privacy enables an individual to exercise his
or her autonomy, away from the glare of societal expectations. The
realisation of the human (7 of 17) personality is dependent on the
autonomy of an individual. In a liberal democracy, recognition of the
individual as an autonomous person is an acknowledgment of the
State's respect for the capacity of the individual to make independent
choices. The right to privacy may be construed to signify that not
only are certain acts no longer immoral, but that there also exists an
affirmative moral right to do them."
In the said judgment, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Misra (then CJI),
also pointed out the duty of the Courts to be guided by constitutional
morality by upholding the values enshrined within the constitution
and not succumbing to societal morality. The said relevant part of
the judgment as follows :
"119. The duty of the constitutional courts is to adjudge the
validity of law on well-established principles, namely,
legislative competence or violations of fundamental rights or
of any other constitutional provisions. At the same time, it is
expected from the courts as the final arbiter of the
Constitution to uphold the cherished principles of the
Constitution and not to be remotely guided by majoritarian
view or popular perception. The Court has to be guided by
the conception of constitutional morality and not by the
societal morality.
120. We may hasten to add here that in the context of the
issue at hand, when a penal provision is challenged as being
violative of the fundamental rights of a section of the society,
notwithstanding the fact whether the said section of the
society is a minority or a majority, the magna cum laude and
creditable principle of constitutional morality, in a
constitutional democracy like ours where the rule of law
prevails, must not be allowed to be trampled by obscure
notions of social morality which have no legal tenability. The
concept of constitutional morality would serve as an aid for
the Court to arrive at a just decision which would be in
consonance with the constitutional rights of the citizens,
howsoever small that fragment of the populace may be. The
idea of number, in this context, is meaningless; like zero on
the left side of any number.
121. In this regard, we have to telescopically analyse social
morality vis-à-vis constitutional morality. It needs no special
emphasis to state that whenever the constitutional courts
come across a situation of transgression or dereliction in the
sphere of fundamental rights, which are also the basic human
rights of a section, howsoever small part of the society, then
it is for the constitutional courts to ensure, with the aid of
judicial engagement and creativity, that constitutional
morality prevails over social morality."
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and time again observed
that it is not the Court's domain to intervene in the matters of choice
or suitability of a marriage/relationship of an individual, until and
unless the legality of such relationship is under challenge. In this
respect, the concurring judgment authored by Hon'ble Dr. Justice
D.Y. Chandrachud, in Shafin Jahan Vs. Asokan K.M. (Criminal
Appeal No.366 of 2018 decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on
09.04.2018), is noteworthy to mention, and thus, the relevant thereof
reads as under:
"23. . . . . .The High Court has lost sight of the fact that she is
a major, capable of taking her own decisions and is entitled
to the right recognised by the Constitution to lead her life
exactly as she pleases. The concern of this Court in
intervening in this matter is as much about the miscarriage of
justice that has resulted in the High Court as much as about
the paternalism which underlies the approach to
constitutional interpretation reflected in the judgment in
appeal. The superior courts, when they exercise their
jurisdiction parens patriae do so in the case of persons who
are incapable of asserting a free will such as minors or
persons of unsound mind. The exercise of that jurisdiction
should not transgress into the area of determining the
suitability of partners to a marital tie. That decision rests
exclusively with the individuals themselves. Neither the state
nor society can intrude into that domain. The strength of our
Constitution lies in its acceptance of the plurality and
diversity of our culture. Intimacies of marriage, including the
choices which individuals make on whether or not to marry
and on whom to marry, lie outside the control of the state.
Courts as upholders of constitutional freedoms must
safeguard these freedoms. The cohesion and stability of our
society depend on our syncretic culture. The Constitution
protects it. Courts are duty bound not to swerve from the path
of upholding our pluralism and diversity as a nation.
24. Interference by the State in such matters has a seriously
chilling effect on the exercise of freedoms. Others are
dissuaded to exercise their liberties for fear of the reprisals
which may result upon the free exercise of choice. The
chilling effect on others has a pernicious tendency to prevent
them from asserting their liberty. Public spectacles involving
a harsh exercise of State power prevent the exercise of
freedom, by others in the same milieu. Nothing can be as
destructive of freedom and liberty. Fear silences freedom."
21. The Apex Court has laid down in no uncertain terms that the
emphasis to be given to public morality is minuscule, when they are
in conflict with constitutional morality, and that the Courts must
uphold constitutional morality and rely on the same rather than
obscure notions of societal morality, which have no legal tenability.
22. In addition to the Courts' responsibility to uphold the principles
of constitutional morality, there exists a parallel duty to not infringe
upon the personal relationship between two free- willed adults.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its sterling judgment rendered in
K.S.Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, held in no
uncertain terms that privacy includes at its core, the preservation of
personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage,
procreation, the home and sexual orientation. The Apex Court in the
same pronouncement also laid down that privacy also connotes a
right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and
recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his
or her life. Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to
privacy.
23. The emphasis on autonomy and privacy was also more
specifically dealt with in the ambit of the institution of marriage in
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, reported in (2018) 2 SCC 189.
Pointing out the institution of marriage not to be a private space
devoid of constitutional rights, the Apex Court of India, in the
aforesaid judgment, observed thus:
"50. The right to privacy depends on the exercise of
autonomy and agency by individuals. In situations where
citizens are disabled from exercising these essential
attributes, Courts must step in to ensure that dignity is
realised in the fullest sense. Familial structures cannot be
regarded as private spaces where constitutional rights are
violated. To grant immunity in situations when rights of
individuals are in siege, is to obstruct the unfolding vision of
the Constitution."
24. It is well- settled that it is not in the Court's domain to intrude
upon an individual's privacy. Any scrutiny or remark upon the socalled morality of an individual's relationship and blanket statements
of condemnation especially in matters where it is not called into
question, to begin with, would simply bolster an intrusion upon one's
right to choice and condone acts of unwarranted moral policing by
the society at large.
25. On the question of the extent of protection to the petitioners, it
would be prudent to consider the opinion of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Others, reported in (1978)
4 SCC 409. Opining on the right to protection invoked by prisoners
and convicts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court succinctly laid down that it
is the duty of the Supreme court and all other subordinate courts to
protect the rights of our country's citizens and that in no way are
prisoners and convicts exempt from this.
26. Similarly, while delving into the issue of the increasing number
of custodial deaths in India, the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.K. Basu v.
State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1997 SC 610, elaborated
upon the scope of Article 21, as follows:
". . . . .If the functionaries of the Government become law
breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would
encourage lawlessness and every man would have the
tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to
anarchism. No civilised nation can permit that to happen.
Does a citizen shed off his fundamental right to life, the
moment a policeman arrests him? Can the right to life of a
citizen be put in abeyance on his arrest? These questions touch
the spinal court of human rights jurisprudence. The answer,
indeed, has to be an emphatic 'No'. The precious right
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be
denied to convicted undertrials, detenues and other prisoners
in custody, except according to the procedure established by
law by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted
by law."
". . . . The latin maxim salus populi est supreme lex (the safety
of the people is the supreme law) and salus republicae est
suprema lex (safety of the state is the supreme law) co-exist
and are not only important and relevant but lie at the heart of
the doctrine that the welfare of an individual must yield to that
of the community. The action of the State, however must be
"right, just and fair". Using any form of torture for extracting
any kind of information would neither be 'right nor just nor
fair' and, therefore, would be impermissible, being offensive to
Article 21. . . ."
". . . .His Constitutional right cannot be abridged except in the
manner permitted by law, though in the very nature of things
there would be qualitative difference in the methods of
interrogation of such a person as compared to an ordinary
criminal. Challenge of terrorism must be met with innovative
ideas and approach. State terrorism is not answer to combat
terrorism. State terrorism is no answer to combat terrorism.
State terrorism would only provide legitimacy to 'terrorism'.
That would be bad for the State, the community and above all
for the Rule of Law. The State must, therefore, ensure that
various agencies deployed by it for combating terrorism act
within the bounds of law and not become law unto themselves.
that the terrorist has violated human rights of innocent citizens
may render him liable for punishment but it cannot justify the
violation of this human rights expect in the manner permitted
by law.. . . "
27. The sanctity and supremacy of law must be protected at all costs.
Even the due process of law through which the fundamental rights of
any person are taken away must conform with the principles of
justice and fair play and has to be reasonably administered
according to the circumstances of the case i.e. there must be a
proportionality between the illegality of the act and the right taken
away through the due process of law. In Olga Tellis and Ors. v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation, reported in AIR 1986 SC 180,
elaborating upon the procedure established by law to be resorted to
in order to deprive him of his fundamental right, the Hon'ble Apex
Court observed as under:
"Just as a mala fide act has no existence in the eye of law,
even so, unreasonableness vitiates law and procedure alike. It
is therefore essential that the procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of his fundamental right must conform the
norms of justice and fair play. Procedure, which is just or
unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of
unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law which prescribes
that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it.. . .
"
28. Elucidating upon the expanded meaning attributed to Article 21
of the Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.S. Ahluwalia v.
Union of India, reported in 2001 (4) S.C.C. 452, categorically laid
down that it is the duty of the State to create a climate where
members of the society belonging to different faiths, caste and creed
live together and, therefore, the State has a duty to protect their life,
liberty, dignity and worth of an individual which should not be
jeopardized or endangered. This constitutional obligation assumes
greater paramountcy when the victim belongs to the weaker section
of the community, as was observed in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.
Union of India and Others (1997) 10 SCC 549.
29. A bare perusal of the precedent law of Mohammed Ajmal Amir
Kasab & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (2012)
9 SCC 1, whereby the Hon'ble Apex Court exemplifies the
significance of Rule of Law in our country wherein a dreaded
terrorist even after being caught red-handed was still not deprived of
his life and right to a free and fair trail until after sentencing.
Furthermore the then minister of state for Home (15 of 17) affairs
RPN Singh submitted before the parliament that the Government of
Maharashtra along with the Indo-Tibetian border police incurred
costs above 31.39 crores to protect the terrorist during his trial. The
state went above and beyond to protect the terrorist kasab because
India is a country where rule of law is supreme and no liberty can be
taken away without due process of law. Moral policing cannot be
allowed to dictate the actions of the state nor can moral policing by
the public at large be allowed or forgiven.
30. It is sufficiently clear to this Court that the Hon'ble Apex Court's
standpoint is that there exists a duty of the State to protect and
safeguard all fundamental rights, unless taken away by due process
of law. Even if any illegality or wrongfulness has been committed,
the duty to punish vests solely with the State, that too in attune with
due process of law. In no circumstance can the State bypass due
process, permit or condone any acts of moral policing or mob
mentality. When the Right to life and liberty is even guaranteed to
convicted criminals of serious offences, there can be no reasonable
nexus to not grant the same protection to those in an "legal/illegal
relationships".
31. Had there been a question before this Court with regards the
morality/ legality of live- in relationships and matters connected
thereto, then perhaps the answer would have required more
deliberation along those lines. However, in the context of the limited
question this Court is posed with pertaining to the application of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and it is clear that the right to
claim protection under this Article is a constitutional mandate upon
the State and can be availed by all (16 of 17) persons alike. There
arises no question of this right to be waived off even if the person
seeking protection is guilty of an immoral, unlawful or illegal act, as
per the precedent law cited of the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, in
this case, this Court does not wish to delve into the sanctity of
relationships.
32. This Court finds itself firmly tied down to the principle of
individual autonomy, which cannot be hampered by societal
expectations in a vibrant democracy. The State's respect for the
individual independent choices has to be held high.
33. This Court fully values the principle that at all junctures
constitutional morality has to have an overriding impact upon
societal morality.
This Court cannot sit back and watch the transgression or
dereliction in the sphere of fundamental rights, which are basic
human rights.
The public morality cannot be allowed to overshadow the
constitutional morality, particularly when the legal tenability of the
right to protection is paramount.
34. This Court is duty bound to act as a protector of the rights of the
individuals, which are under siege with the clear intention of
obstructing the vision of Constitution.
35. The Hon'ble Apex Court has even gone to the extent of the duty
of the courts to protect the rights of prisoners and convicts. The rule
of law has to be held at the highest pedestal. The Constitutional right
of protection cannot be abridged, except in a manner permitted by
law.
36. The aforementioned three issues/questions, as mentioned
hereinabove, stands answered accordingly.
37. Thus, in view of the above, the present petition is disposed of,
with a direction to the petitioners to appear before the Station House
Officer, Police Station, Feench, Luni, District Jodhpur alongwith
appropriate representation regarding their grievance. The Station
House Officer, Police Station, Feench, Luni, District Jodhpur shall
in turn hear the grievance of the petitioners, and after analyzing the
threat perceptions, if necessitated, may pass necessary orders to
provide adequate security and protection to the petitioners.
38. It is made clear that any observation in this order shall not affect
any criminal and civil proceedings initiated against the petitioners.
8.
This Court, looking into the fact that petitioner No. 1 has remained in
the custody of her parents since 29.07.2026 and has spent sufficient time at
her parental home and is still confident to go with petitioner No. 2 requires
the petition to be accepted. There is no pressure upon petitioner No. 1 to
depose as per her will. This Court has kept in consideration the certificate
issued by the Jammu and Kashmir State Board of School Education, which
clearly demonstrates that she is a major in age.
9.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is
inclined to allow of the present writ petition as well as the appeal by
directing that the respondents-State authorities (police authorities), shall
provide appropriate protection to the petitioners and also ensure that the
voluntary will of petitioner No. 1 prevails and remains protected.
10.
With the aforesaid direction, the appeal as well as the writ petition
bearing WP(C) No. 1805/2026 stand disposed of.
(M.A. CHOWDHARY )
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
21.09.2026
Aamir
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)
CHIEF JUSTICE
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