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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
HCP No.130/2025
Reserved on: 10.09.2026
Pronounced on: 19.09.2026
Uploaded on: ______________
Operative part or full judgment: Full
Numan Qayoom Ganie
S/O Abdul Qayoom Ganie
R/O Methan, Chanpora,
District Srinagar.
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Adv. Wajid Mohammad Haseeb.
Vs.
1. Union Territory of J&K
through Principal Secretary to Govt.
Home Department,
Civil Sectt. Srinagar.
2. District Magistrate,
Srinagar.
3. Sr. Superintendent of Police,
Srinagar.
…Respondent(s)
Through: Sr.AAG Mohsin Qadri with
Assisting Counsel Haris Khan.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner herein has invoked the jurisdiction of this
Court
seeking
quashment
DMS/PSA/07/2025
respondent
dated
No.2-District
of
detention
Order
No.
29.04.2025
passed
by
Magistrate,
Srinagar
under
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Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act,
1978 (for short, “the Act”), whereby the petitioner has been
placed under preventive detention, in order to prevent him
from his activities prejudicial to the maintenance of
‘security of the State’.
2. The case of the petitioner, as projected in the petition, is
that the detention order is legally unsustainable, inter alia,
on the grounds that the material relied upon by the
detaining authority is stale; that the criminal case relied
upon against the petitioner is FIR No. 53/2022 under
Sections 121, 121-A IPC and Sections 16, 17, 18 & 40 of
UA(P) Act registered at Police Station Saddar; that the
petitioner had already been admitted to bail in the said
FIR; that there is no proximate intervening activity
disclosed in the grounds which could furnish a live link
between the alleged past conduct and the necessity of
preventive detention in the year 2025; that the detaining
authority
has
failed
to
demonstrate
the
requisite
application of mind; that the detention order was executed
on 03.05.2025; that the representation made by the
petitioner came to be considered and rejected; that the
mere fact that the representation was subsequently
considered cannot, by itself, cure an otherwise invalid
detention founded upon stale or irrelevant material.
3. Per contra, the respondents opposed the petition, pleading
in their counter affidavit, that the Detaining Authority after
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considering the material placed before it, arrived at the
requisite subjective satisfaction that preventive detention
of the detenue was necessary; that the detenue had been
bound down in terms of Section 126/170 BNSS with
regard to his continuous involvement in anti-national and
unlawful activities in the area; that the material placed
before the Detaining Authority disclosed his association
with elements inimical to the security of the State; that the
representation submitted on behalf of the detenue was
duly considered and rejected, therefore, no prejudice can
be said to have been caused to him.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
detention record and considered the matter.
5. Preventive detention is an exceptional measure and
constitutes a serious inroad into the fundamental right to
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution. The power is preventive and not punitive.
The material relied upon by the detaining authority must,
therefore, have a live and proximate link with the object
sought to be achieved by the detention. The Supreme
Court in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported as
(2011) 5 SCC 244, and Sama Aruna v. State of
Telangana, reported as
repeatedly
emphasized
(2018) 12 SCC
that
stale
150, has
incidents
cannot
ordinarily constitute the foundation of preventive detention
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unless the record discloses circumstances establishing
continuity and proximity.
6. In the present case, the criminal antecedent relied upon is
FIR No. 53/2022 registered under Sections 121, 121-A
IPC and Sections 16, 17, 18 & 40 of UA(P) Act at Police
Station Saddar, whereas the detention order came to be
passed in the year 2025. Thus, there is a substantial
temporal gap between the alleged criminal activity and the
preventive detention. More importantly, the record placed
before the Court does not disclose any sufficiently
proximate intervening prejudicial activity which could
bridge this temporal gap and establish a live link between
the alleged past conduct and the subjective satisfaction
recorded by the detaining authority. The mere reference to
vague antecedents cannot substitute the requirement of a
live and proximate nexus. Antecedents may be relevant
material, but they cannot, by themselves, transform stale
material into proximate material warranting preventive
detention.
7. Another
circumstance
which
assumes
considerable
significance is that the petitioner had already been granted
bail in FIR No. 53/2022. Where the person sought to be
preventively detained is already in custody or has been
released on bail, the detaining authority is required to
demonstrate conscious consideration of that circumstance
and the existence of cogent material showing that there
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was a real possibility of the person engaging in prejudicial
activities notwithstanding his release. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that a mere awareness of the fact of
bail is not sufficient where the circumstances otherwise do
not disclose the necessity for preventive detention.
8. In the present case, the detention order read in the light of
the
material
placed
before
this
Court,
does
not
satisfactorily disclose what subsequent circumstance,
contravention of bail conditions, fresh prejudicial activity
or other compelling material persuaded the detaining
authority
that
ordinary
criminal
law
had
become
insufficient and that preventive detention had become
necessary. The distinction between punitive detention for
an offence already committed and preventive detention to
prevent future prejudicial conduct cannot be lost sight of.
9. The grounds of detention are required to reflect an
independent and conscious consideration by the detaining
authority of the material placed before it. The subjective
satisfaction contemplated by the public Safety Act cannot
be an empty formality or a mechanical reproduction of the
police dossier. If the grounds merely reproduce the
allegations contained in the dossier without demonstrating
why those allegations, viewed in the circumstances
prevailing on the date of detention, necessitated preventive
detention, the satisfaction of the detaining authority
becomes vulnerable on the ground of non-application of
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mind. In the present case, the reliance upon the old FIR,
coupled with the failure to satisfactorily account for the
intervening period and the grant of bail to the petitioner,
assumes significance in determining whether the requisite
subjective satisfaction was independently reached.
10.
There is yet another fundamental infirmity in the
detention. Section 15 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978 provides that:
“In every case where a detention order has
been made under this Act, the Government
shall, within four weeks from the date of
detention
under
the
order”
grounds
of
detention
place
the
and
the
representation, if any, before the Advisory
Board.”
11.
Thus, the reference to the Advisory Board is not an
optional or directory exercise. The statutory scheme makes
such reference a mandatory safeguard in every case of
detention. Section 16 of the Public Safety Act requires the
Advisory Board to consider the material placed before it
and submit its report, while Section 17 of the Public
Safety Act provides for the action to be taken by the
Government upon such report. The purpose of this
safeguard is evident. Preventive detention, by its very
nature, deprives a person of liberty without a regular
criminal trial. The legislature has, therefore, incorporated
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an independent statutory scrutiny by the Advisory Board
as an additional safeguard against arbitrary or unjustified
deprivation of liberty. In the present case, the respondents
have failed to place on record material demonstrating that
the petitioner's case was duly referred to the Advisory
Board within the period prescribed under Section 15 of
the Public Safety Act.
12.
The absence of such reference constitutes a serious
statutory
infirmity.
The
continued
detention
of
the
petitioner cannot be sustained merely on the strength of
the original detention order when the mandatory statutory
safeguard contemplated under Section 15 has not been
shown to have been complied with. It is, thus, not
necessary for this Court to examine whether every
procedural step subsequent to the detention order was
otherwise duly undertaken. Once the very foundation of
the detention is found to be infirm on account of stale and
remote material, absence of a live and proximate link,
failure to properly account for the grant of bail, and noncompliance
with
the
mandatory
statutory
safeguard
relating to the Advisory Board, the continued detention
cannot
be
permitted
to
stand.
The
subsequent
consideration or rejection of the representation cannot
validate an order which was otherwise vitiated at its
inception.
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13.
For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court is of
the considered view that the impugned detention order
suffers from fundamental legal infirmities. The reliance
upon
FIR
No.
53/2022,
in
the
absence
of
any
satisfactorily disclosed proximate intervening prejudicial
activity, does not establish the requisite live nexus with the
detention ordered in 2025. The fact that the petitioner had
already been granted bail in the said FIR has not been
shown to have been meaningfully considered in the context
of the necessity for preventive detention. The grounds
further fail to demonstrate the requisite independent
application of mind. Additionally, the respondents have
failed to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory
requirement of reference to the Advisory Board under
Section 15 of the Public Safety Act.
14.
Consequently, the detention of the petitioner cannot
be sustained and is found liable to be set aside. The
petition is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned detention
Order No. DMS/PSA/07/2025 dated 29.04.2025 passed
under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety
Act, 1978 against the petitioner herein is hereby quashed.
The respondents are directed to release the petitionerdetenue forthwith, if his custody is not required, in
connection with any other case(s).
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15.
Scanned detention record, as produced by learned
counsel for the respondents, is directed to be sent back
through him.
16.
The petition stands disposed of in the above terms.
(M. A. CHOWDHARY)
JUDGE
Srinagar
19.09.2026
Muzammil. Q
Whether the order is reportable: Yes / No
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