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2024:MLHC:696
Serial No.
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 40 of 2023
Date of Decision: 05.08.2024
North Eastern Electric Power Corporation
Employees Provident Fund Trust,
NEEPCO Ltd., Brookland Compound,
Lower New Colony, Shillong – 793003,
represented by its Secretary
:::Petitioner
-VsRegional Provident Fund Commisioner-II,
Office of the Employees Provident Fund
Organization, N.E.R., Laitumkhrah,
Shillong – 793003
:::Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. S. Jindal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Ms. P. Bhattacharjee, Adv.
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
Yes/No
2024:MLHC:696
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
By the present writ petition, challenge has been put to a notice dated
21.10.2021, issued by the respondent wherein it has been alleged that the
petitioner made certain payments for the period 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2014,
after the respective due dates and as such, the petitioner was liable to pay
penalty and interest under Section 14B and 7Q of the Employees Provident
Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act). Thereafter, in the proceedings that ensued, vide order dated
03.02.2023, under Section 14B of the Act, the petitioner was found liable to
pay damages amounting to Rs.41,73,951/- and by another order of the same
date passed under Section 7Q of the Act, the petitioner has been found
liable to pay interest amounting to Rs.18,83,923/-. The petitioner on the
ground that the aforesaid proceedings and orders passed therein, being
without jurisdiction, inasmuch as, recovery was sought for a period beyond
25 years is therefore before this Court by way of the instant writ petition.
2.
Mr. S. Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that by
the impugned notice dated 21.10.2021, the respondent had indicated the
period of scrutiny to be from 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2014, wherein it was
found that certain payments were made after the respective due dates,
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which made the petitioner liable to payment of damages and interest.
Thereafter, it is submitted the petitioner appeared before the respondent on
several dates for hearing, and it was stated by the petitioner before the
respondent that the delay if any, was not intentional but on account of
change from the CDA pattern to IDA pattern on the applicable scales of
pay. It has further been submitted that as the queries from the respondent
required the production of bank statements for the period 1996 to 2001, the
same though on being requested from the bank, could not be obtained, as
the records pertained to the periods before the bank was computerized,
which communicated the same vide letter dated 14.12.2021 (Annexure -3),
It is also submitted that, it was pointed out to the respondent that it was not
possible to trace out records or documents of the last 15-25 years, and as
such, it was prayed that the respondent close the proceedings on the ground
that the demand was for very old cases. As due to the circumstances, it was
impossible to produce the relevant records, it is submitted that the
petitioner by a letter dated 25.05.2022, addressed to the respondent,
highlighted the fact that exercise of powers under Section 14B of the Act,
was to be within a reasonable period of time and not for periods that extend
beyond 25 years, which would result in irretrievable prejudice being
caused. However, he submits that there was no acknowledgement to the
said letter, and the result was in the impugned orders being passed.
2024:MLHC:696
3.
It is then contended that even though Section 14B itself, does not
contemplate any period of limitation, it would be an unjust and unfair
exercise to order for production of documents for the period stretching as
far back as 26 years. To support his contention with regard to ‘reasonable
period’ and ‘irretrievable prejudice’ learned counsel has placed reliance on
the following judgments.
(i)
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jalpaiguri
vs. Darjeeling Dooars Plantation (Tea) Limited & Anr.
reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Cal 6868
(ii)
Presidency Kid Leathers (Private) Ltd. vs. Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras reported in
1997(3) LLN 381
(iii)
Gandhidham Spinning and Manufacturing Company,
Ltd. vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner &
Anr. reported in 1986 SCC OnLine GUJ 68
(iv)
Hindustan Times Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.
reported in (1998) 2 SCC 242
4.
The learned counsel has also contended that the presence or absence
of Mens Rea would be a determinative factor in considering the matter
under Section 14B of the Act, and in this regard has cited the case of
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II vs. Hooghly Mills Company
Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2022) SCC OnLine Cal 248. It is also lastly
contended that the presence of alternative remedy of appeal under Section
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7I of the Act, will not act as a bar, as the impugned orders have been passed
without jurisdiction and in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice.
5.
Ms. P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent has firstly
submitted that, the contention that the orders were passed in violation of
the Principles of Natural Justice is incorrect, inasmuch as, the letter dated
25.05.2022, had been given due consideration and the impugned order
reflects that the representative of the petitioner was heard. The learned
counsel has taken the Court to the relevant part of the impugned order,
wherein it is recorded that the letter was taken into consideration and the
submissions of the petitioner duly recorded. She further submits that a
simple perusal of the impugned order would reflect that challans submitted
by the petitioner for the wages month 01/2001 to 01/2007, were examined
and found that they were deposited within a grace period of 5 days, as also,
revision was done for the wages month of 06/2002 and 08/2005, but
however, for wage month 07/1999, 04/2008, the contention of the
petitioner was rejected. Further she submits a revised calculation sheet was
then prepared, and on the petitioner’s inability to provide the data
substantiating particular payment of dues, the matter was closed and order
for the damages for the late payments for the period from 03/1995 to
04/2008, totaling Rs.60,57,874/- had been passed. On the ground of delay
of initiation of proceedings by the respondent, learned counsel submits that
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there is no limitation provided for proceedings to be initiated under Section
14B, and it is necessary that such damages are levied to recoup the loss
sustained by the respondent and also as a deterrent on the employer against
defaulting in future. With regard to the judgment placed by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that is Hindustan Times Ltd. vs. Union of India
& Ors.(supra), she submits that the judgment has clearly underlined the
fact that, there is no limitation period for computing and recovering arrears
under Section 14B of the Act, and that the ground of reasonableness in this
case was not found sustainable.
6.
It is then submitted that the writ petition itself is not maintainable,
due to the availability of alternate remedy under Section 7I of the Act,
which provides for appeal before the Tribunal against orders passed under
Section 14B of the Act. She therefore submits that the petitioner is at
liberty to challenge the instant impugned orders before the said tribunal,
and that, the writ petition does not deserve any consideration, as no
irretrievable prejudice has been caused to the petitioner to warrant the
invocation of writ jurisdiction of this Court.
7.
Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, and on examining
the materials on record, the ground of challenge simply put, is basically not
on the merits of the matter that is, whether there were delayed payments or
any other laches on the part of the petitioner, that called for the initiation of
2024:MLHC:696
proceedings for recovery of the same, but in the manner and method, the
same was initiated and conducted. It is first to be noted that,
notwithstanding the absence of any limitation period under Section 14B, in
the instant case, by the impugned notice dated 21.10.2021, the respondent
had made demands for payment of damages and interest for alleged
delayed payments for the period 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2014. As rightly
submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the earliest period
therein, that is, 01.04.1996, is over 25 years ago, and even the end period
thereof, that is, 31.03.2014, is after 7 years, from the date of the impugned
notice. As such, the question of reasonableness of exercise of powers under
Section 14B by the respondent, for initiating the said proceedings, assumes
considerable importance. A perusal of the letter dated 25.05.2022, which
was submitted to the respondent in the course of the proceedings, shows
that the petitioner had apprised the respondent that the bank statements for
the period 1995 to 2001, could not be provided, as the records pertain to a
period before the concerned bank started digitizing or computerizing its
records, and that further, that clarification had been provided for the delay
that had occurred on account of the switch over from the CDA to IDA
system. It is also seen that in the said letter, the petitioner had expressed its
inability to trace documents pertaining to 15-25 years back, to reconcile
certain figures in the statement.
2024:MLHC:696
8.
In the impugned order as observed above, the proceedings were
actively conducted by the respondent for verification to discern the alleged
delays for fixation of damage periods. To clearly portray the same, for the
sake of convenience, an extract of the impugned order is reproduced herein
below.
“Shri. Dwijen Kumar, Secretary, however sought some more
time and stated that the detailed and comprehensive
explanation of the queries of EPFO, Shillong, will be
submitted along with relevant documents on the next date of
hearing. The submission of Shri. Dwijen Kumar, Secretary,
is taken on record, and the next date of hearing was fixed on
06/05/2022 at 11am. Shri. Dwijen Kumar Secretary of the
estb. attended the proceeding on 06/05/2022 and he prayed
for more time to find the records required by EPF office as
stated in the previous hearing 28/04/2022, the request is
granted. The next date of hearing was fixed on 25/05/2022.
On 25/05/2022 Sh. Dwijen Kumar, Secretary, of the
establishment attended the proceeding, and submitted a
letter reference no. neepc/2022-23/3103 dated 25/05/2022,
and case was adjourned to 21/10/2022. On 21/10/2022 Sh.
Dwijen Kumar, Secretary of the establishment attended the
proceeding. They were again directed to bring the deposit
statements of the damage period 04/1997 and 04/2008, also
on perusal of the letter ref. no. NEEPCO/2022-23/3013
dated 25/05/2022 the estb. hasn’t given the point wise
clarification sought on the daily order date 28/04/2022. They
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were directed to bring the requisite bank statements and the
point wise clarification sough in the next hearing 04/11/2022
and 30/11/2022. Sh. Dwijen Kumar Secretary of the
NEEPCO attended the proceeding, he is advised to submit
the challans and bank deposit statements for the contested
period 02/2002 to 12/2007. The next date of hearing is fixed
on 15/12/2022. On 15/12/2022 Sh. Dwijen Kumar Secretary
of the estb. attended the proceeding. He submitted a letter
along with supporting documents for cross verification by
EPF Office and also stated that from the year 1999 to 2007
the dues were deposited within the grace period of 5 days
(which was allowed by EPFO earlier), and damage dues for
the period 04/2008 actually relates to 04/2010. In regards to
the other damage periods, the estb. contested that the delay
arose as a result of the delay in credit by the Bank, even
though the estb. has deposited the payments on time. The
estb. is informed that damage calculations is done by taking
the date of credit as the date of receipt of dues by EPFO. As
verification needs to be done for the first two matter, the case
is fixed on 22/12/2022. On verification of challans submitted
by the establishment it is seen that for the wages month
01/2001, 02/2002, 05/2002, 08/2002, 12/2002, 04/2003,
06/2003, 03/2004, 05/2004, 06/2004, 03/2005, 04/2006,
06/2006, and 01/2007, the challans were deposited within the
grace period of 5 days. For wages month 06/2002 and
08/2005, the number of delays days was revised and taken as
7 and 10 days respectively and the damage and interest has
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been calculated accordingly and duly intimated to the estab.
For wage month 07/1999, the contestation of the estab. is
rejected, as on scrutiny of the challans submitted by the
estab. it is found that there is variation in the amount
reflected in Annexure – A and the challan submitted by the
estab. Further no proper explanation or supporting
documents could be furnished by Establishment with
regards to the variation. For 04/2008 on scrutiny of challan
and bank statement it was seen that contribution mentioned
against 04/2008 actually pertains to 04/2010 and payment
was also made on time. Therefore damage and interest for
04/2008 has been struck off. A Revised Calculation Sheet
was prepared and handed over to the Establishment for
perusal and their submissions before next date of hearing,
that is on 24/01/2023. On 24/01/2023 Shri. Dwijen Kumar,
Secretary, NEEPCO EPF Trust and Sh. Paritosh Deb
Assistant Accounts Officer attended the proceeding on
behalf of the establishment. When enquired whether they
have any objection with the Revised Calculation Sheet
forwarded to them, they asked the reason for non acceptance
of their petition that the damage dues relating to 04/1997
relates to arrear payment. Regarding the reason for their
inability to provide the documents, be it the number of
employees who have opted on that particular month, that is
04/1997,
for
IDA
pay
representative stated-
pattern,
the
establishment
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“that arrear payment can be given to employees only when
option is made by the particular employees and that as the
records pertains to a period of 25 years back they are unable
to provide the data substantiating that this particular
payment of dues relates to arrear payment of the
employees.” Also for the month of 03/1995 they have stated
that they couldn’t trace out the old records.
Considering that the clarifications sought by this office in
the daily order dated 28/04/2022 has still not been furnished
by the estab. despite lapse of over 8 months and as all their
other objections, regarding the calculations of damage dues,
have already been taken into account, and as Revised
Calculation Sheet has also been furnished, and since more
than a year has elapsed with regards to this case, and as
adequate time and opportunities have already been given to
the establishment, it was felt that there is no further need to
prolong the case and therefore the same is hereby concluded
and closed.
NOW THEREFORE, I, Kamlalbel Neitham, Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner-II, Shillong, in exercise of
the powers conferred on me under section 14-B of the Act
and on application of my mind to the facts and
circumstances of the case and on perusal of the relevant
records, consider it to be a fit case for levy of damages as per
the rates prescribed under Para 32-A of the EPF Scheme,
1952, Para 5(1) of the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995
2024:MLHC:696
and Para 8-A of the EDLI Scheme, 1976, notified vide
notification dated 14.08.91 and 26.09.2008 issued by the
Government of India and accordingly order that the
damages for the delayed payments for the period from
03/1995 to 04/2008……totaling Rs.60,57,874/- be recovered
as per the account wise schedule indicated below from the
employer in relation to M/S NORTH EASTERN ELECTRIC
POWER
CORPORATION
LTD,
BROOKLAND
COMPOUND, LOWER NEW COLONY, SHILLONG
793003, HAVING P.F. CODE NUMBER NE/SHG/941.
Nature of Damages
Amount due
Accoun
P.F. Contribution
Administrative charges
FPF/EPS contributions
EDLI contributions
EDLI
administrative
Rs. NIL/Rs. 29806/Rs. 4109457/Rs. 34018/Rs. 670/-
t No.
charges
Total
Rs. 4173951/I further order that the amount as mentioned above
shall be paid by M/s NEEPCO Ltd. into the respective EPF
accounts maintained in the State Bank of India within 15
days of receipt of this order, failing which, action will be
taken under Section 8 of the Act to recover the amount in
the same manner as laid down under Section 8B to 8G of the
Act.
Issued under my signature and seal on this 6 th day of
February’ 2023.
Sd/-
2024:MLHC:696
9.
On the contention of the petitioner that, the letter dated 25.05.2022,
was not addressed by the respondent, a perusal of the impugned order
reflects that apart from mechanically verifying the submitted challans for
the various periods, that could be provided, the reason for the inability of
the petitioner to provide the documents, as to the details of the employees,
who have opted for the IDA pay pattern for the month 04/1997, as also
payment of dues or arrears for earlier years, on account of the same being
old records of over 25 years, was never considered by the respondent. The
finding tersely just records that clarification sought by the respondent were
still to be furnished, and that adequate time and opportunity being already
given, there was no need to prolong the case. The question of
reasonableness, which had been raised by the petitioner has been given a
total go bye, without considering the fact that though Section 14B of the
Act, does not provide for any limitation for initiation of proceedings for
levy of damages, such power should be exercised within a reasonable
period of time. The petitioner, as they have demonstrated before the
respondent and also before this Court, were totally handicapped, as the old
records especially the bank details were not in their possession, and in fact,
the concerned bank had also expressed its inability to provide the same in
time, as it related to very old transactions before the advent of
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computerization or digitization. This aspect in the considered view of this
Court is vital, inasmuch as, notwithstanding that the Act is a socially
beneficial piece of legislation, the actions of the respondent in
implementing the same should not be visited with arbitrariness or
unreasonableness.
10.
In this context, reference may be made to a few judgments where
this aspect has been discussed by various High Courts and also the
Supreme Court. The same are as follows.
(i) Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jalpaiguri vs.
Darjeeling Dooars Plantation (Tea) Limited & Anr.(supra),
wherein at Para -18, it has been held as follows:“18. It is a principle of law that though Section 14B of the
Act does not provide for any limitation for initiation of proceeding
for levy damages, but the power should be exercised within a
reasonable period.”
(ii) Presidency Kid Leathers (Private) Ltd. vs. Regional Provident
Fund Commissioner, Madras(supra) wherein at Para – 13, it has
been held as follows:“13. We cannot also ignore the legitimate contention of the
learned counsel for the petitioner that by reason of the delay in the
initiation of the proceedings under S.14B of the Act, the
petitioner/appellant was totally handicapped in putting forth the
reasons for the alleged delay in the payment of the contribution
and, therefore, the order impugned is liable to be modified.
2024:MLHC:696
Though it is contended by the petitioner/appellant that the
respondent's failure in initiating the proceedings within a
reasonable time, viz., not later than one year, will render the
impugned order non est in law and liable to be set aside, we are
unable to accept the said contention. But, however, we hold that
the initiation of proceedings with a delay of 4 1/2 years to 8 years
cannot at all be easily ignored. Therefore, the interest of justice
and fair play will be amply met if we reduce the amount of
damages levied by 50 per cent in both the writ petition and the writ
appeal for the relevant periods in question.”
(iii)Hindustan Times Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.(supra),
wherein at Para – 25, 26 and 29, it has been held as follows:“25. The Gujarat High Court in Gandhidham Spg. & Mfg.
Co. Ltd. v. R.P.F. Commr. (to which, one of us Majmudar, J. was a
party), laid down a principle that “prejudice” on account of delay
could arise if it was proved that it was "irretrievable". There it was
observed that for purposes of Section 14-B, there is no period of
limitation prescribed and that for any negligence on the part of the
Department in taking proceedings the employees, who are third
parties, cannot suffer. It was further observed:
"The only question that would really survive is the one
whether on the facts and circumstances of a given case, the
show-cause notice issued after lapse of time can be said to be
issued beyond reasonable time. The test whether lapse of time
is reasonable or not will depend upon the further fact
2024:MLHC:696
whether the employer in the meantime has changed his
position to his detriment and is likely to be irretrievably
prejudiced by the belated issuance of such a show-cause
notice."
(emphasis supplied)
It was also stated that such a defence of irretrievable prejudice on
account of delay, was to be pleaded and proved in the reply to the
show-cause notice. We may add that if such a plea is rejected by the
Department, it cannot be raised in the High Court unless
specifically pleaded. The above principle of prejudice laid down by
Gujarat High Court in Gandhidham Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.
(Guj) has been followed by the Bombay High Court in Soaner
Taluka Ginning, Pressing and Dal Mill Prakriya v. R.P.F. Commr.,
Super Processors v. Union of India.
26. A different aspect of prejudice was referred to in Sushma
Fabrics (P) Ltd. v. Union of India by a learned Single Judge of the
Bombay High Court. It was stated that in some cases there could be
serious prejudice on account of abnormal delay in taking
proceedings under Section 14B, either because the records or
accounts of the defaulter are lost or on account of the concerned
personnel acquainted with the facts of a bygone period no longer
being available for unearthing the facts. But such pleas must be
raised before the Department and strictly proved. In case such facts
are proved it is possible in some cases that there is irretrievable
prejudice.
2024:MLHC:696
29. From the aforesaid decisions, the following principles
can be summarised:
The authority under Section 14-B has to apply his mind to
the facts of the case and the reply to the show-cause notice and pass
a reasoned order after following principles of natural justice and
giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard; the Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration the
number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of default
and the amounts involved; default on the part of the employer
based on plea of power-cut, financial problems relating to other
indebtedness or the delay in realisation of amounts paid by the
cheques or drafts, cannot be justifiable grounds for the employer to
escape liability; there is no period of limitation prescribed by the
legislature for initiating action for recovery of damages under
Section 14-B. The fact that proceedings are initiated or demand for
damages is made after several years cannot by itself be a ground for
drawing an inference of waiver or that the employer was lulled into
a belief that no proceedings under Section 14-B would be taken;
mere delay in initiating action under Section 14-B cannot amount
to prejudice inasmuch as the delay on the part of the Department,
would have only allowed the employer to use the monies for his
own purposes or for his business especially when there is no
additional provision for charging interest. However, the employer
can claim prejudice if there is proof that between the period of
default and the date of initiation of action under Section 14-B, he
has changed his position to his detriment to such an extent that if
the recovery is made after a large number of years, the prejudice to
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him is of an "irretrievable" nature; he might also claim prejudice
upon proof of loss of all the relevant records and/or nonavailability of the personnel who were, several years back in charge
of these payments and provided he further establishes that there is
no other way he can reconstruct the record or produce evidence; or
there are other similar grounds which could lead to "irretrievable"
prejudice; further, in such cases of "irretrievable" prejudice, the
defaulter must take the necessary pleas in defence in the reply to
the show-cause notice and must satisfy the authority concerned
with acceptable material; if those pleas are rejected, he cannot raise
them in the High Court unless there is a clear pleading in the writ
petition to that effect.”
11.
The respondent therefore having come to a finding that for the
period 03/1995 to 04/2008, the petitioner was liable to pay damages and
interest thereon, in the circumstances as has been narrated earlier, does not
pass the test of reasonableness, inasmuch as, the impugned orders have
been passed without regard to relevant considerations, and thus lack
proportionality. In the considered view of this Court, though in Section 14B there is no limitation for initiation of proceedings, the powers exercised
by the respondent in this regard should be in a rational and reasonable
manner, which is not the case in the instant matter.
12.
On the point of irretrievable prejudice being caused to the
petitioner by the delay in the initiation of proceedings, the only aspect that
2024:MLHC:696
can be said to contribute to this being caused, to the mind of the Court, is
the fact that between the period of default and the date of initiation of
proceedings under Section 14B, the position has some what altered as there
was a switch over from the CDA to IDA pay pattern, and that the petitioner
had expressed in its inability to trace the documents, to reconcile certain
figures in the statement, as arrear payments were given only to employees
who opted for the same. This surely has caused a certain amount of
prejudice, as the petitioner was not in a position and therefore helpless to
supply certain documents, due to the inordinate delay in the initiation of
proceedings under Section 14B. A ground of absence of Mens Rea, has also
been raised by the petitioner and in this regard, the judgment in the case of
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Hooghly Mills Company
Ltd. & Anr.(supra), has been placed. Though, the same is a factor to be
taken into consideration, in the facts of the present case, the main plank of
challenge being on ground of unreasonableness and irretrievable prejudice,
this aspect is not discussed.
13.
Though, the Act provides for alternate remedy by way of an appeal
under Section 7I, against orders passed under Section 14B, in the
considered view of this Court, the impugned order which suffers from
arbitrariness, non-consideration of the circumstances, as put forth by the
petitioner by letter dated 25.05.2022, and passed in a mechanical fashion
2024:MLHC:696
without any application of mind, as to whether the power as vested had
been exercised within reasonable time, deserves to be interfered with by
this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
14.
Accordingly, in the given facts and circumstances and as discussed
above, the instant writ petition is allowed, and the impugned notice dated
21.10.2021, and both the impugned orders dated 03.02.2023 under Section
14B and 7Q are accordingly set aside and quashed.
Judge
THABAH
Date: 2024.08.05 17:12:29 IST
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