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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
WRIT APPEAL NO.572 OF 2026
(CNR No: HBHC010352932026)
Date: 05.11.2026
Reserved on: 22.09.2026
Pronounced on: 05.11.2026
Uploaded on: 05.11.2026
Between:
Nizams Institute of Medical Sciences and another
…Appellants
AND
K. Vinodhar and another
…Respondents
JUDGMENT: (As per the Hon’ble Sri Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda)
Heard Mr. Prabhakar Sripada, learned Senior Counsel,
Mr.K. Prabhakar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for NIMS
appearing for the appellants and Mr. D. Goverdhana Chary,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1. Perused the
entire material on record.
2. This Writ Appeal is filed under Section 15 of the Letters of
Patent against the order passed by the learned Single Judge
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in IA No.1 of 2026 in WP No.21197 of 2019 dated 24.04.2026,
refusing to recall the order dated 10.11.2023.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the writ petitioner was
working as a Deputy Registrar in the Nizam’s Institute of
Medical Sciences (NIMS) was a given a charge memo dated
16.11.2001 vide Rc.No.4/2001/PM/H2, wherein the writ
petitioner was charged with misleading his superiors while
preparing orders dated 31.03.2001 and thereby enhancing
the benefit of enhanced scale of Pay of Rs.2,200 to Rs.4,000/to Legal Assistant (LA) by interpolating words ‘Legal Assistant’
(LA)
after
Assistant
Registrar
(AR)/Assistant
Finance
Controller (AFC).
4. The
petitioner/respondent
No.1
contended
that
notwithstanding his reinstatement, treating the intervening
period as dies non amounted to the imposition of a
substantive punishment. Aggrieved thereby, he submitted a
representation to the Director of the respondent/Institute,
seeking reconsideration of the decision and a direction to
treat the said period as duty for all purposes.
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5. The petitioner/respondent No.1 herein also preferred a
representation dated 20.08.2015 before the Hon’ble Minister
for
Health,
Medical
and
Family
Welfare
Department,
Secretariat, seeking reconsideration of the decision to treat
the said period as dies non. He contended that such
treatment amounted to a substantive punishment and was
contrary
to
the
Fundamental
Rules.
Accordingly,
he
requested the intervention of the Hon’ble Minister and sought
a direction to treat the period from the date of compulsory
retirement to the date of reinstatement as duty for all
purposes.
6. The petitioner further stated that on 31.08.2006, the institute
issued a notice proposing to treat the period during which he
remained out of employment, from the date of compulsory
retirement until the date of reinstatement, as a substantive
punishment. The reinstatement order dated 27.09.2006 was
issued upon his undertaking to accept the said treatment of
the intervening period.
7. The petitioner further contended that while passing the
reinstatement order, the Executive Board of NIMS had
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observed that the order of compulsory retirement had been
passed without following the rules and procedure prescribed
by the Institute for the imposition of a major penalty.
Nevertheless, the Director of NIMS subsequently passed
orders treating the period from 12.06.2002 to 27.09.2006 as
dies non.
8. It was the specific contention of the petitioner that the order
treating the said period as dies non was passed unilaterally,
without issuing any notice or affording him an opportunity of
being heard. The petitioner argued that once the Executive
Board had observed that the order of compulsory retirement
was imposed without following the procedure prescribed
under the applicable rules, the question of treating the
intervening period as dies non did not arise.
9. The
petitioner
further
contended
that
despite
his
representation to the Government, no orders had been passed
thereon. Aggrieved by the same, he filed the writ petition
No.42430 of 2016 seeking a direction to the respondents to
consider and pass appropriate orders on his representation
dated 20.08.2015, which was dismissed as withdrawn on
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27.11.2018, and that this important fact was not disclosed
before this Court while obtaining the order dated 10.11.2023.
10.
The petitioner had earlier filed Writ Petition No.464 of
2003, questioning the order of the appellate authority dated
19.11.2002, whereby a fresh enquiry was directed setting
aside the order under appeal. By the said order, a committee
comprising respondents Nos.4 and 5 was constituted and
entrusted with the task of conducting a detailed enquiry and
submitting a report to respondent No.2. The said order dated
19.11.2002 was quashed and the appellate authority was
directed to consider the appeal in accordance with law.
11.
Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation dated
23.09.2002, pursuant to which the Executive Board resolved
to reinstate him, treating the intervening period from the date
of compulsory retirement until the date of reinstatement as a
substantive punishment. Accordingly, an order was passed
on 31.08.2006. The petitioner accepted the said decision and
on 07.09.2006, expressed his willingness to join duty subject
to
the
punishment
imposed
by
the
Executive
Board.
Subsequently, he was directed to withdraw the pending case.
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On 27.09.2006, the petitioner reported for duty and was
permitted to join duty in the afternoon of the same day, as
reflected in the order dated 09.10.2006.
12.
Thereafter,
vide
proceedings
dated
16.05.2008,
the
Executive Registrar issued a communication directing that
the intervening period from the date of compulsory retirement
until
the
date
of
reinstatement
from
12.06.2004
to
27.09.2006, comprising 1,569 days, is treated as dies non.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present WP
No.21197 of 2019 seeking the following relief:
“…to issue a Writ Order or direction more particularly one in the
nature of Writ of Mandamus calling for records pertaining to the
impugned order issued by respondent No.1 in his proceedings
No.9745/VCV 2/20154 dated 22/10/2018 confirming the order of
respondent No.2 proceedings issued in letter Rc.No.7/1/2006/HRD/H1
dated 27/09/2006 treating the intervening period as substantive
punishment and further orders of respondent No.3 issued in his
proceedings Rc.No.3/1/89H1 dated 16/05/2008 treating the
intervening period from the date of compulsory retirement to the date
of reinstatement i e from 12/06/2002 to 27/09/2006 1569 days as Dies
non and declare the same as illegal arbitrary and also violative of Art
14 and 16 of Constitution of India besides being violative of CCA
Rules and violative of principles of natural justice while issuing a
consequential direction to the respondents to treat the intervening
period from 12/06/2002 to 27/09/2006 (1569 days) as duty with all
attendant benefits including notional sanction of increments and
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revision of pay and pension and pay arrears accordingly in the
interest of justice and pass”
Having heard the learned counsel on either side, the learned
Single Judge has allowed the above writ petition setting aside
the impugned orders and the intervening period from the date
of compulsory retirement to the date of reinstatement i.e.,
from 12.06.2002 to 27.09.2006 (1569 days) shall be treated
as “on duty” for all purposes and directed the respondents to
extend all monetary benefits including increments and
revision of pay and pension by treating the above period as
duty and pay arrears to the petitioner within a period of four
(4) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
13.
In view of the said order, the Executive Board filed IA No.1
of 2026 seeking to recall the order dated 10.11.2023 in WP
No.21197 of 2019. The learned Single Judge on considering
the material on record, dismissed the said IA.
14.
Aggrieved by the order in IA No.1 of 2026, the instant Writ
Appeal is filed by the appellant seeking to allow IA No.1 of
2026 in WP No.21197 of 2019 contending that the writ
petitioner played fraud by not disclosing the fact that he had
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filed WP No.42430 of 2016, which was dismissed as
withdrawn on 27.11.2018 and this fact was not brought to
the notice of the Court while obtaining the order dated
10.11.2023 in WP No.21197 of 2019 and on the said ground,
the said recall petition ought to have allowed.
15.
The appellants also averred that the learned Single Judge
did not see that as per the directions of this Court in WP
No.464
of
2003,
the
Executive
Board
considered
the
submissions of the writ petitioner in the appeal and rejected
the same. The appellants have also contended that the writ
petitioner approached the local MLA, who wrote a letter to
Special Chief Secretary to the Government to look into the
matter and acting upon the said letter of MLA, the Special
Chief Secretary to the Government, through his letter dated
23.01.2017 requested the Director NIMS to furnish report
pertaining to the writ petitioner.
16.
The appellants further contended that the learned Single
Judge failed to see that the writ petitioner did not challenge
the substantive punishment order dated 12.06.2002 and dies
non order dated 16.05.2008 in the earlier writ petitions filed
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by him and the writ petitioner now cannot challenge the same
after a lapse of seventeen (17) years.
17.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
following judgments and the relevant paragraphs of the
judgments are extracted:
i.
In Vipin Kumar v. Jaydeep and others1
21. This appeal arises out of the order dated 5-1-2021 [Jaydeep v.
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Utt 1921] wherein an
application seeking recall of the order passed in the review
petition dated 11-10-2019 [Jaydeep v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., SA
No. 140 of 2016, order dated 11-10-2019 (Utt)] and consequently,
the judgment dated 1-7-2019 [Jaydeep v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
2019 SCC OnLine Utt 1901] was sustained. This was on the
premise that a second review petition is barred under Order 47
Rule 9 of the Code.
From the above judgment, it is held that once it is
established that order was obtained by a successful party
by practicing or playing fraud, it is vitiated and such order
cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is
non-existent and non-est and cannot be allowed to stand.
ii.
In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by Lrs. v.
Jagannath (Dead) by Lrs. and others2
2025 (6) SCC 465
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5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short
question before the High Court was whether in the facts and
circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary
decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however,
went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse.
We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty
cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove
it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation”
cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it
becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The
courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties.
One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are
constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is
being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers
and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the
court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains
indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case
is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can
be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that
Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on
the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design
of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is
a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating
intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk
with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court
auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own
volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour
of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew
that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his
master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he
filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he
had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of
Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the
release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the
court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court
1994 (1) SCC 1
11 of 31
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that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the
certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A
litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the
documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If
he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the
other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as
well as on the opposite party.
iii.
In A.V. Papayyasastry and others v. Government of
A.P. and others3
21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or
order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or
order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke
proclaimed:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or
order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority
is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment,
decree or order—by the first court or by the final court—has to be
treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or
even in collateral proceedings.
33. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders, this Court
stated: (SCC pp. 587-88, paras 15-17)
“15. It is unrealistic to expect the appellant Company to resist a
claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because the
appellant Company had at that stage no knowledge about the
fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company
comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with
the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if
by that time the award was already passed, it would not be
possible for the Company to file a statutory appeal against the
award. Not only because of the bar of limitation to file the appeal
but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be
2007 (4) SCC 221
12 of 31
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condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the
pleadings made till then.
16. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for
recalling the order on the basis of the newly-discovered facts
amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a
situation. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to
recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled
through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would
affect the very basis of the claim.
17. The allegation made by the appellant Insurance Company, that
the claimants were not involved in the accident which they
described in the claim petitions, cannot be brushed aside without
further probe into the matter, for the said allegation has not been
specifically denied by the claimants when they were called upon to
file objections to the applications for recalling of the awards. The
claimants then confined their resistance to the plea that the
application for recall is not legally maintainable. Therefore, we
strongly feel that the claim must be allowed to be resisted, on the
ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we fail
to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate
their contentions it might certainly lead to a serious miscarriage
of justice.”
iv.
In Yashoda (alias Sodhan) v. Sukhwinder Singh and
others4
24. What would be the effect of suppression of earlier proceedings
has been considered by this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu
[S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1] . The
Court observed thus : (SCC p. 5, paras 5-6)
“5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short
question before the High Court was whether in the facts and
circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary
decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however,
2002 (17) SCC 307
13 of 31
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went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse.
We do not agree with the High Court that ‘there is no legal duty
cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove
it by true evidence’. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot
be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an
engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of
law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who
comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are
constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is
being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers
and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the
court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains
indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case
is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can
be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that
Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on
the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design
of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is
a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating
intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk
with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court
auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own
volition, executed the registered release deed (Ext. B-15) in favour
of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew
that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his
master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he
filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he
had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of
Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the
release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the
court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court
that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the
certified registered copy of Ext. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff.
A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the
documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If
he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the
14 of 31
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other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as
well as on the opposite party.”
In the aforesaid judgments, wherein it is held that the
judgment or decree obtained by fraud to be treated as
nullity and can be questioned even in collateral proceedings
and the meaning of ‘fraud’ is defined.
v.
In State of Punjab and others v. Krishnan Niwas 5
3. The admitted facts are that the respondent was charged for an
offence under Section 302 IPC. He was convicted and sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for life. Thereafter, proceedings were
initiated against him under Article 311(2) of the Constitution and
he was removed from service. Appeal against his conviction under
Section 302 IPC was allowed by the High Court. Punishment of
conviction under Section 302 IPC was modified to one under
Section 325 IPC and he was directed to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 1-1/2 years. After undergoing imprisonment, the
respondent filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The
appellate authority by order dated 1-3-1989 reduced the
punishment of removal from service to lower scale of pay drawn
by him and directed that he was not entitled to back wages. The
respondent accepted it and joined duty on 5-6-1989. Subsequently,
he filed a civil suit for declaration that his dismissal from the
service and reduction of rank and also the direction that he is not
entitled to pay the arrears of wages, were illegal. The trial court
dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Additional District Judge
reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit. In
the second appeal, the High Court has confirmed the same. Thus
this appeal, by special leave.
1997 (9) SCC 31
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4. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the
offence with which he was sentenced under Section 325 IPC does
not involve his moral turpitude and, therefore, the imposition of
punishment of reduction of his scale of pay and also denial of back
wages, is clearly illegal and that the appellants are not entitled to
challenge the order. We find no force in the contention. The
respondent having accepted the order of the appellate authority
and joined the post on 5-6-1989, it was not open to him to
challenge the order subsequently. By his conduct he has accepted
the correctness of the order and then acted upon it. Under these
circumstances, the civil court would not have gone into the merits
and decided the matter against the appellants.
vi.
In Sanat Kumar Dwivedi v. Dhar Jila Sahakari
Bhoomi Vikas Bank Maryadit and others 6
2. The admitted facts are that the appellant was reinstated in
service by order dated 12-5-1978 with a condition that he will not
get any back wages. Obviously, earlier on 8-3-1976 his services
were terminated but by the aforesaid order, he was reinstated
without back wages. He accepted such reinstatement without back
wages by his joining report, Annexure R-4 at p. 106 of the paperbook that he has joined his duty on 13-5-1978. By his own
conduct, the appellant has accepted the correctness of the order of
reinstatement without back wages. Under these circumstances,
subsequent dispute raised by him regarding back wages was
clearly not maintainable as held by this Court in State of Punjab v.
Krishan Niwas [(1997) 9 SCC 31 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 998 : (1997)
3 Scale 338] . In view of the settled legal position, no interference
is called for. The appeal is therefore, dismissed.
vii.
In Union of India and another v. N.M.Dhobi7
2001 (9) SCC 402
2005 SCC OnLineGuj 342
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15. In this background referred to above, Western Railways has
finalized issue that applicant is not entitled for condonation of
break in service due to resignations/removals and dismissals as a
matter of policy. Applicant has made misrepresentation to the
Western Railways that he was a member of S.C. community on two
occasions. Those allegations were found to be proved and removal
order was passed by Disciplinary Authority after holding
departmental inquiry against applicant. In such serious
misconduct, punishment of removal is considered to be a proper
and legal punishment, decided by the Apex Court and High Court
in number of cases [See: Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram
Rattan Yadav, 2003 AIR SCW 1126 : [2003 (2) SLR 602 (SC)]; R.
Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, 2004 Lab. IC 556;
Ravindra Ramjorbhai Oza v. Western Railway, 2005 (1) GLH 721.
Question raised before us is, whether applicant is entitled for
condonation of break in service for period prior to date of his
reappointment. Facts are to the effect that order of removal was
not challenged by applicant before Tribunal. The Tribunal has not
set aside order of removal and order of reappointment. Order of
reappointment. Order of reappointment as a fresh entrant dated
13-4-1978 was also not challenged by applicant but said order
was accepted by applicant and he resumed duties with effect from
18th April, 1978. We have perused Original service sheet in which
“S.C.” is written below the name of the applicant and servicesheet bear signatures of the applicant. Railway Service
(Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1968, Rule 25 Part VI is relating
to revision and review. The authority under Rule 25 can confirm,
modify or set aside order or confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside
penalty imposed by order or impose any penalty where no penalty
has been imposed or remit case to the authority which made order
or any other authority directing such authority to make such Fresh
inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case
or pass such orders as it may deem fit. Therefore, revisional and
reviewing authority has power to pass such orders as it may deem
fit, therefore, contention raised by learned Advocate Mr. Shah that
reappointment is not prescribed as punishment under Rules,
therefore, order of reappointment is bad, cannot be accepted in
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light of provisions of Rule 25 of said Rules of 1968 which provides
that revisional authority and reviewing authority has power to
pass such orders as it may deem fit. Revisional and reviewing
authority has not set aside order of removal, but with sympathetic
approach, granted only reappointment as a fresh entrant. Said
order has been accepted by the applicant and requested the
authority to condone break in service. Representation dated 17th
July, 1989 after rejection of representation dated 11th November,
1982 by order dated 14th March, 1984 suggests that applicant has
accepted order of reappointment and then made request to the
General Manager, Western Railways to condone break in service.
In such circumstances, when order of reappointment is accepted
which does not include benefit of continuity of service impliedly or
expressly, therefore, applicant is not entitled for condonation of
break in service. Applicant is not having any legal right to receive
benefit of continuity of service. It is not impliedly included in case
of reappointment. In case of reappointment, employee would lose
his past service for all purposes. Order of reappointment is not
punishment but result of sympathetic approach made by
concerned authority. Tribunal has not given any reason on what
basis, it has granted benefit of continuity of service or
condonation of break for purpose of pension and other retirement
benefits. Reliance placed by the Tribunal on decision of Apex
Court in case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Pari shad v. Rajendra
Bahadur Srivastava (supra) is misconception. The facts before the
Apex Court in UP. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Rajendra
Bahadur Srivastava (supra), are totally different. In aforesaid
case, order of termination was set aside. High Court, while
allowing writ petition by order dated 17th July, 1993 set aside the
order of termination dated December 31, 1971 and directed for
benefits of his past service including the benefit of seniority,
increment and promotion as if his service has not been terminated.
This order of the High Court was set aside by Apex Court by
declaring it as illegal but Apex Court held that employee is
entitled to computation of period from the date of his initial entry
for purpose of pensionary benefits only and to no other relief. This
being mere order passed by Apex Court, no ratio has been laid
18 of 31
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down by Apex Court. In such case, when reappointment order is
passed and accepted by employee, then he is legally not entitled
for benefit of continuity in service or condonation of break in
service as a matter of right. Therefore, in the circumstances of this
case, this judgment is not helpful to applicant. In Keshav Samsher
Singh v. Union of India (supra) also, facts are totally different.
Central Administrative Tribunal Bombay set aside termination
order and granted benefit of continuity of service whereas in order
of removal remains as it is and reappointment order has been
accepted by applicant and did not challenge the same before any
forum. Not only that, Tribunal has not set aside order of removal
and reappointment. Therefore, Tribunal has not properly applied
mind and direction issued by Apex Court in V.P. Awas Evam Vikas
Parishad v. Rajendra Bahadur Srivastava (supra) has been blindly
applied to facts of this case and granted benefit of condonation of
break with pensionary and retirement benefit. Decision of the
C.A.T. Bombay in Keshav Samsher Singh v. Union of India
(supra) is also not applicable to facts of this case. In present case,
no penalty has been imposed by revisional authority while
granting reappointment to applicant. Revisional/reviewing
authority has exercised power under Rule 25 enabling it to pass
appropriate order it may deem proper. So, it is not a case of
setting aside order of removal or imposition of any other penalty
to applicant. Learned Advocate Mr. K.K. Shah has relied upon
Apex Court decision is S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P., (1989) 4 SCC
582 : AIR 1990 SC 10 : [1989 (5) SLR 779 (SC)] to point out that
in service dispute, cause of action would arise from date of order
of higher authority and not from date of adverse order, and where
no order is made by higher authority within six months from date
of remedy is availed, the date on which six months time expired.
This decision is not applicable to facts of this case because, lastly,
on 14-3-1984, representation of the applicant dated 11th
November, 1982 was decided against applicant, thereafter,
applicant remained silent upto 17th July, 1989. In between, no
challenge by applicant either to adverse order or no proceeding is
filed by applicant within period of six months. However, apart
from that, we are not examining the question of delay in filing of
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O.A. before Tribunal but we are examining merits of the matter,
whether applicant is entitled to benefit of condonation of break in
service or not?
Tribunal has not discussed on what basis applicant is entitled for
said benefit. No reasons have been recorded by Tribunal. Tribunal
granted benefits in favour of the applicant by merely relying upon
decision of Apex Court in UP. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v.
Rajendra Bahadur Srivastava (supra). The order of C.A.T. is not
legal but based on sympathy and sentiment. According to us, this
is nothing but clear case of non-application of mind by Tribunal.
In case of reappointment which does not include continuity of
service, benefit of past service cannot be granted by condoning
break when order of reappointment has been accepted by
applicant-employee. Once order of reappointment has been
accepted by applicant and resumed duties without any protest and
enjoyed benefits flowing from said order, then, applicant is
estopped from claiming benefit of past service and other
consequential benefits. Apex Court has examined the issue that
once reinstatement order passed by Labour Court denying back
wages for intervening period and then employer ordered for
reinstatement and accepted by the employee, then, subsequent
challenge against denial of back wages by filing of petition is not
maintainable and it was not entertained by Apex Court on ground
that the reinstatement without back wages has been accepted by
employee, then, to challenge back wages part, subsequently, is not
maintainable. (See: Sanat Kumar Dwivedi v. Dhar Jilla Sahakari
Bhoomi Vikas Bank Marayadit, (2001) 9 SCC 402 : [2000 (5) SLR
417 (SC)]; State of Punjab v. Krishan Niwas, (1997) 9 SCC 31 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 998 : 1997 (3) Scale 338) : [1997 (2) SLR 514
(SC)].
viii.
In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Bombay v. Prakash Tulshiram Pardeshi 8
2008 (4) Mh.L.J. 940
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4. The charges against the respondent were of a serious nature
and character. A disciplinary enquiry was convened to enquire
into the allegation that the respondent while discharging his duties
as conductor had collected the fare from two passengers on the
bus, but to whom tickets had not been issued. The money bag of
the respondent also showed an excess fare collection. The charge
against the respondent was, therefore, that he had
misappropriated the funds of the Corporation and had been guilty
of a dereliction of duties by not issuing tickets to passengers for
the journey. Such an act of misconduct having been found to be
duly established, had to be taken seriously both by the disciplinary
authority and by the Labour Court. Upon holding the charge to be
established, the respondent was dismissed from service. The first
Appellate Authority, as a matter of fact, came to the conclusion
that the charge was established, that it was of a serious nature
and that the service record of the respondent was not satisfactory
and he was penalised in the past under the service rules. The final
order of the Appellate Authority clearly suggests that the
Appellate Authority was inclined to dismiss the appellant from
service. However, it was the respondent who had stated that he
would not commit such a mistake in the future and it was on his
request that the Appellate Authority eventually decided to make a
fresh offer of appointment so as to enable the respondent to have
some opportunity to improve upon himself. The respondent
accepted the order of the Appellate Authority and joined service
with effect from 10th December, 1994. Once that was done and
having taken the benefit of the order, it was clearly not open to the
respondent to turn back and complain of an unfair labour
practice. The respondent is clearly estopped from doing so. The
principle of estoppel must apply in such a case and the Labour
Court ought to have rejected the complaint on this ground alone.
Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner urged that the
powers of the Appellate Authority are wide enough to include an
offer of the fresh appointment to the workman. For the purposes of
these proceedings, it is not necessary for this Court to enter any
final judgment on whether the Appellate Authority in the course of
modifying the order of dismissal can pass an order of fresh
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appointment. But in the facts of the present case, it needs emphasis
that the order of the Appellate Authority properly construed, was
an offer for a fresh appointment which was duly accepted by the
respondent. If the respondent believed that the Appellate Authority
had no authority to impose such a direction upon him, he could
have challenged the order in its entirety. Having taken the benefit
of the order, the respondent was estopped from challenging the
order by which he was given fresh appointment. The Appellate
Authority while justifying its own finding, confirmed the order of
dismissal. The respondent was, however, offered re-employment
on humanitarian grounds, particularly in the light of the fact that
he accepted his mistake and stated that he would not commit such
a mistake in future. The interference of the Labour Court in the
proceedings, was therefore, clearly not warranted. The principle
that estoppel must apply in a situation such as this is consistent
with the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab v.
Krishan Niwas, 1997 (1) CLR 855. The same view has been taken
by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Union of India
v. N.M. Dhobi, 2006 (1) CLR 587.
ix.
In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation,
through
the
Divisional
Controller,
Chandrapur
Division, Chandrapur v. Kawdu9
2. Shri Mehadia, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
has invited my attention to plea raised in para 5 of the written
statement to the effect that once the complainant accepts the order
of the First Appellate Authority and joins the services, he is
estopped from questioning the said order. He has relied upon the
decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Bombay v.
Prakash Tulshiram Pardeshi reported in 2008 (4) Mh.L.J. 940 and
the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v.
Krishan Niwas reported in (1997) 9 SCC 31. He submits that the
2014 SCC OnLineBom 3534
22 of 31
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complainant joined the duties as per the decision of the First
Appellate Authority on 13.10.2000 and was getting Rs. 2310/- per
month as a basic pay.
From the above judgments, wherein it is held that an
employee after accepting the punishment and joining duty
is stopped from challenging the punishment and the
acceptance of order reinstating services without back wages
and in view of the order of subsequent claim for back wages
was not maintainable.
x.
In R.N. Gosain v. YashpalDhir10
10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and
reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election
which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same
instrument and that “a person cannot say at one time that a
transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which
he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then
turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some
other advantage”. [See : Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and
Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. [(1921) 2 KB 608, 612 (CA)] ,
Scrutton, L.J.] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th
Edn., Vol. 16, “after taking an advantage under an order (for
example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from
saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside”. (para 1508)
11. In Thacker Hariram Motiram v. Balkrishan Chatrabhu
Thacker [1989 Supp (2) SCC 655] this Court was dealing with a
similar situation. The High Court, while deciding the second
appeal in an eviction matter gave the appellant (tenant) one year's
time subject to his giving an undertaking within a period of three
(1992) 4 SCC 683
23 of 31
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weeks stating that vacant possession would be handed over within
the aforesaid time. The appellant gave an undertaking in
accordance with the said terms wherein he undertook that he
would vacate and give vacant possession of the suit premises by
December 31, 1985, i.e., to say after one year if “by that time no
stay order from the Supreme Court is received as I intend to file
an appeal in the Supreme Court”. It was held that in view of the
said undertaking the petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and he should
abide by the terms of the undertaking, and it was observed: (pp.
655-56)
“This undertaking filed by the appellant in our opinion is in clear
variation with the oral undertaking given to the learned Judge
which induced him to give one year's time. We do not wish to
encourage this kind of practice for obtaining time from the court
on one plea of filing the undertaking and taking the different
stand, in applications under Article 136 of the Constitution.”
xi.
In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and
Investment Corporation and another v. Diamond &
Gem
Development
Corporation
Limited
another11
15. A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot-blow cold”, “fast
and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one knowingly
accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order,
he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of
such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is
applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a
manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good
conscience. [Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [AIR 1956 SC
(2013) 5 SCC 470
and
24 of 31
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593] , CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216] , Ramesh
Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement [(2008) 14 SCC 58 : (2009) 1
SCC (L&S) 706 : AIR 2009 SC 713] , Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD
[(2011) 5 SCC 270 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 712 : AIR 2011 SC 1869]
, Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co.
Ltd. [(2011) 10 SCC 420 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 685] and V.
Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer [(2012) 12 SCC 133 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136 : JT (2012) 9 SC 260] .]
This extract is taken from Rajasthan State Industrial Development
& Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn.
Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153 : 2013 SCC
OnLine SC 143 at page 481
16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the
rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate and
reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is
one among the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel),
which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded,
by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to
speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.
xii.
In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Karunesh Kumar and
others12
In the case at hand, the un-selected candidates want to press into
service a part of the 1978 Rules while accepting the 2015 Rules.
Such a selective adoption is not permissible under law, as no party
can be allowed to approbate or reprobate, as held by this Court in
Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:
“Approbate and reprobate
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1706
25 of 31
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26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would
only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the
same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle
behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of
approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity
coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who
knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the
benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the
fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the
rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an
instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to
affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be
applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a
party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of
the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element
of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of
estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already
dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the
conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while
confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.
27.2. State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu [(2014) 15 SCC
144] : (SCC pp. 153-54, paras 22-23 & 25-26)
“22. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a species
of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case
of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute.
(Vide CIT v. MR. P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216].)
23. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been
passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and
derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground.
(Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR
1969 SC 329].) In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [(1992) 4 SCC
683] this Court has observed as under : (R.N. Gosain case
[(1992) 4 SCC 683], SCC pp. 687-88, para 10)
‘10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and
reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election
which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same
instrument and that ‘a person cannot say at one time that a
26 of 31
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transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which
he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then
turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some
other advantage’.’
25. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development
& Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn.
Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153], made an
observation that a party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and
cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where
one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or
an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him
of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do
equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate
the principles of right and good conscience.
26. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of
estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is
inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among
the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a
rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of
his actions, or conduct, or silence when he has to speak, from
asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.”
In the aforesaid judgments, it is held that law does not permit
a person to both approbate and reprobate and this principle is
based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no
party can accept and reject the same instrument and that “a
person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and
thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be
entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round
27 of 31
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and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other
advantage.”
18.
The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon
the
judgment
in
Chief
Commissioner,
Land
Administration, Government of Telangana, Hyderabad
and others v. P. Govind Reddy and others13, the relevant
paragraph is extracted below:
39.
There is no dispute to the proposition that fraud vitiates all
proceedings, judicial as well as administrative, and when it is a case
of fraud, limitation cannot be put up as a defence. Nonetheless,
Supreme Court has time and again a note of caution that merely
allegation of fraud of suspicion is not enough. Fraud must not only be
pleaded must also be demonstrated and established. Mere raising of
suspension would not be adequate to draw any conclusion of fraud.
As director (Appeals) has pointed out in his letter dated 09.04.2008
that District Collector and Joint Collector have only created suspicion
to justify the request for initiating proceedings for cancellation of
supplementary sethwar. This is not adequate more so, when several
decades have gone by since the initial assignments which have not
been cancelled; subsequent sale transactions of the vendors have also
not been cancelled; it is a supplementary sethwar of the writ
petitioners which has been targeted.
19.
Having heard the contentions and rival contention of both
the counsel and on consideration of entire material on record,
it is pertinent to note that the order of reinstatement itself
2022 (5) ALT 498 (DB)
28 of 31
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indicates that the period from the date of compulsory
retirement until the date of reinstatement was treated as a
substantive
punishment.
Having
accepted
the
said
punishment, the petitioner cannot now contend that he was
compelled to accept the
same
owing to his financial
constraints. The petitioner had availed himself of the
appellate remedy and had also approached this Court by
filing
a
writ
petition
seeking
relief
in
that
regard.
Subsequently, withdrawn the writ petition without obtaining
liberty to institute fresh proceedings and having accepted the
punishment imposed by the Executive Board, the petitioner
cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same issues by raising
pleas that were available to him earlier.
20.
It is further pertinent to note that the petitioner had
already challenged the proceedings treating the intervening
period as dies non in an earlier writ petition, which was
subsequently withdrawn. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the
present proceedings seeking substantially the same relief i.e.,
to set aside the proceedings of the Executive Registrar
treating the said period as dies non and to direct that the
29 of 31
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period be treated as duty. The earlier filing and withdrawal of
the
writ
petition,
particularly
when
the
subsequent
proceedings were filed without disclosing the said fact,
constitute
a
relevant
circumstance
for
consideration.
However, the petitioner seeks to rely upon the alleged
suppression of material facts and the fraud said to have been
played upon the Court as grounds for recalling the order
passed in Writ Petition No. 21197 of 2018.
21.
It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner had preferred
a writ appeal against the order passed in Writ Petition
No.21197 of 2018. The said writ appeal was subsequently
withdrawn with liberty to file a review application against the
order passed by the learned Single Judge. Although the
petitioner thereafter filed a review application, the ground of
fraud now sought to be urged was not raised therein. Though
an application for review and an application for recall would
more or less stand on the same footing, rest on overlapping
considerations, the petitioner cannot be permitted to pursue
successive proceedings by raising grounds that were already
available when the earlier proceedings were filed.
30 of 31
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22.
The alleged fraud and suppression now relied upon by the
petitioner were matters that could have been raised in the
writ petition itself. However, the petitioner failed to raise the
said grounds in the review proceedings. The order passed in
the review application was not further challenged and has
therefore, attained finality. Having allowed the said order to
attain finality, the petitioner cannot now seek to reopen the
matter by filing an application for recall on grounds that were
available to him at the relevant time but were not urged in the
review proceedings.
23.
We have perused the order passed by the learned Single
Judge in the application seeking recall, as well as the
grounds urged before this Court in the present writ appeal.
On consideration of the reasons assigned in the application
for recall and the contentions made in the present appeal, we
are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge
has passed the impugned order after duly considering the
material
available
on
record
and
we
find
no
ground
warranting interference with the order passed by the learned
Single Judge.
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24.
Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed confirming the
order dated 24.04.2026 in IA No.1 of 2026 in WP No.21197 of
2019 passed by the learned+ Single Judge. There shall be no
order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this appeal
shall stand closed.
_______________________________
P. SAM KOSHY, HACJ
________________________________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 05.11.2026.
vjb
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