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Supplementary List-II
Serial No. 120
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Pronounced on : 17.02.2026
Uploaded on : 19.02.2026
WP(C) No. 348/2026
Nityanand
…..Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vilakshan Singh, Advocate
Vs
Regional Director,
Survey and Land Records, Udhampur & Ors.
.….Respondents
Through: Ms. Chetna Manhas, Assisting Counsel
to Mrs. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
ORDER
01.
The petitioner has challenged order dated 18.01.2024
passed by the Regional Director Survey and Land
Records, Udhampur [(Commissioner Agrarian Reforms),
for
short,
‘learned
Commissioner’],
whereby
appeal
against mutation No. 1279 dated 29.09.1986 pertaining
to land measuring 13 kanals and 14 marlas in Khasra
No. 1070, land measuring 09 kanals and 15 marlas in
Khasra No. 1523/1074, land measuring 08 marlas in
Khasra No. 1525/1075, land measuring 07 kanals and
12 marlas in Khasra No. 1527/1077, land measuring 02
WP(C) No. 348/2026
kanals and 13 marlas in Khasra No. 1522/1077 and land
measuring 01 kanal in Khasra No. 1030/1079 situated at
village Kud, Tehsil Chenani, District Udhampur, has
been dismissed.
02.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused
record of the case.
03.
It appears that mutation under Section 8 of the Agrarian
Reforms Act, 1976 came to be attested in respect of the
aforesaid land vide mutation order No. 1279 dated
29.09.1986 in favour of the respondent No. 3-Isher Dass
S/o Sayan Chand. The said mutation order came to be
challenged by the petitioner by way of an appeal filed
before the court of learned Commissioner Agrarian
Reforms, Udhampur which was instituted on 05.09.2020.
The
petitioner
also
filed
an
application
seeking
condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
04.
Vide the impugned order, the learned Commissioner has
dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner on the ground
that the same is barred by limitation.
05.
The petitioner has assailed the impugned order passed by
the learned Commissioner on the grounds that mutation
order dated 29.09.1986 came to be attested at his back
WP(C) No. 348/2026
and he was not given any opportunity of hearing at the
time of passing of the said mutation order. It has been
submitted that limitation would start to run against the
petitioner from the date of knowledge of the said order
and because the petitioner was not having knowledge
about the attestation of the mutation in favour of
respondent No. 3, as such, the appeal filed by him was
not barred by limitation. It has also been contended that
the learned Commissioner while declining to condone the
delay in filing the appeal has failed to appreciate that
valuable rights of the parties are going to be affected and
that a liberal view was required to be taken in the matter
while considering the issue of condonation of delay. It
has been further contended that the petitioner has a
strong case on merits, therefore, on this ground alone,
the learned Commissioner should have exercised the
discretion of condoning the delay in his favour.
06.
It is clear from the mutation order No. 1279, which is
subject matter of the present writ petition that the same
has been attested in favour of respondent No. 3 on
29.09.1986. The challenge to this mutation order has
been laid by the petitioner by filing an appeal before the
WP(C) No. 348/2026
learned Commissioner on 05.09.2020 which more than
33 years after the passing of mutation order.
07.
As per Section 22 of the Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976, the
period of limitation that has been prescribed for filing an
appeal is 60 days from the date of order appealed from.
In terms of Sub-Section (2) of the Section 22 of the said
Act, the provisions of Limitation Act have been made
applicable to the appeals under the said Act. Section 5 of
the Limitation Act which provides condonation of delay in
filing applications/appeals etc., is applicable to the
appeals under the Agrarian Reforms Act.
08.
In the present case, the learned Commissioner Agrarian
Reforms, Udhampur has dismissed the appeal of the
petitioner on the ground of limitation. In the application
filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay in
filing the appeal, a copy whereof has been placed on
record by the petitioner along with the writ petition, it
was pleaded by him that he is in continuous and
uninterrupted exclusive cultivating possession of the land
in question and that a false mutation order has been
manipulated by the respondent No. 3.
WP(C) No. 348/2026
09.
It was further pleaded that the petitioner has come to
know about the mutation order only on 08.08.2020 when
respondent No. 3 openly declared that he has got
mutation attested in his favour whereafter the petitioner
enquired about this fact from the concerned Patwari and
applied for certified true copy of the mutation order. It
was contended by the petitioner that the appeal has been
filed within the prescribed period of limitation which
according to him starts to run from the date of knowledge
of the order.
10.
The question that arises for determination is as to
whether by projecting the aforesaid reasons for filing the
appeal belatedly, the
petitioner has
carved out a
sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act that would entitle him to seek condonation
of delay in filing the appeal.
11.
The learned Appellate Forum while dealing with the
aforesaid ground projected by the petitioner has noted
that as per the revenue record including the Khasra
Girdawaris, respondent No. 3 has continuously been
shown in possession of the land in question after the
attestation of mutation in his favour in the year 1986.
WP(C) No. 348/2026
The learned Commissioner has, therefore, raised a doubt
about the contention of the petitioner that he had no
knowledge about the attestation of the mutation.
12.
The contention of the petitioner that he has been in
continuous possession of the land in question is not
borne out from any material. He has not placed on record
of this Court or before the appellate authority any
document that would go on to show that he has been in
continuous possession of the land in question. On the
contrary, the revenue record relating to the land in
question including the Khasra Girdawaris admittedly
reflect the name of the respondent No. 3 to be in
continuous possession of the land in question ever since
the attestation of mutation in his favour. In the face of
this situation, the observation of the appellate authority
that assertion of the petitioner that he was not having
knowledge of the attestation of mutation in favour of the
respondent No. 3 is doubtful, cannot be termed as either
perverse or irrational.
13.
The petitioner and the respondent No. 3 are residents of
the same village and once as per the material on record it
is shown that the respondent No. 3 has been in
WP(C) No. 348/2026
continuous possession of the land in question for the
past many decades, it cannot be believed that the
petitioner was not aware about the attestation of the
mutation in favour of the respondent No. 3, therefore, the
explanation offered by the petitioner for the delay in filing
the appeal could not have been accepted by the Appellate
Forum.
The
circumstances
learned
has
rightly
Commissioner
in
these
declined
accept
the
to
application of the petitioner.
14.
The other contention raised by the petitioner is that his
case is meritorious, therefore, technicalities of Limitation
Act should not come in the way of substantial justice. In
this regard, it is to be noted that Supreme Court in the
case of Pathapati Subha Reddy Vs. Special Deputy
Collector; 2024 SCC Online SC 513 has clearly held
that merits of the case are not required to be considered
in condoning the delay.
15.
Para 26 of the aforesaid judgment is relevant to the
context and the same is reproduced as under:
“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the
law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is
evident that:
(i)
Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
WP(C) No. 348/2026
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to
remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii)
A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease
to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii)
The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a
strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed
liberally;
(iv)
In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach,
justice-oriented
approach
or
cause
of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v)
Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone
the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that
exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not
be exercised even if sufficient cause is established
for various factors such as, where there is inordinate
delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi)
Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it
does not mean that others are also entitled to the same
benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown
for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii)
Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii)
Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
WP(C) No. 348/2026
16.
Recently, the Supreme Court has, in the case of
“Shivamma
(Dead)
By
Lrs
Vs.
Karnataka
Housing Board & Ors”, 2025 Live Law (SC) 899,
while analyzing the issue relating to technical
considerations
vis-à-vis
substantive
justice,
observed as under:
135.
In construing “sufficient cause” it must be
borne in mind that rules of procedure are handmaids of
justice. Procedural rigidity should not become an
instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, this balance assumes special significance.
Courts have repeatedly underscored that while limitation
provisions are founded on sound principles of finality and
certainty, their application cannot be divorced from the
overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not
shut out from the doors of justice merely on account of
technicalities.
136.
When technical considerations of limitation
conflict with the imperative of substantial
latter
should
justice,
the
ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation are
not designed to destroy the rights of parties but to
prevent inordinate delay in seeking remedies. Thus, the
interpretation of “sufficient cause” must be liberal and
purposive, aimed at advancing the cause of justice rather
than defeating it. This is why the courts, while construing
applications for condonation of delay, emphasize the
bona fides of the applicant over the sheer arithmetical
length of the delay.
WP(C) No. 348/2026
137.
Where strict adherence to these rules results
in injustice, the Court is dutybound to apply a liberal
interpretation of “sufficient cause” so as to balance
technical requirements with the demands of justice. A
litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late,
and therefore, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach
must inform the judicial discretion under Section 5. This
decision continues to be the most frequently cited authority
for the proposition that the judiciary should incline towards
justice rather than technicality. Therefore, when courts
interpret “sufficient cause,” they are expected to exercise
discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness and
equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation.
138.
When a Court of Law deals with an application
to condone the delay filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, such application will have to be generally
viewed in a liberal and lenient way to do substantial
justice between the parties. Section 5 of the Limitation
Act must be liberally construed and applied so as to
advance substantial justice. It is undoubtedly true that a
justice oriented approach is necessary while deciding
application under Section 5 of Limitation. However, it
cannot be said that in every case delay must necessarily
be condoned. It is a condition precedent for Section 5 of
the Limitation Act that there must be a sufficient reason
for condoning the delay.
139.
However, while substantial justice must be
advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and
“sufficient cause” must be shown in substance, not in
empty form. This ensures that the balance between
justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited
litigants.
WP(C) No. 348/2026
140.
However, at the same time, the courts must be
mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for
condonation
of
delay.
When
an
application
for
condonation of delay is placed before the court, the
inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has
been
demonstrated
for
not
filing
the
appeal
or
proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The
merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to
this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the
matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries
between
preliminary
procedural
questions
and
substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct
stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is
legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant
had a reasonable justification for the delay.
141.
Test of “sufficient cause” cannot be substituted
by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation
of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for
the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If
merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may
be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a
weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is
made out. This would lead to an inequitable and
inconsistent application of the law, undermining the
uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is
designed to maintain.
142.
Another practical reason why merits must not
be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it
risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party
even before the matter is substantively heard. By
glancing
into
merits
prematurely,
the
court
may
inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the
WP(C) No. 348/2026
subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required
at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be
scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the
ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and
unprejudiced setting.
143.
The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly
across cases,
regardless
of
the
intrinsic
strength
or
weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into
condonation
proceedings
would
effectively
dilute
this
uniformity.
17.
In the face of aforesaid statement of law, even if it
is assumed that the case of the petitioner may be
meritorious, still then huge delay of more than 33
years in filing the appeal against the impugned
mutation order without any proper explanation,
cannot be condoned merely because the petitioner
claims that he has a strong case on merits.
18.
It is a settled law that a writ Court
while
exercising its power of judicial review of an order
passed by a quasi judicial authority has to only
satisfy itself as to whether the order passed by the
authority below is not vitiated due to any material
irregularity,
want
considerations
or
of
evidence,
failure
to
extraneous
take
into
consideration any relevant fact or being contrary
WP(C) No. 348/2026
to the law of land. In the present case, the learned
appellate
forum
and
revisional
forum
while
refusing to exercise their discretion to condone
the
delay
committed
in
any
filing
the
material
appeal
has
irregularity
refusal to condone the delay
neither
nor
the
is based upon
extraneous consideration.
19.
In the aforesaid circumstances, it is not open to
this Court to interfere in the impugned order
passed by the learned Commissioner whereby the
petitioner’s application seeking condonation of
delay in filing the appeal was rejected, and
consequently, the appeal was dismissed as being
time-barred. Thus, without going into the merits
of the case, the writ petition deserves to be
dismissed.
20.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
(SANJAY DHAR)
JUDGE
JAMMU
17.02.2026
SUNIL
Whether the order is speaking ?
Whether the order is reportable ?
WP(C) No. 348/2026
:
:
Yes
Yes
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