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CGHC010434352025
2026:CGHC:31802
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
S.A. No. 579 of 2025
Nirupa Bai @ Kanti, D/o Resham Singh, aged about 45 years, R/o Village Chinvaridand,
Thana And Tahsil Manendragarh, Distt. Manendragarh- Chirmiri- Bharatpur, C.G. Through
Power Of Attorney Holder Devendra Kumar Aged About 63 Years, S/o Shri Patpal , By
Caste Gadriya, R/o Village Chinvaridand, Thana And Tahsil Manendragarh, Distt.
Manendragarh- Chirmiri- Bharatpur, C.G.
...Appellant
Versus
1. Indrajit Kaur, W/o Late Shri Narendrajit Saini, aged about 51 years, R/o Bus Stand, Ward
No. 11, Manendragarh, Distt. M.C.B. C.G.
2. Simran Saini, D/o Late Narendrajit Saini, aged about 31 years, R/o Plot No. 36, Diamond
Colony, Saraswati Nagar, Behind Hotel The Lalit, Jaipur Rajasthan
3. Siran Saini, D/o Late Shri Narendrajit Saini, aged about 11 years, Being Minor Through
Natural Guardian Mother Indrajit Kaur, Aged About 51 Years, W/o Defendants Late Shri
Narendrajit Saini, R/o Bus Stand, Ward No. 11, Manendragarh, Distt. M.C.B. C.G.
4. D.P. Singh, S/o Jeevan Singh, aged about 57 years, R/o Village Bajag, Distt. Dindori
M.P. At Present R/o Village Mevra, Tahsil Katghora, Distt. Korba, C.G.
5. The State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Collector, Distt. M.C.B., C.G.
6. Rajendra Singh @ Ram Singh, S/o Chotelal, R/o Village Manendragarh, Distt. M.C.B.,
C.G.
...Respondents
For Appellant
For Respondent No.6
For Respondent/State
: Shri Parag Kotecha, Advocate
: Shri Hemant Kumar Agrawal, Advocate.
: Shri Jaiprakash Tiwari, PL.
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(Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput)
Order on Board
24.07.2026
This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as “CPC”) has been filed by the appellant assailing legality, validity and
correctness of the judgment and decree dated 12.08.2025 passed by Learned First District
Judge, Manendragarh, District Korea (henceforth “First Appellate Court”) in Civil Appeal
No. 6-A/2024. By the impugned judgment and decree the First Appeal filed by respondents
No. 1 to 4/defendants was dismissed, and the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2024 passed
by II Civil Judge Class-I, Manendragarh, District Korea (henceforth “trial Court”) in Civil
Suit No. 1-A/2019 was affirmed. Appellant herein was never impleaded as party either
before the trial Court or before the First Appellate Court.
2.
An application (IA No. 02/2025) seeking permission to file the present appeal has
been filed by the appellant, which is being decided by this Court.
3.
Facts necessary for adjudication of the said application are briefly stated as under:-
3.1
Respondent No. 6 Rajendra Singh alias Ram Singh who happens to be the plaintiff
had filed a Civil Suit before the trial Court initially arraying Narendrajeet Saini S/o
Dharamjeet Saini, D.P. Singh and the Chhattisgarh Government as the defendants, for
declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property
comprising Khasra No. 177/2 and 178 area 0.049 and 0.162 hectare (total area 0.211
hectare) situate at village Chainpur, Tehsil Manendragarh, District Manednragarh-ChirmiriBharatpur, CG.
3.2
As per the pleadings, as at the relevant time the plaintiff namely Rajendra Singh
alias Ram Singh was minor, the suit property was purchased in his name by his mother. The
money for purchasing the land was arranged by the maternal grand parents of the plaintiff.
During the pendency of the suit the original defendant Narendrajeet Saini passed away and
his legal heirs namely Indrajeet Kaur, Simran Saini and Siran Saini were brought on record.
It is stated that when the plaintiff was minor, the original defendant Narendrajeet Saini
playing fraud with his illiterate father executed the sale deed in favour of original defendant
No.2 namely D.P. Singh on 29.03.1990 without obtaining permission for doing that. It is
stated that the plaintiff was not aware with respect to sale of the suit property. It is stated
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that father of the plaintiff neither knew original defendant No.2 nor he ever saw him as he
never resided at Manendragarh. It is further stated that as the father of the plaintiff had no
right to execute the sale deed, it is void abinitio, and for that the original defendants No. 1
and 2 do not derive any right, title or interest over the suit property. It is pleaded that
defendant No.2 never appeared in any Court nor is he the actual buyer and being that it was
the benami transaction.
4.
The defendants filed their written statement, issues were framed by the trial Court
and eventually vide judgment and decree dated 30.04.2024 the suit was decreed. The
relevant portion of the decree passed by the trial Court reads as under:“It is order and decreed that 1. That The suit of the Plaintiff against the defendants is accepted
hereby
2. The Plaintiff is declared as owner of suit land khasra no. 177/2 and
178 area 0.211 hectare situated at Village Chainpur, Tahsil
Manendragarh District M.C.B.
3. The Plaintiff is entitled for possession of khasra no. 177/2 and 178
area 0.211 hectare situated at Village Chainpur, Tahsil Manendragarh
District M.C.B..
4. Possession of khasra no. 177/2 and 178 area0.211 hectare situated at
Village Chainpur, Tahsil Manendragarh District M.C.B. shall be
given to the Plaintiff in due course of law.
5. Sale deed executed on 29/03/1990 is declared null and void ab initio
hereby.
6. As per Section 31 of Specific Relief Act a copy of decree send
towards the Registrar Manendragarh in whose office the instrument
(Sale deed executed on 29/03/1990 between Chotelaal and D.P.
Singh) has been so registered regarding to note on the copy of the
instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.
7. Looking to the nature of the case, success and defeat of parties, the
parties shall bear their own cost.
8. Counsel s fees as per Rule 179 and Rule 523-535 of the Chhattisgarh
Civil Courts Rules and Orders or as certified and whichever is less.
9. On getting the advocate fee certified, whichever is less as per the list,
will be payable as per rules.”
5.
The suit was instituted on 18.09.2018. During the pendency of the suit, the suit
property was purchased by the appellant herein on 27.08.2019 by a registered sale deed
executed by defendant No. 2 D.P. Singh through his general power of attorney holder Anil
Kumar. The trial Court passed the aforesaid decree on 30.04.2024, and by that time the
appellant herein had not moved any application before the trial Court for arraying herself as
one of the defendants to the suit. The said judgment and decree was put to challenge by
respondents No. 1 to 4/ defendants. During the pendency of First Appeal it appears that an
application under Order I Rule 10 CPC was filed by the appellant herein on 18.07.2025 for
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impleading herself as one of the defendants as necessary party, which was dismissed by the
District Judge on 31.07.2025. Ultimately the impugned judgment and decree came to be
passed on 12.08.2025 by the First Appellate Court.
6.
As the application of the appellant herein filed under order I Rule 10 CPC was
rejected by the District Judge and she could not be arrayed as defendant in the First Appeal,
she filed this appeal along with an application seeking permission to file the same. It is
stated in the said application that the appellant is a necessary and proper party in the
proceeding, however, learned District Judge has illegally rejected the said application and
not permitted her to participate in the appellate proceedings. It is stated that the appellant
was not aware of pendency of the civil proceedings and thus she could not file the said
application earlier. It is stated that after rejection of the application by the District Judge
final judgment and decree was passed, she has filed this appeal along with the said
application (IA No.2/2025). It is pleaded that the suit property was purchased by the
appellant by registered sale deed dated 27.08.2019 from respondent No. 4 herein. Thus the
prayer has been made to allow the said application to permit the appellant to present this
appeal.
7.
Reply to the aforesaid application has been filed by plaintiff/respondent No.6 stating
that the application filed by the appellant to present the second appeal is totally
misconceived, devoid of merit and hit by the doctrine of lis pendens as provided under
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is stated that the genuineness of the sale
deed dated 29.03.1990 executed in favour of defendant D.P. Singh is highly doubtful. It is
stated that defendant D.P. Singh throughout the proceedings remained ex parte and never
appeared before any revenue or civil Court. It is stated that as the predecessor-in-title D.P.
Singh had no valid title, appellant herein cannot acquire any better and independent title
over the suit property separate from him. It is stated that the respondent No.6/plaintiff
instituted the civil suit for title and possession on 18.09.2018 whereas the appellant is stated
to have purchased the suit property on 27.08.2019. It is stated that since the said transaction
took place during the pendency of the suit, the appellant is a transferee pendente lite and is
bound by the judgment and decree passed against her predecessor-in-title namely D.P.
Singh. It is stated that the original sale deed dated 29.03.1990 executed in favour of D.P.
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Singh is highly doubtful as per paragraph No. 37 of the judgment passed by the trial Court.
It is further stated that the appellant is not the bona fide purchaser of the suit property, and
the application for impleadment was rightly rejected.
8.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that being the bona fide purchaser of the
suit property, right to challenge the impugned judgment and decree vests in the appellant,
and thus her application for permission to file the present appeal deserves to be allowed. It
is stated that even if the property was purchased by her during the pendency of the civil suit,
she was a necessary party and her right, title and interest over the suit property is not put to
jeopardy. In support of his submission, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme
Court in the matter of H. Anjanappa and others v. A. Prabhakar and others reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 183 as also the decision of this Court rendered in batch of Writ
Petitions, WPC No. 1287 of 2015, being the lead one on 11.05.2026.
8.
Per contra, Shri Hemant Agrawal learned counsel for respondent No. 6/plaintiff
opposes the submission of Shri Kotecha. He however made the submission in the light of
his reply to the application seeking permission to file the present appeal. It is submitted that
as the appellant is not the bona fide purchaser, Learned trial Court as well as the first
Appellate Court passed the judgment and decree in favour of plaintiff/respondent No.6. He
submits that the suit property was purchased by the appellant during pendency of the suit
therefore the principle of lis pendens provided under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act would come into play. He submits that the appellant never made any effort to array
herself as party before the trial Court and even in the First Appellate Court the application
for that purpose was filed at the fag end. He submits that the first appellate Court while
rejecting the application has observed that power of attorney holder of D.P. Singh himself
appeared before the Court and stated that he does not know D.P. Singh and denied the
execution of the sale deed dated 27.08.2019. He submits that lis has to come to an end
somewhere. He submits that as the appellant is not the bona fide purchaser of the suit
property, the application filed by her for permission to file the present appeal is liable to be
dismissed. To support his contention, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and others reported in (2008) 7 SCC 144
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and in the matter of Shingara Singh v. Daljit Singh and another rendered on 14.10.2024
in Civil Appeal No. 5919 of 2023.
9.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record including the judgments
and decree passed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court.
10.
The main thrust of the argument of Shri Kotecha revolves around the fact that the
appellant purchased the suit property on 27.08.2019 and thus she acquired the title of the
suit property by virtue of sale deed and in order to prove the fact that the appellant is bona
fide purchaser and could protect his title, an opportunity was to be given to her to assail the
judgment and decree. He has attacked the order passed by the District Judge rejecting his
application filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC impleading herself as appellant.
11.
Learned counsel for respondent No.6/plaintiff makes the submission that the sale
deed was executed during pendency of the civil suit and thus principles of lis pendens
provided under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would come into play. He
submits that as the appellant never made any effort to array herself as party before the trial
Court and even in the First Appellate Court, the application for impleading herself as party
was filed at the fag end and therefore the application was rightly rejected. For ready
reference Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:-
“52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.—
During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of
India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond
such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which
is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly
and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or
otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect
the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may
be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such
terms as it may impose.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or
proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the
presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of
competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has
been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or
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discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become
unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation
prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in
force.”
12.
Perusal of the order passed by the District Judge rejecting the application filed under
order I Rule 10 CPC would clearly speak that learned District Judge has considered the
provision of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and observed that in case the
judgment passed by the Civil Judge is affirmed the subsequent sale deed 27.08.2019 would
be rendered as null and void automatically, and in case the judgment and decree of Civil
Judge is set aside it would be considered valid. It is observed that right of the appellant
herein cannot be adjudicated at this stage. It is further observed that power of attorney
appeared before the Court and denied knowing D.P. Singh being executant of the sale deed
but admitted his signature on the sale deed, and thus found that the appellant was not the
necessary party.
13.
Dealing with the case involving an identical issue, the Supreme Court in the matter
of H. Anjanappa and others (supra) has observed that though not brought on record
under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, the lis pendens transferee is entitled to seek leave to appeal
against the final decree passed against the transferor. However, whether to grant such leave
or not is within the discretion of the court and such discretion should be exercised
judiciously in the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant portion thereof reads as
under:“58. From a conspectus of all the aforesaid judgments, touching upon the
present aspect, broadly, the following would emerge:
i. First, for the purpose of impleading a transferee pendente lite, the facts
and circumstances should be gone into and basing on the necessary facts,
the Court can permit such a party to come on record, either under Order I
Rule 10 CPC or under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, as a general principle;
ii. Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on record as
a matter of right;
iii. Thirdly, there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente lite,
with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on
record as a party;
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iv. Fourthly, the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would depend
upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the material available on
record;
v. Fifthly, where a transferee pendente lite does not ask for leave to come
on record, that would obviously be at his peril, and the suit may be
improperly conducted by the plaintiff on record;
vi. Sixthly, merely because such transferee pendente lite does not come on
record, the concept of him (transferee pendente lite) not being bound by
the judgment does not arise and consequently he would be bound by the
result of the litigation, though he remains unrepresented;
vii. Seventhly, the sale transaction pendente lite is hit by the provisions of
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; and, viii. Eighthly, a transferee
pendente lite, being an assignee of interest in the property, as envisaged
under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, can seek leave of the Court to come
record on his own or at the instance of either party to the suit.”
14.
Thus perusal of the aforesaid decision would indicate that the Courts have ample
power to allow the lis pendens transferee to come on record, with the leave of the Court.
15.
Perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court Judge would indicate
that 08 issues were framed. Issue No. 1 is in respect of ownership of the suit property, issue
No. 2 is with respect to illegal possession of the suit property and issue No. 4 was with
respect to declaring the sale deed dated 27.08.2019 as void abinito. While deciding issue
No. 4 learned trial Court has considered the plaintiff’s averment that at the time of
execution of sale deed 29.03.1990 he was minor and thus the sale deed is void. Fraudulent
execution of the sale deed in the name of the non existing buyer was also considered.
Learned trial Court also discussed whether the plaintiff’s father has right to alienate the suit
property of the minor. Quoting provision of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act and the evidence on record decided learned trial Court the issue in favour
of the plaintiff. Learned trial Court has also observed that respondent No.4/defendant D.P.
Singh remained ex parte in the initial stage of the suit and he never appeared before the
Court nor in the revenue case. Learned trial Court has also observed that respondent
No.4/defendant has not produced any document regarding identity of defendant No.2 and
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ultimately in paragraph No. 38 of the judgment it has been held that the suit land belongs to
minor and without permission of the Court it was sold and identity of the power of attorney
was never revealed in the case. Sale deed so executed was thus held to be the part of
fraudulent transaction. This finding of fact has eventually been affirmed by the First
Appellate Court.
16.
Now this Court has to consider whether despite suit property being purchased by the
appellant herein during the pendency of the suit she should be allowed to file appeal and can
be held as necessary party in the proceeding. In the case of Usha Sinha (supra) has
observed that the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to the alienation of the suit property
during the pendency of the suit irrespective of the fact that purchaser/alienees had no notice
of the pending proceeding. Relevant portion thereof reads as under:“18. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the
pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of
decree passed by a competent Court. The doctrine of 'lis pendens'
prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject
matter of suit. 'Lis pendens' itself is treated as constructive notice to a
purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit.
Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or
obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance
is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the
judgment debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rule 98 or 100 of Order XXI.
23. So far as the present case is concerned, the facts are no more in
dispute. As already noted earlier, Title Suit No. 140 of 1999 was instituted
by the respondent-plaintiff on April 10, 1999. Thus, the litigation was
pending in respect of the property and the matter was sub-judice. The
appellant thereafter purchased the property from original defendant Nos. 4
and 5 by a registered sale deed on February 15, 2000 i.e. during the
pendency of the suit. It is also not in dispute that ex- parte decree came to
be passed against the defendants on May 24, 2001. In the situation, in our
considered opinion, the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to the
transaction in question, and the High Court was wholly right in holding
that the case was covered by Rule 102 of Order XXI of the Code. The
appellant could not seek protection of pendency of suit instituted by her.
The Executing Court was not justified in granting stay of execution
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proceedings. The High Court was, hence, right in setting aside the order of
the Executing Court.”
17.
Further in the case of Sanjay Verma vs Manik Roy And Ors reported in (2006) 13
SCC 608 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:“12 The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in
accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon
an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an
action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to
prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as
he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in
Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of
good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that
a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during
the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not
prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the
subject matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the
alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any
decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated
with the permission of the Court.”
18.
Perusal of the sale deed itself is part of the record executed in favour of the appellant
by the power of attorney would indicate that if on account of any error the suit land or a part
thereof gets out of the ownership or possession of the buyer, the seller would be responsible
to make up the loss which the buyer shall be entitled to get from his movable and
immovable property. Sale deed also shows the suit land to be free from all encumbrances.
19.
Learned counsel for the appellant brought on record to persuade this Court that she
is the bona fide purchaser and has her right, title and interest to challenge the judgment and
decree, but this Court is not persuaded with the same. As held by the Supreme Court in H.
Anjanappa and others (supra) that a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on
record as a matter of right; there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente lite, with
the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party; that the
impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would depend upon the nature of the suit and
appreciation of the material available on record. However, whether to grant such leave or
not is within the discretion of the court and such discretion should be exercised judiciously
11 / 11
in the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case in hand the litigation is pending
since 18.09.2018 but till that time despite the purchase of the suit property the appellant has
not filed any application for impleadment in the suit before passing of the judgment and
decree by the trial Court. Such application was filed at the fag end of the first appeal.
Learned trial Court found the execution of initial sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2
fraudulently and also doubted existence of identity of defendant No. 2. Admittedly, the
plaintiff was minor at the time of initial execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant
No. 2 by father and it does not appear that any permission was taken from the Competent
Court before the sale deed was executed. While deciding the application under Order I Rule
10 CPC learned First Appellate Court has also observed that the appellant is neither
necessary nor proper party. Recital of the sale deed also indicates that if any loss is caused,
the appellant is entitled for reimbursement of the same. Thus in the opinion of this Court the
lis has to come to an end somewhere and therefore in the light of the aforesaid decisions of
the supreme Court and the observations made above, this Court is of the opinion that the
application cannot be allowed. It is thus dismissed.
20.
Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost.
Sd/(Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge
Jyotishi
Digitally signed
by AVANISH
AVANISH JYOTISHI
Date:
JYOTISHI 2026.07.27
17:34:50
+0530
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