Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Serial No. 01
Supp. List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C). No. 331 of 2021
Date of Decision: 26.07.2022
___________________________________________________________
Shri. Nirmalya Bhattacharjee
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Judge.
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. S.Sen, Adv. with
Ms. S.Shallam, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. S.Sahay, Adv. with
Ms. R.Colney, GA.
i)
ii)
:
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The petitioner, who retired from the post of Executive Engineer
(Electrical) on 31-01-2015, is aggrieved with the effect and consequences on
his pensionary benefits caused by the Notification of the Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Limited (Revision of Pay) Regulation, 2015, which was notified
on 15-05-2017, which he alleges has resulted in Executive Engineers who
were junior to the writ petitioner but who retired before 01-01-2015, drawing
a higher pension.
2.
The writ petitioner retired from the post of Executive Engineer
(Electrical) on 31-01-2015 when his basic pay was Rs. 56,330/- and the
prevailing norm for fixation of pension was 50% of the average pay of the
last 6 months, including Special Pay subject to a maximum of Rs. 27,380/per month. After computation of the last 6 months pay of the petitioner, 50%
of the average emolument worked out to Rs. 27,948.33/- and accordingly his
pension was fixed at Rs. 27,380/- with effect 01-02-2015 which was the
maximum amount payable.
3.
The respondent corporation vide Notification dated 15-05-2017,
notified the Meghalaya Energy Corporation Limited (Revision of Pay)
Regulation, 2015, revising the pay scale of its employees with effect 01-012015 and consequently by an Office Memorandum of the same day, the
pensionary benefits of the employees stood revised with effect from 01-012015. Regulation/Paragraph 5 of the said OM dated 15-05-2017 dealt with
the Revision of Pension/Family Pension and Principles of Fixation.
Paragraph 5 (i) of the OM provided that Pension/Family Pension will be
determined by multiplying the existing Basic Pension/Family Pension as on
01-01-2015 by a factor of 1.82, whereas Paragraph 5(iv) of the OM provided
the computation and fixation of the employees who retired within 6 months
from the date of coming over to the revised scale of pay i.e., MeECL (RoP)
Regulation, 2015.
4.
Mr. S.Sen, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on the basis
of the Revision of Pay implemented by the respondent corporation with
effect from 01-01-2015, his revised pay for the month of January 2015, was
fixed at Rs. 1,06,200/- and the respondent corporation relying on Paragraph
5 (iv) of the OM dated 15-05-2017, revised the pension of the writ petitioner
with effect from 01-01-2015. Learned counsel submits that taking into
account the last 6 months including the last month at the revised pay, the
petitioner’s pension was fixed at Rs. 44,330/-. This, the learned counsel
contends, has created an anomalous situation vis-a-vis the cases of the
Executive Engineers who retired before 01-01-2015, as their pension has
been revised by applying the principle contained in Paragraph 5 (i) of the
OM i.e., by multiplying their existing basic pension by a factor of 1.82 which
has resulted in them drawing a higher pension. The learned counsel submits
that, as he received the benefit of the revised pay only for the month of
January 2015, in comparison to other Executive Engineers who were getting
the same pension earlier before the said revision, but retired before 01-012015, his basic pension is much lower than them. To illustrate this point, the
learned counsel has referred to a chart which is annexed as Annexure-4 to
the writ petition showing this anomaly.
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the classification
introduced by Paragraph 5 of the OM dated 15-05-2017, is unreasonable and
unjustified and has no reasonable nexus with the objects sought to be
achieved, as the same has resulted in discrimination in the revision of
pension wherein, a junior is drawing higher pension than a senior, and as
such he contends, the same is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India and is liable to be interfered with by this Court.
6.
Mr. S. Sen, in support of his arguments, has placed heavy reliance on
the judgment of D.S. Nakara & Ors. vs. Union of India. (1983)1 SCC 305
and submits that as per this judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that unequal treatment offends Article 14, if it appears that pensioners for the
purpose of pension benefits who form a class are divided by arbitrarily fixing
an eligibility criterion, and that any classification has to be based on some
rational principle. The following decisions have also been placed by the
learned counsel for consideration by this Court:
(i)
AIR 1989 SC 669 M.L.Jain Vs. Union of India & Ors.
(ii)
(2006) 11 SCC 709 Col. B.J. Akkara (Retd.) Vs. Govt. of India
& Ors.
(iii)
(2021) 11 SCC 543 State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. Vs.
Dinavahi Lakshmi Kameswari.
7.
Mr. S. Sahay, learned counsel for the respondent corporation in reply,
has firstly submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner
has not been able to disclose any legal or fundamental right which has been
violated. He also submits that the petitioner is receiving pensionary benefits
in accordance with the applicable terms and conditions as provided by the
OM dated 15-05-2017, which has been given effect to without any deviation
and that the petitioner has no vested right to claim pensionary benefits at an
amount of his choosing. It is contended that the amount to be disbursed as
pension is a matter of policy, and that the pay and emoluments of the
employees of the corporation, are determined on the recommendations of the
Pay Committee, which is an expert body constituted for the purpose.
8.
Learned counsel submits that the writ petition is also barred by laches
as the re-fixation of Pay and Pension, had been carried out by the respondent
corporation vide the OM dated 15-05-2017, whereas the petitioner has
chosen to approach this Court only on October 2021, without explaining the
inordinate delay, when even the representations of the petitioner were
rejected in 2017-2018 itself. On this ground alone, it is submitted the writ
petition deserves no consideration and is liable to be dismissed.
9.
On merits, learned counsel contends that the writ petition is
unsustainable. It is submitted that the OM dated 15-05-2017, in respect of
Revised Pension was introduced keeping in view the interest of the
employees, but however due to the method of calculation wherein, in most
cases the date of retirement plays a vital role, there cannot be parity in respect
of a quantum of pensionary benefits to all its employees. It is further
submitted by learned counsel that there are no Pension Protection Rules to
protect the pension of an employee from their respective juniors and no
provision for one rank one pension under the respondent corporation.
10.
In support of his arguments, learned counsel has cited the following
cases:
(i)
(1993) 4 SCC 62 State of West Bengal vs. Ratan Behari Dey
& Ors.
(ii)
(2002) 2 SCC 179 State of W.B. & Anr. Vs. W.B. Govt.
Pensioners’ Associations & Ors.
(iii)
(1990) 4 SCC 207 Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
(iv)
(1994) 4 SCC 68 Union of India Vs. P.N.Menon & Ors.
(v)
(2006) 5 SCC 65 State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Bihar Pensioners
Samaj.
11.
The learned counsel has sought to distinguish the judgment of
D.S.Nakara (supra) and submits that the principle enunciated therein is not
applicable to the facts of this case and has referred to State of West Bengal
vs. Ratan Behari Dey (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that terminal benefits and also pensionary benefits constitute conditions of
service and the employee is vested with the right to revise salaries as also
terminal/pensionary benefits and also to specify a date from which the
revision of pay scales, terminal/pensionary benefits shall take effect, and as
long as such dates specified in a reasonable manner without discriminating
between similarly situated persons, no interference is called for. Reference
has also been made to the case of Krishena Kumar vs. Union of India &
Ors. (supra) wherein learned counsel submits the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court held that notification setting a cut-off date could not be struck
out by applying the ratio of Nakara (supra) and that a cut-off date for
granting service benefits may not necessarily tantamount to a violation of
Article 14 and will be upheld by Courts if there is some reasonable
explanation in support of that date.
12.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
materials on record. Firstly, it is to be noted that on the date of retirement of
the writ petitioner, the prevailing norm was that pension was fixed at 50% of
the average of the last 6 months of emoluments including Special Pay subject
to a maximum of Rs.27,380/-. Accordingly, the petitioner’s pension was
worked out as follows: -
i.
Pay for August 2014
Rs.55360/- + Spl. Pay Rs. 375/- = Rs. 55,735/-
ii.
Pay for September, 2014
Rs.55360/- + Spl. Pay Rs. 375/- = Rs. 55,735/-
iii
Pay for October, 2014
Rs.55360/- + Spl. Pay Rs. 375/- = Rs. 55,735/-
iv. Pay for November, 2014
Rs.55360/- + Spl. Pay Rs. 375/- = Rs. 55,735/-
v.
Rs.55360/- + Spl. Pay Rs. 375/- = Rs. 55,735/-
Pay for December, 2014
vi. Pay for January, 2015
Rs.56330/- + Spl. Pay Rs. 375/- = Rs. 56,705/Total
= Rs.3,35,380/-
Average emolument Rs.3,35,380 ÷ 6 = Rs.55,896.66
50% of 55,896.66 = 27,948.331
Pension was fixed w.e.f. 1.2.2015 at Rs.27,380/- (this being the maximum limit).
13.
On coming into effect of the Office Memorandum dated 15-05-2017,
the petitioner came to be governed by paragraph 5 (iv) of the OM which
provided as follows:“MEGHALAYA ENERGY CORPORATION LIMITED
Corporate Affairs
Corporate
Identification
U40101ML2009SGC008374
No.
LUM JINGSHAI, SHORT ROUND ROAD, SHILLONG 793 001,
MEGHALAYA
Fax: 0364-2590355: Website address: www.meecl.nic.in
No. MeECL/CA/PB/77/2017/42
Dated 15th May,2017.
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
5.
Revision of Pension/Family Pension and
Principle of Fixation.
(iv)
In the case of Corporation’s employees
who retire within 6(six) months from the
date of
coming over to the revised
scale of pay in
terms of the Meghalaya
Energy
Corporation
Limited
(Revision of Pay) Regulations 2011 (sic)
average
emoluments for 6(six) months
period
preceding the
date
of
retirement shall be
calculated
by
taking into account pay as
follows:(a) For the period during which pay is
drawn in pre-revised scale – Basic
Pay multiplied by a factor of 1.53.
(b) For the period during which pay is
drawn in the revised scale – Basic
Pay in the Revised Scale.
NOTE – (1) In the case of employees
in receipt of Special Pay, the same
shall be taken into account for the
purpose of calculating average
emoluments.
(2) The Pension/Family
Pension in terms of these orders shall
qualify for
Dearness Allowance
as per rates revised from time
to
time.”
(Note: It appears that 2011 has been
inadvertently referred to instead of 2015.)
14.
On the basis of the revision of pay with effect 01-01-2015, the revised
pay of the petitioner for the month of January, 2015 was fixed at Rs.
1,06,200/-. Accordingly, by application of paragraph 5 (iv) of the OM dated
15-05-2017, the revised pension of the petitioner with effect from 01-022015 was as follows:
Pre Revised Pay for August 2014 Rs. 55360 × 1.53 + Spl. Pay Rs. 375 = 85075.80
Pre Revised Pay for September Rs. 55360 × 1.53 + Spl. Pay Rs. 375 = 85075.80
Pre Revised Pay for October Rs. 55360 × 1.53 + Spl. Pay Rs. 375 = 85075.80
Pre Revised Pay for November Rs. 55360 × 1.53 + Spl. Pay Rs. 375 = 85075.80
Pre Revised Pay for December Rs. 55360 × 1.53 + Spl. Pay Rs. 375 = 85075.80
Revised Pay for January 2015
Rs.106200 × 1 + Spl. Pay Rs. 375 = 106575.00
Total
= 531954.00
A.E. 531,954.00 ÷ 6 = Rs. 88,659.00
(B) S/Pension Admissible:
50% of 88659.00 × (30÷30) = Rs.44329.50 Say 44330.00
15.
In contrast, as projected by the writ petitioner in the case of Executive
Engineers who retired before 01-01-2015, their pension has been revised by
application of paragraph 5 (i) of the OM dated 15-05-2017, which was by
multiplying their existing basic pension by a factor of 1.82, which has
resulted in them drawing higher pension, even though they were junior to the
writ petitioner but retired before 01-01-2015. This Court is therefore to
examine as to whether the fixation of the cut-off date has been done
arbitrarily bringing about a discrimination between similarly situated person
or whether the said specification of the date was reasonable.
16.
The fixation and revision of pension in the respondent corporation as
can be seen from the materials is as per rules, terms and conditions laid down
by the corporation in the Office Memorandums from time to time. By OM
dated 15-05-2017, revision of pensionary benefits was with effect from 0101-2015 upto 31-12-2019 and by OM dated 11-12-2019, revision of
pensionary benefits was with effect from 01-01-2020 onwards. In the case
of the writ petitioner as noted above, OM dated 15-05-2017 had prescribed
the computation of revised pension in the case of employees who retired
within six months from the date of coming over to the revised scale of pay
of 2017. The effect of this OM is that due to the peculiar situation of the
petitioner, inasmuch as, he enjoyed the benefit of revised pay only for a
month i.e., January 2015, his revised pension would therefore be less in
comparison with the employees retired prior to 01-01-2015. No arbitrariness,
irregularity or illegality can be attributed to the respondent corporation for
fixation of the cut-off date which has resulted in the alleged anomaly.
Moreover, it is to be noted that there are no Pensionary Protection Rules in
place to protect the pension of the employee from that of his junior
employees and further there is no provision for one rank one pension. As the
discrepancy is not between similarly situated classes, the petitioner cannot
be said to have been discriminated against.
17.
In this context, it would be apposite to refer to the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court as cited by the parties which have been pronounced
in such matters:In the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Ratan Behari Dey &
Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 62, at paras 7, 8, 9 & 10 it was held as follows:
“7.
In our opinion, the principle of Nakara
has no application to the facts of this case. The
precise principle enunciated in Nakara has been
duly explained in Krishena Kumar by a
coordinate Bench. For reasons to be assigned
hereinafter, it cannot be said that prescribing
April 1, 1977 as the date from which the new
Regulations were to come into force is either
arbitrary or discriminatory. Now, it is open to the
State or to the Corporation, as the case may be,
to change the conditions of service unilaterally.
Terminal benefits as well as pensionary benefits
constitute conditions of service. The employer
has the undoubted power to revise the salaries
and/or the pay scales as also terminal
benefits/pensionary benefits. The power to
specify a date from which the revision of pay
scales or terminal benefits/pensionary benefits,
as the case may be, shall take effect is a
concomitant of the said power. So long as such
date is specified in a reasonable manner, i.e.,
without bringing about a discrimination between
similarly situated persons, no interference is
called for by the Court in that behalf….
8.
In this context, it may be remembered that
the power of the State to specify a date with effect
from which the Regulations framed, or amended,
as the case may be, shall come into force is
unquestioned. A date can be specified both
prospectively as well as retrospectively. The only
question is whether the prescription of the date is
unreasonable or discriminatory. Since we have
found that the prescription of the date in this case
is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, the
complaint of discrimination must fail.
9.
Now coming to the argument of Sri P.P.
Rao that the Regulations bring about an
unreasonable classification between similarly
placed employees, we must say that we are not
impressed by it. It is not submitted that the
Corporation had no power to give retrospective
effect to the Regulations. It was within the power
of the Corporation to enforce the Regulations
either prospectively or with retrospective effect
from such date as they might specify. Of course,
as repeatedly held by this Court, in such cases the
State cannot, as the expression goes, pick a date
out of its hat. It has to prescribe the date in a
reasonable manner, having regard to all the
relevant facts and circumstances. Once this is
done, question of discrimination does not arise.
Reference in this behalf may also be had to the
decision of this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State
of Rajasthan a decision of the Division Bench
comprising E.S. Venkataramiah and Sabyasachi
Mukherji, JJ.
10. As rightly pointed out in Krishena Kumar,
Nakara was a case where an artificial date was
specified classifying the retirees, governed by the
same Rules and similarly situated, into two
different classes, depriving one such class of the
benefit of liberalized Pension Rules. It was found
in that case that the specification of the date
(from which the liberalised Rules were to come
into force) was arbitrary. Whereas in this case,
the employees retiring prior to April 1, 1977 and
those retiring thereafter were governed by
different sets of rules. The argument to the
contrary may mean that the Government can
never change the conditions of service relating to
retiral benefits with effect from a particular date.
No such absolute proposition can be stated that
while effecting any such change, no date from
which such change will come into force can be
specified. As stated above, a date can be
prescribed but such date should not be drawn in
such a manner as to bring about discrimination
between persons situated similarly i.e., in a
manner violative of Article 14. This aspect has
been elaborately dealt with and explained in
Krishena Kumar and we do not think it necessary
to repeat the same.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case of State of W.B. & Anr. Vs. W. B. Govt. Pensioners’
Associations & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 179, at paras 20 and 21 it was held as
follows:
“20. What is noticeable is that the definition of
the word “emoluments” in the 1971 Rules was
not amended. As such pension continued to be
calculated on the basis of emoluments as defined
in the 1971 Rules namely the last pay drawn
immediately prior to retirement. The pay of the
pre- 1986 pensioners was not revised. The Third
Pay Commission had given a reason for choosing
1-1-1986, as the cut-off date. As held in Krishena
Kumar v. Union of India and Union of India v.
P.N. Menon merely because a cut-off date is
fixed would not make the exercise invalid
although persons in the service immediately
before the cut-off date would be deprived of the
benefit of the revised scales of pay. It would
depend upon the relevancy of the consideration
underlying the choice of such date. The reason
stated by the Third Pay Commission cannot be
said to be arbitrary or irrelevant.
21. Because the scales of pay had been revised
from 1-1-1986, the recomputation of pension for
such employees as had been granted the revised
scales of necessity was limited to the same cut-off
date. All that the impugned Memorandum No.
4056-F dated 25-4-1990 did was to recompute the
benefits in favour of post 1-1-1986 retirees
according to the existing formula as provided by
the Memorandum No. 7530-F and No. 7531-F
both dated 6-7-1988. The same formula
continues to be applied to the pre-1986 retirees.
The difference between pre-1986 pensioners and
the post-1986 pensioners is only on account of
the revision of pay scales and not account of
failure of State Government to equitably apply
the liberalised pension scheme formula. The
quantum of the emoluments formed no part of
the formula for grant of pension during 1986 to
1995.”
In the case of Union of India Vs. P. N. Menon & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC
68, at para 8 it was held as follows:
“8. Whenever the Government or an authority,
which can be held to be a State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, frames
a scheme for persons who have superannuated
from service, due to many constraints, it is not
always possible to extend the same benefits to one
and all, irrespective of the dates of
superannuation. As such any revised scheme in
respect of post-retirement benefits, if
implemented with a cut-off date, which can be
held to be reasonable and rational in the light
of Article 14 of the Constitution, need not be held
to be invalid. It shall not amount to "picking out
a date from the hat", as was said by this Court in
the case of D.R.Nim v. Union of India (AIR 1967
SC 1301: (1967) 2 SCR 325: (1968) 1 LLJ 264) in
connection with fixation of seniority. Whenever
a revision takes place, a cut-off date becomes
imperative because the benefit has to be allowed
within the financial resources available with the
Government.”
In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Bihar Pensioners Samaj
(2006) 5 SCC 65, at para 17 it was held as follows:
“17. We think that the contention is well
founded. The only ground on which Article
14 has been put forward by the learned counsel
for the respondent is that the fixation of the cutoff date for payment of the revised benefits under
the two notifications concerned was arbitrary
and it resulted in denying arrears of payments to
certain sections of the employees. This argument
is no longer res integra. It has been held in a
catena of judgments that fixing of a cut-off date
for granting of benefits is well within the powers
of the Government as long as the reasons
therefor are not arbitrary and are based on some
rational consideration.”
18.
From the facts of the case and from the pronouncements of the
judgments that have been quoted above, apart from the fact that the writ
petition has been filed after a considerable delay, no unreasonableness can
be discerned from the actions of the respondent corporation in fixing the cutoff date to warrant any sort of interference by this Court. In the circumstances
therefore, this writ petition is accordingly dismissed, but however, the parties
are to bear their own cost.
Judge
Meghalaya
26.07.2022
“Samantha PS”
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review